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Abstract 
 
Casualties during the First World War were far higher than had been anticipated in 
pre-war planning.  They required rapid replacement in order to maintain operational 
effectiveness.   
 
This Thesis considers the provision and management of British Other Rank 
replacements for Infantry battalions on the Western Front.  The initial influx of 
volunteers meant a much larger Army, which in turn required an increased number of 
draft-finding units and changes to reinforcement procedures for its maintenance.  It 
has previously been assumed that these changes, together with the introduction of 
conscription, destroyed the previous cohesion of regiments.    
 
A chronological approach is used in order to trace the evolution of changes.  Although 
predominantly pitched at the management level, implicit in this examination are the 
effects of political decisions together with the impact on battalions of changes in the 
drafting and reinforcement process.  Amongst the conclusions reached are that there 
is little or no evidence that the Government actively withheld reinforcements.  
Analysis of details of soldiers of selected Infantry battalions from the English/Welsh 
Marches also indicates that, despite the growing scarcity of men, drafts continued to 
be provided to a large extent from Western Command even at the end of the war.       
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 1 
Introduction 
  
 
During the First World War almost 5,000,000 individuals enlisted in the British Army.  Of 
these, over 700,000 British soldiers died, more than 170,000 were reported as prisoners of war 
and the number of wounds received by soldiers totalled nearly 1,663,000.  The gaps caused by 
these casualties needed to be filled by replacements as quickly as possible if units were to 
continue to function effectively.   
 
Pre-war plans for the expansion and renewal of the British Army had been created, albeit not 
on such a scale as would be needed.1  Similarly, pre-war plans for the replacement of losses had 
been developed but would need adaptation and refinement from virtually the start of the war.  
This latter aspect of manpower management during the First World War has received very little 
attention.  Those who have written on manpower have tended to concentrate on political aspects 
or on constituent parts of the Regular Army, Territorial Force (TF) and the New Armies.2  Huge 
casualty figures have been identified and losses mourned but nothing has been examined about 
how they were replaced and to what extent their arrival changed the composition of the units 
they joined.  This thesis seeks to address that gap through examination of the management of 
non-officer reinforcements for British Infantry units during the First World War.   
 
                                                 
1 See Edward Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980), K.W. 
Mitchinson, Defending Albion (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and Ian F.W. Beckett, The Amateur 
Military Tradition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991). 
2 Keith Grieves, The Politics of Manpower (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988); Beckett, Amateur 
Military Tradition; Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s Army (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985); Ian F.W. 
Beckett and Keith Simpson, eds., A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Jon Cooksey, Barnsley Pals (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2008); 
Michael Stedman, Manchester Pals: 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd and 23rd Battalions, Manchester 
Regiment: A History of the Manchester Brigades (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 1998). 
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In the past many writers have concentrated solely on the frontline operational experience of 
formations and units, with manpower issues mentioned only as an aside.  More recently work 
has started on organization, infrastructure and command and control within the BEF but there 
remains little on the reserve and drafting system, training of replacements and the social and 
geographical composition of units.3  The lack of such research has enabled misperceptions to 
persist.  For example, it continues to be suggested that the 2,504,183 who enlisted after January 
1916 were all conscripts.4  Numerically this is incorrect since the appointed date for the 
introduction of conscription was 2 March 1916 (a difference of 164,594) but, more importantly, 
to the end of the war it remained possible for boys and men to volunteer before they were 
actually called up.  Another prevailing misperception is that there was deliberate intent, fostered 
by the often-quoted comment of Captain Dunn RAMC in The War the Infantry Knew, to 
‘destroy the Regiment, the immemorial foundation of Armies, and nationalize the Army’.5  It 
has also been suggested that after July 1916 there was a deliberate policy change to draw 
casualty reinforcements from a common pool rather than their parent regiments, partly to lessen 
the concentrated impact of battle losses on particular communities.  The evidence contained in 
the relevant Army Council Instructions indicates otherwise.  Such prevailing misapprehensions 
and the lack of research into this area indicate that there are questions to be addressed.    
 
Some previous writers have concentrated on the political aspects of military manpower.  Keith 
Grieves, in The Politics of Manpower, gives a comprehensive and useful analysis but many of 
                                                 
3 Peter Simkins, From the Somme to Victory (Barnsley: Praetorian Press, 2014), p. 11. 
4 For example: Richard Holmes, Tommy (London: HarperCollins, 2004), p. 89 and David Stevenson, With Our 
Backs to the Wall (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 256.  Enlistment figures are given in War Office, 
Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War (London: War Office, 1922; Uckfield: 
Naval & Military Press, 1999), p. 364. 
5 J.C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew (1938; London: Abacus, 1994), p. 245. 
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his sources are from within the Ministry of Munitions, and therefore opposed to unrestricted 
manpower for the Army.  He also makes extensive use of Lloyd George’s memoirs, which are 
inevitably somewhat biased.  The War Office perspective, which is, of course, equally biased 
towards the Army’s requirements is visible in the memoirs of Sir William Robertson and 
General Sir Nevil Macready.6  Below the political level, Army manpower aspects are touched 
upon in such works as Charles Messenger’s Call to Arms and Richard Holmes’s Tommy, but 
these are broad-brush works covering a variety of topics, which do not touch on manpower in 
sufficient depth to give a clear picture.7   
 
In searching for works about soldiers in the First World War, it is easier to find books about 
volunteers than about conscripts.  The first books about the New Armies were published during 
the war itself: Ian Hay’s The First Hundred Thousand and Basil Williams’s Raising and 
Training the New Armies.8  These were followed during the 1920s and 1930s by many personal 
memoirs.  Those of Sir William Robertson, together with Charles Carrington’s  A Subaltern’s 
War, written under the pen-name Charles Edmonds,  and Frank Richards’s Old Soldiers Never 
Die are examples of the range, but inevitably far more accounts were written at that time by 
officers than by former soldiers.9  More recently, soldiers’ diaries have come to light, such as 
Geoffrey Husband’s, edited by John Bourne and Bob Bushaway and published as Joffrey’s War,  
and Harry Drinkwater’s Harry’s War, edited by Jon Cooksey and David Griffiths.10  The advent 
of e-publishing on the internet has also enabled transcripts of diaries, such as George Culpitt’s, 
                                                 
6 Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1921) and 
General Sir Nevil Macready, Annals of an Active Life Vol. 1 (London: Hutchinson, n.d.). 
7 C. Messenger, Call to Arms (London: Cassell, 2005) and R. Holmes, Tommy (London: HarperCollins, 2004). 
8 I. Hay, The First Hundred Thousand (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1916) and B. Williams, Raising and Training the 
New Armies (London: Constable, 1918). 
9 C. Edmonds, A Subaltern’s War (London: Peter Davies, 1929) and Frank Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1933). 
10 J. Bourne & R. Bushaway (eds), Joffrey’s War (Nottingham: Salient Books, 2011) and J. Cooksey & D. 
Griffiths (eds), Harry’s War (London: Ebury Press, 2013). 
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to reach a wider audience.11  From the perspective of this thesis, however, the difficulty with 
the various personal accounts is that, whilst they may provide snatches of evidence concerning 
reinforcements, they rarely if ever (Robertson excepted) consider manning issues from a 
management level.     
 
Although a proportion of replacements would undoubtedly have been provided by conscripts 
from mid-1916 onwards there has been far less written by and about these men.  As Gordon 
Corrigan noted, in Mud, Blood and Poppycock, in later years old soldiers did not advertise the 
fact that they had been conscripted.  Similarly, Ian Beckett commented that relatively few 
soldiers who wrote memoirs or left diaries or letters admitted to the stigma of conscription.12  
Of those accounts that are known to have been definitely written by conscripts, Frederick 
Voigt’s makes no mention of his conscript status while that of Alfred Hale reads almost like a 
spoof document, so different is it from the usual accounts of life in training units.13  An apparent 
start on researching this group of soldiers was made by Ilana Bet-El, but her views are based 
on the false premises that all those who enlisted after January 1916 were conscripts, and thus 
by definition unwilling soldiers, who, on being called up, became pawns in an inflexible 
bureaucratic process.14  One of the individuals she cites in support of these views is Private 
W.D. Tonkyn.  In reality, Tonkyn was a civil servant who, early in 1917, applied to his 
government department for permission to volunteer.  He was able to move his medical 
examination to a more convenient location than the one initially offered, and was accepted to 
                                                 
11 www.culpitt-war-diary.org.uk/index.htm. 
12 G. Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock (London: Cassell, 2003) and I. F.W. Beckett, ‘The Real Unknown 
Army: British Conscripts 1915-19’, Great War, 2 (November 1989). 
13 F. Voigt, Combed Out, (London: Swarthmore Press, 1920) and P. Fussell (ed), The Ordeal of Alfred M Hale, 
The Memoirs of a Soldier Servant (London: Leo Cooper, 1975). 
14 I. Bet-El, Conscripts, Forgotten Men of the Great War (Stroud: Sutton, 1999). 
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join the unit of his choice, the Civil Service Rifles.15  The lack of any detailed research into the 
men recruited in the second half of the war means that there is a gap that has not yet been 
satisfactorily filled.       
 
There is also a relationship between casualty figures and operational aspects that has not been 
fully explored.  Throughout the war, GHQ withdrew divisions that had suffered particularly 
heavy losses from the line in order that they might recuperate and be refilled.  Paddy Griffith 
commented, in Battle Tactics of the Western Front, on the ensuing amount of movement within 
corps caused by this, and the consequent effect on the continuity of relationships formed by and 
within divisions.  The adverse effect of this lack of continuity of command amongst British 
corps was also noted by Gary Sheffield and echoed by Andy Simpson in Directing Operations: 
Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-18.16  The inference drawn was that the more 
permanent structure of the Dominion Corps was preferable and should perhaps have been 
adopted by the British Expeditionary Force.   
 
What this view ignores, however, is the reason why divisions were moved around: the need for 
time and space to enable them to be returned to full strength.  This could be achieved more 
quickly for some divisions than others and was dependent on the availability of replacements.  
Some divisions could be reinforced close to the front and re-join the line, such as the 39th 
Division which took part in three battles during 3rd Ypres, whilst others such as the 38th (Welsh) 
Division, which suffered 2,922 casualties between 31 July – 3 August 1917, had of necessity 
                                                 
15 IWM: Con Shelf: Letters and Diary of Private W.D. Tonkyn. 
16 P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994), Gary 
Sheffield, ‘The Indispensable Factor: British Troops in 1918’, in Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey, eds., 1918: Defining 
Victory (Canberra: Department of Defense, 1999), pp. 72-95 and A. Simpson, Directing Operations: Corps 
Command on the Western Front 1914-18 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006).   
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to be withdrawn after just one action.  It would not attack again until July 1918.  In discussing 
38th (Welsh) Division’s subsequent success during the Hundred Days, Gary Sheffield suggests 
that the time spent on trench-holding duties indicates that 38th Division was not regarded by 
GHQ as an elite formation.17  Perhaps not, but for GHQ there was also the difficulty of finding 
replacements for a Welsh Division.  This is another area which merits further examination. 
 
There is a definite gap in the historiography on how manpower was managed within the Army 
during the First World War, on how the different types of soldier were assimilated and the effect 
on the composition of units of the frequent influx of replacements.  It is commonplace to read 
that battalions increasingly lost their links with their traditional recruiting areas as the war 
progressed.  This view has been challenged by Helen McCartney, who argues the case strongly 
for continuing homogeneity within units.18 Her conclusions were based on very detailed 
research but concentrated only on Liverpool Territorial units.  There remains scope for research 
into a wider selection of units in order to test the conflicting arguments – and to what extent 
they might or might not remain valid for the later years of the war.     
 
The subject of manpower management is vast and it has been necessary to limit the approach 
of this thesis.  It does not seek to examine political aspects in great depth, but it has been 
necessary to touch on the background to political decisions in order to trace their impact on the 
provision of Army manpower and their effect on the organizations and formations of the BEF.  
It is pitched predominantly at the management level but draws on the experiences the individual 
soldier where these add flesh to the analysis.  It has also been limited to the Infantry as the area 
                                                 
17 Gary Sheffield, ‘Finest hour? British forces on the Western Front in 1918: An overview’, in Ashley Ekins, ed., 
1918 Year of Victory (Auckland: Exisle, 2010). 
18 Helen McCartney, Citizen Soldiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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most closely in contact with the enemy and hence suffering the greatest losses.  It examines 
how replacements were obtained, trained and assimilated, their effect on the character and 
composition of the units they joined and to what extent the men of 1918 might have differed 
from those of earlier years of the war.  In looking at unit cohesion it considers whether there 
was any visible impact on operational effectiveness.  Different frameworks were considered 
but a thematic approach was discarded in favour of a chronological one concentrating on the 
Infantry on the Western Front as this would show any developments and effects most clearly.   
 
In moving from the general to the specific, in order to analyse the impact of policy changes 
together with the impact on units of high casualties followed by an influx of reinforcements, it 
was decided to concentrate on four Infantry Regiments drawn from an area not previously 
studied in depth during the First World War, namely the English/Welsh Marches.  Although 
the experiences of various battalions are considered, one Regular, one Territorial Force and one 
New Army battalion from each of the four Infantry Regiments have been chosen for specific 
analysis into their composition as the war progressed.  The Regular battalions chosen are the 1st 
battalions of the Cheshire, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI) and the South Wales 
Borderers (SWB) Regiments, and the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers (RWF); these 
battalions were all serving with the Home Army in August 1914.19  Fewer Territorial Force 
(TF) battalions served on the Western Front initially as many were sent overseas to relieve 
Regular Line battalions.  Of those that did serve in France and Flanders, 1/6th Cheshire and 1/4th 
RWF have been chosen, together with 1/4th KSLI and 1/1st Herefordshire, which arrived in 
                                                 
19 This spelling was the official one during the First World War, although Welch was the version used unofficially 
by both the RWF and the Welsh Regiment.  It was not until 1 January 1921 that the use of Welch was officially 
authorised. 
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France in 1917 and 1918 respectively.  For the New Army, 9th Cheshire, 6th KSLI, 5th SWB and 
9th RWF have been chosen.        
 
Although general works have provided pointers, it has been necessary to use original sources 
to a large extent, cross-referencing with others where necessary.  Extensive use has been made 
of the Official Histories and original documents have been consulted at The National Archives 
(TNA), including War Office and Formation correspondence, War Diaries, Army Council 
Instructions (ACI) and Army Orders (AO).  It has been difficult to find some documents and 
the contents of war diaries are not always accurate due to the circumstances under which they 
were often written.  Regimental histories have also been used; although many of these have 
been drawn from the unit war diaries there are also other inclusions which provide 
amplification.  Personal memoirs, papers and diaries, both published and unpublished, have 
been consulted, including those at the Imperial War Museum, but it was decided not to use oral 
history recordings made later in veterans’ lives on the grounds that memories can unwittingly 
become false after too long a period of time.20 
 
Extensive use has been made of Soldiers Died in the Great War (SDGW) and the 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) website in order to analyse the composition 
of units.21  Both these sources contain errors but overall there is sufficient information to enable 
broad conclusions to be drawn.  Given that the death-toll during the Great War was roughly 20 
per cent of those who served in the British Army, the details contained in these two sources 
represent a sample of that size.  The evidence of the composition of units is also backed up by 
                                                 
20 Dan Todman, The Great War, Myth and Memory (London: Hambledon & London, 2005), pp. 187-8. 
21 Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914 -19 (London: War Office, 1921; Uckfield: Naval & Military Press CD 
Rom, 2011) and www.cwgc.org. 
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the use of unit War Diaries, which normally state the arrival of drafts and occasionally where 
they have come from.  Using the information thus obtained, together with the Regimental 
Numbers of the soldiers concerned, it has been possible to at least a certain extent to plot the 
dates of their joining a particular Regiment.  This has been backed up by examination of 
individual Service Records, where they exist, and Medal Rolls using www.ancestry.com.  
 
The thesis consists of six chapters.  Chapter One provides a brief background covering pre-war 
manpower planning, the different types of units then existing and the composition of the 
Reserves, and then considers the events of 1914.  Chapter Two examines developments in 1915, 
both at home and on the Western Front, up to the introduction of the Derby Scheme, whilst 
Chapters Three, Four and Five cover the years 1916, 1917 and 1918 respectively.  The effects 
of political decisions, such as the introduction of conscription, are examined, as are the 
development of the Training Reserve, the reorganisation of formations and the creation of new 
corps and units.  Each chapter contains analysis of the composition of the selected units during 
July – November of the years concerned.  The evidence from the preceding chapters is then 
drawn together in the Conclusion.  
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Chapter 1  
 
Planning, Preparation and First Contact 
 
 
The British Army that mobilized in 1914 was the product of reforms and reorganizations 
initiated less than a decade earlier; the Army’s performance during the Second South African 
War had shown that there was an urgent need to review the structures necessary for it to fulfil 
its role.  Consequently, much detailed work into its future shape and requirements was carried 
out between 1905 and 1908 by both the War Office and the Government.  What was put in 
place then, with some further refinements in the intervening years, would form the basic 
structure of the Army for 1914.  
 
The General Staff in the War office had considered potential scenarios in which the Army might 
be deployed in future, together with the size of force necessary for each one.  The outcome of 
their analysis was circulated in January 1906.  Five scenarios had been identified: a Boer 
uprising in South Africa; war against the United States, Russia or France respectively; and war 
in alliance with France against Germany.1 Of these scenarios, war against France seemed 
improbable, war with Russia or the United States, or a further Boer rebellion could be possible 
but the most likely conflict was deemed to be war against Germany, which appeared not only 
possible but an eventuality to be seriously considered.   
 
                                                 
1 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA): Robertson Papers, 1/2/6: Director of Military Operations 
(DMO) Major General J.M. Grierson, ‘Memorandum upon the military forces required for over-sea warfare’, dated 
4 January 1906. 
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Each scenario was analyzed in detail, identifying potential force levels on each side together 
with various external factors that might come into play, and detailed estimates produced of the 
number of troops likely to be required over a possible time frame.  Distance meant that war 
against the United States would require the greatest number of troops but war against Germany 
was considered more likely and would require the next greatest force level.  It was concluded 
that for planning purposes the standard level of requirement should be the estimated force level 
necessary to conduct a war with Germany, namely 75 Infantry divisions plus Cavalry, Artillery, 
Engineer and other supporting units.2  It also decided that during the first six months of any 
Continental War permanently organized Regular units would be needed to confront opposing 
Regular troops, whilst troops that might be called upon later could feasibly exist as cadres 
during peacetime. Thus the idea was already developing of formed Regular units being 
maintained at home to form an Expeditionary Force in case of war, with a second line ‘fit for 
active service abroad after six months embodiment or training’, and behind that a ‘third line 
army to be ready, say, 12 months after the commencement of war’.3  
 
In December 1905 the new Liberal Government appointed Richard Burdon Haldane as 
Secretary of State for War.  He had also been giving thought to the future size and role of the 
Army and in January 1906 submitted a Memorandum to the Army Council on ‘a highly 
                                                 
2 Ibid: ‘The Regular field troops to be maintained as units at home for the purpose of over-sea warfare should, 
therefore, be: 
18 Cavalry regiments 
10 batteries Horse Artillery 
63 batteries Field Artillery 
9 batteries heavy Artillery 
3 batteries Mountain Artillery 
Cadre of a Siege Train 
75 battalions of Infantry 
 
besides Engineers, Ammunition Columns and Departmental Services in due proportion.’ 
3 Grierson, ‘Memorandum upon the military forces required for over-sea warfare’. 
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organised and well-equipped striking force that could rapidly be transported to any part of the 
world where it might be required’.4  Haldane’s proposals would, however, be constrained by 
demands for financial economies and the need to reduce the annual Army Estimates to below 
£28 million.  Whilst any future Army needed to be highly mobile, ‘it ought to be on a strictly 
limited scale, and perfect rather in quality than in expanded quantity’.5  
 
The General Staff had also considered how the Army should be maintained in the event of war, 
studying lessons learned from recent campaigns particularly the Russo Japanese War of 1904-
5.  In April 1906 a study entitled ‘Wastage in War’ identified that during the first year of any 
future conflict a further 80 per cent of the original Expeditionary Force would be required to 
replace Infantry casualties from all causes.  Drafts amounting to 10 to 20 per cent of the 
Expeditionary Force should be available in theatre within six weeks of the commencement of 
the war, with subsequent drafts following each month.  Those drafts required in the first six 
months should be mobilized with, or immediately after, the Expeditionary Force and consist of 
men already fully trained and ready for active service.  After the first six months, men who had 
been only partially trained on the outbreak of war, together with a proportion of men invalided 
and since recovered during those months, would be fit to proceed to the front.6  This important 
study would inform the subsequent plans for the provision of reinforcements that would be in 
place at the start of the First World War. 
 
                                                 
4 R.B. Haldane, ‘A Preliminary Memorandum on the present Situation. Being a rough note for consideration by 
Members of the Army Council’ National Library of Scotland (NLS) Haldane Papers 5918, cited in P. Simkins, 
Kitchener’s Army (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p.6. 
5 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1906, CLIII, cols 663-76 cited in ibid p.6.  
6 TNA: WO 32/8813 General Staff Study ‘Wastage in War’ (April 1906).   
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Haldane’s key proposal was for the creation of an expeditionary force immediately available 
for war service overseas with behind it a territorial organization ‘capable of supporting and 
expanding it’.7  To create this home-based expeditionary force, the Infantry would be re-
structured by withdrawing or disbanding some of its overseas units leaving a balance of 
seventy-four paired battalions, one of each pair being home-based and the other overseas.  An 
Expeditionary Force of 150,000 men could be created from the home-based Regular units, 
formed into six ‘great’ infantry divisions of 18,000 – 20,000 men and four cavalry brigades, 
with artillery and supporting arms.  In support would be a new Territorial Force (TF), consisting 
of fourteen infantry divisions and fourteen mounted (Yeomanry) brigades, which would be 
formed from the existing Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers and its administration 
decentralized into County Associations under the leadership of Lords Lieutenant.      
 
Serious opposition was initially encountered from within the Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers 
who saw their traditions and independence being eroded by the proposed subservience to 
County Associations.  The Militia in particular, firmly entrenched within its local areas and 
wielding significant influence in Parliament, posed the greatest threat to the scheme.  The 
difficulty was ultimately resolved by a suggestion from the new DMO, Major General Spencer 
Ewart, that the Militia Depots should become seventy-four reserve battalion cadres, which on 
mobilisation could become draft-producing battalions for the Regular Army.  This was agreed 
and the Militias effectively became the future Special Reserve (SR) battalions. 
 
There still remained questions over the proposed use of the new TF.  By the time Haldane’s 
proposals finally went before Parliament, he had been forced into a compromise.  Instead of 
                                                 
7 TNA: CAB 3/1/38A ‘Notes on the organization and administration of the military forces of the United Kingdom’, 
18 June 1906, p.2. 
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becoming the future source of reinforcements for the Expeditionary Force, the new TF would 
be limited to home defence.  The County Associations would be responsible for recruiting and 
organizing their TF formations and units in peace and war and responsibility would pass to the 
War Office only those units were called out for training or for actual military service.  In March 
1907, when presenting the Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill to Parliament, Haldane was 
careful to emphasise that it would exercise direct control over the calling out of the new TF and 
to reaffirm its primary purpose as home defence.  It was a compromise but one that would 
enable the Act to be passed, with an effective date of 1 April 1908.   
 
Haldane’s reforms created an Expeditionary Force and rationalised the organisation of the 
auxiliary forces, integrating them more closely with the Regular formations. The draft-finding 
system was improved but by limiting the TF to a Home Defence role the Army was deprived 
of the planned second line support for active service abroad.  After the First World War, 
Haldane would claim that his reforms had been underpinned by a single strategic concept, 
namely the possibility of sending an army to France in the event of a German invasion.  Few 
military advisers shared that view since a force of 150,000 was always going to be too small to 
intervene effectively against the conscript armies of the Continent.  As Spiers concludes: 
The size of the Force did not relate to a strategy, Continental or otherwise; it simply 
reflected the exigencies of peacetime, particularly the restrictions imposed by a 
financial ceiling of £28 million, the draft-producing requirements of the home 
army, and the political opposition to conscription.8    
 
                                                 
8 Hew Strachan, ‘The Continental Commitment, 1904-14’, in D. French & B. Holden Reid (eds), The British 
General Staff (London: Cass, 2002), p. 76; E.M. Spiers, Haldane – An Army Reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1980), pp. 192-3. 
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The BEF was simply the largest formation that could be made out of the units left at home after 
the demands of Imperial policy had been met.9  It was still a very small force, albeit almost 
twice as large as the entire Army today. 
 
The necessary legislation had been passed, however, and re-organization proceeded apace from 
1908 onwards.  The new Army structure would contain three components: the Regular Army, 
the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force. 
 
The Regular Army 
The Regular Army was little changed other than the Infantry, which now consisted of seventy-
four paired battalions, one serving at home and the other overseas.   In 1908 the 1st Battalions 
of both the Cheshire Regiment and the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI)  were based in 
Ireland, whilst both 2nd Battalions were serving in India; 1st South Wales Borderers (SWB) was 
in Hampshire whilst 2nd SWB was in China; and 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers (RWF) was in Malta 
with its second battalion in Dorset.  
 
The traditional recruiting areas for Infantry Regiments remained as laid down in the nineteenth 
century reforms initiated by Cardwell and Childers, which had created designated areas where 
Regiments would recruit and have their Depots.10  These ‘Regimental Areas’ were numbered 
with the old Regimental numbers: for example, No 53, which covered Shropshire, 
Herefordshire and Radnorshire, remained the recruiting area for Regular soldiers of the 53rd 
Regiment of Foot, now the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI).11  The Regimental Areas 
                                                 
9 J.M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War (London: Arnold, 1989, 1994), p. 13. 
10 TNA: WO 123/23 General Order (GO) 41/1881 of 1 May 1881 amended by GO 70/1881 of 1 July 1881. 
11 Regimental Area No 22 (Cheshire Regt): Cheshire; Regimental Area No 23 (Royal Welsh Fusiliers): 
Denbighshire, Flintshire, Carnarvonshire, Anglesey, Merioneth and Montgomeryshire; Regimental Area No 24 
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were themselves grouped into Military Districts.  No 4 Military District, based on Shrewsbury, 
covered Cheshire, Shropshire, Herefordshire, Monmouthshire, the whole of Wales and that part 
of South Lancashire where the South Lancashire Regiment was recruited. Together with No 3 
Military District, (Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire (except part of South Lancashire) and 
the Isle of Man) it formed Western Command.  This Command thus covered a huge, 
geographically diverse area from the Scottish Borders southwards through the industrialised 
areas of south Lancashire, to Cheshire and the rural counties of Shropshire and Herefordshire; 
westwards it included the whole of Wales.  
 
The home-based battalions would form the new Expeditionary Force of 150,000.  The plan 
looked good on paper but their strengths were seldom up to their effective war establishment: 
not only were they perennially under-recruited but they also contained recruits undergoing 
training before being sent to the overseas based battalion, plus men ineligible for service 
overseas because they were either under the age of 19 or medically unfit for active service.  The 
units that would form the Expeditionary Force were weakened in order to keep the overseas 
battalions fully manned.   
 
Recruiting was easier in some locations than others but the individual regimental numbers of 
soldiers in different battalions indicate that, prior to August 1914, an average of about 200 
recruits joined up annually.12  The under-recruited home-based Regular battalion was thus 
reliant on being augmented by men from the Reserves.  In 1870 the then Secretary of State for 
                                                 
(South Wales Borderers): Brecknockshire, Cardiganshire, Monmouthshire, Montgomeryshire; Regimental Area 
No 40 (South Lancashire Regiment): South Lancashire; Regimental Area No 41 (Welsh Regiment): 
Carmarthenshire, Pembrokeshire, Glamorganshire; Regimental Area No 53 (King’s Shropshire Light Infantry): 
covering Shropshire, Herefordshire and Radnorshire.  
12 It is possible to identify when particular cohorts joined up by using a combination of Soldiers Died in the Great 
War (SDGW) and Service Records.  The 1911 census also shows some 200 recruits in training at Chester Castle. 
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War, Edward Cardwell, had introduced short service engagements in the Army followed by 
reserve service. A man could, if he did not want a full career of 21 years, serve a period with 
the battalion and then a further period on the Reserve to make up a total of 12 years.   The 
Reserve consisted of three main sections: A, B and D.  Sections A and B consisted of men 
completing the Reserve term of their original engagement; those serving in Section A had 
undertaken a higher liability for call-out in an emergency which did not call for general 
mobilisation.  Those in Section D were men who on completion of their twelve years Colour 
and Reserve service had re-engaged in the Reserve for a further four years. Army Reservists 
were liable to be called out for twelve days annual training and on mobilization were liable to 
serve as long as their services were required up to the expiry of their term of service in the 
reserve. Provision also existed under the Army Act for an addition of twelve months or more 
service if a state of war existed or in times of imminent national danger or great emergency.  
Reservists would expect, on mobilization, to return to the unit to which they had formerly 
belonged; under Section 83 of the Army Act consent was required before a man could be 
appointed or transferred to an arm or branch of the service other than that in which he had 
previously served.13 
 
Prior to 1908 the length of time spent on the Reserve was changed frequently and confusingly.  
In May 1902 the ratio between colour and reserve service of seven and five years respectively 
had been changed to three and nine years, in order to attract more recruits.14  This did not prove 
successful and in November 1904, as a result of a growing manpower crisis, the ratio of service 
was reversed to nine and three years.  Then, in September 1906, the ratio reverted to the original 
                                                 
13 On enlistment a soldier was appointed to a Regiment or Corps and was bound to serve in any part of it; he would 
usually spend the whole of his military life in one part or other of that Regiment.     
14 TNA: WO 123/44 Army Orders (AO) 73 and 117 of 1902.  
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seven and five years respectively.15  There was a potentially serious effect arising out of the 
rapid changes in length of service commitments: both the 1905-6 and the 1907-8 enlistments 
would be due to transfer to the Reserve in 1914.  They could be retained for a further 12 months 
in time of war but this was a problem that would need addressing in 1915. 
 
The 1906 Reserve Forces Act also introduced a significant change.  In future, a soldier enlisting 
after the implementation of that Act could, if called out whilst subsequently serving in the Army 
Reserve, be appointed to any regiment or corps and could also be transferred within three 
months to any other regiment or corps.  This was a major change and a break with decades of 
tradition and accepted practice.  It is early evidence not only of recognition of the need for 
greater flexibility in times of crisis but also, and more unexpectedly, of a previously unheard of 
readiness to sacrifice regimental loyalty.  For some reason, the Notice paper signed and given 
to recruits on enlistment was not amended to show the new liability until 7 July 1908 so the 
change could not apply to those enlisted before that date.16  It would thus remain hidden for the 
next few years since none of the post-1908 enlistments would become eligible for transfer to 
the Reserve until 1915 at the earliest.   
 
Special Reserve  
The second, draft-finding, line of the new structure was the Special Reserve (SR), created out 
of the old Militia.  It consisted of men with no previous military experience who signed on for 
six years.  They accepted the same liability for service abroad in the event of general 
mobilization as did men of the Army Reserve, namely completion of the unexpired portion of 
                                                 
15 TNA: WO 123/46 AO 209 of 1906. 
16 Sir H. Jenkyns, ‘Constitution of the Military Forces of the Crown’, in Manual of Military Law 1914 (London: 
War Office, 1914), pp. 202 & 744. 
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their term of service plus a further period not exceeding 12 months if so directed by the 
competent Military Authority.  On enlistment they received six months full time basic training 
and thereafter three to four weeks training annually.  Re-engagement for a further four years 
was permitted but there was an age limit of forty.  On enlistment, the man could elect to serve 
in either Section A which contained those willing to accept a higher liability for call out for up 
to 12 months in any part of the world when war was imminent or in progress or Section B which 
consisted of all the rest, who were equally liable to serve in any part of the world but could only 
be called out by Proclamation in case of imminent national danger or of great emergency.17   
 
In order to provide drafts for the Regular battalions, and in the event of war to train recruits and 
forward drafts to keep the battalions up to strength, the SR was organized on a scale of one SR 
battalion to two Regular battalions within each regiment of the line.  It was usually designated 
simply as the 3rd (SR) Battalion.  In those Regiments with four Regular Battalions, such as the 
Worcesters, the new SR battalions became the 5th and 6th (SR) Battalions.  Although draft-
finding for an Expeditionary Force would be their primary role, the SR battalions were also an 
integral part of the plans for home defence.18  The 3rd (SR) Battalion of the Cheshire Regiment 
would form part of the Mersey Garrison, defending the ports of Liverpool and Birkenhead, 
whilst the 3rd KSLI, formed out of the 3rd (Shropshire) Militia and the 4th (Royal Herefordshire) 
Militia, would on mobilization move to its War Station at Pembroke Dock.   
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Manual of Military Law, p. 202. 
18 Manual of Military Law, pp. 202 – 5, and K.W. Mitchinson, ‘The Special Reserve’, Stand To! 70 (April 2004), 
pp. 5-9. 
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Territorial Force 
The third component of Haldane’s new structure was the TF, created out of the earlier Volunteer 
and Yeomanry units.  The four TF Battalions of the Cheshire Regiment were created from 
volunteer battalions: the 1st Volunteer Battalion became the 4th Battalion TF, the 2nd and 3rd 
Volunteer Battalions combined to form the 5th (Earl of Chester’s) Battalion TF, the 4th 
Volunteer Battalion became the 6th Battalion TF and the 5th Battalion became the 7th Battalion 
TF.  The transformation was not achieved without some bitterness: the Macclesfield Courier 
and Herald reported the farewell order issued by the Commanding Officer of the 5th Volunteer 
Battalion on Tuesday 31 March 1908:  
After an existence of nearly 50 years, the 5th Volunteer Battalion Cheshire Regiment 
will tomorrow be merged in a new battalion known as the 7th Battalion Cheshire 
Regiment. …. I trust that those who served so long in the 5th will not be prevented 
by [new conditions of service] from continuing their service for another two years at 
least, to give the new battalion a fair start, and to show the country that England still 
has some men willing to protect her shores even at the cost of a little personal 
inconvenience.19 
 
After the reorganisation, the TF consisted of fourteen infantry divisions and fourteen mounted 
(yeomanry) brigades.  It was recognized, however, that in the event of war it would take six 
months for the TF to become fully trained.  Moreover, in manpower terms, it lacked flexibility.  
Under the 1907 Territorial and Reserve Forces Act a recruit could select the particular TF unit 
in which he wished to serve and could not subsequently be transferred without his consent; 
furthermore, although recruits could agree to ‘subject themselves to the liability – (a) To serve 
in any place outside the United Kingdom …’, they could not be compelled to do.20  The role of 
the TF was thus very definitely restricted to home defence and its men protected from being 
                                                 
19 Extract from Macclesfield Courier and Herald, Saturday, 4 April 1908 (Cheshire Regiment Archives). 
20 Manual of Military Law 1914, p. 763: Territorial & Reserve Forces Act 1907 s. 13. 
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forced to serve in a different unit or abroad against their wishes.  This meant that unless the 
legislation was changed, the TF could not be used to reinforce a BEF serving abroad.     
 
Development of Strategy 
Consideration was needed on how the new structures could be used in the event of war.  In 1908 
the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) considered the possibility of invasion, concluding 
that, in the event of the BEF being sent abroad, at least two Regular divisions should remain 
behind for Home defence until the TF was ready.21  In the event of war with Germany it was 
suggested that an Expeditionary Force of four Infantry Divisions and one Cavalry Division 
should be sent to operate on the left flank of the French Army.    
 
By 1911, increasing tensions with Germany were giving growing cause for concern.  In the 
aftermath of the Agadir crisis of July, on 23 August the CID discussed the possibility of giving 
armed support to France in the event of a German assault.22  Major General Henry Wilson, the 
Director of Military Operations (DMO), confirmed that the earlier plan to send the BEF to the 
left flank of the French Army remained extant and had been worked out in minute detail.  
Although no formal conclusions were reached as a result of this meeting, the Naval Assistant 
Secretary to the Committee, Maurice Hankey, privately considered that from then on there was 
no doubt as to ‘the Grand Strategy in the event of our being drawn into a continental war in 
support of France’.23  It remains debatable, however, whether this ‘Grand Strategy’ could be 
said to have become national policy after 1911.  Hew Strachan argues that had this been so, the 
army would immediately have been restructured in order to provide a large European-sized 
                                                 
21 Lord Hankey,  The Supreme Command 1914-1918 (London: Allen &Unwin, 1961), pp. 66-68.  
22 TNA: CAB 2/2  Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence 114th Meeting, 23 August 1911.    
23 Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918, p. 82. 
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army.24  There was no impetus to do this, however, as there was neither the political nor the 
military will to create the size of army that would be required.  The CID and the General Staff 
continued to believe that the appearance of six British Divisions on their left flank would be of 
immense moral value to the French and thus sufficient.25  They saw no need to plan for the 
provision of more troops on European lines as this would have meant conscription.       
 
Conscription had been debated for some years but had few supporters. The National Service 
League, created in 1902 to call for conscription in peacetime for the purpose of home defence, 
continued to lobby for its introduction and between 1909 and 1912 League membership tripled 
to almost 100,000.  There was little significant political support, however.  Apart from 
Governmental concern that conscription might precipitate the very conflict with Germany that 
they were trying to avoid, both the nation and the Liberal party were opposed on principle to 
compulsion.  The Liberals were also averse to the expense it would incur, which would curtail 
many schemes for social reform.26  Nor was there any support from the Conservatives.  
Electorally it would have been a disaster; conscription was not a vote-winner and thus not an 
option at that time. 
 
If conscription was not to be considered, increasing anxieties over German intentions meant 
that existing structures needed to be viable.  Concern remained over the size and viability of the 
TF in the event of the Expeditionary Force being mobilised and sent abroad.  In 1908 the TF 
had been set ambitious recruiting targets of just over 312,000 men.  Although initially growing 
rapidly, with numbers in the region of 144,600 in June 1908, 183,000 in July 1908 and 270,000 
                                                 
24 Strachan, ‘The Continental Commitment 1904-14’, pp. 78 & 91. 
25 TNA: CAB 2/2 CID 114th Meeting, 23 August 1911, p. 5. 
26 Hankey, Supreme Command 1914-1918, p. 137. 
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in October 1909, it never achieved its target.  A pre-war high water mark of about 276,096 was 
reached in October 1910, from which it steadily declined until it numbered 268,777 officers 
and men in July 1914.27  Attention had been diverted from home defence and the TF had 
suffered delays in the provision of ranges and drill halls and consequently had been criticised 
for poor training and musketry.  In 1910 a third of the force failed the musketry requirement of 
firing 23 rounds.  Attendance at the annual training camp was poor: in 1912 only 155,000 men 
had camped for a full 15 days and 6,000 had not turned up at all.28  The fundamental problem, 
however, was the TF’s lack of liability for overseas service.  Haldane had always rather 
optimistically hoped that after embodiment on the outbreak of war and six months subsequent 
training, the TF units would be ready to say ‘We wish to go abroad and take our part in the 
theatre of war’.29 A more formal footing was obviously required and in 1910 members of the 
TF were invited to accept liability for overseas service in the event of mobilization by signing 
the Imperial Service (IS) obligation.. This did not meet with a resounding response and by 
September 1913 only 7.7 per cent of its 245,779 members had committed themselves.  By July 
1914, although TF membership had risen to 268,777, the number of those who had committed 
themselves would fall to 18,683 officers and men, just under 7 per cent of the whole.30   
 
Preparations and Planning 
Although no further plans had been made for expanding the Army in the event of war, other 
contingency planning had continued. The outcomes relating to manning would include such 
                                                 
27 Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, pp. 17-18. 
28 I.F.W. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 222. 
29 Spiers, Haldane, p. 109, quoting Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Ser., vol.169 (25 February 1907) cols. 1,286-
301. 
30 I.F.W. Beckett, ‘The Territorial Force’, in I.F.W Beckett & K. Simpson (eds), A Nation in Arms (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1985; 2004), pp. 129-30 and Statistics of the Military Effort p.30. 
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publications as War Establishments (Expeditionary Force), Field Service Regulations, covering 
both operational and administrative matters, and detailed Mobilization Regulations.  
 
In 1909 two volumes of Field Service Regulations (FSR) were produced by the War Office.  
The second volume, FSR Part 2 Organization and Administration (FSR Part 2), included 
procedures for the maintenance of manpower levels in the field.31 The Department responsible 
for all matters concerning personnel, including manning, casualties and invaliding, was that of 
the Adjutant General (AG) in the War Office, who ranked second in the Army hierarchy below 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS).  These responsibilities were cascaded from the 
AG down the chain of command to Divisional level.  In the field, the work of the AG’s branches 
would cover the whole range of personnel matters including: the organization of new units; 
drafts to replace casualties; discipline; medical and sanitary matters, including the removal and 
care of the wounded; and later the registration of graves.32   The replacement of casualties and 
the maintenance of appropriate levels of manning, in accordance with the procedures laid down 
in FSR Part 2, would thus fall to the AG staffs of the operational theatre concerned.  
 
The number of reinforcements required was based for planning purposes on a 1906 analysis on 
‘Wastage in War’.  The War Establishments (Expeditionary Force) laid down the numbers of 
personnel to proceed overseas for each unit, which included an element known as ‘First 
Reinforcements’: 10 per cent of the rank and file of the unit plus one officer if the number was 
over 40.  On the unit’s arrival overseas these First Reinforcements were to be left at the 
appropriate Base Depot ready to replace the first casualties as required.  Subsequent 
                                                 
31 FSR Part 2 Organisation and Administration 1909, published by HMSO for the General Staff, War Office, 1909. 
NB Minor amendments were made to this document in October 1914. 
32 General Sir Nevil Macready, Annals of An Active Life Vol 1 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925?), p. 200. 
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reinforcements would be sent out from UK, if possible in anticipation of the requirements of 
the CinC, as notified by the Deputy Adjutant General (DAG) in charge of the AG’s office at 
the Base.  Within six weeks of the outbreak of war, further drafts amounting to 10 – 20% of the 
army in the field were to be available in the Base Depots of the overseas theatre.  Subsequent 
drafts were to follow each month, with an additional increase about the sixth month; they were 
to arrive at the Base before, and not after, the losses occurred.33   
 
The Base Depots to which the drafts were to be sent were holding camps located within easy 
reach of the ports of entry to the theatre.  They were to be organized according to the War 
Establishments manual and would come under command of the Inspector General of 
Communications (IGC), the officer in charge of the Lines of Communication (LofC).  This 
organisation would be responsible for sending forward all items required from the Base, 
including reinforcements, and for the evacuation of anything, including casualties that needed 
to return in the opposite direction.   
 
The replacement of manpower depended on accurate and timely notification of the numbers of 
losses incurred.  FSR Part 2 made a very clear distinction between management information 
regarding the fighting strength of units or formations, which had to be received by commanders 
as quickly as possible, and the accurate details necessary for the notification of casualties to 
relatives and the public.34  In order to obtain replacements for casualties, units were required to 
forward sufficient information as quickly as possible to the AG branch at divisional 
headquarters. Small losses of personnel, due to normal wastage such as sickness, were to be 
                                                 
33 FSR Part 2, pp. 56 – 58. 
34  Ibid. Part 2 Section 133, pp. 167-8 Casualty reports were to be notified to the AG’s office at the Base as soon 
as they occurred.  After verification and confirmation, the names of all officers and men who had been reported as 
dead, wounded or missing would be telegraphed to the government concerned with the least possible delay.  
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notified by unit commanders through divisional headquarters directly to the IGC, copied to 
AG’s office at the Base.  These small losses were to be replaced by the IGC at the earliest 
opportunity.  When heavy casualties occurred the IGC would receive instructions from AG’s 
Branch at General Headquarters (GHQ) as to the priority and extent to which, units were to be 
completed.  The orders and timetables for each move were then to be issued by the IGC’s 
organization to the commanders of the base depot concerned, who was then responsible for 
warning the necessary personnel, ensuring that they were ready to move at the time ordered and 
sent to the front fully clothed, armed and equipped.35  In hindsight, the planned information 
flow, being split between AG at GHQ and the IGC at the Base, was bound to cause problems.  
Until the system was put to the test, however, the full extent of these was unappreciated. 
 
As has already been mentioned, units of the Home Army were perennially under-strength and 
also contained men who were unready for whatever reason to be sent overseas immediately.  In 
order to reach its War Establishment, which for an Infantry Battalion in 1914 was 30 officers 
and 977 men, a unit would need to be brought up to strength by trained soldiers of the Reserve.36  
Under the Mobilization Regulations, the Officer In Charge (OiC) of the Records Office in each 
Military District was responsible for planning the allocation of the personnel under his control 
‘to the best advantage, with due regard to the efficiency, not only of the regular units and depots 
affiliated to his record office, but also of the reserve units, including any to be formed on 
mobilization’.37  In Western Command, there were two Infantry Record Offices, Preston (No 3 
District) and Shrewsbury (No 4 District), for the Regiments whose Regimental Areas came 
                                                 
35 Ibid pp. 54 & 58 – 59. 
36 The Peace Establishment of a unit was the number of officers, W.Os, N.C.Os., men, animals, guns and vehicles 
provided for it annually in Army Estimates; the War Establishment was the number in each category required for 
war.  The 1914 edition of War Establishments (Expeditionary Force) laid down the numbers of personnel to 
proceed overseas.   
37 Regulations for Mobilization 1914, p.18. 
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within these Districts.  Notices for regular and special reservists and the TF to mobilize, together 
with addressed envelopes, were prepared, kept up to date and held by the Record Offices and 
the Officers Commanding SR and TF units.  On Mobilization, the letters would be sent out 
ordering Reservists and TF soldiers to report to their units.  
 
Detailed plans, including mobilisation timings and embarkation arrangements, for the BEF to 
join the left flank of the French Army had been in place since 1911.  Plans for the handling of 
reinforcements had also been drawn up, based on the instructions in FSR Part 2.  On arrival in 
France, each Infantry Division would set up a Base Depot at Le Havre to handle reinforcements 
for its units whilst six General Base Depots at Harfleur would handle reinforcements for the 
supporting arms.38  Large Rest Camps were also to be established at the ports of entry to receive 
troops on arrival and then despatch them to the appropriate Base Depots.   
  
A sub-branch of AG’s office at GHQ, known as the 3rd Echelon, would also be located at the 
Base, where it would be responsible for the huge amount of personnel administration arising 
from any army in the field: management of personal records so that casualties could be quickly 
and accurately traced and reported to the War Office; taking on strength reinforcements, both 
officers and men, and keeping track of their despatch to the front; and recording and 
promulgating AG’s decisions in order to ensure the existence of an identical system on routine 
personnel matters throughout the BEF.  It would be commanded by a Deputy AG (DAG), and 
initially consist of about 200 officers and clerks.  As yet, there could be no inkling that as the 
BEF expanded in size, so the Echelon’s strength would eventually grow to close to 4,000, 
mostly officers and men incapacitated from active work.39  
                                                 
38 No 1: RGA; 2: RHA and RFA; 3: RGA, ASC and RE; 4: RE; 5: RAMC and Cavalry; 6: Corps Details. 
39 Macready, Annals of an Active Life Vol 1, pp. 199 – 201. 
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In August 1914 the Army was as ready as it could be.   Details had been worked out for the 
BEF’s movement to France, the mobilization of the Reserves and the TF and the provision and 
drafting of reinforcements.  Even at the outset, however, the manpower numbers did not add 
up.  The Regular Army’s Other Rank (OR) strength was some 9,000 short of its establishment 
of 245,860.  The Army Reserve contained 145,347 ex-Regular soldiers but these were men of 
varying ages, experience and physical fitness and would not all be usable.  The SR, specifically 
created to provide drafts for an Expeditionary Force, numbered 61,376: : about 16,000 below 
its establishment.40  Finally, the Territorial Force (TF) was now effectively the third line but 
there had been little planning for its use in the event of war and the poor training record and 
attendance at training camps did not bode well for its efficiency. Furthermore, it remained 
highly questionable whether the restriction of the TF’s role to home defence could be overcome.  
In July 1914 the TF numbered 268,777 officers and men but only five complete TF units, had 
taken the Imperial Service (IS) obligation enabling them to be sent overseas.41 On the face of 
it, there might be enough men to maintain the Army to meet current commitments around the 
Empire, for home defence and to bring the BEF up to strength and maintain it in the field - but 
only if the war was over quickly.    
 
Mobilization 
War was declared on 4 August 1914 and mobilization began.  Regimental depots, in accordance 
with pre-war plans, split from their respective SR battalions, becoming separate units ready to 
                                                 
40 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War (SME) (London, 1922; 
Uckfield: Naval & Military Press 1999), p. 30.  
41 Beckett, ‘The Territorial Force’, pp. 129-130.  BOH 1914 Vol II, pp. 2, 3: Northumberland Yeomanry, Dorset 
Fortress Company RE, 6th East Surrey and 7th and 8th Middlesex.  Full bibliographic citations for the British Official 
History may be found in the Bibliography, below. 
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receive and process Reservists.42  The Line battalions implemented their particular mobilization 
plan. In Londonderry, 1st Cheshire had six days to complete the process.  Like other battalions 
they were under-strength and during the next three days received three drafts of Reservists from 
the Depot, totalling 556 men.  Many of these men had seen only two or three years’ service, 
and that as much as nine years before.43 They would find many differences.  In 1913, the 
organisation of Infantry battalions into eight companies, each of four platoons, had been 
changed to four companies, each with four platoons and four sections in each platoon: ‘We 
reservists were a little muddled at first by all this’.44  Most battalions were also now equipped 
with the new Short, Magazine Lee-Enfield (SMLE) rifle on which the incoming Reservists 
needed hasty familiarisation and training.  Across Britain, Depots were hastily processing and 
equipping men before despatching them to the Line battalions. The KSLI Depot despatched 
drafts daily to 1st KSLI which remained in Tipperary until 14 August, before moving to camp 
near Cambridge with the rest of the 6th Division where they were kept continuously at intensive 
training until ‘all ranks had become hardened and were fighting fit’.45   
 
In all, some 136,781 non-commissioned officers and men from the Army Reserve rejoined the 
colours in August, with a further 2,699 in September and 932 in October 1914.  Of these, some 
1,816 became non-effective almost immediately: 1,528 were unfit, 181 had completed their 
engagements, 24 were discharged and 83 died from unspecified causes.46 After the Regular 
battalions had been brought up to strength, the remaining Reservists were sent to the SR 
                                                 
42 Major W. deB. Wood, The History of the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry in the Great War (London: Medici 
Society Limited, 1925; Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, n.d), p. 301. 
43 A. Crookenden, The History of the Cheshire Regiment in the Great War (Eastbourne: Rowe, nd), p. 338. 
44 F. Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die (1933; Uckfield: N&P reprint, nd) p. 11.  Frank Richards rejoined the Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers in August 1914. 
45 Wood, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry in the Great War, pp. 1-2. 
46 TNA: WO 162/23 General Mobilisation: Review of Arrangements 1 November 1914. 
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battalions, now at their pre-planned War Stations.  The 3rd (SR) Cheshire had assembled at 
Chester to draw equipment and stores and was now at its War Station at Birkenhead.  On 
mobilization, it had numbered only 16 officers and 500 men but was soon joined by older 
trained soldiers, retired NCOs, Army Reservists plus those who had already completed their 
time on the Reserve, and newly enlisted recruits. The 3rd (SR) KSLI mobilized at the Depot in 
Shrewsbury and on 11 August, numbering 1,052, left by train for its war station at Pembroke 
Dock.  Within a very short space of time its numbers would be up to 1,600.47   
 
The TF was embodied on 4 August 1914 and mobilized as quickly and effectively as its Regular 
and SR counterparts.  The four Territorial Battalions of the Cheshire Regiment, the 4th, 5th (Earl 
of Chester’s), 6th and 7th Battalions, formed the Cheshire Infantry Brigade of the Welsh 
Division.  The Regimental History commented that the: 
response to the order to mobilize was exceedingly creditable, especially as many 
of the men were clerks and cashiers, holding responsible jobs which they would 
have to hand over.48 
 
Within six days, all four TF Battalions of the Cheshire Infantry Brigade were at full strength.    
 
Arrival in France and the First Test of the System 
The BEF, consisting of I Corps (1st and 2nd Divisions) and II Corps (3rd and 5th Divisions) and 
numbering about 100,000 men, moved to France between 9th and 17th August.  Three Large 
Rest Camps had been established at the ports of entry. There had been no mention of these in 
FSR Part 2 and plans appear to have been somewhat vague: the designated CO of No 2 Large 
Rest Camp complained that it was only on arrival at Southampton that they had discovered that 
                                                 
47 Wood, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry in the Great War 1914-1918, p. 315. 
48 A. Crookenden, Cheshire Regiment in the Great War (Chester: Evans, no date), pp. 340-1. 
 
 
31 
 
they would be under the orders of a Base Commandant and received some idea of their role – 
and furthermore that they would be leaving for France immediately!  No 2 Large Rest Camp 
arrived at Rouen on 10 August and took over two camps previously set up by the French.  By 
13 August they were ready to arrange the reception and accommodation of troops arriving in 
France until their departure for the Front by rail.49  
 
The 1st SWB left Hampshire for France on 12 August, arriving at Le Havre in the early hours 
of the following morning.  After a couple of days in a rest camp, they moved forward and 
arrived at Leschelle in the BEF’s concentration area by 16 August.  The rest of 3rd Brigade and 
the 1st Division were close by; forming part of I Corps.  The 1st Cheshire left Londonderry for 
Belfast early on 14 August in order to sail direct for France, arriving at Le Havre mid-afternoon 
on 16 August.  Following a night spent in a Rest Camp, they entrained the next day for an 
unknown destination.   By 18th August, with the rest of the 5th Division, they were in the Le 
Cateau-Landrecies area as part of II Corps.  The 2nd RWF arrived to France by 13 August, 
initially to act as LOC troops but on 21 August was posted to 19th Brigade at Valenciennes.        
 
The Divisional Infantry Base Depots (IBDs) were slowly getting organised. Having arrived at 
Boulogne on 20 August, No 2 IBD moved to Le Havre the next day where it took over Camp 
No 8 containing 100 tents.  No 3 IBD also arrived at Le Havre on 21 August.  Both received 
their first reinforcements from England the next day: 15 officers and 1143 ORs for 2nd Division 
and 13 officers and 1279 ORs for 3rd Division, including 1 officer and 113 ORs for the RWF.  
Drafts were sent up to the Front on 25 August, with the next ones arriving from England on 27 
August. At this point the Rest Camps and the IBDs had expected a lull but the BEF’s retreat 
                                                 
49 TNA: WO 95/4116 War Diary of No 2 Large Rest Camp. 
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after Mons on 23 August meant there was nowhere to go for the reinforcements that had already 
been sent up to Advanced Base at Amiens, so they were returned No 2 Large Rest Camp.  
Matters deteriorated and Rouen was ordered to be evacuated; No 2 Large Rest Camp entrained 
on 30 August with 65 officers and 6000 men for Le Mans where it arrived the next day.  The 
IBDs had also been ordered to move and were now en route by sea for St Nazaire.50  Huge 
numbers of men and stores were forced to be moved at speed away from the newly set-up Bases.  
 
The fighting in the Mons area was the first real test of the FSR Part 2 procedures. Casualties 
began to flow back and by 25 August it was already apparent that the toll exacted by modern 
warfare was going to be far heavier than expected. On 24 August, 1st Cheshire had gone into 
action at Audregnies with 27 officers and 934 men; by the time the roll was taken at Les Bavay 
that evening only 6 officers and 200 men were present.51  Of those absent, 55 had been killed, 
500 taken prisoner and the rest wounded.  Whatever the cause, they were all out of action.  The 
Cheshire losses were particularly high owing to their having failed to receive orders to 
withdraw, but the Infantry as a whole had suffered significant casualties during the first real 
contact with the enemy.  The approximate figures for the BEF for August 1914 would later 
show a total of 14,409 casualties of whom 105 officers and 1,277 soldiers were dead.52 The 
continuing fighting at the front made it difficult to get accurate casualty returns back to the Base 
and only rough estimates could be made of the reinforcements required.  AG GHQ needed a 
firmer handle on casualty numbers and the first amplification of the FSR 2 procedures was 
made on 29 August: divisions were to obtain from units the details of officers and the numbers 
of ORs killed, wounded and missing and to report these by the quickest method direct to GHQ.  
                                                 
50 Ibid, and TNA: WO 95/4185 War Diaries of No 2 and No 3 IBDs. 
51 Cheshire Regiment Archive (CRA), 1st Cheshire War Diary, 24 August 1914. 
52 SME, p. 253. 
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In slower time the DAG, GHQ 3rd Echelon, would receive direct from units the regimental 
numbers and names of the dead and missing and from the commanders of medical units the 
details of those wounded; after the information had been verified the DAG’s office would cable 
home the names of all individuals reported as killed, wounded and missing.53  
 
The ‘First Reinforcements’ were waiting at the Base Depots and Rest Camps but until a pause 
could be expected in some definite locality it would be impossible to send them up the line.54  
Mons was followed by Le Cateau and the Retreat.  When a halt was finally called in early 
September, some 20,000 were missing from the BEF’s original numbers.  Not all were 
casualties: on 2 September No 2 Large Rest Camp contained 3,340 stragglers in addition to 
about 5,970 reinforcements. The reinforcements were sent up on 3 September and on 4 
September stragglers numbering 18 officers and 1064 men were re-equipped and despatched 
back to their units.  There was concern about the numbers unaccounted for and GHQ Army 
Routine Order (ARO) 59 of 4 September notified that in future stragglers were to be given 
written instructions on where and to whom to report.55  A proportion of the missing would rejoin 
later but the official casualty figures for the period up to 5 September still showed just over 
15,000 casualties ie killed, wounded and missing. The temporary halt at last enabled the ‘first 
reinforcements’ to be brought up from the IBDs, reaching most units by 6 September.56  The 
Cheshires received one officer and 90 men on 5 September but still remained at less than half 
strength. By 7 September, all available men from the Base had been used to replenish units.   
 
                                                 
53 TNA: WO 95/25 GHQ – AG Branch War Diary – Army Routine Order of 29 Aug 14. 
54 Macready, Annals of An Active Life Vol 1, pp. 199–201, 203-4. 
55 TNA: WO 95/25 GHQ – AG Branch War Diary. 
56 BOH 1914, Vol. I, pp. 286-7, 301. 
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The experience of the first extended contact with the enemy had revealed significant 
deficiencies in the pre-war plans and organisations.  The AG GHQ, Major General Sir Nevil 
Macready, realised pre-war casualty estimates needed revision and immediately increased 
future indents on the War Office.  There had also been friction between the respective roles of 
the AG GHQ and that of the IGC at the Base, where the latter’s designated role had been to 
anticipate requirements and push as much forward as possible, including reinforcements, in 
readiness for when required.  In practice this proved unworkable.  A tetchy letter of 24 August 
from Macready to the IGC at the Base, Major General F.S. Robb, illustrates the problem of the 
passage of information and conflicting roles and responsibilities:   
Theoretically I am aware that your jurisdiction extends to rendezvous points, but I have 
always held, and present experience confirms me in the idea, that in the area 
immediately in the rear of the troops it will be better to advise the officer of GHQ 
concerned before any action is taken, in case we may have information that possibly 
may not have reached you.57  
 
Individuals had done their best and reinforcements had been waiting to be sent forward but all 
had not gone smoothly.  On 4 September Robb wrote back to the CIGS, General Sir Charles 
Douglas, concerning mistakes he felt had been made in the replacement of casualties.  He had 
sent reinforcements up to Advanced Base and been most anxious to send them further forward 
only to be told that until units disentangled from the enemy they could not take them.  
Eventually they were called forward on 3 September.  Robb claims to be telling CIGS this only 
to show the ‘extraordinary difficulties they have in the fighting line’.  In a further letter he 
continues to make the point that he had been ready and willing to send men and stores forward 
but the time taken to fill gaps of all sorts ‘is governed by the ability of the unit to receive and 
not the LofC to send up’.  It had also proved impossible to forecast events and to place 
                                                 
57 TNA: WO 95/25 – GHQ – AG – War Diary – Macready letter dated 24 August 1914. 
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reinforcements ahead in view of the daily changes and the inability of the Army to retire on its 
own LofC.58  That these letters were flying back to London from the Base cannot have endeared 
Robb to an already hard-pressed GHQ.  There was a further difficulty in that Robb reported 
directly to the C-in-C BEF rather than through the BEF’s principal staff officers, AG and QMG.  
The latter at the time was Major General Sir William Robertson.  This dual chain of command 
caused problems since Robb was independently sending indents for men, stores and matériel to 
the War Office at the same time as the ‘A’ and ‘Q’ staffs were also sending indents to London, 
thus causing confusion at both ends.  This was not something that could be allowed to continue, 
and the system was changed so that in future Robb would receive his orders from the GHQ 
Staff, in the same way as any officer commanding one of the larger formations at the front.59   
 
By the end of the first week of September, the inadequacy of pre-war estimates of the 
reinforcements necessary was already apparent.  The drafting system was working so far but 
already the numbers were too few and the manpower pot was not bottomless. Steps were already 
in hand to obtain more men but this would take time. 
 
The Expanding Army 
The new Secretary of State for War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, who had accepted the 
appointment on 5 August 1914, was well aware of the need for more men. He rejected the 
prevalent view that economic conditions precluded a long war and instead considered it 
necessary to plan for at least 3 years, with a significant manpower requirement.  Recruiting 
                                                 
58 TNA: WO 79/63 – Sir A.J. Murray Private Papers. Letters from Robb to CIGS dated 3 September 1914 and 
16/17 September 1914.  Murray was then COS GHQ so it may be assumed that GHQ had sight of these letters. 
59 Macready, Annals of an Active Life, p. 210; Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), p. 200; TNA WO 163/45 Minutes of Meeting of Military Members 
of Army Council of 9 Jan 15. 
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started immediately.  The first ‘call to arms’ for 100,000 men, aged between 19 and 30, to enlist 
for general service for a period of three years or the duration of the war appeared first in the 
national daily papers on 7 August and subsequently in local weekly papers.  On 24 August 
Kitchener updated the House of Lords on the Government’s intention to prepare: 
an Army in the field …….  I cannot at this stage say what will be the limits of the 
forces required, or what measures may eventually become necessary to supply and 
maintain them.  The scale of the Field Army which we are now calling into being 
is large and may rise in the course of the next six or seven months to a total of 
thirty divisions continually maintained in the field.60  
  
Whilst the ultimate size remained unclear, what was recognised was the need not only to create 
a large Army but also the requirement for it to be maintained.  
   
Much has been written about the raising of the New Armies, in particular by Peter Simkins in 
Kitchener’s Army.61  It is not intended here to re-iterate here the sequence of events except in 
so far as they had a bearing on the future provision of replacements. During the early weeks of 
the war men enlisted in large numbers daily.62  The peacetime recruiting organisation, used to 
handling less than 100 recruits a day in total, found it increasingly difficult to cope and the 
Regimental Depots and 3rd (SR) Battalions were rapidly over-loaded.  The flood of recruits was 
not destined solely for the embryo New Armies as the recruiting organization distributed the 
volunteers to different parts of the Army.  By 22 August, for example, some 2,450 men had 
joined the Colours in Chester and had been allocated as follows:  
Enlisted for normal Army Service       950 
Joined the 3rd (SR) Battalion of the Cheshire Regiment       600 
Enlisted in the Service Battalion, Cheshire Regiment for Lord Kitchener’s army    350 
Joined the Special Reserve        250 
Enlisted in Engineers, Army Service Corps and other regiments   30063 
                                                 
60 HLRO: ‘Debates on Army Affairs, House of Lords, Session 1914’ (London, HMSO, 1915), c. 504.  
61 Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, passim. 
62 TNA: WO 162/3, ‘Approximate number of recruits raised day by day from 3rd August 1914’. 
63 Cheshire Records Office (CRO) Cheshire Observer, Saturday, 22 August 1914 (mf 225/37). 
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There were more volunteers than the existing units could take and some form of organisation 
for the surplus was urgently needed.  This led to the creation of the new battalions to be known 
as Service battalions.  By 21 August, the first ‘Service’ battalions had been grouped into six 
new Divisions and by the end of the month the first New Army (K1) was virtually complete.  
The SR battalions remained the primary draft-finding source, however, and on 28 August 
Kitchener appealed for a second 100,000 men, to be used initially to fill all the SR battalions 
up to 2,000 strong.  Any balance above this figure would remain for training at the regimental 
depots.64  On 1 September the AG, General Sir Henry Sclater, informed his Army Council 
colleagues that further new divisions would be formed once the K1 battalions had reached their 
war establishments of 1,000 all ranks and the SR battalions a strength of 2,000.  The next six 
divisions would form K2, or the Second New Army.  By 9 September, the influx of new recruits 
had been such that the formation of two further New Armies, K3 and K4, was organised.   
 
Unfamiliarity with the scale of losses they were now encountering was such that the draft-
finding process was nearly destroyed when on Wednesday 9 September the Army Council was 
informed that the Secretary of State had decided to organize the SR battalions into six Divisions, 
to form the 2nd New Army (K2).65  At a stroke this would have removed the draft-finding 
sources for the Regular Army, already fully occupied in sending reinforcements to the BEF 
whilst at the same time manning their war stations.  Fortunately, by 13 September, the plan had 
been reversed; there is a simple entry in the Minutes that the Secretary of State had ‘approved 
changes in nomenclature’, which almost certainly indicates some fast footwork by the Staff 
reminding him of the obvious difficulties that would be caused by turning the draft-finding SR 
                                                 
64 TNA: WO 163/44 Meeting of Military Members of the Army Council, 27 August 1914. 
65 TNA: WO 163/44 30th Meeting of Military Members of the Army Council on 9 September 1914.  
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Battalions into Service battalions destined for the Front.  The ‘changes in nomenclature’ 
returned the composition of the Second New Army to New Army battalions and divisions.  The 
SR battalions would retain their draft-finding role and any surplus manpower used to create 
new infantry battalions for six divisions of a Fourth New Army (27th to 32nd Divisions).66  The 
revised plan was promulgated immediately by an Army Order formally announcing new titles 
of ‘the several additions to the Army’.67  
 
Many more battalions were also being enthusiastically raised by local authorities, industrialists 
and committees of private citizens eager to play their part in the war effort.  The main benefit 
of the scheme was that it relieved the hard-pressed War Office staff of the burden of housing, 
clothing and feeding yet more thousands of potential recruits until they were ready to adopt 
these ‘locally raised’ battalions.  These battalions, which would become known emotively as 
‘Pals’ battalions, often adopted very specific identities and loyalties to those who had raised 
them.  Many were raised in specific geographic areas, such as major cities, but this in itself did 
not differentiate them a great deal from Infantry battalions raised within their own Regimental 
recruiting areas.  Indeed, the recruiting of ‘local squads’ was a common approach for the New 
Armies.68  The main difference with the locally raised battalions was that the men frequently 
shared common social and occupational backgrounds as well as a geographical one or were 
recruited from particular pools, such as the Sportsmen’s and the Public Schools battalions.69  
                                                 
66 TNA: WO 163/44 34th Meeting of Military Members on 13 September 1914.  
67 TNA: WO 123/56 AO 388 and 389 of 14 September 1914.   
68 Whitchurch Herald, Saturday, 19 September 1914, p. 4.  On 14 September 1914 a recruiting meeting for the 
county regiment was held in the Shropshire village of Whixall since it was the ‘desire of the Government to form 
the squads, to get young men from neighbourhoods to go forward for the defence of their country.’ Any Whixall 
lad joining at that meeting would have joined 6th (Service) KSLI, of the Second New Army.   
69 The 15th (Service) Battalion Highland Light Infantry (HLI) (1st Glasgow) contained many recruits from the 
Glasgow Tramways whilst its sister battalion, the 16th (Service) HLI (2nd Glasgow) was always referred to as the 
Glasgow Boys Brigade Battalion, having drawn many of its officers and soldiers from graduates of the Glasgow 
Battalion of the Boys Brigade. 
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Once overseas, however, they would need to be reinforced in the same way as other battalions 
but their recruiting pool was often more limited.   
 
The TF had been embodied on 4 August and was also expanding rapidly.  On 10 August TF 
soldiers were again invited to volunteer for overseas service and on 21 August it was announced 
that units in which 80 per cent of the men had taken the IS obligation could be sent overseas as 
formed units.  The initial response was not overwhelming with only seventy battalions reaching 
the 80 per cent mark initially so on 31 August the percentage was lowered to the more realistic 
figure of 60 per cent.70  The County Associations had been authorised, on 15 August, to raise 
new units to replace those volunteering for overseas service and this now enabled first line TF 
units to make up their numbers for overseas service whilst those men remaining ‘home service 
only’ could move to the second line,  forming a nucleus of trained soldiers.  Once the First Line 
battalions went overseas, the Home Service (HS) battalions would replace them at their war 
stations and also  provide drafts for overseas service from new recruits who had signed the IS 
obligation.  By 31 August most of the officers and 80 per cent of the men of 6th Cheshire TF 
battalion had volunteered for overseas service and a home service battalion, 2/6th Cheshire, was 
created at Stockport in September.71   
 
There remained ambivalence over the use of the TF overseas and it is apparent from statements 
made in August and September that they were not expected to be sent abroad in a hurry, or at 
least not before they had received considerable training and reached a sufficient level of 
efficiency.72  Expediency forced this to change, however, and by October TF units were being 
                                                 
70 Beckett,  Amateur Military Tradition,  p. 228.  
71 C. Smith, War History of the 6th Battalion The Cheshire Regiment (Chester: 6th Cheshire Old Comrades 
Association, 1932), p. 2.  
72 K.W. Mitchinson, Defending Albion (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 62. 
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rapidly despatched to different parts of the Empire to replace Regular battalions recalled for 
active service.  In late October 4th KSLI embarked for Garrison duties in India but by then the 
first TF units were already in France.  Intended initially as LofC troops, 1/14th London (London 
Scottish) and 1/1st Queen’s Own Oxfordshire Hussars had landed on 16th and 22 September 
respectively.  The arrival of TF units in various parts of the Empire enabled Regular battalions 
to return home to make up new divisions for France.  The newly formed 7th Division landed in 
Belgium in early October and was followed by a new 8th Division in November.  Further 
Regular Army battalions returning from overseas later in the year were formed into three new 
Regular divisions, the 27th, 28th and 29th.   
 
The creation of the new Regular divisions meant several organizational changes to the New 
Armies but as yet these would make little impact on the newly formed Service battalions.  Of 
more concern for the future was that no system for the replacement of their losses had yet been 
put in place other than that provided by the already overworked 3rd (SR) battalions.  Authority 
was given in December for the locally raised battalions to recruit above the War Establishment 
in order to form additional Depot companies, each 250 strong, but as yet there was no provision 
for reinforcements for the battalions of the New Armies.   
 
Meanwhile in France and Flanders….. 
On 6 September the BEF had again turned north as the Allies and the Germans tried to outflank 
each other and gain the crucial Channel Ports.  The next few weeks would see a succession of 
battles: the Marne 6 – 10 September, the Aisne 13 – 28 September, La Bassée 10 – 31 October, 
culminating in the First Battle of Ypres from 19 October to 21 November.  The BEF was 
steadily increasing in size through what the Official History refers to as efforts to ‘improvise’ 
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armies and by 15 September it numbered 163,897.73  The 6th Division arrived in mid-September 
having been released from home defence duties as fear of invasion receded.  The 1st KSLI, fresh 
from training in Cambridge with the rest of the Division, landed on 10 September with 27 
officers and 970 other ranks.74 They would make a welcome arrival in the rear of III Corps on 
16 September where the Division was temporarily broken up to provide relief to the weary 
troops; 16th Brigade, containing 1st KSLI, was attached to II Corps.   
 
Between 15 August and 30 September some 485 officers and 31,888 men were sent out to the 
BEF as reinforcements.75 The heavy and unexpected wastage within the BEF’s first month in 
France had exhausted the supply of Regular reservists for many regiments and men of the SR 
were already beginning to take their place; the first draft of 100 Special Reservists had left for 
1st KSLI on 15 September.76  More drafts arrived to fill the weary battalions but some were only 
penny-packets: the draft arriving at 1st Cheshire at Sormoise on 24 September numbered four 
officers but only 21 men.  It would be 17 October before a draft of any real size reached them: 
3 officers and 248 men would reach 1st Cheshire on 17 October.77 These were a mixture of 
Reservists such as 6407 George Playfoot, who had originally enlisted in 1900, and new recruits 
such as 27 year old John William Beard who had enlisted ten weeks earlier, on 5 August 1914.78  
Since Mons, 1st Cheshire had received 359 men to replace the losses of Audregnies but the 
battalion was still only just over half strength.  The reinforcement system was working but it 
had already had to provide many more replacements than expected. 
                                                 
73 BOH 1914 Vol I, p. 8fn. 
74 Wood, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry in the Great War , pp. 1-2. 
75 BOH 1914 Vol I, p. 467 fn 1.  
76 BOH 1914 Vol I, p. 440 and Wood, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry in the Great War, p. 318. 
77 Crookenden, Cheshire Regiment in the Great War, p. 25 and TNA WO 95/1571 1st Cheshire War Diary. 
78 http://www.ancestry.co.uk/ The Medal Index Cards (MIC) for 6407 Pte George Playfoot and 10103 Pte John 
William Beard show that both arrived in France on 7 October 1914.  Pte Beard’s Service Record shows his date 
of enlistment.  
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It was also already proving necessary to switch particularly depleted units out of the Line for 
rest and replenishment.79  Such moves must have been confusing for the divisions and units 
themselves but an absolute nightmare down at the Base for the IBDs to know where to send 
reinforcements.  On 9 October, 3 IBD transferred 2 officers and 199 men destined for the 
Devonshires to the 5th Division IBD, receiving in return 5 officers and 351 men of the Suffolks.  
Similarly, No 2 Rest Camp noted the transfer of 100 men from 3rd to 5th Division between 10 – 
12 October.80  Men and units were moving in all directions with consequent disruption and 
disorientation. 
 
The IBDs were at this this point still where they had been rushed at the end of August during 
the Retreat.  It would be early November before 3 IBD moved from St Nazaire to Rouen and 
could become properly established.  No 2 Rest Camp remained at Le Mans until 21 December 
when it moved back to Boulogne, where it could fulfil its role of receiving individual 
reinforcements from UK and despatching them to the base depots now settled at Étaples, 
Harfleur and Rouen. 81 
 
Fierce fighting continued through October and into November.  The 7th and 8th Divisions arrived 
but other Regular battalions were still en route from overseas.  Only TF battalions were readily 
available and on 26 October, Kitchener telegraphed the CinC promising six TF battalions to 
replace six units, including 1st Cheshire, that had suffered the heaviest casualties. On 30 October 
he telegraphed that the battalions were either already on their way or about to leave and the 
                                                 
79 TNA: WO 95/25 – GHQ – AG Branch War Diary 29 Sep 14. 
80 TNA: WO 95/4185 3 IBD War Diary and WO 95/4116 No 2 Rest Camp War Diary. 
81 TNA: WO 95/4185 3 IBD War Diary and WO 95/4116 No 2 Rest Camp War Diary. 
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following day notified that a further 6 TF battalions would be sent.82  Nineteen TF battalions 
had arrived in France by early November when 1/6th Cheshire and 1/4th (Denbighshire) RWF 
landed at Le Havre for use as L of C troops.  The 1/6th Cheshire had been augmented by 100 
men from its Reserve battalion, which now replaced it in its Home Defence role.83 
 
By late October, II Corps had suffered nearly 14,000 casualties, of whom 10,000 were Infantry.  
Against its established Infantry strength of 24,000, it could muster only 14,000, of whom 1,400 
had been with their battalions less than a week.  The 5th Division numbered just over 7,600 
Infantry, but 800 of these had joined as reinforcements only on 25 October.  There were doubts 
over whether battalions containing so many new men, Reservists, SR and young soldiers, would 
be able to withstand a really determined attack.84  This is the first instance of what would later 
become regular complaints that the new men were never as good as the old.  Yet, even with 
these so-called inferior troops, on 28 October at La Bassée British troops showed: 
a superiority over the enemy in fortitude and endurance through all the varying phases 
of a battle, and once more their fire discipline had, in his eyes, multiplied the small force 
opposing him into immense superiority of numbers.85  
 
The switching around of units and formations was also causing strain.  By early November the 
Fifth Division history notes: 
a regular jumble everywhere; Brigades, Battalions and Batteries were sent hither and 
thither to patch up the holes in the strained British front, and many units had no notion 
to what formation they belonged; Battalions were attached for a day or two to a Division 
or a Brigade, and then spirited away elsewhere as the circumstances demanded.86 
    
                                                 
82 BOH 1914 Vol II, pp. 252 and 276 fn. 
83 Smith, 6th Cheshire, pp. 2-3. 
84 BOH 1914 Vol II, pp. 209-10. 
85 Ibid, p. 220. 
86 Brigadier-General A.H. Hussey & Major D.S. Inman, The Fifth Division in the Great War (London: Nisbet & 
Co, 1921), p. 44.  
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It would be the end of the month before the component units of the Division would be gathered 
together again.  All units were low in numbers but by then 1st Cheshire, still suffering from the 
legacy of Audregnies, was again so weak that they were kept back in Corps Reserve.  The 
battalion had lost a further 35 killed, 99 wounded and 65 missing between 5 – 20 November 
but no reinforcements are shown as having arrived.  Although 1 officer and 64 men would arrive 
on 6 December it would not be until 24 December that 6 officers and 444 men would make a 
real difference.87 Meanwhile, divisions were being bolstered by newly arrived TF units: 1/6th 
Cheshire joined 1st Cheshire in 15th Brigade, 5th Division from the LofC in December whilst 
1/4th (Denbighshire) RWF joined 3rd Brigade, 1st Division.   
 
Changes to Procedures in the Light of Experience 
The FSR Part 2 procedures had needed several further amendments as the ‘A’ staff struggled 
with the passage of information.  Incorrect information had occasionally been passed: in mid-
September II Corps units were reminded to ensure that officers ‘missing’ were not shown as 
killed or wounded unless this was absolutely certain as there had been several cases of officers 
reported to GHQ as killed who had subsequently been found alive in England - after the 
publication of the casualty lists in the Press.  Information had also been passed by a variety of 
routes, causing overlapping demands and delayed replacements.  In late October, Army Routine 
Orders (ARO) 248 noted that all demands for replacements, arising from both casualties and 
normal wastage, were now to be submitted by formations to AG, GHQ, who would pass them 
to DAG 3rd Echelon GHQ at the Base.  Only LofC units were to submit demands for 
replacements due to normal wastage direct to DAG, 3rd Echelon GHQ at the base.88    
 
                                                 
87 1st Cheshire War Diary 24 November 1914 and 24 December 1914. 
88 TNA: WO 95/25 AG GHQ War Diary September and October 1914. 
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Analysis 
The BEF continued to increase in size; on 19 December its estimated British strength was 
229,782 officers and men.89  On the debit side, between August and December it had suffered 
a total of 95,654 casualties: 16,965 of whom were dead.90  Analysis of the deaths in selected 
battalions of the Marches Regiments will serve as a baseline for future analysis of these 
battalions through the rest of the war.91  
 
Recruiting from the Regimental areas seems to have varied, as is shown in Table 1.1 below.  
Enlistment Locations 1st Cheshire 1st KSLI 2nd RWF 1st SWB 
Regimental Area 187 82% 63 61% 18 24% 148 42% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - England 1  8  7  8  
Elsewhere in No 4 District – Wales 3  3  5  29  
Total enlisted in No 4 District 191 83% 74 71% 30 41% 185 52% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 2  9  3  5  
 Liverpool/Manchester 12  7  2  5  
Total Enlisted in Western Command 205 90% 90 87% 35 47% 195 55% 
Northern Command 5  1  1  16  
Southern Command 5  2  13  33  
 Birmingham 3  3  23  11  
Eastern 7  3  1  17  
London District 4  4  2  81  
Scotland/Ireland   1    1  
Overseas       1  
Total Other Commands 24  14  39  160  
Total Deaths 229  104  74  355  
 
Table 1.1.  Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected Regular battalions who were killed/died between 4 
August – 30 November 1914.  
 
Some 83 per cent of 1st Cheshire had enlisted in its own Regimental area but only 59 per cent 
of the KSLI.  The latter, however, shows a further 11 per cent enlisted in other parts of No 4 
District and when enlistments for these two battalions in their parent Home Command 
(Western) are considered the percentages are 90 per cent for 1st Cheshire and 85 per cent for 1st 
                                                 
89 SME, p. 64 (iii) NB This does not include 15,357 British members of the Indian contingent. 
90 Ibid, p. 253.  
91 Sources of data: Soldiers Died in the Great War (Naval & Military Press CD Rom Version 2.5) – Western 
European Theatre and www.ancestry.com.  
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KSLI.  The figures for the two Welsh battalions look very different.  Only 24 per cent of 2nd 
RWF and 43 per cent of 1st SWB had enlisted within their respective Regimental areas.  Even 
when enlistments within Western Command are considered the percentages for these two 
battalions remain low: 47 per cent for the RWF and 55 per cent for the SWB.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, given the RWF’s previous recruiting patterns, some 31 per cent of those who died 
in the first months of the war had enlisted in Birmingham.  However, of similar note is that 
some 23 per cent of the SWB had enlisted in the London area.   
 
It might be thought that these men were Welshmen who had left to find work elsewhere but the 
figures for those born in the respective Regimental recruiting areas show that only 11 per cent 
of the RWF and 19 per cent of the SWB had hailed from those areas originally (see Table 1.2 
below).  Even when the figures for those born in the rest of Wales are taken into account, the 
percentages for both the RWF and SWB rise to only 39 per cent.  
Birth locations 1st Cheshire 1st KSLI 2nd RWF 1st SWB 
Regimental Area 125 55% 51 49% 8 11% 69 19% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - England 3  8  12  14  
Elsewhere in No 4 District – Wales 5  6  8  54  
Total born in No 4 District 133 58% 65 63% 28 39% 137 39% 
Born in No 3 District 22  13  4  9  
 Liverpool/Manchester 31  3    4  
Total Born in Western Command 186 81% 81 78% 32 42% 150 42% 
Northern Command 16  7  7  26  
Southern Command 6  4  15  58  
 Birmingham 4  1  16  10  
Eastern 6  4  1  31  
London District 8  2  3  71  
Scotland/Ireland 2  2    8  
Overseas 1  3    1  
Total Other Commands 43  23  42  205  
Location of Birth Unknown         
Total Deaths 229  104  74  355  
 
Table 1.2.  Birth locations of soldiers of selected Regular battalions who were killed/died between 4 August 
– 30 November 1914. 
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Even in the two English battalions, the percentages for those born in their respective recruiting 
areas are also significantly lower than their enlistment percentages.  The figures for those born 
within Western Command remain high, however, with 82 per cent of 1st Cheshire deaths and 
76 per cent of 1st KSLI deaths having been born within Western Command.  The Welsh 
battalions show just under half having been born in the parent Command.   
  
So it would appear that neither the 2nd RWF nor the 1st SWB were particularly Welsh at the 
start of the war whilst both the English County regiments of 1st Cheshire and 1st KSLI show a 
high degree of homogeneity.   
 
Situation at the end of 1914 
By the end of 1914, a total of 962 officers and 108,310 men had already been sent out as 
reinforcements for the BEF.92  The reinforcement procedures had worked but under extreme 
pressure as far more men had been needed than previously anticipated; it was now only too 
apparent that the new industrial form of warfare would require reinforcements far in excess of 
the pre-war planning figures.  Furthermore, there were doubts over the quality of the men 
arriving who were alleged by some units to be practically untrained and by others ‘to have 
neither the will nor physique to fight’.  One report claimed that many of the men were ‘old, 
worn, drunken wasters’ and no young recruits were being sent.93  In December 1914 there were 
already many who felt the old Army had gone forever. 
 
                                                 
92 BOH 1914, Vol. II, p. 467 fn 1. 
93 Ibid, p. 449 and fn 1. 
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Chapter 2 
1915: The Realities of War 
 
The War that had been expected to be over by Christmas moved inexorably into 1915.  With 
the arrival of the 28th Division in mid-January, the number of British Infantry Divisions on the 
newly-styled Western Front had risen to eleven in which the Marches Regiments were already 
well represented by 7 Regular and 6 TF battalions.1  In manpower terms, the total number of 
British troops in rations on 15 January 1915 was 326,278.  Some 103,957 casualties had been 
notified up to that date, however, which was some 4,000 more than the total strength of the BEF 
that had landed five months previously.2  Pre-war planning estimates of the reinforcement 
requirement had been well exceeded and far more men would be needed. 
 
The year 1915 would see various debates and changes in approach to the prosecution of the 
war.  On the political front there would be debates between ‘easterners’ advocating the opening 
of other fronts, particularly the Dardanelles, and ‘westerners’ who were adamant that the war 
must be won in France and Belgium.  At home, recruiting continued but concerns were 
beginning to be raised over the effect of indiscriminate recruiting on industry.3  The Army’s 
manpower requirements continued to escalate but the Government needed urgently to balance 
them against the demands of the nation as a whole and conscription began to be debated at 
                                                 
1 1st, 2nd, 1/5th and 1/6th Cheshire; 1st, 2nd and 1/4th RWF; 1st SWB; 1st and 2nd KSLI; and 1/1st, 1/2nd and 1/3rd 
Monmouthshire Battalions.  
2 TNA: WO 95/25 – AG GHQ War Diary 15 Jan 15.  Total ration strength, including LoC and Army troops, was 
326,278: 9,609 officers (plus 674 Indian) and 270,785 men (plus 12,641 Indian contingent).  A further 848 officers 
and 31,721 were at the Base Depots, sick in hospital and prisoners (presumably German who still had to be taken 
on the ration strength).  Total casualties notified up to and including 14 January 15 were 4222 officers (1021 killed, 
2435 wounded and 766 missing) and 99,735 other ranks (11,066 killed, 44,856 wounded and 43, 813 missing). 
3 Parliamentary Debates Fifth Series Volume XVIII House of Lords 1914-15 cc 231-62 and 352. 
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every opportunity in Parliament.  It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyze the path towards 
conscription but it would be impossible to proceed further without some reference to the 
different initiatives to provide manpower for the Army.   
 
The War Office and senior military authorities were confronted by an Army of a previously 
unimaginable size and composition, and were feverishly occupied in trying to work out new 
organizations to meet the changing demands caused by both the numbers of men coming 
forward and the different nature of the war that was developing.  At home, where the threat of 
an attack on Britain had not as yet been completely discounted, the Home Army needed to be 
revitalized whilst continuing to train the TF and the New Armies.  Many changes, both political 
and military, would be made during 1915, some of which would be of an ‘ad hoc’ nature and 
need subsequent refinement but on the manning side it would be a year in which foundations 
were laid for what would come later.  For clarity it has been decided to consider firstly events 
on the home front and then on the Western Front.   
 
Provision of Reserves  
The escalating losses on the Western Front made it essential that the SR battalions were kept 
up to strength to provide drafts for the Line battalions.  In early February instructions were 
issued that no more men were to be posted to 4th New Army or Extra Reserve (ER) battalions 
until the SR battalions were up to their establishments.4  This was timely: already almost 20,000 
reinforcements were required in France per month and this number was rising.5  
 
                                                 
4 TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 16 of 2 February 1915. 
5 TNA: WO 95/25 AG GHQ War Diary – February 1915. 
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Reserves were also needed for those TF units already on active service. In January it was 
announced that it was intended to raise 2nd Reserve units for six TF Divisions and that the 1st 
Reserve units in those divisions should be recruited up to 30 per cent in excess of establishment 
‘with a view to forming 2nd Reserve units later on’.6  Fortunately this rather woolly provision 
was soon clarified with the instruction that all Home Commands were to start raising a 2nd 
Reserve unit as soon as they were notified that a TF unit from their Command had been selected 
for service on the Continent.7  The titles of TF units had now become cumbersome and a first 
attempt at clarification was published at the end of January.  The original I.S. battalion remained 
as 1/… eg 1/6th Cheshire; the First Reserve would become 2/… eg 2/6th Cheshire; and the 
Second Reserve shown as 3/…. eg 3/6th Cheshire. 8  The titles I.S, 1st Reserve and 2nd Reserve 
rapidly proved confusing, however, so within a month they were dropped in favour of 1st, 2nd 
and 3rd Line respectively.9   
 
In March it was determined that the Third Line’s function was to train and provide drafts for 
both the First and Second line units.  All recruits were to be sent to the Third Line depots in the 
first instance and not transferred to a First or Second line unit until they had completed the 
recruit musketry course and were otherwise considered as trained soldiers.  The Second Line 
units would replace the First Line units when the latter deployed, or be otherwise employed as 
directed.  They would provide drafts for the First Line units serving abroad only when 
absolutely necessary and this draft finding duty would cease as soon as the Third Line unit was 
in a position to carry out these functions.10   
                                                 
6 The Divisions indicated were N and S Midland, 2nd London, West Lancashire, Northumbrian and West Riding 
Divisions. TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 92 of 13 January 1915. 
7 TNA: WO WOI 151, 15 February 1915. 
8 TNA: WO 123/57 AO 54, 3 January 1915 and WO 293/2 WOI 258, 30 January 1915. 
9 TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 228, 24 February 1915. 
10 TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 72, 6 March 1915 – L. 121/1720, AG 2a. 
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The New Armies would soon be ready for overseas service but still needed their own source of 
reserves.  In April it was decided to provide these by breaking up the 4th New Army and turning 
its battalions into reserve units, to be known as the 2nd Reserve. They were to retain their 
Regimental designations and would train recruits and provide reinforcements for the divisions 
of the first three New Armies, whilst the existing SR battalions continued to provide training 
and reinforcements for the Line battalions.11  In the Marches Regiments, 14th Cheshire, 12th 
RWF, 9th SWB and 9th KSLI now became 2nd Reserve battalions for their respective Service 
battalions.12   
 
The Brigades of the former 4th New Army were re-numbered as Reserve Infantry Brigades, 89th 
Brigade becoming 1st Reserve Infantry Brigade, 90th Brigade becoming 2nd Reserve Infantry 
Brigade and so on, and attached to the six Home Commands as units of the Home army.13  They 
were located within the Home Commands they served and contained the Second Reserve 
battalions for the Regiments of that Command.  The 11th Reserve Brigade was based at Prees 
Heath in Shropshire, 13th and 14th Reserve Brigades was at Kinmel Park in North Wales whilst 
16th Reserve Brigade was at Altcar in Lancashire.  The creation of dedicated reserves for the 
first three New Armies was timely; by May 9th (Scottish), 12th (Eastern) and 14th (Light) 
Divisions were in France and in June 13th (Western) Division, containing 8th Cheshire, 8th RWF 
and 4th SWB, would sail for Egypt and then Gallipoli.  
 
The creation of the 2nd Reserve necessitated clarification of the distribution of recruits.  It was 
confirmed that SR battalions were to be filled first until they reached their establishment of 
                                                 
11 TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 96, 10 April 1915. 
12 See Appendix 3 for more details. 
13 K.W. Mitchinson, Defending Albion (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), p. 124. 
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2,085 all ranks; then the 2nd Reserve until they reached 1,500; and then Extra Reserve battalions, 
where they existed, until their establishment of 1,020 all ranks was reached.  Any recruits over 
this number were to be retained at the depot until they numbered 300 when the War Office was 
to be informed so they could be diverted elsewhere.14 
 
Although they had been provisionally designated as the 5th and 6th New Armies, the War Office 
had not as yet taken over any of the ‘locally raised’ units being created by private citizens and 
municipalities.  The original 4th New Army having been broken up, the 5th and 6th New Armies 
now became the 4th and 5th New Armies respectively.  Their constituent divisions were 
renumbered, with, for example, the 43rd Division becoming the 38th (Welsh) Division.  They 
would also need reserve units and in mid-1915 the Depot companies of the locally raised 
battalions were combined to form Local Reserve battalions.15  These new battalions, 68 in total, 
took their numbering from their parent Regiment: 17th (Reserve) Cheshire being formed from 
the depot companies of 15th and 16th Cheshire, 13th (Reserve) SWB grew out of the depot 
companies of 1st Gwent (10th SWB) and 2nd Gwent (11th SWB) battalions and the depot 
company of 3rd Gwent (12th SWB) became the 14th (Reserve) SWB.  The Local Reserve 
battalions joined the same Reserve Brigades as the Second Reserve battalions of their parent 
Regiments. For the Marches regiments these were either 13th Reserve Infantry Brigade at 
Kinmel Park, near Rhyl in North Wales, or 11th, 14th and 17th Reserve Infantry Brigades at Prees 
Heath in north Shropshire.16     
 
 
                                                 
14 TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 145, 18 May 1915. 
15 TNA: WO 293/3 WOI 205, July 1915. 
16 E.A. James, British Regiments 1914–18 (London: Samson Books, 1978), pp. 65-6, 69, Appendix III to Part II. 
 
 
53 
 
Legislative Changes 
Legislation designed to provide greater flexibility for Army manning was enacted early in 1915.  
The first was the Army (Suspension of Sentences) Act of 16 March.  Its inspiration was claimed 
by Major-General Sir Wyndham Childs, the Assistant Adjutant General (AAG) GHQ, who was 
responsible for discipline.  Walking through St. Omer he spotted a group of soldiers, cheerfully 
singing and whistling, as they were being marched under escort to the Base to serve sentences 
of imprisonment.  Whether Childs was correct in his immediate assessment that ‘certain types 
of men would commit crimes solely to avoid duty at the front’, it was certainly true that 
sentences of penal servitude or imprisonment would remove men from the front line.  Under 
Military Law, the highest penalty was the death sentence, below this came penal servitude for 
a minimum period of three years, which had to be served in a civilian prison in the UK, and 
imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a maximum of two years and which could be 
served in a military gaol.17  Childs immediately dusted off a previous proposal for a form of 
‘probation’ for soldiers found guilty of offences.  It was submitted to Parliament where it was 
passed within two weeks.18   
 
The Army (Suspension of Sentences) Act enabled sentences of imprisonment or penal servitude 
awarded for offences committed on active service to be suspended.  Suspensions would be 
reviewed every three months and might at that stage be either remitted on the grounds of good 
conduct or cancelled and the original sentence invoked.19  Only the CinC had the final decision 
on whether a death sentence should be confirmed or commuted to a lesser penalty, which could 
now be suspended.   
                                                 
17 Manual of Military Law (London: War Office, 1914), pp. 110 – 119 Offences and Punishments. 
18 Major-General Sir Wyndham Childs, Episodes and Reflections (London: Cassell, 1930), pp. 137-8. 
19 Public General Statutes 5 & 6 Geo 5 1914-16 (London: Eyre & Spottiswood, 1916), pp. 47-8. 
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The Act was promulgated to the BEF on 26 April by means of GRO 300 and an explanatory 
pamphlet.  Rowland Feilding, a battalion commander, thought it good that the bad soldier had 
a threat hanging over his head whilst the otherwise good soldier, who might simply have lapsed 
momentarily, had the chance of gaining a complete reprieve through good conduct or gallantry 
on the battlefield.20  From the point of view of the Manning staffs, it also enabled men to carry 
on fighting rather than needing to be replaced.  It is difficult to arrive at an exact figure for the 
number of sentences subsequently suspended but it appears likely that around 38 per cent of 
sentences overseas were suspended.21 Between 1 October 1915 and 30 September 1916 some 
2417 sentences were suspended but this does not include those that were suspended after the 
Court Martial proceedings had been finalised.  The Act undoubtedly closed a loophole and was 
a useful tool in retaining men in the frontline, although it is debateable how much of a deterrent 
it posed to anyone considering transgressing solely to avoid duty; a large number of those 
subsequently executed were already on suspended sentences for previous offences.22 
 
The second area to be addressed was Section 83 of the Army Act.  Under this section a Regular 
soldier could be transferred within three months of his attestation to any Regular corps of the 
same arm or branch; after three months his consent was required.  Thus, after completing three 
months service a Regular soldier of the Cheshire Regiment could not be transferred to (say) the 
KSLI without his consent.  By early 1915 this was restricting flexibility over the provision of 
                                                 
20 R. Feilding, War Letters to a Wife (London: Medici Society, 1929; Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2001), pp. 175-6. 
21 Statistics of the British Military Effort, Table (x)(g) p. 666; 1 Oct 16 – 30 Sep 17: 2532 sentences suspended; 1 
Oct 17 – 30 Sep 18: 3078 sentences suspended.  
22 Private Evan Fraser’s death sentence for desertion in April 1915 was commuted to penal servitude and 
suspended. He made three more attempts to desert within two months of returning to his unit.  There appears to 
have been insufficient evidence on the new charges of desertion to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt but 
the FGCM invoked the original death sentence, which was subsequently confirmed by the formation commanders 
and the CinC.  Pte Fraser became the first man to be executed for reoffending whilst under a suspended sentence.  
Cited in C. Corns & J. Hughes-Wilson, Blindfold and Alone (London: Cassell, 2002), pp. 338-40. 
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replacements.  The first amendment to Section 83 was contained in the Army (Amendment) 
Act, 1915, of 16 March, which removed the time limitation on transfer between corps of the 
same arm or branch during time of war but only for any Regular soldier enlisted after 4 August 
1914.  The amendment was passed with no difficulty. 
 
The War Office now sought to gain greater flexibility in the use of TF soldiers. Under 
the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907, a TF soldier could not be transferred without 
his consent from one corps to another nor, unless embodied, could he be posted without his 
consent to any unit, even in the same corps, other than that which he had joined on enlistment.  
He certainly could not be posted without his consent to any regular unit.23  The War Office had 
begun trying to chip away at this in mid-January 1915 and had tentatively proposed the transfer 
of ‘IS men in TF reserve formations who may be willing to transfer to the regular army’.24  This 
was followed by a similar instruction in February but by March it had obviously proved too 
difficult and the proposal was retracted.25  All that could be done was to ease transfer by consent 
between embodied TF units of the same corps.  In April it was announced that in future transfers 
between one TF unit and another would be handled administratively on the lines laid down in 
Kings Regulations for the Regular Army.26     
 
It was already proving difficult to reinforce TF units overseas.  The success of the earlier 
legislative actions seems now to have prompted the War Office’s first attempt to obtain greater 
flexibility for the use of TF soldiers through legislation.  In late April a Bill was proposed which 
                                                 
23  Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907, Section 7(4), Manual of Military Law (London: HMSO, 1914), p. 
760. 
24 TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 118, 16 January 1915. 
25 TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 258, March 1915. 
26 TNA: WO 123/57 AO 188, April 1915. 
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removed the need for TF members to consent to being transferred to other TF units or from one 
TF corps to another.  It was rapidly apparent, however, that it would have a far more difficult 
ride through Parliament since it immediately came up against the strong TF lobby in the 
Commons.  The Bill was seen as yet another attack on TF terms of service.  Mr Joynson-Hicks 
reminded the House of the ‘very great pressure’ that had been put upon Territorials to induce 
them to agree to serve overseas.  He continued: 
… it seemed to me, even then, a form of conscription on the very type of men who did 
not need conscription. They had already joined the Army for Home Defence, and 
pressure was put upon them to induce them to consent to go on foreign service.27 
 
There was much more in this vein during a lengthy and heated debate and, considerably bruised, 
the Government adjourned the matter.  It was going to be no easier to change the TF’s terms 
and conditions of service, even during a war, than it had been to create it in the first place.  
 
The following week the Government replaced the TF Bill with a Bill further amending Section 
83 of the Army Act, which applied to Regular soldiers.28  It is apparent from the ensuing debate 
that some MPs remained, at least initially, a little confused as to which part of the Army they 
were now debating.  Introducing the new Bill, the Under Secretary of State for War, the Rt Hon 
H. J. Tennant, explained that: 
…it is very desirable that we at the War Office should be enabled to ... employ such 
soldiers as are available in the capacity in which they are most required …where you 
have considerable wastage in a particular battalion, and there are not sufficient Reserves 
in the Reserve battalion for that particular unit, it is desirable that the process of transfer 
should be made more simple and more easy. The whole object of this Bill is to empower 
the Army Council to make such transfers. 
 
The difference between this proposal and the earlier Army Act amendment was two-fold: it 
would apply to all members of the Regular Army, irrespective of their length of service, and 
                                                 
27 Hansard HC Deb 27 April 1915 vol 71 cc611-23. 
28 Army Act Amendment (No 2) Bill.  HC Deb 06 May 1915 vol 71 cc1311-20. 
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enable a man to be transferred to a different arm or branch of the Army from the one in which 
he had previously been serving.  Various matters were raised in the Parliamentary debate: the 
position of friends and workmates who had enlisted in the ‘Pals’ battalions; the reluctance a 
man might feel to be transferred to ‘any Line or Cavalry or Artillery regiment’; Welsh, Scottish 
and Irish national feelings; the transfer of non-combatants to combat units; and the question of 
re-transfer at the end of the War.  The matter was adjourned but, despite much further discussion 
in both Houses, the Bill was subsequently passed relatively easily.  The only amendment 
inserted was that a soldier who was compulsorily transferred might transfer back to his original 
cap-badge after the war.29  The Army (Transfers) Act, 1915 received Royal Assent on 19 May. 
 
Interestingly, the provisions of the new Act were not immediately promulgated to the Army as 
a whole.  It would seem that the War Office, despite having gained the authority, were as yet 
reluctant to invoke it too widely, perhaps since it was such a fundamental change to a soldier’s 
terms of service.  The only relevant AO simply amended the Pay Warrant to ensure that soldiers 
who were transferred, and remained in the same rank, would retain their existing rates of pay if 
they were more advantageous than those of the corps to whom they had been transferred.30  The 
new powers were instead publicised by correspondence from the War Office to Home 
Commands, details of which were contained in two War Office Instructions (WOI), both dated 
23 May 1915.  These related to transfers to the Infantry from firstly the Royal Army Medical 
Corps (RAMC) and secondly from the Royal Horse Artillery (RHA and Royal Field Artillery 
(RFA).  Both letters contained space to insert the number of transfers to be made within the 
Command concerned and an exhortation that whenever possible volunteers for transfer should 
                                                 
29 This sometimes causes confusion when researching a soldier since his unit on demobilization can be different 
from the one in which he spent the bulk of his Great War service. 
30 TNA: WO 123/58 Army Order (AO) 211, 25 May 1915. 
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take precedence over others.  Those selected should also be those least likely to make the grade 
as medics or artillerymen. Furthermore, ‘Scotsmen, Irishmen, Welshmen and Englishmen’ 
should be transferred as far as possible to ‘regiments of their own nationality’ and men of the 
same nationality serving together would be transferred together to the same regiment of 
infantry.31   
 
By June the effect of the Act was becoming visible.  James Jack, serving briefly with 3rd 
Cameronians, noted on 9 June that 84 volunteers from the RAMC had reached the battalion for 
training as infantry.32  Also in June some 200 Gunners were transferred to 3rd Cheshire.  Harry 
Parkinson, Wilfred Yates and William Joseph Fleming were part of this group and all would 
find themselves in France in December 1915.33  Similarly, Pte George William Hall, RAMC, 
was transferred with a group of about 40 from the RAMC Training Centre to 3rd Cheshire.  All 
these men had enlisted in 1914 or very early in 1915 so were six months through their initial 
training.  It would be a further six months before they would find themselves at the Front. 
 
Although men of the same nationality were supposed to be transferred together, there seems to 
have been less effort in 1915 to post men from the same regional Commands together.  A group 
of about 100 men was transferred from the Sherwood Foresters in Northern Command to 3rd 
Cheshire on 9 July.  Many of these men had enlisted in late 1914/early 1915, although their 
regimental numbers show that others were pre-war soldiers, presumably Reservists recalled to 
                                                 
31 TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 199, 23 May 1915 - Transfers from RAMC to Infantry and ACI 200 of 23 May 1915 - 
Transfer of men from RH and RFA to Infantry. 
32 John Terraine (ed), General Jack’s Diary (1964; London: Cassell & Co, 2000), p. 106. 
33 www.Ancestry.com Service records (SR) and Medal Index Cards (MIC) for 28062 Private H. Parkinson, 
28113 Private W. Yates, 28275 Private W.J. Fleming and 28024 Private George William Hall.  
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the Colours.  Unlike the medical and artillery transferees, some of these men would arrive in 
France within a week of their transfer: a draft of 33 joined 1st Cheshire on 24 July.34   
 
Growing Use of Medical Categories 
Earlier in 1915 the need for some means of ensuring uniform standards of medical fitness 
amongst drafts had been recognised.  In March instructions were issued for the establishment 
of Standing Medical Boards (SMB) in all stations providing drafts for service abroad.  
Composed of two or three medical officers, one of whom was to be a Regular RAMC officer, 
they were to examine all men reported by their unit as unfit for service abroad, using the 
following classifications:  
 
A Fit for service home and abroad; 
B Temporarily unfit for service abroad; 
C Fit for home only; 
D Unfit for service home or abroad. 
 
This was the beginning of classification by medical fitness.  Later, in July 1915, Travelling 
Medical Boards were established to inspect and classify all men reported as being permanently 
or temporarily unfit for overseas service.35   
 
It was decided in late April that SR battalions should create supernumerary companies or 
platoons containing men permanently unfit for service overseas.36  In a subsequent initiative to 
provide further units for Home Defence, Garrison companies were formed in August from these 
supernumerary companies.  There were some interesting caveats:  
… care should be taken … to compose each company of men drawn from the same class 
as far as possible … [and] … men sent from the locally raised units … should be formed 
                                                 
34 Cheshire Regimental Archives (CRA) – 1st Cheshire War Diary, July 1915. 
35 Major-General Sir W.G MacPherson, Medical History of the War Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1921), p. 120. 
36 TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 232, 25 April 1915. 
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into separate companies whenever the numbers available render it possible, so as to keep 
together all men coming from the same class or locality.37 
 
In late 1915 these Garrison companies would be expanded into home service (HS) Garrison 
battalions and allotted to Regiments.38  Not all Regiments would have such battalions: in the 
Marches Regiments the only one was the 3rd (HS) Garrison Battalion Cheshire, formed in 
November 1915.   
 
It had also been realized that although men in Medical Category B might not be fit enough for 
service on the frontline they might still be sent overseas to relieve battalions on garrison duties.  
This led to the formation of Overseas Garrison Battalions from mid-1915 onwards.  The 1st 
Garrison battalions of the RWF and the Cheshire were formed in July and August respectively 
and both were sent to Gibraltar in September 1915.  Whilst initially they were formed from ‘B’ 
men, a revision of medical categories in October also enabled the use of men unable to return 
to active service at the Front.    The 2nd Garrison Battalion Cheshire, raised in October 1915, 
was composed mostly of such men who had become casualties earlier in the war but were now 
fit enough for garrison service overseas.  Cheshire soldiers were grouped as far as possible into 
A and B companies whilst C and D companies were composed largely of men from the South 
Lancashire and the Loyal North Lancashire Regiments.  They were given ‘light training, sport 
– in so far as (their) disabilities would permit – and plenty of good appetising food’ and the 
battalion was soon brought up to standard.39  In due course it would leave for Egypt in March 
1916 along with the 2nd Garrison Battalion RWF thus releasing two TF battalions for the 
Western Front.   
                                                 
37 TNA: WO 293/3 WOI 88, 10 August 1915. 
38 TNA: WO 293/4 ACI 5 of 2 Jan 16; ACI 325, 9 February 1916. 
39 A. Crookenden, The History of the Cheshire Regiment in the Great War (Chester: Evans, nd; Uckfield:  Naval 
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The basic medical categories were now: general service; field service at home; garrison service 
(a) abroad or (b) at home; labour; sedentary work; and unfit for any military service.  It had also 
become apparent that there was a need for longer term treatment of sick and wounded men 
evacuated from the EF, who were unlikely to recover sufficiently to return to overseas service 
within three months.  This led to the establishment towards the end of 1915 of Command 
Depots, run by the respective Home Commands.  The Western Command Depots were in 
Manchester, Prescot, just outside Liverpool, and at Catterick.  On arrival at the Command 
Depot, the convalescent soldier would be examined by a medical board and allocated to an 
appropriate company according to his physical fitness.  He would continue to receive any 
necessary medical treatment together with graduated exercises, massage and ‘therapeutic 
gymnastics’ designed to ‘harden’ him ready for drafting overseas.  Every fourteen days he 
would be re-boarded to assess his progress and when he had recovered sufficiently he would be 
posted to the appropriate reserve battalion.40        
 
TF Difficulties  
It continued to prove difficult to provide TF drafts both for overseas and home defence.  
Although the attempt to obtain legislation allowing TF soldiers to be transferred without their 
consent had failed, the matter continued to rumble on with the War Office seeking ways round 
it and the now vigilant TF lobby on its guard against any perceived assault on TF terms of 
service.  In late May serving Territorials who had previously accepted IS liability were invited 
to sign an amended version of the original IS declaration indicating their consent to being 
                                                 
40 MacPherson, Medical History of the War Volume 1, pp. 91 & 114. 
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transferred between corps if necessary.  In June, a new version, to be signed by recruits was 
also produced, containing the words:   
and where, with a view to service overseas, my transfer to another corps is required, I 
hereby consent to such transfer notwithstanding that the corps to which I am to be 
transferred may be different from that in which I am serving.41  
 
The topic of these forms was immediately raised in the House of Commons.  Despite Mr 
Tennant’s insistence that signature was voluntary, and that transfers would be made only in 
exceptional circumstances, MPs remained unconvinced.42  In early July, the matter reached the 
Lords with the suggestion that it was desired ‘to obtain by a side wind what was directly 
excluded from the Army (Transfers)) Act itself’.  Lord Derby noted that something had affected 
TF recruiting in West Lancashire during the previous fortnight.  He could not say if it was 
definitely due to the reluctance of recruits to agree to be transferred from one battalion to 
another but whereas an average of 1,100 recruits per week had been joining the figure was now 
down to 250.43  Within a week, the forms had been withdrawn and the question of TF transfers 
had to be dropped for the time being, even though it was already proving impossible to reinforce 
some of the TF units serving in France.   
 
There was another problem concerning the TF, namely its use for home defence.  Until March 
individuals could continue to enlist in the TF for home service (HS) only.  Although many came 
under pressure to take the IS obligation, some 82,588 HS men would still be shown on TF 
returns in August 1915.44  The population of the Second Line battalions was thus a mixture: 
genuine HS men, others who had enlisted too late to go overseas with the First Line but still 
                                                 
41 TNA WO 123/58 AO 249 and Appendix XXVIII of 15 Jun 15. 
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hoped to do so and those who were willing but unfit to serve abroad.  The problem was how to 
use these different categories to best advantage whilst ensuring the Second Line formed an 
efficient part of the Home Army.   
 
Steps had been taken in late April 1915 to separate HS from IS men by organizing the former 
in coast protection units and using the latter to complete the Second Line units so that they 
might be available to serve wherever required.45  In June the HS men were organized into 56 
composite TF battalions, known as Provisional battalions, to act as front-line anti-invasion 
units.  They were grouped into Provisional Brigades, with other infantry and support units from 
the same regions, and placed under command of the GOCs of the Home Commands.46  The 
intention was that they would be deployed closest to the coast and in the event of invasion 
would engage the enemy on the beaches and immediately inland.47   
 
These Provisional battalions contained both HS personnel and also soldiers of low medical 
categories.  The prohibition on transferring TF soldiers was circumvented by enlisting the men 
in Second or Third Line battalions and then simply attaching them to the Provisional battalions, 
whilst showing them as supernumeraries on the rolls of their parent units.  Training and 
exercises were carried out and drafts received from Second and Third Line units: on 5 October, 
37 men of the 2nd Monmouthshire joined the 48th Provisional Battalion in Norwich, and on 9 
December some 82 men from the 2nd Line 1st Herefordshire plus a further 113 Monmouthshires 
arrived.48  Although the Provisional battalions were not intended as draft-finders, pressure was 
                                                 
45 TNA: WO 293/2 WOI 220 of 24 April 1915 – Separation of Home Service men from IS Men in the TF.  
46 TNA: WO 293/3 WOI 31 of 4 July 1915 Composition of Provisional Bde; refers to AO 314 of 1915.  
47 Mitchinson, Defending Albion, p. 101 and Appendix III, p. 208. 
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increasingly placed on those men who became fit enough for overseas service as the need for 
reinforcements grew.  In October the 44th Provisional Battalion noted:  
During the month a total of 42 recruits have been received from the 7th, 8th and 9th 
(King’s Liverpool Regiment) Depots.  These men are shaping very well and will be 
used for Guard duties as soon as their training is completed.  They are all Imperial 
Service men and will be sent to 2nd or 3rd line units when medically fit and trained.49 
 
The problem for the Provisional battalions was their rapid turnover of manpower which made 
coherent training difficult.  Furthermore, their coastal locations were not ideal for training and 
they were also very far down the line for the provision of ammunition and equipment.  In 
September 1915 the Norwich-based 48th Provisional Battalion undertook a tactical exercise 
travelling by train from Thorpe to Melton Constable, a journey of over 2 hours, and then seem 
to have dug trenches.  On 8 September it was noted that 193 Japanese rifles were given out to 
‘A’ Company in exchange for 193 Japanese carbines.50  Men posted from such units and drafted 
out to the Front were in for a rude shock, as were the units that would receive them. 
 
Behind and in support of the Provisional Battalions were the TF Second Line Divisions.  
Kitchener appears to have promised not to use these as draft finders, but it proved impossible 
to hold to this.51  In May, Kitchener pessimistically informed the War Cabinet that the Second 
Line had been ‘bled white’ by despatching drafts and was now incapable of fulfilling its Home 
Defence role.52  Some drafts had been sent to the First Line by the Third Line but the Third 
Line depots had taken time to create and as yet there were simply not enough trained men so 
drafts had of necessity been sent from the Second Line Home Defence units.   
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50 TNA: WO 95/5458 – War Diary of 48th Provisional Battalion September 1915. 
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The difficulties of providing TF replacements and the constant tension between home defence 
and the BEF were highlighted by the situation of the 50th Northumbrian Division.  It had 
proceeded overseas in mid-April and by 23 April had arrived at its concentration area to the 
west of Poperinghe with 572 officers and 16,858 men.53  A newly arrived division would 
usually undergo a period of training but 50th Division’s arrival coincided with the German attack 
at Ypres on 22 April so it was rushed into the heavy fighting of the Second Battle of Ypres, 
suffering heavy losses: 186 officers and 5018 men between 22 April and 31 May 1915.54  
Replacements for the 50th Division, the only TF division to have been involved, would need to 
come from its Second and Third Line units.  However, its Second Line units had originally been 
full of HS only men and the Third Line units had been very late in forming.55   
 
With these constraints the Division was still seriously undermanned nearly six months later 
when in late September it became the subject of a series of War Office Minutes.  The trigger 
for these was a note from AG’s branch, containing drastic proposals to replenish the Division 
from its Second Line units.  Since 1 September 1,474 men had gone or were under orders to 
join the First Line units in France but this was still inadequate.  The only way to increase this 
figure would be to take every trained man from the Second Line, a total of 1,336.  This would 
leave the Second Line units very weak but would ensure the Division’s Infantry units received 
a total draft of 2,810 during September.56  The proposal sparked a serious reaction from the 
then Director of Home Defence (DHD), Major General L. E. Kiggell, who wrote to the CIGS 
on 27 September warning of the continuing possibility of invasion and the low fighting strength 
of the HD force which would have to confront such an event with partially trained and 
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inadequately armed troops led by inexperienced officers.  The nub of the minute was a request 
for a decision on whether the already ‘dangerously’ weak TF divisions at home should be 
weakened still further for the sake of the BEF.57  The matter reached Kitchener, who on 7 
October ruled that the Northumbrian Territorials should receive the available reinforcements. 
The immediate problem for that Division had been eased but the underlying difficulties 
remained, namely the constraints the TF transfer regulations placed on reinforcing units and the 
conflicting requirements of the Home Army and the BEF.     
 
Growing Manpower Problems 
The consequences of uncontrolled recruiting were becoming apparent for the nation at large.  
Many industries had been affected but the loss of skilled and experienced munitions workers in 
particular meant that the output of equipment and weapons was failing to meet requirements.  
The main problem was a lack of any centrally held information on the distribution of manpower. 
On 1 July 1915, a remedy was sought with a Bill proposing compulsory registration of the 
capabilities and occupations of everyone in Great Britain, male and female, between the ages 
of fifteen and sixty-five was put before Parliament.58 It was designed to obtain information on 
the numbers employed in each industry from which could be calculated those needed for 
munitions work, shipbuilding, agriculture and other essential activities and the consequent 
surplus available for the army and navy.  Despite some opposition from those who saw it as a 
precursor to conscription, the National Registration Act was passed in July and registration took 
place on 15 August.  The outcome showed 2,832,210 married and 2,179,231 single men of 
military age not serving in the forces.  Those considered indispensable for work essential for 
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national survival were ‘starred’ as being in ‘reserved occupations’; of the single men, 690,138 
were thus ‘starred’, leaving 1,489,093 technically available for military service.59      
 
Opposition to conscription continued alongside growing realization of the inadequacy of a 
voluntary system to meet the manpower demands placed upon it.  A War Policy Committee 
was set up in early September to examine the existing voluntary recruiting system and ‘some 
general consideration of the alternative of compulsion’.60  It based its considerations on a 
projected British Army strength in the field on 1 April 1916 of 1.5 million or about 70 divisions, 
the figure Kitchener had pledged in discussions with the French High Command at Calais in 
July 1915, and the need to maintain that force at its full establishment until the end of 1916.  
The War Office contended that recruiting would have to be raised to 25,000 per week in order 
to maintain a force of 70 divisions throughout 1916.   
 
Statements were taken from Government departments which inevitably accorded both with the 
responsibility of the Minister concerned and, to a lesser extent with his political leanings: the 
First Lord of the Admiralty, Balfour, questioned the concentration on the Army when ships 
were more important; the Chancellor of the Exchequer, McKenna, contended that 50 divisions 
were the maximum that Britain could afford to recruit and equip; and Kitchener not only needed 
70 divisions but regarded 100 as the ideal.  He confirmed that more recruits would be needed 
to maintain the Army in 1916 than could be obtained under a voluntary system which currently 
produced about 20,000 men per week, enough to keep only 1,000,000 men in the field.61    
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The War Policy Committee put forward three options: maintain the current system and tell the 
French that 70 Divisions were unobtainable; increase the number of voluntary recruits through 
the threat of later compulsion; or introduce compulsory service.  The report was signed by the 
six members of the Committee.62  However, in a Supplementary Memorandum dated 7 
September 1915, four of the signatories, Churchill, Curzon, Selborne and Chamberlain, broke 
ranks and offered six more positive conclusions: 70 divisions would be possible; sufficient 
munitions would be available from March 1916; the required numbers of men existed, albeit 
unobtainable on a voluntary basis; men could be spared from industry if a proper form of 
selection was employed; financial arrangements could be made to maintain 70 divisions up to 
the end of 1916; and it would be desirable to increase the number of divisions to 100 for which 
munitions would be available by August 1916.63  The decision required of the Cabinet was 
clear:  
Whether the 70 division scheme is to be cut down to the limits which can be supplied 
by voluntary enlistment, or whether it is to be maintained and carried out by 
compulsion.64 
 
Action of some kind would shortly become necessary as it became increasingly difficult to 
replace the high level of casualties occurring on the Western Front and elsewhere.  A month 
later, Kitchener informed the Cabinet that the voluntary system was failing to produce the 
35,000 men now needed each week to maintain the armies in the field.65   
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A final attempt at voluntary enlistment was made with the announcement in mid-October by 
Lord Derby, recently appointed Director General of Recruiting, of the ‘group’ or ‘Derby 
Scheme’.  Under this scheme, not applied to Ireland because of continuing fears of unrest in 
that province, men between 18 and 41 not employed in ‘reserved occupations’ were asked either 
to enlist immediately or to attest their willingness to serve when required.  The attested men 
would be divided into 46 groups by age and marital status; single men in groups 1-23 and 
married men in groups 24-46.  Groups would be called up as required, beginning with single 
men aged 19 (Group 2), but no married men would be called up until all the single men had 
been summoned.66  Those who attested but chose to defer their service would receive a day's 
pay at Infantry rates and were then transferred to Section B Army Reserve to await call up.   
This change to the normal form of Reserve service necessitated a hasty amendment to the Army 
Pay Warrant to ensure that the ‘Derbyites’ received no further ‘emoluments from Army Funds’ 
or any normal Reservist entitlements before being called up.67  Applications by attested men 
for further postponements would be considered by specially established Local Tribunals. A 
network of some 2000 local tribunals was created by the Local Government Board (LGB).  
They each consisted of five members, drawn mostly from the local registration authorities that 
had conducted the August registration, and mirrored existing urban and rural council 
boundaries.68   
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The Derby scheme was initially successful and its original end date of 30 November was 
extended until mid-December 1915.  Enlistment into the TF had been allowed under the scheme 
and this was also extended until its completion.69  The processing of recruits seems to have 
worked well although there were some delays and also resentment of those who turned up only 
to attest: a ‘haughty ‘grouper’’ who complained of having been kept waiting in the Recruiting 
Office was greeted by the retort: ‘What the devil are you grumbling at, we have been waiting 
for you for sixteen ***** months.’70    
  
There was a late rush of attestations before the cut-off date of 11 December but by 24 December 
1915 it had become apparent that almost a third of the 3,145,760 unstarred men were 
unavailable for various reasons: medical, Government employment, or employers’ consent 
refused.  Only 55 per cent of available men had enlisted or attested; almost 47 per cent of the 
available married men had refused as had 40 per cent of the single men.71  It was estimated that 
the scheme had produced only 343,386 single men forcing Derby to conclude that ‘it will not 
be possible to hold the married men to their attestation unless and until the services of single 
men have been obtained by other means.’72  The scheme had failed but this was due not so 
much to insufficient single men volunteering as that the demand for 35,000 volunteers per week 
was far too high a target for any industrial society to be able to meet after sixteen months of 
war.73 The Government was now reluctantly faced with the inescapable conclusion that 
conscription was the only way forward.74 
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It might be thought that those left at home had a far easier time than those overseas.  True there 
was little risk to life and limb but the demands on the Government, the War Office and the 
Home Army in seeking to prosecute the war were multi-faceted.  This was particularly the case 
in the provision and organization of the necessary manpower. In contrast, the role of the BEF 
was more hazardous but simpler: they just had to use the men provided to them.    
 
Western Front 
By late 1914, the organization that had brought the BEF across the channel was insufficient to 
manage eleven infantry divisions and five cavalry divisions, with more on their way.  
Instructions were issued on the evening of 25 December for the BEF’s immediate re-
organization into two Armies: First Army, under General Sir Douglas Haig, would comprise I, 
IV and the Indian Corps, whilst Second Army, under General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, would 
contain II and III Corps plus the 27th Division.  The impact of the new structure on existing 
systems and procedures appears initially not to have been recognized.  On 28 December, Haig 
produced a note on staff duties in which he noted that the Army HQ should not become simply 
a ‘post office’ and that GHQ would continue to deal direct with Corps on almost all subjects 
except ‘operations’.  Corps were to forward to the Army Commander ‘Everything that affects 
operations, and which the Army Commander should know in order to command his forces in 
action’.75  This was endorsed on 29 December by a GHQ Routine Order noting that the ‘A’ 
staffs at Army HQs would deal only with disciplinary matters, courts martial and medical 
arrangements.  The rest of the ‘A’ work, including reinforcements, casualties, posting and 
                                                 
75 TNA: 95/589 1st Army ‘Notes regarding Staff Duties’, 28 December 1914, cited in Niall Barr, ‘Command in 
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72 
 
transfer of officers would ‘for the present’ be dealt with by Corps direct to GHQ.76  The 
introduction of the Army level of command was a new departure, so perhaps it is not surprising 
that there should have been some muddled thinking over quite what an Army Commander might 
need to know.  The numbers of effective troops under his command and the necessity for 
reinforcements would, however, appear to be key information.   
 
In the meantime, reinforcements continued to arrive and some 23,815 regular infantry were sent 
up to the Front during January.  They were of variable standards.  Some were half-trained SR 
men, some were time-expired re-enlisted soldiers past military age and some were recruits who 
had joined since the outbreak of war.77  Others were not fit: in January the CO 3 IBD commented 
that whilst the general behaviour of the troops from home had improved, and they were better 
equipped and of good physique, the pre-drafting medical inspections did not seem to be 
sufficiently rigorous and many men were being sent to Medical Boards immediately on arrival 
at the Depot on account of bad teeth. This meant they were not fit for the Front and were 
practically useless.78  The AG staffs at GHQ attempted to keep units up to strength but it was 
difficult: on 20 January the AAG visited HQ 2nd Corps and 27th Division to discuss an 
unaccountable shortage of men in certain units.  There, he learned that a proportion of weak or 
older men had been removed from units to form corps and divisional reserve ‘without the fact 
having been reported’ to GHQ.79    
 
New formations were soon to arrive as well and plans had to be made for the creation of their 
Base Depots.  In mid-February, DAG 3rd Echelon attended various meetings concerning the 
                                                 
76 TNA: WO 95/25 GHQ AG War Diary 29 December 1914.  
77 BOH 1915 Vol. I, p. 54. 
78 TNA: WO 95/4185 No 3 IBD War Diary January 1915. 
79 TNA: WO 95/25 AG War Diary of 20 January 1915. 
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imminent arrival of both TF and New Army Divisions.  On 25 February the Base Depots for 
the Territorial units due to arrive shortly and for the North Midland Div (TF) ‘which are now 
landing’ were discussed.80  In the event, Territorial Camps were established to act as receiving 
units and IBDS were then created; in mid-March No 6 General Base Depot at Rouen was 
recycled as No 46 (North Midland) IBD, receiving details from No 2 Territorial Camp.81   
 
The split of responsibilities relating to manpower continued to require refinement and the 
necessity for Army HQs to have visibility of the reporting of casualties and the provision of 
reinforcements was soon realized.  New instructions were issued to come into effect on 1 March 
1915.  In future, Divisions would telegraph daily reports of casualties, as at 12 noon daily, to 
their respective Army HQ where the reports would be consolidated and forwarded to AG, GHQ 
and the DAG 3rd Echelon, Rouen.  If heavy fighting was in progress then Divisions or Corps, 
as previously arranged by the Army HQs, were to telegraph round numbers of heavy casualties 
in any particular units direct to AG, GHQ.  This was to enable advanced warning to be given 
of the need for reinforcements either from the Base or from England.  Demands for 
replacements due to casualties and normal wastage such as sickness were now to be submitted 
directly to DAG, 3rd Echelon by the Army Corps, and no longer through AG, GHQ.  The DAG 
would decide how reinforcements for the same Regiment would be apportioned.  He would also 
send weekly tables showing reinforcements at Bases direct to Army HQs as well as to GHQ.  
Daily routine strength returns showing the fighting strengths of brigades were to continue to be 
compiled and submitted to AG GHQ and a weekly statement showing the strength of each unit 
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together with details of reinforcements at the Base on that date would in future be sent by Corps 
to Army HQs and copied to DAG, 3rd Echelon and AG, GHQ.82      
 
These new reporting processes would be tested at the battle of Neuve Chapelle, 10 – 13 March.  
This was the first planned British offensive of the war, and the outcomes would provide lessons 
and methods that would form a model for most British attacks for the rest of the war.83  The 
passage of information was particularly acute concerning the reporting of casualties.  
 
The First Army plan was to capture the village of Neuve Chapelle and then seize the heights of 
Aubers Ridge.  On 10 March, an Advanced Report Centre for AG GHQ was established at 
Hazebrouck by the AAG, Colonel Cooke and the DAAG, Captain Jeffcoat, where arrangements 
were made for the rapid reporting in round numbers of casualties from Neuve Chapelle and St 
Eloi.  The contents of the telephoned reports back to GHQ show the steepness of the learning 
curve and the difficulty of obtaining accurate information.  On 11 March, the AAG reported on 
his visits to the Advanced Reporting Centres for the 1st, 2nd, 7th and 8th Divisions.  The 1st 
Division had so far had no casualties above the normal level, three battalions of the 2nd Division 
had suffered heavy casualties but no confirmed figures were as yet available for the 7th and 8th 
Divisions.  They had ‘promised to wire definite information as they get it direct to GHQ’.  
Unofficially, the DAQMG of 8th Division understood that 2nd Berkshires had lost 9 officers and 
170 ORs and the Divisional staff considered: 
…that we shall be on the safe side if we indent for 400 men each for the 2nd Scottish 
Rifles and 2nd Middlesex.  In the remaining battalions of the 23rd and 25th Brigades they 
consider we shall be about right if we ask for 200 men each.84  
                                                 
82 TNA: WO 95/25 GHQ AG War Diary GRO 674 Appendix 1 – “A” Staff Duties – Headquarters of Armies 
wef 1 March 1915 and WO 95/43 DAG 3rd Echelon War Diary for 1 March 1915. 
83 Barr, ‘Command in the Transition from Mobile to Static Warfare’, p.33. 
84 TNA: WO 95/25 AG War Diary entry for 11 March 1915. 
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Matters were not much better at HQ First Army.  An Advanced Report Centre had been set up 
on 9 March at Merville, manned by the AQMG, Lt Col Holman, and a clerk.  By 11 March 
another officer had joined him as Holman had ‘found he had too much to do’ but even then they 
had difficulty obtaining information.  The estimated total casualties for 10 – 13 March inclusive 
were given as 463 officers and 13,120 men but accompanied by the comment: 
As, however, practically no casualty figures are available from 4th Corps, these figures 
being merely estimates based on remaining strength as far as it is known, the estimate 
is necessarily very much a matter of guess work.85 
 
On 14 March, the report telephoned back to AG branch GHQ shows increasing signs of 
frustration:  
Col Cooke went out today to the 4th Corps and the 1st Army Headquarters, and he 
pointed out clearly that the matter of reporting casualties must be quickened up.  He 
then went on to the 7th Division, and he understands from them that 113 names of 
officers have been submitted already. As regards other ranks in the 7th Division, 
estimated casualties are 2448. Col Cooke impressed upon the 7th Division that they must 
have some better system, on future occasions, of sending out a staff officer to collect 
information. He then went on to the 8th Division advanced reporting centre.  All he could 
get from the 8th Division was the strengths on this morning.  The unofficial figures may 
be correct, but Col Cooke does not know what they actually include.  He thinks they 
may mean only men in the trenches.  Col Cooke’s opinion is that these casualties are 
not over-estimated. They are gained from quartermasters and transport personnel of the 
formations mentioned.86                             
 
The frustrations were not all one-sided, however.  First Army complained that the present 
system of collecting casualty returns had given rise to ‘very numerous enquiries and telegrams’, 
requesting that: 
a more speedy and accurate scheme .. be devised for rendering these returns without 
unduly harassing Divisional and other Staffs during periods of active fighting.87 
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That several lessons had been learned during the fighting is evident from Col Cooke’s 
subsequent report: 
1. That it is very advisable for representatives of AG GHQ to keep in touch with 
HQ of Divisions during the progress of heavy fighting to ensure early information 
reaching the AG (and through him the CinC) regarding casualties. 
2. That it is essential that Divisional Commanders shall have some organized 
system of communicating casualties rapidly in round numbers from Brigades to 
Divisional HQ. 
3. That ordinary routine work of the administrative staff of Divisions, Corps and 
Armies must be suspended to a sufficient degree to enable sufficient numbers of the 
staffs to deal with the unusual casualty and reinforcement work. 
4. That, in order that Division staffs may not be worried with unnecessary 
questions, the General Staff (GS) Liaison officers should not concern themselves with 
any figures of casualties, which it is the business of AG’s staff to collect.88     
 
A new instruction on Casualty Reports and Reinforcements was published on 17 March.89  It 
was produced too early to incorporate all the lessons from the recent fighting but, in replacing 
nine previous instructions, its aim was clearly to consolidate procedures.  It was still broadly 
based on FSR Part 2 but the key change was that when fighting was actually in progress round 
numbers of casualties were to be notified to AG GHQ as quickly as possible so that a forecast 
of the situation and the reinforcements required might be made.  The need for speed was 
paramount in notifying casualty numbers, but absolute accuracy remained essential in the 
subsequent report to DAG 3rd Echelon of personal details of the dead and missing.  Only after 
further verification would the names of the dead, wounded and missing be forwarded to the 
War Office. 
 
The casualty figures for Neuve Chapelle were later shown to be 583 officers and 12,309 men.90  
Despite the difficulties in obtaining accurate figures, the reinforcement system appeared to 
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work effectively as practically all losses had been made good by about 18 March, with total 
reinforcements sent forward from the Base Depots between 10 – 20 March numbering 387 
officers and 19,558 men.91 
 
What had evolved from FSR Part 2 in the light of experience was the key role now played by 
DAG 3rd Echelon.  All applications for the provision of reinforcements were to be made through 
him and he was the sole authority for submitting, when necessary, demands for manpower to 
the War Office.  Once reinforcements arrived in theatre their processing remained based on the 
original procedures: all troops, other than formed units, but including casualties and returned 
stragglers, were to be sent to their respective Base Depots where the OC Reinforcements would 
await the DAG’s orders concerning the numbers to be sent to the Front.  Demands to replace 
casualties and wastage were now submitted directly to the DAG from formation headquarters.92  
On receipt of such demands, if sufficient troops were available in the Base Depots, the DAG 
would send orders to the appropriate OC Reinforcements to prepare the necessary personnel for 
entrainment as soon as rail transport could be provided.  If insufficient numbers were available 
to meet demands, the DAG would dispatch what was available and take steps to demand the 
residue from England.  Where the request was for replacements for normal requirements, such 
as routine casualties and wastage through sickness, the DAG would use his discretion in 
deciding whether to comply at once or to wait until a sufficiently large number was required in 
the Brigade or Division from which the demand emanated.  Overall, it was a large and growing 
area of responsibility and one that overlapped in places with the responsibilities of the IGC, 
who was responsible for the training, administration, interior economy and discipline of all 
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92 TNA: WO 95/181 1st Army War Diary 30 March 1915 - correspondence between DAG 3rd Echelon, AG GHQ 
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DAG 3rd echelon as before, and a daily report to AAG 1st Army. 
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reinforcements, including formed units, and arrangements for their onward movement by rail 
once orders were received for them to proceed to the Front.   
 
Lessons were still being drawn from Neuve Chapelle and a conference at GHQ on 23 March 
discussed future arrangements for accelerating the reporting of casualty numbers during heavy 
fighting.  The outcome seems to have been a constant round of visits by AG staff officers to 
explain what was wanted.  It was, for example, ‘explained to 27th and 28th Divisions that they 
must have some system of sending staff officers round to collect information as to casualties 
and let us know at the earliest moment’.93  In early April Army HQs were informed of future 
arrangements to be introduced by AG Branch GHQ for dealing with casualty numbers during 
severe fighting.  An advanced report centre would be set up, consisting of sufficient AG GHQ 
staff officers to connect with each Army involved in the fighting, plus an officer representing 
the DGMS.  These AG staff officers would be always out during the day visiting the different 
divisional headquarters in order to gather information: collecting the earliest possible 
information regarding round numbers of casualties, ascertaining which units had been, or were 
likely to be, most heavily engaged and generally gaining any other information likely to be of 
use in forecasting probable casualties and requirements. This information would be correlated 
to provide the CinC with the latest figures of casualties and strengths of units and of 
reinforcements expected and a daily estimate of casualties to date and of reinforcements 
expected would also be furnished to the General Staff report centre.94 
 
 
The battle of Neuve Chapelle had been for many of the staffs of the newly expanded BEF a first 
introduction to the casualty reporting procedures.  Evidence of the steep learning curve is shown 
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by the plethora of detail in the respective ‘A’ Staffs’ War Diaries for March and April 1915.  
Such detail does not occur for the periods during which the subsequent battles of 1915 were 
being fought: Second Ypres, Aubers Ridge, Festubert and the actions around Hooge.  It may 
therefore be assumed that the lessons learned from Neuve Chappelle and the casualty reporting 
procedures developed from them remained in place unchanged.   
 
The rapid expansion of the Army had led to shortages of experience at all levels.  The OH notes 
a report from GOC First Army on the shortage of experienced officers and NCOs ‘and that in 
some battalions neither the training of companies nor the general cohesion came up even to a 
moderate standard of efficiency’.95  The problem was also acute at the staff level; qualified 
officers could not be found for the growing number of staff posts created by the increase in the 
number of formation headquarters at home and overseas.  Increased size brought increased 
complexity.  Instead of the previous generalists, specialist staff officers would now be needed 
who understood the routine of one branch or department of the staff.96  In the ‘A’ area a 
programme of ‘on the job’ training was instigated at GHQ.  For example, between 15 and 26 
April Captain C.V.O. Gray, Seaforth Highlanders, was attached to AG’s office for instruction 
in ‘A’ staff work.  This was followed by a fortnight at the DAG 3rd Echelon’s office and then a 
further period, 9 – 28 May, at the AG Advanced Report Centre.  On 29 May he assumed the 
duties of a Staff Captain in 2nd Infantry Brigade.  At a more senior level, Lt Col White, 
Connaught Rangers, spent from 8 June – 14 July on attachment to AG’s staffs before assuming 
his appointment as AAG 3rd Army.  These were just two of a large number of officers who 
passed through monthly for training.  It might not have been in depth training but at least it gave 
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six weeks’ grounding in procedures and, perhaps more importantly, created personal contacts 
between ‘A’ staff officers at different levels.      
 
Some idea of the numbers of men now required for reinforcements may be gained from figures 
for the Second Battle of Ypres.  The total losses for the period 22 April to 31 May were 2,159 
officers and 57,125 other ranks.  In April, 24,301 plus 3,325 TF were sent from the Base and 
the May infantry numbers were even higher: 37,774 plus 4,041 TF.97  The Fifth Division figures 
show 71 officers killed, 209 wounded and 13 missing plus 1,068 men killed, 5,478 wounded 
and 1,155 missing giving a grand total of 7,994 casualties over the whole period of Second 
Ypres.98  Reinforcements were sent up as they became available: between 23 April and 4 May 
63 officers and 3544 men were received by Fifth Division.99  The system set in place seems to 
have been coping.     
 
Between 1 January and 30 June 155,000 Infantry reinforcements were dispatched to the Front 
from the various Base Depots.  However, these overall figures mask a chronic shortage of 
reinforcements for the TF.  As early as 23 April French had protested to the War Office about 
the weakness of TF units.  In early May he and Macready considered retaining a portion of the 
Highland Division as a reinforcement pool as it had been sent from England in place of TF 
reinforcements ‘which the War Office are not able to find’.100  In the event this did not happen 
but by 18th May drastic action had become necessary.  Three of the weakest battalions of the 
London Regiment, 5th (London Rifle Brigade), 12th (Rangers) and 13th (Kensingtons) were 
withdrawn to the LofC and temporarily formed into a composite battalion.  The 7th and 9th 
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Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were also temporarily amalgamated as were the three 
battalions of the Monmouthshire Regiment, which had been particularly badly hit.  Official 
notification from AG GHQ reached Army HQs on 25 May: as TF reinforcements would be 
unobtainable for a considerable time if the strength of a TF battalion fell below 400 ORs a 
proposal for its amalgamation with another battalion was to be submitted to GHQ.  A battalion 
of a TF division requiring such action would be amalgamated with another in the same division 
and if possible a TF battalion from amongst those attached to Regular Infantry Brigades would 
be transferred to the TF division to keep up the prescribed number of battalions in the 
division.101  There was an immediate outcry at home, particularly from the TF lobby in 
Parliament and within a month the policy had been discontinued.  In future any TF battalions 
falling below 400 in strength were to retain their identity unless they expressed a desire to be 
amalgamated or to be attached to a Regular battalion as a separate company, in which case the 
matter was to be referred to AG before any action was taken.  Meanwhile, the WO had notified 
that drafts were being prepared for certain TF units.102  The establishment of all TF battalions 
in France was also to be reduced to 800 men from 2 July. 
 
Fortunately for the BEF, the first divisions of the New Armies were now arriving.  The 9th, 12th 
and 14th Divisions arrived during May followed by five more divisions in July.  Kitchener did 
not want to waste the excellent material of his New Armies and had great faith in their esprit de 
corps.103  Consequently he remained reluctant to allow them to be broken up, as GHQ had 
suggested earlier, and the First New Army divisions went to the Front unbroken; in June, for 
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example, the 12th Division replaced the 27th Division in the line north-west of Armentieres 
whilst on 1st July the 9th Division relieved the 7th Division near Festubert.  
    
The Base Depots were by now well settled into their routine, sending drafts to the Front as and 
when required.  Drafts were allocated to particular units and were not to be diverted to other 
units without specific authority from GHQ.104  In early July James Jack commanded 93 men of 
the 2nd Cameronians at No 8 IBD at Harfleur where facilities included practice trenches, assault 
courses and a rifle range.  Parades were held morning and afternoon, and training consisted of 
tactical exercises, route marches, lectures, drill and other training.  Reinforcements arrived from 
various sources; on 8 August Jack noted that ‘a smart draft’ composed mainly of Cameronians, 
who had recovered from wounds received at Neuve Chapelle, had arrived on 27 July and a draft 
of 60 from the 12th (Service) battalion had arrived three days later.  The latter were ‘splendid 
material but insufficiently trained …’.105   
 
Training available at the Base depots could not replicate frontline conditions.  A partial solution 
to this was found by the creation of ‘Entrenching Battalions’.106  These would be closer to the 
Front and also provide much needed manpower for work such as digging, wiring and trench 
boarding.  By the end of the month ten such battalions, each containing 20 officers and 1000 
men, had been formed and two were already at work at the Front.  For draft-finding purposes 
they remained under the orders of the DAG and were effectively an ‘Advanced Base Depot’.  
As drafts were posted out to units they would be replaced by further drafts from reinforcements 
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available at Base Depots.107  Men were normally attached to Entrenching battalions in 
regimental batches accompanied by their own officers; when they were drafted on as 
reinforcements it was usually, at least in 1915 and early 1916, to battalions of their own 
regiment.108      
 
Medical facilities were also being refined in order to facilitate the return of men to the Front.  
The policy was to evacuate as few casualties as possible to England ‘in order to avoid general 
loss of manpower’ but the increasing number of casualties caused greater congestion in the 
Base hospitals than the single convalescent hospital mobilized in 1914 could handle.  By July 
eight convalescent depots had been established on the LofC at Boulogne, Wimereux, Rouen, 
Le Havre, Étaples, Dannes, Camiers and Le Tréport.  Their purpose, similar to that of the 
Command Depots at home, was to reduce congestion in the hospitals and treat convalescent 
patients until they were sufficiently recovered to be fit for duty.109   
 
Planning had begun in June for a British attack in support of the French later in the year.  The 
battle of Loos would take place between 25 September and 16 October.  Preparations for 
casualty reporting and replacements had been made.  On 21 September the indefatigable AAG 
GHQ, Colonel Cooke, visited the Headquarters of 1st, 2nd, 9th, 15th and 47th Divisions and First 
Army to discuss arrangements and on 22 September the War Office was warned to expect about 
30,000 casualties.  Once the attack started on 25 September, he spent that day and the next two 
going round various headquarters and on 28 September visited 1st Army, 9th and 15th Divisions, 
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arranging for these two divisions to be brought up to strength as early as possible on being 
drawn back into reserve.  By 30 September AG GHQ’s Branch was able to note that the system 
of wiring estimated casualties had worked well, enabling the War Office to begin sending out 
30,000 reinforcements within three days of the start of the battle.  On 4 October, however, 
following information received from the CinC, Colonel Cooke had to warn Sclater at the War 
Office to expect a further 50,000 casualties before the end of October.110 
 
The British casualties at Loos were heavy: 2,013 officer and 48,367 other rank casualties 
between 26 September and 16 October, of whom some 800 officers and 15,000 men were killed 
or missing.111  All these would need to be replaced, particularly the NCOs.  On 22 October HQ 
First Army received an enquiry from DAG 3rd Echelon as to whether its battalions would accept 
Cavalry NCOs from England on condition that these NCOs would be promoted to the next rank 
on transfer.  The answer was that a considerable number of battalions would accept such 
NCOs.112 
 
The omission of mention of further changes to casualty reporting in any of the relevant ‘A’ 
Branch War Diaries may be taken to show that the procedures had worked well.  The 
reinforcement system had also been effective with replacements on hand.  During September 
and October 75,062 men were sent up from the Base.113   
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The Official History analyzes Loos in some detail and attributes at least part of the problems 
encountered during it to the composition of the Army.  The commanders and their staffs lacked 
experience and ‘their divisions were not yet the instruments demanded by the exigencies of 
modern war.’  The Regular Army had been refilled with half-trained officers and men, the TF 
were as yet untried in war and also lacked professional officers and NCOs and the Divisions of 
the New Armies had received ‘only hasty and imperfect training’, hampered by the late arrival 
of weapons and equipment.114  In short, there was a chronic lack of experience at all levels.   
 
Analysis of Changes to the Composition of Marches Battalions 
Five of the Marches battalions selected for analysis had taken part in the battle of Loos.  On 25 
September their reported casualties were 1st SWB (121), 2nd RWF (7 + 113), 9th Cheshire (3 + 
54) and 9th RWF (11 + 240).115  The 1/1st Monmouthshire, the Pioneer battalion of the 46th 
(North Midland) Division, had suffered 13 + 147 casualties, including 27 killed, on 13 
October.116   Based on information in SDGW, the geographical details of enlistment and birth 
locations for selected battalions have been analysed.117   
 
Many of those who died in the second half of 1915 were pre-war soldiers, as evidenced by their 
Regimental numbers, who had joined a Regiment presumably of their choice: there are 
numerous examples such as 8269 Pte William Holden who was born and enlisted in Blackburn, 
Lancashire but joined the Cheshire Regiment.  In many cases, however, enlistments also 
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reflected the need for men to move around to find work.  Within Western Command that might 
mean the cotton industries of Lancashire or the mining areas of South Wales.  Men frequently 
joined the local regiment where they worked, as for example 10940 Pte Alfred Hunt from 
Salisbury who enlisted in Pontypool in the SWB.  Sometimes those volunteering reported to 
their nearest convenient recruiting office with a request for a particular Regiment: 19530 Pte 
John McKeown was born in Talke and enlisted in Burslem, both in Staffordshire, but chose to 
enlist in the SWB.  At its most extreme, two Cheshire soldiers, 25860 Pte Frank Alden 
Gallagher and 25854 Pte William Harry McCarty, were born in Canada and enlisted in Barry, 
presumably straight from the ship.  In a few cases in late 1915, the effects of the Army 
(Transfers) Act may also be seen; some of the men transferred in mid-1915 from the Sherwood 
Foresters to the Cheshires were killed in October.  The information in SDGW simply allows a 
broad analysis and an identification of trends during the period in question.  Greater visibility 
of the picture may be gained by drilling down into the geographic details for selected 
battalions.118  
 
The enlistment figures (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below) invariably show a higher percentage 
enlisted within the Regimental areas than do the birth figures but whilst the KSLI figure of 59 
per cent remains exactly the same as 1914, the Cheshire’s has fallen from 83 per cent to 69 per 
cent.  This is not such a marked drop as it might appear, however, since it is caused simply by 
3 men (12 per cent of the total number of those killed) having enlisted in Northern Command.   
Conversely, local enlistments for the Welsh battalions have increased slightly, although 2nd 
RWF remains low on 28 per cent.  Looking across No 4 District as a whole, 1st SWB seems to 
                                                 
118 NB Where the figures are low the corresponding percentages may give a skewed picture: e.g. 18 Cheshire 
soldiers, 69 per cent of 26 deaths, enlisted in No 4 District.  This rises to 88 per cent of enlistments within Western 
command with the addition of just five more soldiers.  
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be more successful recruiting in the rest of Wales, having enlisted 16 (23 per cent) to 2nd RWF’s 
3 (5 per cent), and only 2nd RWF has enlisted less than 66 per cent from No 4 District as a 
whole.   This trend continues for Western Command where three battalions have enlisted over 
80 per cent whilst 2nd RWF recruited 19 (29 per cent) in Birmingham (Southern Command).  
Enlistment Locations 1st Cheshire 9th Cheshire 1st KSLI 6th KSLI 
Regimental Area 18 69% 35 92% 67 59% 30 97% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - England     4    
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales     4    
Total enlisted in No 4 District 18 69% 35 92% 75 66% 30 97% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 2    12    
 Liverpool/Manchester 3  2  6    
Total Enlisted in Western Command 23 88% 37 97% 93 82% 30 97% 
Northern Command 3  1  3  1  
Southern Command     3    
 Birmingham     5 (4%)   
Eastern     3    
London District     6 (5%)   
Scotland/Ireland         
Overseas         
Total Other Commands 3 12% 1  20 18%  3% 
Total Deaths 26  38  113    
Table 2.1. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected English Regular battalions who were killed/died 
between 1 July – 30 November 1915. 
 
 
Enlistment Locations 2ndRWF 9th RWF 1st SWB 
Regimental Area 18 28% 43 36% 36 52% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - England 12 18% 6 5% 1 1% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 3 5% 47 40% 16 23% 
Total enlisted in No 4 District 33 51% 96 81% 53 77% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 2  4  3  
 Liverpool/Manchester   1    
Total Enlisted in Western Command 35 54% 101 86% 56 81% 
Northern Command 1  7  1  
Southern Command 10  5  2  
 Birmingham 19 (29%) 5 (4%)   
Eastern     10  
London District       
Scotland/Ireland       
Overseas       
Total Other Commands 30 46% 17 14% 13 19% 
Total Deaths 65  101  69  
Table 2.2. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected Welsh Regular battalions who were killed/died on 
the Western Front between 1 July – 30 November 1915.   
 
The difficulty with drawing any firm conclusions for the four Line battalions is that the differing 
sizes of the samples, 270 deaths against 765 in 1914, means that some percentages may give a 
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disproportionate picture.  However, overall the figures for the Line battalions bear out the 
finding above that they were more homogenous in late 1915 than in 1914, despite the large 
numbers of replacements that the draft-finding organisations had already had to produce.   
 
It might have been expected that the figures for the New Army battalions would show 
universally high recruiting in the Regimental areas.  This is the case for enlistments into the two 
English regiments: 92 per cent for 9th Cheshire and 97 per cent for 6th KSLI.  The 9th RWF, 
however, shows only 35 (36 per cent) recruited within its Regimental area, although a  further 
47 (40 per cent) were recruited in the rest of Wales making the enlistment figures for No 4 
District roughly balance: 9th Cheshire 92 per cent; 6th KSLI 97 per cent and 9th RWF 81 per 
cent.  The Western Command figures are similarly over 80 per cent for all three.   
 
The percentages of those born in the respective Regimental areas for 1st Cheshire, 1st KSLI, 2nd 
RWF and 1st SWB (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4 below) remain similar to those of 1914 although 2nd 
RWF shows a marked increase from 11 per cent to 20 per cent.  To the latter may be added a 
further 8 per cent for those born elsewhere in Wales; however, at 28 per cent the 2nd RWF could 
not have been said to be ethnically Welsh in late 1915.  Traditionally 2nd RWF had recruited in 
Birmingham and this is borne out by the 26 per cent born in that city.  The 1st SWB appears 
more Welsh with 39 per cent having been born in Wales.  In contrast, the two English battalions 
show 61 per cent and 50 per cent respectively for 1st Cheshire and 1st KSLI having been born 
within their Regimental Areas, rising to 88 per cent for 1st Cheshire and 72 per cent for 1st KSLI 
having been born within Western Command.  For the Service battalions, the figures for birth 
locations are more varied: whilst only 16 per cent of 6th KSLI were born in other Commands, 
this rises to 26 per cent for 9th Cheshire and 31 per cent for 9th RWF.   
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Birth locations 1st Cheshire 9th Cheshire 1st KSLI 6th KSLI 
Regimental Area 16 61% 24 63% 56 50% 21 68% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – 
England 
  1  3  2  
Elsewhere in No 4 District – Wales   1  6  2  
Total born in No 4 District 16 61% 26 68% 65 58% 25 81% 
Born in No 3 District 3  1  13  1  
 Liverpool/Manchester 4  1  3    
Total Born in Western Command 23 88% 28 74% 81 72% 26 84% 
Northern Command 3  7  7  3  
Southern Command     7  2  
 Birmingham     5    
Eastern   1  7    
London District     3    
Scotland/Ireland   2  3    
Overseas         
Total Other Commands 3  10  32  5  
Location of Birth Unknown         
Total Deaths 26  38  113  31  
Table 2.3. Birth locations of soldiers of selected English Regular battalions who were killed/died between 1 
July – 30 November 1915. 
 
 
Birth Locations 2ndRWF 9th RWF 1st SWB 
Regimental Area 13 20% 35 30% 14 20% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – England 12 18% 7 6% 5 7% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – Wales 5 8% 33 28% 13 19% 
Total born in No 4 District 30 46% 75 64% 32 46% 
Born in No 3 District   3  5  
 Liverpool/Manchester   4    
Total Born in Western Command 30 46% 82 69% 37 54% 
Northern Command 5  13  4  
Southern Command 10  15  12  
 Birmingham 17  3    
Eastern 2  2  12  
London District   2    
Scotland/Ireland   1  3  
Overseas       
Total Other Commands 34  36  31  
Location of Birth Unknown 1    1  
Total Deaths 65  118  69  
Table 2.4. Birth locations of soldiers of selected Welsh Regular battalions who were killed/died between 1 
July – 30 November 1915. 
 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 below show the equivalent data for TF battalions in 1915.  The numbers of 
TF soldiers who died in 1915 were too small for meaningful analysis but have been produced 
to form a baseline for future consideration.  Enlistments show 100 per cent from the Regimental 
area for all the battalions surveyed, which is unsurprising given the local nature of TF recruiting 
and service and the inability to transfer men between TF units.      
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TF Battalions – Enlistment 
Locations 
1 /5th  
Cheshire 
1 /6th  
Cheshire 
1 /4th 
RWF 
1 /1st 
Monmouths 
1 /3rd 
Monmouths 
Regimental Area 19 100% 1 100% 14 100% 30 100% 11 100% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - 
England 
          
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales           
Total enlisted in No 4 District 19 100%  100% 14 100% 30 100% 11 100% 
Enlisted in No 3 District           
 Liverpool/Manchester           
Total Enlisted in Western 
Command 
19 100%  100% 14 100% 30 100% 11 100% 
Northern Command           
Southern Command           
 Birmingham           
Eastern           
London District           
Scotland/Ireland           
Overseas           
Total Other Commands           
Total Deaths 19  1  14  30  11  
Table 2.5. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected TF battalions who were killed/died between 1 July – 
30 November 1915. 
 
The birth locations for the English TF battalions also show 100 per cent as having been born in 
the regimental areas.  The Welsh birth locations are far more scattered, with only around half 
having been born in Wales.   
TF Battalions – Birth Locations 1 /5th  
Cheshire 
1 /6th  
Cheshire 
1 /4th 
RWF 
1 /1st 
Monmouths 
1 /3rd 
Monmouths 
Regimental Area 19 100% 1 100% 7 50% 12 40% 5 45% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – 
England 
    1      
Elsewhere in No 4 District - 
Wales 
      5 17% 2 18% 
Total born in No 4 District 19 100% 1 100% 8 57% 17 57% 7 63% 
Born in No 3 District           
 Liverpool/Manchester           
Total Born in Western 
Command 
19 100% 1 100% 8 57% 17 57% 7 63% 
Northern Command       1    
Southern Command       2  1  
 Birmingham           
Eastern       2    
London District       1    
Scotland/Ireland           
Overseas           
Total Other Commands       6  1  
Location of Birth Unknown     6  7  3  
Total Deaths 19  1  14  30  11  
Table 2.6. Birth locations of soldiers of selected TF battalions who were killed/died between 1 July – 30 
November 1915. 
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Conclusions   
The year started with continuing reliance solely on the recruiting of volunteers but by its end it 
was clear that the introduction of conscription was imminent.  A National Register had been 
compiled providing the Government for the first time with information on the employment of 
manpower throughout the country and the first steps towards greater organisation of the nation’s 
manpower had been taken.   
 
Legislation had also been put in place enabling greater flexibility over the transfer of Regular 
soldiers between cap-badges, although as yet the TF remained obdurate and consequently its 
usefulness both overseas and at home was reduced.  Reserve units had been created for the New 
Armies, including the locally raised battalions, and were now organised into Reserve Brigades.  
Administratively, greater medical classification had been introduced enabling those less than 
100 per cent fit to fight to be used in other ways.   
 
On the Western Front, casualty reporting procedures had been refined in the light of experience 
at Neuve Chappelle and both these and the reinforcement procedures and structures had been 
tested successfully at Loos.  Inevitably the reinforcements coming through as the year went on 
were less experienced than their predecessors but the new camps at home contained better 
training facilities and the Base depots were also better equipped.  The creation of the 
Entrenching battalions was an attempt to give experience near the Front whilst at the same time 
assisting in basic maintenance work.    
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Finally, analysis of fatalities during mid to late 1915 shows as yet no marked decrease in the 
homogeneity of battalions.  Indeed, analysis of the two Welsh Line battalions shows that they 
were slightly more Welsh at the end of 1915 than they had been in 1914.  
 
The Official History, in referring to operational events, notes that its ‘very misfortunes and 
mistakes make 1915 particularly worthy of study’.119  It is also worthy of study in the manning 
and administration spheres, not for mistakes, but for the steady development of structures and 
procedures which laid foundations for what was to come. 
                                                 
119 BOH 1915 Vol. I, p.vi. 
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Chapter 3 
1916: Into the Melting Pot 
 
The first part of this chapter considers political and military developments at home during the 
early part of the year as the Government and the War Office struggled with the manpower 
problem.  The coming of conscription is not explored in great detail but some analysis of its 
provisions and impact is required since men called up under the Military Service Acts (MSAs) 
would become future casualty replacements.  The second and third parts consider events on the 
Western Front during 1916, including analysis of the experiences of selected Marches battalions 
and men, their performance and reinforcement.  Later developments at Home are then 
considered in the fourth part.  Finally, the geographic origins of fatalities are analysed in 
comparison with earlier years.    
 
The prologue for 1916 was the Inter-Allied Military Conference held at Chantilly in early 
December 1915, attended by military representatives of the four Allied armies, French, British, 
Italian and Russian.  The main agreement was to the launching of offensive actions on their 
respective fronts, if possible simultaneously, in order to prevent Germany from transferring 
forces to defend one front after another.  For the British and French this would be a major joint 
offensive in Picardy, on either side of the river Somme.1      
 
Governmental agreement to the planned offensives was needed so the Conference outcomes 
were incorporated in a General Staff paper on the ‘Future Conduct of the War’ for consideration 
                                                 
1 BOH 1916 Vol. 1, pp. 4-9. 
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by the Cabinet War Committee.  The principle underlying its recommendations was that ‘every 
possible division, fully manned and equipped in every respect’ should be placed in France in 
order to ‘break the enemy’s resistance in that theatre’.2  The crucial question of manpower for 
1916 was thus firmly in the spotlight. 
 
On 28 December the War Committee agreed that France and Flanders would be the main theatre 
of operations and that every effort would be made to mount an offensive in the spring in ‘close 
co-operation with the Allies and in the greatest possible strength’.3  By late December, 
therefore, and contrary to those who would wish later to portray the Battle of the Somme as a 
purely military initiative, the British Cabinet had endorsed the Allied military proposals for 
1916.  There would be some back-pedaling in early January when the War Committee noted 
that ‘it must not be assumed that such offensive operations are finally decided upon’, but it was 
clear that there would be a joint offensive with the French in 1916.4  All subsequent manpower 
deliberations of early 1916 would be conducted against that backdrop. 
 
The military men who would handle the events of 1916 had changed during December 1915.  
General Sir Douglas Haig had replaced Sir John French as CinC BEF and Lieutenant General 
Sir William Robertson also moved from being CGS BEF to replace Sir Archibald Murray in 
London as CIGS.  Whilst this deprived Haig in his new post of the assistance of an experienced 
Chief of Staff, it meant that the most senior Military men in London and France not only knew 
each other well but also the new CIGS had had over 12 months experience of fighting on the 
                                                 
2 Ibid, p.9.  
3 TNA: CAB 37/139/59 Meeting of the War Committee held on Tuesday December 28, 1915. The War Committee 
of the Cabinet was formed in October 1915 and consisted of the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for War, 
Foreign Affairs and India, the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Minister of Munitions (Lloyd George).  
4 TNA: CAB 37/140/29 Meeting of the War Committee held on 13 January 1916. 
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Western Front.  When in February 1916 General Sir Nevil Macready left his post as AG BEF 
to return to London to become AG in the War Office, this meant that the two top military 
positions in London were now filled by men with recent BEF experience.5   
 
Developments at Home: January – June 1916 
The manpower estimate for the financial year 1915-16 was originally 3,000,000 men but on 21 
December the Prime Minister sought Parliamentary authority for an additional 1,000,000 by 31 
March 1916.  Wastage at the Front was running at 15 per cent per month and extra men were 
needed for future reinforcements: for every man kept abroad there ought to be 1.8 (sic) at home 
in reserve.  A lengthy debate ensued, covering the perennial topics of the need to recruit all 
available single men; the merits of the voluntary system over conscription; and the demands of 
trade and industry and effects on labour.6  The urgent need for TF reinforcements was also 
raised, particularly for the under-manned second line, prompting one MP to ask whether, in the 
interests of economy in staffing and recruiting, the distinctions between the Regular Army, TF 
and New Armies should be removed.  The Under Secretary of State for War, Tennant, noted 
that different terms, conditions and lengths of service would make it difficult to implement such 
a change during wartime but concluded ominously that ‘if we have the opportunity before us, 
(such change) may very properly form the subject of legislation, if legislation is required’.  The 
Vote was eventually passed the day before the Commons adjourned for Christmas but the 
debate had highlighted aspects that would re-occur throughout the year.7    
 
                                                 
5 HQ BEF was not so fortunate:  Robertson was replaced by Lieutenant-General Launcelot Kiggell who until then 
had spent the war in England, initially as Director of Military Training at the War Office and then as Director of 
Home Defence.  Macready was replaced by Major-General G.A. Fowke, all of whose previous service had been 
with the Royal Engineers.  Whilst he had been serving in France he had no previous personnel experience.   
6 HC Deb 21 December 1915 vol 77 cc213-437. 
7 HC Deb 22 December 1915 vol 77 cc536-574. 
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Committee on Co-ordination of Military and Financial Effort 
Parliament might have adjourned for Christmas but the Cabinet continued to meet to discuss 
various matters, including manpower, recruiting and the disappointing outcome of the Derby 
scheme.  Serious concerns were also raised over the complete lack of co-ordination of military, 
financial and industrial resources.  The situation was succinctly summed up by Sir William 
Robertson, writing to Haig on 31 December:     
There has been no co-ordination of the different departments.  I have been working up 
to 70 Divisions. Lloyd George has ordered material for 100 Divisions.  The Chancellor 
of the Exchequer did not till yesterday know either of these things.  Now he says the 
money will not run to it and I do not think it will.8  
The upshot was the creation on 31 December of a Cabinet Committee for the Co-ordination of 
Military and Financial Effort.9  
 
The Committee took statements from the War Office, the Treasury and the Board of Trade on 
their ‘respective desiderata’ concerning the size of the army, the finance available and the 
numbers that could be spared without dire results for the country’s trade and industry.  The War 
Office stance was that no limit could be placed at present on the numbers of men which might 
be necessary for a successful conclusion to the war: ‘we should aim at placing in the field every 
man we can possibly pay for and get’.  The Committee accepted this as a general principle, 
subject to the requirements of the Navy and obligations to the Allies.     
 
                                                 
8 Robertson Mss I/22/4, Robertson to Haig, 31 December 1915, cited in Keith Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 
1914-1918 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 23. 
9 TNA: CAB 37/139/70 PM letter to the King of 1 January 1916 reporting on the two Cabinet sittings of 31 
December 1915. 
 
 
97 
 
The Committee reported on 4 February.10  The report gives useful insight into the structure and 
state of the British Army in early 1916.  Of its 70 Divisions, 50 were abroad (including 1 
division just about to leave UK), 3 TF divisions were in India, 4 New Army divisions would be 
ready for overseas service within a few months and 13 TF second line divisions, containing 
weak battalions of about 600 men, were allocated to home defence.  A key question was whether 
any of the TF divisions should be prepared for active service.  The Committee decided to focus 
its deliberations on 67 divisions, since the TF divisions in India were unlikely to require many 
reinforcements, and requested the War Office to produce manpower estimates of the numbers 
required to maintain 67 divisions in various permutations of active service and home defence.  
Two of these estimates were then selected for further consideration: the requirements 
respectively for 62 and 54 divisions serving abroad and their maintenance at full strength until 
the end of September.11  Robertson’s position was that all 67 divisions were required and should 
be made ready to take the field as soon as possible.   
 
The estimates were scrutinized in detail.  The first requirement would be to bring all divisions 
up to establishment.  Some 69,000 (44,000 Regulars and 25,000 TF) would be required for 54 
divisions and 148,000 (44,000 and 104,000) for 62 divisions.  The reserves needed to cover 
anticipated wastage during January to March for either force would be 56,000 (39,000 Regulars 
                                                 
10 TNA: CAB 37/142/11 dated 4 February 1916. 
11 Under the 54 divisions scheme, 13 TF divisions would be retained for Home defence at their weak strength ie 
600 and with no reserves.  Under the 62 divisions scheme, 8 out of the 13 TF divisions would be brought up to full 
strength plus reserves ready to be sent abroad by June if needed; the remaining 5 TF divisions would be brought 
up to full establishment of 1,000 men per battalion and retained for home defence, but would not have the usual 
three months reserves ie they would not be available for service abroad unless reserves were subsequently provided 
for them.   
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and 17,000 TF).  The numbers needed by the end of March would thus total 125,000 for 54 
divisions and 204,000 for 62 divisions.12   
 
Wastage after March was estimated at 108,000 all arms per month for 54 divisions and 123,000 
a month for 62 divisions.13  Total manpower requirements for the period January to June were 
estimated at 648,000 for 54 divisions and 703,000 for 62 divisions, the latter figure having been 
discounted by 35,000, as some of the TF divisions would remain at home for some months.  
Finally a figure of 60,000 was included in order to form new units ‘extra to divisions’ such as 
Tank Corps and Machine Gun Corps units.  The total estimated requirements for the period 
January – June came to 833,000 for 54 divisions and 967,000 for 62 divisions.   
 
The monthly requirements were then broken out. January’s figures, at 243,000 and 259,000 
respectively, reflected the need to bring divisions up to strength so the subsequent monthly 
figures up to and including June were less: 118,000 for 54 divisions and between 137,000 and 
145,000 for 62 divisions.  Assuming a decision not to provide reserves for the 5 TF divisions 
remaining at home, the total numbers for July, August and September would amount to 354,000 
for 54 divisions and 399,000 for 62 divisions.  The total recruiting requirement up to September 
would be 1,187,000 for the 54 division scheme and 1,366,000 for the 62 division scheme, which 
would keep the divisions at full strength until the end of the calendar year.14  There were now 
definite and visible calculations showing the numbers required but it remained to be seen 
                                                 
12 TNA: CAB 37/142/11 dated 4 February 1916 pp. 4 & 5; a footnote to the pre-March requirements notes that 
‘These figures are arrived at after credit has been taken for 358,000 infantry in the depots at home (including 
88,000 men returned from the Expeditionary Force who will eventually rejoin their units’.   
13 Monthly wastage was calculated at 13.5 per cent for the infantry, 6 per cent for cavalry, 3 per cent for artillery, 
4 per cent for engineers and 2 per cent for other arms, making an overall monthly average of 9 per cent. NB: The 
infantry wastage had been reduced from 15 percent; it was considered that it had previously been inflated by the 
retreat from Mons and the ‘highly wasteful Gallipoli campaign’.    
14 Ibid, p. 6.  NB: Men recruited at the end of September would not be available for drafting until the end of 
December. 
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whether sufficient men were available, whether they could be spared from their civil 
occupations and whether they could be called up as quickly as needed.   
 
The Board of Trade (BoT) eventually agreed that if necessary 250,000 men could be called up 
so long as certain safeguards were put in place: call up should be by trades rather than by age 
and celibacy; after 1,275,000 had been taken no more men (beyond the army’s proper share of 
the new crop) should be raised from industry for the last seven months of 1916; and the BoT 
should be able to ‘watch the pressure gauge’ weekly and immediately reduce the rate of 
enlistment if grave industrial dangers become apparent.15    
 
The Treasury inevitably submitted that there was insufficient money to support the increase in 
manpower.  Despite this, the Committee concluded in favour of implementing the 62 divisions 
scheme, although it considered it unlikely that the Army would meet its proposed timetable.  
Indeed, it was already estimated that the shortfall against the 473,000 required by the end of 
March would be 94,000.16  Any such delay, however, would both ease the situation concerning 
industry and save expenditure.  The Committee’s final recommendation was that there should 
be a further review in April when the effect of recruiting on trade would be more obvious.  
 
The First Military Service Act (MSA) 
On 28 December, the same day that the War Committee agreed to a joint offensive with the 
French, the Cabinet had formally considered conscription.  A first draft of a Military Service 
Bill to introduce compulsion for single men was considered on 30 December.17  Not all the 
                                                 
15 Ibid, pp. 7-10. 
16 TNA: CAB 37/142/17 Comment by Kitchener on the Report of the Committee on Co-ordination of Military and 
Financial Effort dated 7 February 1916. 
17 TNA: CAB 37/139/58 PM letter to the King of 28 December 1915; TNA CAB 37/139/67 30 December 1915.  
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Cabinet supported it, the Home Secretary, Sir John Simon, resigning over the issue, but work 
on the Bill continued and it received its first reading in Parliament on 5 January.  Key to the 
debate was the recently received report on the Derby scheme highlighting the disappointingly 
large numbers of single men who had neither enlisted nor attested.  Large numbers of married 
men had come forward but on 2 November Asquith had pledged that married men enlisting 
under the Derby scheme would not be sent abroad whilst single men held back.  In order to 
uphold this pledge, it was planned to retain voluntary enlistment for the married man whilst 
introducing compulsion for the single man.   
 
Unsurprisingly, the Bill did not have an easy ride during four extremely lengthy Commons 
sittings.  Many entrenched positions were aired in great detail: the voluntary system versus any 
form of conscription, the effects on trade and industry, warnings of industrial unrest, the 
omission of Ireland (and should Scotland not be omitted too – which was ignored) and 
accusations that by introducing conscription the Government would be introducing the very 
Germanic approach that the nation was fighting against.18  Despite passionate debate, the 
outcome was never in any real doubt.  The Government gained the support it needed and, 
despite further lengthy scrutiny in the Lords, the Bill returned to the Commons to be passed on 
27 January 1916 as the Military Service Act (MSA).  Its effective date would be 10 February 
and the ‘appointed date’ 2 March 1916.19   
 
The Act applied to single men and childless widowers, aged between 18 and 41, resident in 
Great Britain on or since 15 August 1915, the date of National Registration, and who had been 
unmarried on 2 November 1915.  After the ‘appointed date’ all men falling within the terms of 
                                                 
18 HC Deb 5, 6, 11 and 12 January 1916, vol 77. 
19 Public General Acts 5&6 Geo 5 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1916), Chapter 104. 
 
 
101 
 
the Act would be deemed to have been enlisted in the regular forces for the duration of the war 
and been immediately transferred to the reserve.20  There were exceptions, listed in Schedule 1, 
including those already serving in the Navy or the Marines; men previously discharged from 
service due to disability or ill-health; ministers of religion; and members of the TF already liable 
for overseas service.  By definition, the terms of the MSA had removed the TF HS option for 
single men but significantly only the Liberal MP, Percy Molteno, had spoken against its 
removal whilst the rest of the normally vocal TF lobby had acquiesced. 
 
Section 2 of the MSA allowed applications for exemptions to be submitted to Local Tribunals 
up to the ‘appointed date’ and clearly defined the allowable grounds for exemptions: 
employment on essential war work or in education or training; hardship owing to exceptional 
financial or business obligations or domestic situations; ill-health or infirmity; or conscientious 
objection to the undertaking of military service.  Schedule 2 laid down the constitution of new 
tribunals and the process for appeals against their findings.21 
 
A form of compulsion had been introduced but the allowable exceptions and exemptions 
enabled many to escape the net.  The Act applied only to those of age in August 1915 and thus 
disregarded all who had turned 18 after that date.  Moreover, the retention of voluntary 
enlistment for married men whilst introducing compulsion for singles was always going to be 
                                                 
20 Ibid.  
21 Under Schedule 2 the previous ‘Derby’ tribunals were abolished and new ones created which might contain as 
many as 25 members.  The process remained largely the same although a new layer was introduced at the county 
level in order to hear appeals against decisions made at the local tribunals. TNA: MH 10/195 LGB Circular R36. 
Britain was alone in recognising a legal right to exemption on grounds of conscience. Ian F.W. Beckett & K. 
Simpson, eds., Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1985), p. 13. 
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an uneasy compromise.  Robertson was certainly disappointed in its provisions and later 
described it as a half-baked measure’.22 
 
Re-organization of the Reserves 
In January 1916 Sir John French had been appointed to the new post of CinC Home Forces 
(CinC HF), responsible not only for Home Defence but also for the home-based training and 
draft-finding units.  It would be useful to have someone in that post who understood the needs 
of the BEF but balancing the BEF’s ever-increasing demands against those of home defence 
would prove a continuing struggle.  The problem for French was two-fold: the populations of 
training and draft-finding units changed constantly as replacements were posted overseas, 
whilst entire New Army divisions and overseas units of the TF were sent abroad as soon as they 
became efficient.  It made for a very fluid Command.  
 
The creation of the new CinC HF, plus the anticipated influx of men under the MSA, prompted 
a review of the Home Forces, including the Reserves.  The Infantry Reserves now consisted of 
the SR units, TF Reserves and 18 Reserve Infantry brigades supporting the New Armies.  The 
SR units were settled at their War Stations and dispatching drafts as required.  At Birkenhead, 
3rd Cheshire numbered over 3,000 men at the end of 1915 although not all were available for 
drafting as these numbers included convalescents and those awaiting discharge.23  Similarly, 
3rd KSLI numbered over 3,300 men and was sending out each month some 300-400, in weekly 
drafts to replace casualties, plus a further 50 specially selected men to the Machine Gun Corps 
                                                 
22 Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1921), p. 263. 
23 A. Crookenden, The Cheshire Regiment in the Great War (Chester: Evans, n.d.), p. 340. 
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(MGC).24  Not all men were fit for General Service, however, and Garrison Reserve battalions 
were now created to train and supply less fit men as reserves for both overseas and home service 
Garrison Battalions.  The TF reserve organization consisted of third line battalions formed into 
fourteen Territorial Groups, one for each pre-war TF division.  In February 1916 these third 
line battalions would assume drafting responsibility for both the first and second line units, but 
as yet the TF Reserve system had not been fully tested.25  The area that needed attention, 
however, concerned the reserve battalions of the locally raised battalions of the New Armies.  
As locally raised battalions were adopted by the War Office, Local Reserve battalions were 
created from their depot companies; for example, in late 1915 when the 3rd Gwent battalion was 
adopted as 12th (Service) SWB, its depot company became 14th (Reserve) SWB.  These Local 
Reserve battalions were incorporated into the Reserve Infantry Brigades, which now increased 
in number to twenty-six  with an overall establishment of 225,300.26  The links with the parent 
Command and Regiment remained: 14th (Reserve) SWB and 20th, 21st and 22nd (Reserve) 
battalions of the RWF joined 14th Reserve Brigade at Kinmel Park.  There was now a viable 
Infantry Reserve organization available for home defence. 
 
Call-Up of the ‘Derby’ Men and the First Conscripts 
The Derby scheme had been re-opened on 10 January until such time as the MSA should take 
effect.  Some ‘Derby’ men had already been called up: in December single men aged 19 – 23 
in Groups 2 – 5 were warned for call up on 20 January 1916.  This had produced some 30,158 
men plus a further 34,050 direct enlistments but the total was already about 195,000 short of 
                                                 
24 Major W. de B. Wood, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry in the Great War (London: The Medici Society, 1925; 
Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 2003), pp. 319-20. 
25 In April they would lose the ‘3/’ prefix becoming simply Reserve battalions:  3/4th Cheshire became the 4th 
(Reserve) Cheshire; 3/4th KSLI the 4th (Reserve) KSLI; and 3/1st Herefordshire the 1st (Reserve) Herefordshire. 
26 Colonel T. Cave, ‘The Reserve and Training Reserve’, Stand To! 36 (Winter 1992); K.W. Mitchinson, Defending 
Albion (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), p. 125 and TNA: WO 293/4 ACI 205 of January 1916. 
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the 259,000 required.  In early January, the next four groups were warned for call up on 8 
February with the rest of the Groups of single men following by 18 March.  On being called up 
men were appointed to a Corps or unit, wherever possible the one for which they had applied 
on attesting, and finally approved for service; if not accepted they were retained in the reserve 
and sent home.  Detailed administrative procedures for recording those accepted for service 
were necessary so that the Registrar-General’s records based on the National Register could be 
updated.27  
 
Determined not to repeat the chaos of the early weeks of the war, the recruiting organizations 
were better prepared this time.  In Chester: 
Frantic plans and preparations were made – rooms set apart for them to don their long 
deferred khaki – thousands of tickets for their meals printed – complete kits marked in 
advance for the embryo “Cheshire” lads – recruiting orderlies increased in number – a 
string of NCOs belted and ‘sticked’, ready at a moment’s notice to scurry to the station 
to meet arrivals, or to conduct khaki clad recruits safely to their trains – and – all is 
working smoothly.28 
 
Pte Bert Oakes, born in 1885, was called up in Group 13 on 29 February 1916 and joined 9th 
(Reserve) KSLI at Prees Heath.  On 4 March he wrote home describing his new life at the camp:  
The parade ground is an awful place, up to your ankles in water and as you march it 
splashes, wetting putties (sic), overcoat and all making them in an a fearful mess. Still it 
finds us something to do.  … The camp is as large as Ironbridge, Madeley and Broseley 
all combined...29 
 
A normal day’s training for the recruits was: 
Six o’clock get out of bed, dress, make bed and tidy room, first parade 6.30am. Physical 
training till 7.45am. Breakfast, buttons cleaned, shaving and boots till 8.45am.  Bayonet 
fighting till 10 o’clock. Marching and other drill till 12am. Rest and dinner till 1.45pm. 
                                                 
27 TNA: WO 293/4 ACI 86 of 12 Jan 1916. 
28 ‘Depot Doings’ in The Oak Tree, 1 (3) (February 1916), p. 35. 
29 Letter dated 4 March 1916 to Mrs E Oakes, 5 Barber Street, Broseley from 22219 Private BWO Oakes, D 
Company, 9th Batt KSLI, No 28 Hut, 4th Camp, Prees Heath. NB Broseley lies across the R Severn from Ironbridge 
and Madeley, both of which are now part of Telford. 
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Musketry till 4pm. The trench digging comes in the drill from 11 till 12 am so you see it 
is a good day. Then some nights we have an hour lecture and others silent marching to 
the trenches in the dark.30 
 
Instruction in the history and traditions of the recruits’ regiments would shortly be added to the 
training syllabus, in order to develop esprit de corps in the new men.31  With a short break in 
June to get married, Bert Oakes stayed at Prees Heath for 6 months before leaving for France 
on 10 July.  This was double the 3 months training normally allowed but would hardly equip 
him for France. 
 
The Derby scheme finally closed at midnight on 1 March but even with the extended period, 
far fewer single men had been obtained than expected.  Consequently, on 7 March the married 
‘Derbyites’ of Groups 25 to 32 were warned by Proclamation for Call Up on 7 April.  Although 
these men had attested voluntarily there was a storm of protest that they should be sent when 
there were still single men available.  Attention turned to the single men liable for service under 
the MSA who from 2 March were now deemed to have been enlisted and passed to the Army 
Reserve; they were not attested immediately but their names simply noted on the new Record 
of Service form.32  On 10 March the first men were called up under the MSA when a 
Proclamation notified the calling up of men of both Group and Class 1.33  These were the 
youngest men; those who were still under 19 would be medically examined and given the option 
either of returning home or of remaining and undergoing special training until they were of age 
                                                 
30 Letter dated 17 April 1916 from 22219 Pte BWO Oakes, No 28 Hut, 4th Camp, Prees Heath.  
31 TNA: WO 293/4 ACI 850/16 of 19 April 1916 Instruction in History and Achievements of Regiments. 
32 TNA: WO 293/4 ACI 336 of February 1916.  BOH 1916, Vol. 1, p. 152.  AF B 2513 - Record of Service Paper 
– For Men deemed to be enlisted in H.M Regular Forces for General Service with the Colours or in the Reserve 
for the period of the War, or ex-Soldiers recalled for Service with the Colours, under the provisions of the Military 
Service Acts, 1916. 
33 Under the MSA men were placed by age in Classes in order to avoid confusion with the Groups of the Derby 
Scheme; it also avoided the perceived ‘slur of compulsion’ being cast on the latter. 
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to be sent abroad.34  Other Classes followed and the married Derby men also continued to be 
called up with Groups 33 to 41 being warned for call up on 29 May and the older marrieds of 
Groups 42 to 46 being warned for call up on 13 June.  
 
The application of the MSA to single Territorials who had not taken the IS obligation before 2 
March would appear to have been varied.  Instructions were issued by the War Office and 
notices placed in local papers but there remained an element of confusion.  Questions were 
raised in Parliament to which the response was unequivocal: if TF HS officers and men had not 
applied for exemption from the MSA by 2 March then they should be discharged, becoming 
Reservists under the MSA until such time as they should be called up.35  The administrative 
process does not appear to have been actioned in many units, however, as no examples of 
discharges have been found to date.  Many single HS TF soldiers also appear to have taken 
early action to avoid conscription, either by signing the IS obligation or seeking exemption.   
 
Second Report of the Committee on the Co-ordination of Military and Financial Effort 
Manpower continued to form the Army Council’s main topic of discussion during April 
following the production on 6 April of the review required by the Cabinet Committee.36  The 
situation was gloomy: by 30 June the Infantry would be 179,000 men short.  An anticipated 
287,000 recruits for April, May and June plus 90,000 earlier recruits delayed for various reasons 
might cover the shortfall but the 198,000 remaining would scarcely maintain the Infantry to the 
middle of August and provided ‘no margin for any abnormal wastage such as that arising from 
very heavy fighting’.  Furthermore, they anticipated that the flow of recruits would cease 
                                                 
34 TNA: WO 293/4 ACI 839 of 18 April 1916. 
35 HC Deb 07 March 1916 vol 80 cc1340-1. 
36 TNA: WO 33/881 Minutes of 176th, 177th and 178th Meetings of the Army Council.  
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altogether before the end of August as a result of the MSA’s inadequacies: only 212,000 men 
had been obtained between January and March, despite the 358,000 considered by the Board of 
Trade to be available.  There were further manning problems requiring resolution but these 
would need legislative action: the compulsory extension of time-expired men; inclusion within 
the MSA of all youths reaching the age of 18 after August 1915; and the ability to transfer any 
men, including TF soldiers, from their own arm or branch of the service to any other where 
their services might more urgently be required.  The bottom line for the Army Council remained 
the need for every fit man not required by the Navy or for essential employment to be made 
available for the Army.37  With the impending offensive this was now becoming urgent. 
 
The Cabinet Committee produced its second report on 13 April.  Having reviewed the numbers 
of men available for military service through both the Derby system and the MSA it concluded 
that there were actually more available than had been demanded but that the War Office 
recruiting processes were inadequate.  Further conscription continued to be resisted but the 
Committee did at least endorse the Army Council’s proposals for the compulsory extension of 
time-expired men; compulsion of TF soldiers to serve in any unit where they were needed; and 
that all youths reaching the age of 18 should be brought within the scope of the MSA.38  
 
The Committee met the Army Council on 15 April to discuss their conclusions and to 
emphasize how difficult it would be to introduce compulsion for married men of military age.  
Figures provided by the Registrar-General, however, showed that no appreciable intake of 
recruits would be available under the present system after the end of September.  For the Army 
                                                 
37  TNA: WO 33/881 Minutes of 176th Army Council Meeting of 6 April 1916, Item 2.  
38 TNA: CAB 37/145/36 Second Report of the Cabinet Committee on the Co-ordination of Military and Financial 
Effort dated 13 April 1916.  
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Council time was of the essence; it was already unlikely that 62 divisions could be in the field 
by the start of the offensive at the end of June and the 52 divisions currently abroad were short 
of 66,000 men.  They remained adamant that they required all available manpower, and 
emphasized the need for haste so that due notice could be given the men concerned and not less 
than three months allowed for their training.39  An attempt was made to break the impasse on 
19 April, with a proposal by a Cabinet Member, Arthur Henderson, that a further effort be made 
to obtain men by voluntary enlistment but that if by 27 May 50,000 unattested married men had 
not voluntarily enlisted then the Government would immediately ask Parliament for 
compulsory powers.  The Army Council could only reiterate the need for haste, placing the 
onus firmly on the Government to decide the necessary steps to be taken.40      
 
The balance was finally tipped by the latest recruiting figures, which were insufficient to 
maintain the Army at the agreed size and to replace casualties in the anticipated summer 
offensive.  The subject of general compulsion had been raised in both Houses of Parliament 
during April and on 29 April Asquith informed the King that the Government had no alternative 
but to introduce further legislation as soon as possible.  The whole Cabinet was in agreement, 
although Henderson and Runciman voiced some disquiet over the labour issue but Lloyd 
George believed their fears and forebodings were exaggerated.41  On 3 May 1916 the second 
Military Service Bill was introduced.  
 
 
 
                                                 
39 TNA: WO 33/881 Minutes of 177th Army Council Meeting of 15 April 1915, Item 2.  
40 TNA: WO 33/881 Minutes of 178th Army Council Meeting of 19 April 1915, Item 2.  
41 TNA: CAB 37/146/24 Asquith letter to the King dated 29 April 1916.  
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The Second Military Service Act 
The new Bill extended the first MSA making all single and married men between the ages of 
18 and 41 liable for military service.  The exceptions shown in the first MSA remained but the 
extension of liability to all married men would remove home service as an option for married 
TF soldiers fit enough for overseas service.  The ‘appointed date’ would again be thirty days 
after the Act was passed or 30 days after their 18th birthday for boys turning 18, thus enabling, 
as the Prime Minister emphasized, boys to enlist before the month was up so that they could 
come in ‘voluntarily without any exercise or threatened exercise of the compulsory powers’.42  
It was clearly stipulated, however, that youths would not be sent abroad under the age of 19.   
 
Further sections of the Bill tidied up various Army regulations.  Clause 2 amended the existing 
Army Act so that for the duration of the war Regular, Reserve and TF soldiers would be required 
to continue serving beyond their discharge dates unless they had completed 12 or more years’ 
service and had reached 41.  Clause 3 enabled the recall of time-expired former soldiers who 
remained within military age and also the re-examination of men previously discharged or 
rejected as medically unfit for service.  Later sections related to the TF and, in particular, 
Section 14 finally resolved the transfer problem by enabling a TF soldier to be transferred 
without his consent not only between units but also between TF corps and to be posted to 
‘regular units of the corps to which he belongs or to which he is transferred’.  Much time and 
debate was expended upon the Bill in the Commons, and to a lesser extent the Lords, throughout 
May.43  Essentially, however, it received an easier ride than the first MSA since the failings of 
the latter were only too apparent and was finally passed as the Military Service Act 1916 
                                                 
42 Hansard HC Deb 3 May 1916 Vol 82 cc 41 – 100. 
43 Hansard HC Deb 4 May 1916 Vol 82 cc142-267. 
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(Session 2) (MSA2), receiving Royal Assent on 25 May 1916.44  It came into force 30 days 
later on 24 June.   
 
The new Act was followed by a flurry of AOs and ACIs to enable its implementation.  On 8 
June AO 202 notified the retention in service of time-expired Regular and TF soldiers unless at 
their due date they were aged 41 and had served for 12 or more years, plus the additional twelve 
months' war service.45  The pill was sweetened a few days later, however, by the payment of a 
bounty for these men and also for those recalled for service by the Act or who had voluntarily 
re-enlisted.46  The more contentious issue of compulsory transfer was formally publicized on 9 
June.47  The Army Transfers Act 1915 had already enabled compulsory transfers for Regular 
soldiers but this had not previously been notified in Army Orders, nor had its impact yet been 
felt on the Army at large.  It was now made absolutely clear that Regular and TF soldiers of any 
rank could be transferred without their consent to any Corps.  For clarity, the changes for a TF 
NCO or soldier were enumerated: he could now be transferred without his consent from one 
Corps to another of the TF; if he had taken the IS obligation he could be drafted to serve abroad 
in any TF unit within the Corps to which he belonged or to which he might be transferred; and 
then be posted without his consent to a Regular unit of the Corps to which he belonged or was 
transferred.  The administrative procedures for such transfers were outlined, and the records of 
soldiers so transferred were in future to be annotated, ‘Transferred under authority of AO 206 
and ACI 1166 of June 1916’.     
                                                 
44 Public General Acts Passed in the Sixth and Seventh Years of King George The Fifth (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1916), pp. 33-38. 
45 TNA: WO 123 AO 202 of 8 June 1916 - Discontinuance of Discharges on Completion of Engagement.  During 
1915, soldiers who had come to the end of their engagements or, if they were Reservists mobilised on the outbreak 
of war to the end of the extra year for which they were liable, had been offered the opportunity to continue serving 
until the end of hostilities. TNA WO 123/57 AO 252 of 1915 published June 1915. 
46 TNA: WO 123/58 AO 209/16. 
47 TNA: WO 123 AO 204 of 9 June 1916 and WO 293/4 ACI 1166 of 9 June 1916. 
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Many TF soldiers undoubtedly had cause to feel aggrieved over the changes to their terms of 
service.  They had originally enlisted for home defence but were now compulsorily liable for 
service abroad and, for the duration of the war, they could also be posted without their consent 
from the unit they had originally joined.  The TF lobby had fought to protect their position 
during the MSA debates, remaining unconvinced by Army Council statements that transfers 
would be carried out only when absolutely necessary, and that they had no intention of allowing 
‘any injury to the Territorial Force now or in future’, but their opposition had been over-
ruled.48  The problem for Macready, the Manning authorities and the BEF, however, was that 
the very inflexibility of the original TF regulations had prevented it fulfilling its original 
function of a second line capable of supporting and expanding the regular force.  Furthermore, 
many TF units at the Front could no longer be reinforced and had not only been fighting with 
insufficient manpower but had had to be withdrawn from the front line thus forcing other units 
to take their places.  The two viewpoints were diametrically opposed and would never agree.  
The second MSA created the necessary tools to address the difficulties but the TF grievances 
arising out of what would become known as the ‘Transfer Controversy’ would continue for a 
long time to come.49         
 
Review of Medical Categories 
In early May, in anticipation of reviewing those previously rejected for service on medical 
grounds, the existing medical categories had been expanded and lettered: A – General Service 
(ie active everywhere); B – Abroad, further sub-divided into B1- Garrison Service, B2 Labour 
                                                 
48 Hansard 1916 Series 5 Vol 82, 986-993 – Commons Sitting 11 May 1916. 
49 K.W. Mitchinson, ‘The Transfer Controversy’, Stand To! 33 (Winter 1991), pp. 29 – 32 and K.W. Mitchinson, 
Gentlemen and Officers (London: Naval & Military Press and IWM, 1994), pp. 130 – 6. 
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and B3 Sedentary Work; and C – Home, further sub-divided into C1 Garrison Service, C2 
Labour and C3 Sedentary Work.  The new categories, however, were insufficiently specific to 
categorize casualties from the BEF and in June they were extended and amplified by the 
addition of comprehensive guidelines for the benefit of medical boards.50   
 
Mid-1916 Diversity 
The various changes since the beginning of the war meant that by mid-1916 soldiers of the BEF 
could fall into some nine distinct types: surviving pre-war Regulars; reservists, both SR and 
Army, mobilized on the outbreak of war; ‘Kitchener’ volunteers; TF soldiers, both IS men and 
those HS men caught up for overseas service by the MSA; Derbyites who had delayed their 
enlistment; conscripts; and those continuing to volunteer rather than be called up.  Differing 
perceptions of their relative capabilities were inevitable and widespread.  An early, and 
somewhat naïve comment, was that of Lieutenant Eric King, who had written home in January 
1916:  
no man who is dragged into the Army through Conscription will ever be able to look the 
world in the face with a clear conscience. … one feels such contempt for the miserable 
slackers who wait until they are fetched.51 
 
In contrast, 3rd (Reserve) KSLI would find that the introduction of conscription brought ‘men 
of superior education, drawn from all kinds of trades and professions’ into the battalion.  They 
were not physically of so high a standard as the farm hands and ploughmen who had enlisted 
after the 1915 harvest ‘but training quickly improved them in all ways’.52  Others felt that 
conscripts had at least shown the courage of their convictions by waiting to be called up and it 
                                                 
50 TNA: WO 123/4; BOH 1916, Vol. 1, pp. 152-3 and TNA WO 293/4 ACI 1241of 1 June 1916.  See Appendix 
4 for details.   
51 Lieutenant E. King, ‘A Ripping Lot of Fellows – Letters from a Grenadier Battalion Officer’, Stand To!, 70 
(April 2004), p. 17. 
52 Wood, The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry in the Great War, p. 317. 
 
 
113 
 
was the ‘Derby’ men who were despised: to be called or even thought a ‘Derby’ man in some 
units was an insult.53  This resentment against ‘Derby men’ would continue for some time.  
Walter Williamson attested in late 1915 but was not called up until June 1916.  On joining 6th 
Cheshire in December 1916 he would note that ‘We were made very welcome, and knowing 
that the battalion had been in France since 1914, it was a pleasant surprise to hear no remarks 
about ‘Derbies’.54 
 
Western Front: January – June 1916  
During early 1916, whilst establishing himself as CinC, Haig was also initiating planning for 
the anticipated offensive.  A key preoccupation would be the number of men at his disposal and 
much of his attention and time during the first half of 1916 would be taken up by the 
requirements of munitions and manpower.55   
 
In early January Haig instituted weekly meetings with the three Army Commanders and set 
them to working out schemes for operations to wear out the enemy and for a decisive attack.56  
At this time, General Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army occupied a 20 mile front from 
Boesinghe to Armentières, First Army, temporarily commanded by General Sir Henry 
Rawlinson, held the next 25 miles south to Loos after which the French Tenth Army occupied 
a gap of 20 miles before the Third Army, under General Sir Edmund Allenby, covered the 22 
miles from Ransart down to the Somme near Curlu.  The task of working up an attack in the 
Third Army area initially fell to Allenby, who was instructed that it might be either an isolated 
                                                 
53 R. Feilding, War Letters to a Wife  (1929; Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2001) , p. 47. 
54 D. Priddy, ed., A Tommy at Ypres, Diary and Letters of Walter Williamson (Stroud: Amberley, 2011), p. 46. 
55 BOH 1916, Vol. 1, p.21. 
56 G. Sheffield, & J.M. Bourne, Douglas Haig, War Diaries and Letters (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005), 
p. 178, diary entry for Saturday, 8 January 1916. 
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attack with 15 divisions on a 13 – 14 mile front for about the 20th April or a later attack astride 
the Somme in co-operation with the French and using 25 divisions.  
 
By the end of January the BEF in France consisted of 5 Cavalry divisions and 12 corps, 
containing 38 Infantry divisions, and for the first time had a total strength, including Indian 
troops, of over one million: 874,900 at the Front and 133,500 on the LofC.  Of the 38 Infantry 
divisions, however, nine had been in France less than four months and sixteen had never been 
involved in anything other than trench warfare.57  Four more divisions were expected over the 
next few months but tellingly their despatch depended ‘upon the progress made in arming the 
new formations with rifles’.58  Even more tellingly a subsequent letter noted that the 40th 
(Bantam) Division’s training would be delayed owing to the physical inadequacies of a number 
of its men and the need to replace them.  Arrangements were being made to prepare the 61st 
South Midland Division in its place, for despatch by 1 May.59  Haig was uneasily aware that he 
had ‘not got an Army in France really, but a collection of divisions untrained for the field.’60 
 
The expansion of the BEF now necessitated the creation of a Fourth Army, to be commanded 
by Rawlinson.  Its HQ was formed on 5 February and its troops arrived from March onwards.  
These were obtained in the first instance by taking over three Third Army Corps, XIII, X and 
VIII, and the 20 mile stretch from the Somme to Fonquevillers that they had been holding.61  
Rawlinson now took over planning for the offensive.  On 6 March he outlined to his Corps 
Commanders the general nature of the undertaking although as yet there was neither a clear 
                                                 
57 BOH 1916, Vol. 1, pp. 19-20. 
58 TNA: WO 158/21 Letter from Robertson to Haig dated 16 Jan 16 re move of further divisions to France. 
59 TNA: WO 158/21 Letter from Robertson to Haig dated 10 February 1916. 
60 Sheffield & Bourne, eds., Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, p.183 Wednesday, 29 March 1916. 
61 This initially gave Rawlinson just 8 divisions: XIII Corps: 7th, 18th and 30th; X Corps: 32nd, 36th, 48th and 49th; 
and VIII Corps: 31st. 
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objective nor a definite date.  He expected to receive more troops and planning was to proceed 
on the assumption that there would be 15 infantry divisions if the offensive opened on 1 May 
or 17 divisions a month later, plus in either case a cavalry division.  A further three divisions 
and one or more cavalry division would be held in GHQ reserve.    
 
It was still not definite that there would indeed be an offensive and Haig was coming under 
pressure from the French.  On 4 April he wrote to Robertson asking for confirmation that he 
had the Government’s authority to agree ‘to co-operate with the French armies as requested.’62  
Robertson replied by wire on 7 April that the War Committee had given authority, sending a 
letter on 9 April confirming the War Committee’s conclusions: 
The War Committee approve of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff informing the 
British Commander-in-Chief in France that he is given the authority for which he asks 
in the last paragraph of his letter No O.A.D 679 of the 4th April 1916. 
 
All now seemed clear but Robertson sent a further personal letter on 10 April:    
I desire, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, to make it clear that the 
approval of the War Committee extends only to your co-operation with the French in 
offensive operations and not to the force to be employed by you, which is a matter 
entirely within your discretion.  I am not at present able to guarantee that you will 
receive any troops beyond those already notified to you.63 
 
Haig now had authority for an offensive in conjunction with the French but it had come with a 
warning over the number of troops available. 
 
Fourth Army was gradually building up.64  Rawlinson would eventually have five Corps, none 
of which would have been stable for more than a couple of months, only one contained four 
                                                 
62 TNA: WO 158/21 Haig letter OAD 679 dated 4 April 1916. 
63 TNA: WO 158/21 Robertson correspondence with Haig dated 7, 9 and 10 April 1916. 
64 BOH 1916, Vol. 1, p. 254 fn 1.  In early March Fourth Army comprised VIII Corps (4th, 31st and 48th Divisions), 
X Corps (32nd, 36th and 49th Divisions), and XIII Corps (7th, 18th, 21st and 30th Divisions).  HQ III Corps arrived 
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divisions and two would not receive their third divisions until mid-June.  Furthermore, most of 
the battalions were New Army.  Six of the sixteen divisions (17th, 18th, 19th, 31st, 34th and 36th) 
were totally New Army, three (31st, 34th and 36th) being completely locally raised.  Seven of 
the divisions had yet to see action on the Western Front, other than trench warfare, and many 
of their officers were inevitably inexperienced in battle.  Equally, in those units that had seen 
previous action, many officers and NCOs had been wounded and replaced.  It was thus a simple 
statement of fact when Rawlinson noted on 19 April that many of the battalions   
are new troops with little experience, and amongst whom the standard of discipline, 
leadership and tactical training of company commanders is not what obtained in our 
troops of a year ago.65  
 
Haig was also concerned and on 4 May noted in his diary that ‘My divisions … want much 
careful training before we could attack with hope of success.’66  He reiterated this to Rawlinson 
a couple of days later, making it clear that he had no intention of attacking in force until the 
Armies were as strong as possible, the divisions adequately trained and the ammunition supply 
ample.67 
 
Fourth Army’s five Corps would attack the objectives of Montauban, Contalmaison, Pozières, 
the Miraumont spur and Serre whilst Allenby’s Third Army staged a diversionary attack to the 
north at Gommecourt.  The attack would be on a wide front and Haig had concerns that it would 
be difficult to control any subsequent movement.  Accordingly he informed Rawlinson that 
once operations had begun Lt Gen Gough, then commanding the Reserve Corps, was to stand 
                                                 
on 24 March with 8th Division but 19th and 34th Divisions would not join until early May.  In April VIII Corps was 
joined by the 29th Division but concerns about its strength meant that on 11 April the DA & QMG Fourth Army 
visited GHQ to discuss reinforcements for it.  A new XV Corps was also formed, taking over the 7th and 21st 
Divisions from XIII Corps on 29th April, but it would not be joined by 17th Division until 11 June.  The XIII Corps 
now retained only the 18th and 30th Divisions and the 9th Division would not arrive until mid-June. 
65 BOH 1916 Vol. 1, Appendix 10, p.77; Table 3 – Composition of Fourth Army Prior to 1 July 1916. 
66 Sheffield, & Bourne, Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, p. 186. 
67 BOH 1916, Vol. 1, p. 258. 
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by to command Rawlinson’s two corps on the right wing in order to drive home attacks on that 
flank, warning also that it might subsequently become necessary to make Gough’s force an 
independent one directly under the orders of GHQ.68  Matters progressed more quickly, 
however, and on 23 May the Reserve Corps became the Reserve Army.69  
  
On 17 May Rawlinson informed his corps commanders of their precise objectives and issued  
‘Fourth Army Tactical Notes’, based on a GHQ Memorandum dated 8 May entitled ‘Training 
of Divisions for Offensive Action’, which were to form the basis of training whilst troops were 
in reserve.  It was again emphasised that the inexperience and lack of previous training of 
officers and troops meant that it could not be assumed that military skills that had become 
second nature would automatically take over in unforeseen circumstances.  Divisional and 
Brigade Commanders were therefore to hold special training exercises on the actions of 
subordinate commanders in unexpected situations.  The need for all ranks to have a clear 
understanding of what was required in different and unexpected situations was emphasised 
together with the necessity, in the absence of officers or NCOs, for someone to assume 
leadership and the remainder to act under his control.70  In conducting this training, Brigades 
were also to be trained over the same kind of ground as they would advance across with the 
distance of the various objectives being marked out.71 
 
The training objectives were highly laudable but the problem for those trying to implement 
them was that, whilst in reserve, troops were constantly required to provide labour for numerous 
preparatory tasks necessary for the offensive.  Only two RE Labour battalions and three Infantry 
                                                 
68 Ibid p. 258. 
69 TNA: WO 95/518 Reserve Army War Diary 23 May 1916.  
70 BOH 1916 Vol. 1, p. 131 Appendix 18.   
71 BOH 1916 Vol. 1, p. 262. 
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labour battalions were available for Fourth Army.  Consequently, in the months preceding the 
attack the ‘troops wore themselves out in digging assembly and communication trenches, cable 
trenches and dug-outs’, vast dumps of ammunition, material and warlike stores of all kinds had 
also to be collected and miles of railways and trench tramways to be built.  At the same time 
the line had to be held and ‘most important of all, tactical training of the new levies had to be 
carried on.’72  The adverse effect on training was noted on 28 May by Captain Jack of the 8th 
Cameronians: 
… Training Programmes, submitted to a zealous High Command even before we left 
the line, are scheduled to cover 6½ hours daily, commencing on our first day in 
reserve…But the fine-looking programmes, all neatly typed, have been pretty well 
ruined.  Since the 26th half our dutymen have been required to spend the whole of most 
nights on fatigues near the line, and although they proceed there and back in motor 
transport the men are too tired on their return for more exercise that morning.73 
 
The 8th Cameronians moved back to the Front on 4 June, following their fortnight’s training.  
Jack noted that they had done their ‘level best to instruct all ranks and tune them up for the 
battle ahead’ but in his opinion they were still not ‘PROPERLY TRAINED’(sic).74  
 
Meanwhile, the GHQ Staff Branches had also been making preparations.  In early February a 
comprehensive memorandum entitled ‘Preparatory Measures to be Taken by Armies and Corps 
Before Undertaking Offensive Operations on a Large Scale’ was issued.  It mainly covered G 
and Q matters, apart from reminding Divisional Commanders of the need to keep AG GHQ 
constantly informed of estimates of casualties in units in accordance with previous 
instructions.75  These instructions were the casualty and reinforcement procedures which had 
worked well during the fighting of the previous year and remained in place. 
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73 John Terraine, ed., General Jack’s Diary (1964; London: Cassell, 2000), pp. 136-7. 
74 Ibid, p. 138. 
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Meanwhile business continued as usual for AG Branch GHQ.  No major actions had taken place 
during January but even so the total monthly casualties were 530 officers and 9424 men.  
Furthermore, many units remained undermanned from the previous fighting with a total 
shortage of nearly 75,000 men.  Reinforcements continued to arrive: some 629 officers and 
28,198 men in January, 702 officers and 27,030 men in February and a further 43,538 in March, 
but the BEF would continue to fall below establishment until April.76  Both at home and in 
France the ‘A’ Branches were working tirelessly to gain manpower. 
 
In February Macready had been replaced as AG GHQ by Major General GH Fowke, formerly 
the BEF’s Engineer in Chief and whose only previous personnel experience had been as AAG 
RE during peacetime.  The post of AG BEF would probably not have been his preferred 
appointment, despite promotion to lieutenant general, and it seems equally surprising that 
despite the efforts being made to train ‘A’ staff officers for their roles, eight officer learners 
having passed through AG’s Branch in January for example, the most senior personnel officer 
in the BEF should have no prior familiarity with his new operational responsibilities.77  
Fortunately, the rest of his staff were by now well-experienced in their various roles.  
 
On the manning side replacements for TF battalions remained a problem.  On 1 January the 
Army Council had ordered that priority be given to returning the strengths of TF battalions in 
France to 1,000 but in many cases the men were simply not available.78  In mid-February one 
of Macready’s last acts as AG was to interview the COs of the 1/4th and 1/5th Black Watch, the 
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77 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary for January 1916. 
78 TNA: WO 163/21 Minutes of 179th Army Council Meeting of Saturday 1 January 1916.  
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1/9th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (A&SH) and 1/4th Cameron Highlanders. Casualties 
had reduced each of these battalions to about 500 and insufficient drafts were available to make 
them up to full strength in the near future.  It was proposed to amalgamate the Black Watch 
battalions and to use the other two battalions as drafts for their respective Regular Battalions.  
The COs ‘thought there would be no great objection on the part of the men to the proposals 
being carried out’.79  The Black Watch battalions were duly amalgamated, forming the 4/5th 
Black Watch which was posted to the 39th Division, whilst the other two battalions were 
returned to the Base in late February to provide drafts for other battalions.80  Some 300 men of 
the 1/4th Cameron Highlanders were sent to join the 1st Entrenching Battalion whilst a further 
100 remained at the Base.  Other Scottish TF battalions were proving difficult to reinforce and 
a further four were amalgamated in May on the orders of the War Office: the 1/5th and 1/6th 
Royal Scots and the 1/5th and 1/6th Scottish Rifles.81   
 
Some Service battalions were now also very weak due to lack of reinforcements.  In April War 
Office approval was given for the amalgamation of 7th and 8th Kings Own Scottish Borderers 
(both K2 battalions), 6th and 7th Royal Scots Fusiliers (K1 and K2 respectively), 10th and 11th 
Highland Light Infantry (both K1) and 8th and 10th Gordon Highlanders (K1 and K2 
respectively).  It was not only the Scots who were having difficulties: authority was also 
received for the disbandment of three Public Schools battalions, 18th, 19th and 21st Royal 
Fusiliers.  These men could be drafted to other battalions of the same regiment and many were 
subsequently commissioned.82  In May the DA&QMG Fourth Army saw the GOC 32nd Division 
about the state of 19th Lancashire Fusiliers and the next day visited GHQ to discuss with AG 
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the possibility of breaking up the battalion.  It was decided that it would be impossible to replace 
it, however, so the proposal was abandoned.83 
 
The problem for the Manning staffs was that whilst they were replacing previous losses and 
building up the BEF for the anticipated offensive, trench warfare continued.  During the first 
six months of 1916 there were some nine local actions, including Mount Sorrel, The Bluff, St 
Eloi and Vimy Ridge, plus five more, three of which were German gas attacks.  Considerable 
losses were incurred, for example in the Ypres area on 14/15 February there were some 67 
officers and 1759 OR casualties.84  Furthermore, G Branch GHQ actively encouraged raids as 
a means of gaining experience and fostering the so-called ‘aggressive spirit’.  Between 19th 
December 1915 and 30 May 1916, there were 63 British raids of which 47 were successful.  
The total battle casualties during this period were 4067 officers and 83,862 men, all of whom 
had to be replaced.   Reinforcements were arriving, albeit slowly.  A further 976 officers and 
39,496 men were sent up from the Base in April and by 18 May the manpower deficit had been 
reduced to 46,200.    
 
Between January and June some units suffered (comparatively) few losses, depending on their 
location and the actions they had been in.  The 1st KSLI lost 62 dead plus at least 117 wounded 
whilst 10th RWF had 108 fatalities.85  Conversely 1st Cheshire lost 33 killed but received 385 
replacements for earlier casualties.86  Amongst a draft that arrived on 21 April was a contingent 
of about 40 from the Isle of Man (IoM) Volunteers who had volunteered for overseas service 
                                                 
83 TNA: 95/441 Fourth Army AG & QMG War Diary 21 and 22 May 1916. 
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and had joined 3rd Cheshire in late November 1915.87  On 1 June 1916, a draft of 47 from 15th 
Cheshire, a Bantam battalion, was received via 8th Entrenching Battalion.  Their arrival excited 
no comment as to their size, presumably because they were already Cheshire soldiers. 
 
Base Depots 
Both the draft-finding units at home and the Bases in France were now working flat out to 
replace losses and build up units before the offensive: in May 1463 officers and 51,685 men 
were sent from the Base areas.88  The Bases had increased in size exponentially as new divisions 
and units arrived in France and were now almost the size of small towns.  At Rouen there were 
nine hospitals plus two convalescent camps each taking 1000, plus depots for supplies, 
remounts, ordnance and mechanical transport.  Similarly, at Le Havre and Boulogne there were 
supply and remount depots and Boulogne was also the principal base for the evacuation of the 
wounded.  Reinforcement camps for 40,000 each were provided at Rouen, Le Havre and 
Étaples.  
 
An example of the operation of an IBD in early 1916 is 38th IBD which had landed at Le Havre 
on 2 December 1915.    On arrival at Étaples, the IBD staff spent the next few days putting their 
camp in order before beginning to receive men discharged from hospitals.  The 38th Division 
battalions were all locally raised in Wales: five RWF, six Welsh and two SWB.  On 16 
December the first draft of 30 NCOs and men for 10th Welsh arrived, having been sent from 
20th (Reserve) Welsh at Kinmel Park.  By 29 June 1916, 38th IBD would have received  2775 
men from Kinmel Park and forwarded 2862 men to 38th Division or other Welsh battalions.89 
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One of the men was George Culpitt who had joined up in 1915.  He had no Welsh connections 
but had joined the RWF because he had a Welsh friend joining at the same time.90  His diary 
starts when his draft left Kinmel Park on 27 April 1916 to join 15th RWF.  By early afternoon 
the next day they had arrived at Le Havre where they were accommodated overnight.  The 
following morning they left for Étaples, where they found a very large tented camp with dining 
halls in large marquees and one or two wooden buildings dotted about.  Having drawn brand 
new rifles and bayonets from the stores they made their way to 38th IBD; the 38th IBD War 
Diary for 29th April shows a draft of 50 arriving for 15th RWF.  The next afternoon the draft 
started training started on the Bull Ring, on the sand hills some two miles outside the main 
camp: 
we turned off the road and made our way to the position set out for the 38th I.B.D. about 
half way up the ridge and here awaited the coming of the sergeant instructors. …. During 
the afternoon under the supervision of the sergeants and closely watched by the officer 
we went through rapid loading, extended order drill, and bayonet fighting and we were 
much relieved when we finally made our way back to the road, the instructors took their 
leave and we made tracks for the Depot. 
 
For the next two weeks the draft practised bayonet fighting, bombing and extended order drills, 
apart from two days when they went on route marches to the coast and a single day live-firing 
at targets some 75 yards away on the Sandhills Range just outside the camp.  It did not take 
long and they had returned to camp before lunch.  The following day, 11 May, Culpitt and his 
draft learned they would shortly be leaving for the Front but for 10th RWF instead of 15th RWF 
as originally intended.  He was one of 80 men transferred from 15th to 10th RWF to replace 
casualties suffered by that battalion in a German gas attack on 30 April.91  This transfer between 
RWF battalions confirms that reinforcement by regiment was already happening.  Culpitt does 
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not appear to have been disturbed by the switch of unit; he was simply relieved to find himself 
in the same company as others of his draft from Kinmel Park.      
 
Labour 
As preparations for the offensive progressed so more miles of railway line were required to 
move men and matériel.  Mention has already been made of the problems of finding labour.  In 
1915 eleven RE labour battalions containing elderly labourers and tradesmen had been formed 
for defence works such as roads and water supply.  In early 1916 Infantry Labour battalions 
began to be raised from men of Reserve Infantry units who were not fit for service at the Front 
and were without specialist trades or professional qualifications.  By June 1916 there were in 
France 11 RE Labour battalions, 12 Infantry Labour battalions, 30 Labour Companies ASC (for 
the disembarkation of stores and formation of depots), 3 Naval Labour companies and 8 Non-
Combatant (conscientious objectors) Labour Companies.  The 2nd and 6th RE Labour and 12th 
(Labour) Devonshire battalions, each with companies distributed between the various Corps, 
were allocated to Fourth Army whilst on 26th May 19th Cheshire was temporarily allotted to XV 
Corps for work on the Dernancourt railway.  Labour would continue to be a problem throughout 
the offensive. 
 
Medical Arrangements  
The Medical Services were also making preparations for the offensive.  Originally it had been 
policy to evacuate casualties to England as insufficient facilities were available for their 
treatment in France.  The 1915 casualty numbers, however, had focussed attention on the need 
to retain lightly wounded men in France so that they could be returned to duty as soon as 
possible.  Plans were now reviewed, based on anticipated casualties and the need for their 
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collection and evacuation as quickly as possible if lives were to be saved and earlier 
convalescence encouraged.92  Changes were introduced, including the doubling of regimental 
stretcher bearers from 16 to 32, the establishment of relay bearer posts every 1000 yards and 
the reserving of special communication trenches for the removal of wounded.  The wounded 
would be evacuated from the Regimental Aid Posts (RAPs) to the Advanced Dressing Stations 
(ADS) in the usual manner and then moved on using supply and transport vehicles or whatever 
other transport was available, including improvised trains; there would be 28 ambulance trains 
for the Somme.  Casualty Clearing Stations (CCS) were now grouped together in twos and 
threes and expanded to accommodate an average of 1000.   
 
Arrangements were improved for the reception of casualties and their rapid treatment and 
onward evacuation if necessary although the CCS were now better equipped and manned and 
able to conduct surgery.  Whenever possible they were located near broad gauge railways for 
increased comfort and speed of evacuation back to hospitals where greater care could be given.  
Hospital bed spaces existed for about 61,000 men in a total of 58 hospitals on the LofC and in 
convalescent and stationary hospitals in the front area.  However, only 36,237 vacancies would 
exist on 1 July and a large number of wounded were sent back to UK in order to free up space 
and create a reserve of beds for men too ill to be moved and for sudden surges of fresh cases.  
There were also now seven convalescent depots in France (the equivalent of the Command 
Depots in England) giving spaces for 35,000 but it was recognised that more capacity would be 
needed.  A further large Convalescent Depot would open at Cayeux on 24 July.93 
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Reorganization of IBDs 
Since mid-May, the DAG’s staffs had been instructed to reinforce by Regiment instead of by 
battalions.94  The Army HQs were informed of this on 22 May but as the new instruction did 
not provoke comment it appears to have been simply regularizing what was already happening.  
The decision led to the reorganization of the divisional IBDs since reinforcements needed to be 
centralized by regiment for the system to work.  In mid-June the IGC, Lt Gen F. T. Clayton, 
informed the War Office that GHQ had authorized the re-organization of the IBDs in France 
and forwarded details of the intended amalgamation by Regiments and Districts.  The intended 
effective date was 1 July and the letter’s purpose was to seek agreement to reinforcements being 
directed to the new IBDs from that date.95  The changeover was rapidly implemented: 38th 
(Welsh) IBD became simply 38th IBD and began to receive Royal West Surrey, East Surrey 
and East Kent men in early July.  The last Welsh draft, nine men for the SWB, was sent forward 
on 10 July.96   
 
The IBDs continued to be split between Rouen, Le Havre and Étaples.  Those serving the 
Regular battalions of No 4 District were at Rouen, where No 4 IBD would serve the Cheshire, 
KSLI and Monmouth Regiments, No 5 IBD the RWF and SWB and No 6 IBD the Welsh and 
South Lancashire Regiments.  No 3 District IBDs were all at Étaples with Nos 23, 24, 25 and 
30 IBDs serving the regiments recruited in Lancashire, Westmorland and Cumberland.  The TF 
Base Depots at Rouen and Le Havre continued to be linked to the TF Divisions, but TF 
reinforcements for units not within the TF Divisions would be allocated by the regimentally 
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affiliated Base Depots. The final list of Base Depots in France with their affiliated units was 
sent to the War Office at the end of July.97 
  
Final Plans for Reinforcements 
On 14 June AG GHQ requested that the War Office send out 20,000 men per week, preferably 
ordinary trained reinforcements but partially trained men could be sent provided they had fired 
their musketry course.  On 20 June the War Office wired that 20,000 Regular and New Army 
and 17,500 TF reinforcements would be sent out, leaving the next week.  Of these the TF were 
only partially trained but had at least completed their musketry training.  During June some 
1823 officers and 72,131 men were sent from home – huge numbers but still short of the 20,000 
a week requested.  The War Office telegraphed on 28 June that 2,500 partially trained men were 
being sent at the end of the week, 15,000 partially trained men would be sent on 2 July and a 
further 15,000 partially trained men would be sent during the first fortnight of July.98   
 
On 14 June Rawlinson issued his formal Operations Order and on 22 June held his final 
conference with his Corps commanders.  The planning was over and on 26 June Advanced 
GHQ opened at Beauquesne in readiness for the attack. 
 
Western Front: July – December 1916 
Casualties on 1 July were far higher than the worst forebodings with a total of 19,240 men killed 
and 37,646 wounded or missing.  Thirty-two battalions out of the thirteen divisions taking part 
in the actual assault had suffered more than 500 casualties each.99  As the offensive continued, 
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estimated casualty figures were wired daily to AG’s office in GHQ by all divisions involved in 
operations.  At 09.00 each morning AG’s staff closed the previous day’s list, totaled it up and 
forwarded the figures to DAG at the Base and to the AG in the War Office.  Every night a list 
of casualties by division was telegraphed to Advanced GHQ.100   Occasionally the system 
required a slight tweak to ensure its smooth running but broadly it continued to function as 
planned.  On 25 July AAG Reserve Army, Lt Col C. F. Hunter, notified all Reserve Army Corps 
and Divisions that, whilst estimated casualty numbers would continue to be wired by divisions 
to AG GHQ, Reserve Army ‘A’ Branch and their parent Corps, in future, to reduce telegraph 
traffic, divisions should send long ‘actual’ casualty returns by Despatch Rider Letter Service 
(DRLS) to the parent Corps and Reserve Army ‘A’, with the envelopes marked ‘Casualty 
Return Urgent’.101  
 
Sometimes there were difficulties in obtaining the casualty figures.  Reserve Army ‘A’ staff 
tried to pre-empt problems by meeting incoming Corps staff and briefing them on casualty 
reporting requirements.102  This did not always work: diary entries from 26 July – 1 August 
continually note the non-receipt of casualty figures from the Australian Divisions.  On 31 July 
the A&QMG staff called a conference with the Australian Staff Captains and the figures soon 
began to appear.103   
 
Estimated casualty figures were essential for the reinforcement system to operate as quickly as 
required.  On receiving the consolidated lists, the GHQ GS Operations Branch would each 
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evening notify AG and DAG Base of the priority for reinforcements.  On 9 July, for example, 
it was notified that 70th Brigade should be brought up to strength as soon as possible and on 16 
July divisions were grouped into priority categories.  The system would continue unchanged 
throughout the battle: on 19 November the message to AG and DAG Base was that 
reinforcements were to be prioritised for 3rd, 31st and 32nd Divisions for Fifth Army and for 17th, 
50th, 33rd and 8th Divisions for Fourth Army.104  During the battle, there was also frequent 
contact between the ‘A’ staff and the Armies, with Fowke visiting Advanced GHQ almost daily 
and his staff making frequent visits to the Fourth and Reserve Armies.      
 
Despite the disastrous first day, reinforcements seem to have been available, at least to begin 
with.  On 7 July Rawlinson impressed upon Fowke the need to refill 7th Division as soon as 
possible; on 10 July the  Fourth Army ‘A’ staff reported the satisfactory arrival of drafts for 7th 
and 21st Divisions, and that 7th Division was now practically back up to establishment.  As 
casualties mounted, however, their replacement was required as quickly as possible.  On 16 
July Fourth Army was informed that some 2,000 reinforcements might be expected daily.  In 
the event, these figures fluctuated: on 21 July they received 2,742 men but for the last seven 
days of July the daily average was just 1,338.  From 12 July, when Fourth Army started 
recording incoming figures, to 31 July they received just 30,605 men against estimated 
casualties for the whole month of 4,428 officers and 116,270 men.105   
 
The problem for AG GHQ was that losses were not limited to those on the Somme, estimated 
at 5054 officers and 146,130 men for July.  The rest of the BEF was not unscathed and the total 
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losses for July on the Western Front were 9,228 officers and 180,115 men: battle casualties 
accounted for 7,835 officers and 155,767 men and a further 1,375 officers and 24,348 men were 
classed as ‘sick wastage’.  Reinforcements from home numbered just 1,669 officers and 
106,552 men.106  Battle casualties were to be expected, and many of those shown in the overall 
casualty figures would recover sufficiently to return to the line, but nonetheless the figures for 
July were high.  In a letter to Robertson on 1 August summarizing his views on the present 
situation, Haig rationalized them somewhat cavalierly:  
Our losses in the last month’s very heavy fighting – totaling to about 120,000 more than they 
would have been if we had not attacked – cannot be regarded as unduly heavy, or as sufficient 
to justify any anxiety as to our ability to continue the offensive … our ranks have been filled up 
again and our troops are still in excellent heart.107 
 
Had all the divisions involved in the previous month’s fighting been expected to carry on then 
there might well have been anxiety over their ability to continue the offensive but from the 
earliest days of the war the BEF had withdrawn weakened divisions from the line so that they 
might be rested and refilled with reinforcements.  This continued during the Somme battle with 
divisions being withdrawn from the frontline for short periods and being switched with 
divisions from other Armies if longer rest was needed.   
 
Orders for the movement of divisions were given by GHQ.  For example, GHQ GS Ops letter 
(O.A.D.41) of 4 July initiated the following merry-go-round:  
 II Corps was to transfer from GHQ Reserve to Fourth Army 
 3rd Division was to transfer from II Corps to XIII Corps, Fourth Army 
 12th Division transferred from III Corps, Fourth Army to X Corps, Reserve Army 
 8th Division (II Corps) to be held in readiness to entrain for I Corps, First Army, 
 1st Division (I Corps) to be held in readiness to entrain to II Corps, Fourth Army  
 35th Division, Third Army to move to VIII Corps, Reserve Army108 
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As a result of this instruction, 3rd Division, including 7th KSLI and 10th RWF and newly arrived 
from the Ypres area, on 7/8 July relieved 18th Division, which had been in the line since the 
start of the offensive and had lost over 3,400 all ranks.  The 12th Division, originally in GHQ 
Reserve, had been called forward overnight 1/2 July to III Corps and on 3 July had attacked 
Ovillers, losing nearly 2,400 officers and men.  It would now move to X Corps, Reserve Army.  
The 8th Division, having lost 4,921 officers and men on 1 July, was now warned for a straight 
swap with 1st Division and would entrain on 6 July for the First Army area where it would 
remain until mid-October.  Plans remained flexible, however, the 1st Division being diverted on 
its arrival on 8 July to III Corps.  The 35th Division moved to VIII Corps but was to be held in 
Reserve and not employed without agreement from GHQ.109  Similar divisional movements 
would continue throughout the battle as divisions needed to be withdrawn from the line to rest 
and recuperate; on 13 Nov, GHQ instructed that the 7th Division in Second Army would be 
exchanged in mid-November with the 39th Division in Fifth Army.110  
 
Occasionally brigades were switched.  On 5 July GHQ issued orders for the 110th, 111th and 
112th Brigades of 37th Division to be transferred to the Somme as quickly as possible.  On arrival 
110th Brigade exchanged places with 63rd Brigade from 21st Division whilst 111th and 112th 
Brigades replaced the 102nd and 103rd brigades of 34th Division, III Corps, which had lost 6,811 
all ranks in the first three days of the battle.  The 111th and 112th Brigades immediately went 
into the line with 34th Division on 10 July.  The Brigades leaving the Somme joined 37th 
Division in Third Army on Vimy Ridge.111  Such switches of Brigades were few, however, 
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quite possibly because, apart from dislocating divisions, it became too difficult to keep track of 
them.   
 
The Fourth Army staff created a brightly coloured chart, referred to as the ‘Tartan’, in order to 
keep track on which division was doing what and when.  A check was also kept on the number 
of days up to 31 October that each division spent in the front line, including whether those days 
were north of the Ancre.112  The extract below refers to 3rd and 18th Divisions:     
Division Days in the Line – First period Days in the Line – Second Period Total Days in 
the Line to 31 
October 
18th 
Division 
1-7 Jul 13-17 Jul 12 26 Sep–5 Oct 16 Oct-31 Oct 26 38 
3rd 
Division 
8–25 Jul  
 
15–19 Aug 
  
23 8-19 Oct  
(north of Ancre) 
22-31 Oct 
(north of Ancre) 
22 45 
 
On 20 July 18th Division, having lost 5437 all ranks in just 12 days in the line, was warned for 
transfer from Fourth Army to Second Army.113  It would not return until mid-September when 
it would join the Reserve Army.  In late August the 3rd Division was also sent north to 
recuperate, having spent 25 days in the front line and lost about 8000.  It had spent 18 days in 
the front line until 25 July, taking part in the battles of Albert, Bazentin and Delville Wood, and 
had lost 248 officers and 5854 ORs.  Reinforcements had been received, for example on 21 July 
7th KSLI received a draft of 130, including Bert Oakes who had finally left Prees Heath on 10 
July, but the Division as a whole was still much below strength.114  Despite this it went into 
action again on 15 August, losing nearly 1900 before being withdrawn on 19 August and sent 
north.  It would return to the Somme in early October, going into the line again on 8 October 
as part of Reserve Army. 
                                                 
112 TNA: WO 153/1265 Fourth Army ‘Tartan’ and Days in the Line for Each Division 1 July – 31 October 1916.  
113 TNA: WO 95/5 GHQ GS War Diary entry for 20 July and WO 95/26 GHQ AG Table of Estimated Casualties 
for July 1916.  
114 BOH 1916, Vol. 2, pp. 88 and 193.  
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In early August GHQ notified Second and Third Armies of divisions to be sent to reinforce the 
Somme battle front and those with which it was intended to replace them.  Details were also 
sent to the Reserve and Fourth Armies with forecasts of the replacement divisions they might 
expect.115  A workable and familiar system was obviously in place for divisions but problems 
over individual reinforcements were now becoming apparent.   
 
In response to a complaint by Montagu, the Minister for Munitions, Macready explained the 
reinforcement process:  
 … France indents on us for the number of men required per battalion, and we send them 
out by regiments. That is to say, we may send out to France 1,000 men belonging to one 
regiment and when they arrive in France they are drafted to such battalions of that 
regiment as are likely to require to be made up to full strength at once in conformity 
with the plans of the General Staff.  Also it may be necessary where the supply of men 
for any particular regiment is short to supplement it from other regiments in the same 
recruiting district …116 
 
Despite the caveat in the final sentence above, units continued to expect drafts belonging to 
their parent Regiment.  This did not always work as planned and Fourth Army complained in 
early August that  
reinforcements do not appear to be coming up very satisfactorily, and in two or three 
cases drafts appear to have been sent to units to which they do not belong – apparently 
without reason.  DAG Base has in some cases asked that these drafts should be sent 
back to the Base, but it has been decided to ask that these drafts may be readjusted within 
the Army. 
 
In a meeting with Fowke on 14 August, Rawlinson noted that ‘there was a great deal of 
apparently unnecessary mixing up of reinforcements for various units’, and urged that slightly 
wounded men returning from the Base should be posted to their original units, as was supposed 
                                                 
115 TNA: 95/6 GHQ GS War Diary for 4 and 6 August referring to letters OAD 94, 95, 96 and 97. 
116 General Sir N. Macready, Annals of an Active Life Vol I (London: Hutchinson, n.d.), p. 256. 
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to happen.  He proposed a pool of reinforcements for Fourth Army but this was not agreed by 
Fowke, presumably because it would cut across existing systems.117  In practice Fourth Army 
continued to sanction the transfer to their own regiments of men who had arrived at other 
regiments.  Captain Dunn, the RMO of 2nd RWF, describes the arrival in late July of ‘men 
recruited and trained for the Cheshires, Shropshires and SWB … resentful of their transfer and 
unwanted by us.’  When the opportunity occurred, the Shropshires ‘were bartered for half their 
number of RWF from a neighbouring division’.118    
 
Casualties for August were fewer than the previous month enabling Haig to write to Robertson 
that they had ‘not been more than some 28,000 greater than would ordinarily have occurred 
during three weeks of normal trench warfare …’.119  Nonetheless, they were still high and the 
Manning authorities were struggling to bring Infantry battalions and divisions back up to 
strength.  The official Infantry strength of a division was 12,000, made up of three brigades 
each containing four battalions of 1000 men, but the average divisional strength during the 
Somme was only 10,000.  On 30 August AG GHQ was instructed to bring specified divisions 
up to full establishment at once.  All other divisions in Fourth and Reserve Armies, except those 
going to defensive fronts, were to be kept over 10,000 strong and no battalion was to be under 
850 strong; the strength of battalions in divisions on defensive fronts was to be not less than 
700.120  The figures for August show that great efforts were being made to supply 
reinforcements, some 1431 officers and 74,414 ORs having arrived from home, of which 
34,727 had gone to the Fourth Army.  However, although the total estimated casualties for units 
                                                 
117 TNA: WO 95/441 Fourth Army A&Q War Diary of 8, 14 and 17 August 1916. 
118 TNA: WO 95/441 Fourth Army A&Q War Diary of 12 August 1916 and J.C. Dunn, The War The Infantry 
Knew 1914 – 1919 (London: Abacus edn., 1987), pp. 245-6. 
119 TNA: WO 158/21 GHQ OAD 119 dated 23 Aug 16 – Letter from Haig to Robertson. 
120  TNA: WO 95/6 GHQ GS War Diary entry dated 30 August 1916. 
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engaged in active operations for August were 1155 officers and 36,330 ORs, the total BEF 
losses, including sick wastage, were 5197 officers and 101,965 ORs.121  Whilst many of the 
minor wounded and the sick would be returned to duty as soon as they were fit enough, there 
still remained immediate gaps to fill. 
   
September was a month of successes but also heavy losses: estimated casualties noted by AG 
GHQ were 18,900 for Martinpuich, Flers and Courcellette; 5,000 at Mouquet Farm; 1270 at 
Morval and Les Boeufs; and 7,200 at Geaudecourt, Thiepval, and Combles.  Divisions 
continued to be moved around and reinforced according to the GHQ priorities.  For the first 
time, however, AG Branch’s end of month figures showed that more reinforcements had been 
received (4167 officers and 107,625 ORs) than the total battle casualties (5254 officers and 
105,588 ORs).122  The War Office was obviously finding men from somewhere but the standard 
was gradually declining.  On 16 October it was learned that 15,000 recruits due to arrive 
gradually from England would need to be trained to shoot the short rifle before being sent 
forward.123 
 
The experiences of 1st Cheshire from July through to September provide an illustration of losses 
suffered and their replacement.  The battalion, in 15th Brigade of 5th Division, arrived on the 
Somme from Third Army in early July.  Later in the month, 5th Division was involved in attacks 
towards Longueval but 15th Brigade remained in Divisional Reserve.  During 25 – 26 July 1st 
Cheshire suffered about 45 casualties.124  On 27 July 15th Brigade attacked Longueval with the 
1st Norfolks and 1st Bedfordshires whilst 1st Cheshire carried out a separate attack on an alleged 
                                                 
121  Ibid entry dated 31 August 1916.  
122 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary for September 1916. 
123 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary for 16 October 1916.  
124 TNA: WO 95/1571 1st Cheshire War Diary for July 1916. 
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German strongpoint: the regimental history notes some doubt about its existence!  At 08.38, 
three parties, each led by a Second Lieutenant, went forward. The leading two parties made 
strenuous attempts to reach their objectives but were met by cross fire from machine guns at 
High Wood and Longueval.  Both officers were killed and nearly all the men killed or wounded.  
The objective was not reached, although an advanced post protecting the left flank was 
established, but heavy fighting continued all day.  The CO, Col M. F. Clarke, had been 
wounded, some 24 ORs had been killed and a further 12 would be lost over the following two 
days as the Battalion moved up and occupied the northern and western edges of Longueval.  By 
the time 15th Brigade was relieved on 30 July and back in Divisional reserve near Mametz, the 
Cheshire’s remaining strength was under 300 all ranks; a total of 44 soldiers had been killed in 
action during July with a further 4 dying of their wounds.125  A quarter of the dead had been 
with the battalion since 1914 but almost all the rest had arrived in 1915, with only a couple 
having joined in early 1916.  Fifteen were pre-war Cheshire soldiers with varying lengths of 
service but none of the rest had had previous operational service with other regiments.126  Of 
the 48 who died, 41 had enlisted in Cheshire, 2 in Lancashire, 2 in the IoM and 1 each from 
Nottinghamshire, Essex and Derbyshire; all except 3 had thus been recruited originally in 
Western Command.127    
 
Replacements were quick to arrive.  A draft of 70 reinforcements joined on 31 July bringing 
the total received that month to 100.  During August a further 5 officers and 189 men arrived.  
                                                 
125 SDGW. 
126 8641 Pte Frank Ernest Fox had joined the SR in 1910 and was mobilised on 8 August 1914 with 3rd Cheshire.  
On 19 September he deserted rather than be sent to France and was not arrested until March 1915.  A District 
Court Martial (DCM) in April sentenced him to 1 years’ detention which was mitigated to 56 days detention.  On 
29 May 1915 he rejoined 3rd Cheshire and was posted to 1st Cheshire in France in early July after which he 
seems to have stayed out of trouble until being killed a year later on 28 July 1916. 
127 SDGW and www.ancestry.com. 
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This included a draft of 50 from the Shropshire Yeomanry, who were initially attached on 19 
August and then compulsorily transferred to 1st Cheshire on 1 September.  The Regimental 
History notes that the dismounted ex-Yeomanry needed intensive training to become fit for 
trench warfare but ‘once they realised there was no alternative, they soon learnt the work and 
made excellent reinforcements’.  Once the battalion could be got together in a rest area, ‘these 
[new] men soon became one with the unit’, aided presumably by their coming from the 
neighbouring county.128   
 
The 5th Division spent the next few weeks training near Abbeville before returning to the 
Somme on 26 August and relieving 35th Division on the eastern slopes of Maltz Horn Ridge.  It 
was now part of 14th Corps in Fourth Army and would participate in the attack on Falfemont 
Farm, on the high ground between Combles and Guillemont.  On 1 September 1st Cheshire 
moved into Chimpanzee Trench, immediately northwest of Hardecourt; the War Diary notes 
that ‘casualties during the day were not very heavy but amounted to about 23 OR’.  The attack 
was again postponed but 15th Brigade ordered that strong patrols were to go out at 8.30pm that 
evening and to establish strongpoints if no opposition encountered.  It obviously was 
encountered as the Cheshire’s final casualty toll for the day was 67, including one officer and 
seven ORs killed.  The soldiers who died had all, with one exception, been with the battalion 
since 1915.129   
 
The evening of the following day 15th Brigade was withdrawn into support but 1st Cheshire, 
having been relieved by 14th Warwickshire, was detailed as immediate reserve for a 13th Brigade 
attack on Falfemont Farm at 9am on 3 September.  The attack went in but soon failed due to 
                                                 
128 CRA: 1st Cheshires War Diary for August 1916 and Crookenden, Cheshire Regiment in the Great War, p. 77. 
129 CRA: 1st Cheshire War Diary for 1 September 1916 and SDGW 1st Cheshire deaths for 1 September 1916. 
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lack of artillery support.  Mid-morning 1st Cheshire was ordered forward to reinforce 13th 
Brigade but on reaching the front line found a very confused situation: ‘the KOSBs and the 
Warwickshires had suffered heavily and did not seem to be in a position to fully explain the 
situation’.130  In mid-afternoon the Cheshires were told to push forward patrols to try to ‘clear 
up the situation’.  Messages were received that the enemy was retiring; then that the enemy was 
not retiring but being reinforced with 5000 troops, which was later corrected to just 50.  At 
about 5pm the battalion was ordered to send a company to support the West Kents, whilst 
keeping two companies in the front line and one in support.  Commander 13th Brigade then 
ordered the Cheshires to attack the still strongly defended Falfemont Farm at 6.30pm.  The 
attack failed within five minutes, heavy machine gun fire having caused many casualties, and 
the Cheshires regrouped in the front-line trench, reporting to 13th Brigade that the front line was 
now full of various regiments and asking ‘for some other battalion to take over to enable us to 
re-organize’.  By now the Cheshire casualties were estimated at over 300, including one officer 
and 20 ORs killed.                
 
Overnight 13th Brigade was withdrawn but 1st Cheshire remained in the front line to be joined 
by other 15th Brigade units: Norfolks on the right, Cheshires in the middle and Bedfords on the 
left.  During the morning, orders were received for the three battalions to attack Falfemont Farm 
mid-afternoon.  Despite their depleted numbers, the Cheshires were to attack the Farm and the 
trenches immediately to the north of it, the Norfolks would attack the south side of the Farm 
whilst the Bedfords would attack the German trenches to the west of the Farm and south of 
Wedge Wood.  The attack went in at the planned time soon failed on the right under heavy 
machine gun fire.  There was more success on the left: the German trenches to the north of the 
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Farm were entered by the Bedfords and Cheshires and then a bombing party eventually gained 
a footing in the Farm itself.  By dark the position had been won but the Cheshire casualties had 
again been heavy: 3 officers killed and 7 wounded plus 43 ORs killed and 407 wounded.  The 
regimental history estimated that only 280 men remained untouched.131   
 
For 1st Cheshire, however, the losses had been heavy and the battalion that was withdrawn  
during late afternoon on 5 September was only some 280 strong.  Reorganization began 
immediately with the return of those officers and men who had been left behind with the 
transport, bringing the strength up to 442.  Fortunately two large drafts also arrived: on 8 
September a draft of 136 from 2/6th Cheshire and three days later a draft of 102, mostly from 
2/7th Cheshire.  These TF drafts had arrived at No 4 IBD during August and were transferred, 
under AO 204 and ACI 1499 of 1916, to 1st Cheshire in early September when the scale of the 
battalion’s losses became evident.132        
 
The 1st Cheshire next found themselves ‘very worn out and wet and of no fighting value’ 
holding the line on the right of the attack on Flers-Courcelette.133  Their next objective would 
be Morval, on the right of a much bigger British attack heading north-east towards Bapaume 
on 25 September.  The 15th Brigade’s task would be in three stages: the first objective was the 
German front line in the valley between Ginchy and Morval; the second objective was the 
German support line halfway up the slope towards Morval; and the Cheshires were to capture 
the third objective, the eastern edge of Morval itself.  The attacks went well and ‘objectives 
were taken in every case at the first assault’.134   Morval itself was captured by 1st Cheshire at 
                                                 
131 Crookenden, Cheshire Regiment in the Great War, p. 83. 
132 www.ancestry.com Service Records for 1st Cheshire soldiers. 
133 CRA: 1st Cheshire War Diary 21 September 1916. 
134 CRA: 1st Cheshire War Diary 25 September 1916. 
 
 
140 
 
about 3pm with relatively light casualties, although 23 had been killed.  The battalion 
consolidated its new position but the following day the trenches were steadily shelled and a 
further eight killed.  Fortunately, the Battalion was relieved and by 10.30pm they were able to 
move back.  Altogether they had sustained 140 casualties during the events around Morval, of 
whom 31 had been killed.   
 
Between 19 July and the end of September 5th Division had suffered 559 officer and 11,186 OR 
casualties. The Cheshire Regimental History noted that 1st Cheshire had taken part in three 
separate operations and had suffered about 20 officer and over 1,000 soldier casualties but that 
‘after each action they had received large reinforcements, many of the men having no 
connection with the county’.135  This perception, however, is not entirely borne out by analysis 
as large drafts had arrived from Cheshire TF battalions.   Detailed analysis of the 140 soldiers 
killed 1–26 September shows that 92 had enlisted in Cheshire and 122 had originally enlisted 
in the Cheshire Regiment, either as Regular or TF.  A further 6 had enlisted in No 4 District 
which, with 29 in No 3 District, made an overall total of 127 enlistments in Western Command.  
Of the 13 who had enlisted outside Western Command, 6 had served with the Cheshires for 
over a year having been transferred in 1915 from other Regimental Depots as a result of the 
Transfers Act.  Whilst these figures could be taken to indicate that those killed had been pre-
Somme reinforcements, in fact 29 of the 32 men killed in September were Cheshire TF soldiers, 
who had arrived in France only a few weeks before.  The other 3 were from the Shropshire 
Yeomanry who had arrived in August.  Overall, analysis shows that during September drafts 
for the Cheshire Regiment had continued to come from their own Regimental reserves, albeit 
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predominantly TF soldiers, many of whom were Derby men, who had been transferred on 
arrival in France.      
       
The Somme offensive continued into October with the battles of Le Transloy, 1–18 October, 
and Ancre Heights which lasted the whole of the month and into November.  By November the 
weather had turned, with continuous rain between 24 October and 3 November and further bad 
weather after that.  The Reserve Army, now retitled Fifth Army, continued the battle of Ancre 
Heights whilst Fourth Army attacked Le Transloy.  The offensive was drawing to a close 
although it was still intended to exert pressure on the Germans to avoid their reinforcing other 
theatres with troops from the Western Front.      
 
Some twelve divisions which had been sent north for rest and refit after fighting on the Somme 
in July and August now returned to the line.136  One such was the 32nd Division, which had been 
badly mauled on 1 July in the attack on the Leipzig Salient.  The 11th Border (Lonsdales) of 
97th Brigade, raised in Cumberland and Westmorland and therefore within Western Command, 
had lost 100 killed, 371 wounded and 19 missing on that day and even after re-organization 
their OR strength on 7 July was only 480.137  The other battalions of 32nd Division were in much 
the same state and the Division had been sent north to the area of Bethune and Cambrin where 
it recuperated and reorganized amid ‘conditions of comparative serenity’ whilst waiting for 
reinforcements.138  There were frequent minor moves and some spells in the trenches but very 
little action. 
 
                                                 
136 TNA: WO 153/1265 Days in the Line per Division 1 July – 31 October 1916. 
137 Colonel H.C. Wylly, The Border Regiment in the Great War (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1924), p 85 and 
TNA: WO 95/2403 War Diary for July 1916 – 11th Border Regt. 
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Between 1 August and 22 October the Lonsdales received 378 men, including a draft on 11 
October of 212 TF soldiers from the 1st Reserve Herefordshire Regiment.139  This draft was a 
mixture of former HS men, who had joined 3/1st Herefordshire between August 1914 and May 
1915, and Derby men who had enlisted in the 3/1st Herefordshire Reserve Battalion and had 
since been called up.  Most of the HS men, roughly one third of the draft, were in their late 
twenties and early thirties and almost all came from Herefordshire.  From mid-June 1915 the 
HS men had been defending the Norfolk coast with the 48th Provisional Battalion where many 
of them had pre-empted compulsion by signing the IS Obligation before the appointed date of 
MSA 2: 3064 Pte Joseph Loader and 2786 Pte Henry Pryce signed the IS Obligation at Cromer 
on 21 June.140  On 19 July 1916 they had been returned to their parent battalion.  The other two 
thirds of the draft were ‘Derby men’, mainly from Herefordshire but with a few from 
Radnorshire, Monmouthshire and South Wales.  Both the HS and the Derby men were 
compulsorily transferred to 3rd (SR) KSLI on 22 September and, after being medically 
examined and pronounced ‘Fit for Draft’, they had become part of a draft of 250 which arrived 
on 1 October at No 4 IBD in Rouen.  They were earmarked for 5th KSLI, but on 11th October 
some 212 were posted to 11th Border Regiment.  Although the KSLI and the Borders belonged 
to different Districts, the draft did at least remain in a unit from Western Command.  
  
In late October 97th Brigade moved south again, carrying out some training at La Vicogne 
during the first two weeks of November.  By 15 November 32nd Division was in Fifth Army, 
preparing to take part in the final operations of the Battle of the Ancre and on 17 November, 
they received orders for an attack on Frankfort Trench early the following day.141  The 97th 
                                                 
139 TNA: WO 95/2402 – 2nd KOYLI War Diary and TNA 95/2403 11th Border War Diary  August – October 
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140 Service Papers searched using www.ancestry.co.uk. 
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Brigade’s objective was the capture of Munich Trench in front of the Frankfort Trench, using 
all four battalions ‘by the express desire of the corps’.142      
 
The 32nd Division took over the front-line trenches and began to move up to the start-line.  The 
97th Brigade had difficulty getting through very swampy ground caused by the recent heavy 
rains and the situation was compounded by the men having no previous knowledge of the area 
and the trenches.143  At 06.10 on 18 November the attack went in but was not a success.  On the 
right, 17th HLI was checked by rifle and machine gun fire and to the left 2nd KOYLI and 11th 
Border were held up by an enemy redoubt.  Some Borders managed to get into Munich Trench 
and some even reached Frankfort Trench but were driven back to hold a line about 200 yards 
in front of it.144  By noon the attacking force were back in their front line, except for a party of 
7 officers and some 120 Other Ranks of 11th Borders and 16th HLI who would hold two dugouts 
in Frankfort Trench for a further few days before being taken prisoner.  The attack had cost 97th 
Brigade 491 men killed and many others were wounded and missing.145  The 11th Borders had 
lost 141 men killed, of whom over a third (53) were Herefordshire TF soldiers who had been 
part of the draft of 212 rushed out just five weeks earlier.146  It would be tempting to say that 
the failure of the attack was due to the large proportion of newly arrived former TF HS men in 
the battalions.  Many other reasons might be cited, however, but a key one must be that this was 
a division that had spent just 10 days on the Somme front line in July before being sent north.147  
Since then it had played no part in the subsequent actions that by November had created a very 
differently experienced force from that of early July.     
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143 TNA: WO 95/ 2402 2nd KOYLI entry for 17/18 Nov 16. 
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The 1916 Battle of the Somme officially ended on 18 November.  The Official History shows 
that the BEF suffered 419,654 casualties up to 30 November 1916, although this includes some 
absentees who had returned.148  The Statistics of the British Military Effort gives a figure of 
498,054 (excluding sick) during the period of the Somme Offensive, of whom 108,724 were 
dead, 343,431 were wounded and 45,899 missing or prisoners.149  Prior and Wilson give a total 
casualty figure of 432,000 for divisions based on an untitled document in the Australian War 
Memorial.150  All these figures are at odds with the estimated casualties at the time given in AG 
GHQ’s War Diary:   
 July August September October November December Total 
Total strength of 
BEF 
1,465,200 1,520,000 1,539,584 1,520,900 1,524,110 1,590,700  
Total battle 
casualties (k, w, m)  
163,602 77,191 110,842 70,812 47,887 11,290 481,624 
Total sick wastage 25,723 29,970 37,660 32,209 47,093 55,660 228,315 
Total losses 189,343 107,161 148,502 105,021 94,980 66,970 711,977 
Reinforcements 
from home 
(excluding RA, RE 
and RFC) 
108,221 75,845 111,792 88,732 71,786 119,859 576,235 
Estimated casualties 
by Divisions 
engaged in Active 
operations (Somme) 
151,184 37,485 90,249 31,015 26,604 (no 
separate 
figures 
shown) 
336,537 
Source: TNA WO 95/26 GHQ AG Branch War Diary for July – December 1916 (NB Estimated casualty figures) 
The disparity between the total figures during and after the event shows the huge difficulty of 
obtaining accurate data, which inevitably compounded the problem for those providing 
reinforcements.  The GHQ figures show that 576,235 men, less those for the RA, RE and RFC, 
were received from home, enough to cover the battle casualties but short of the overall number 
required.  The replacement figures were augmented, however, by the achievements of the 
                                                 
148 BOH 1916 Vol. 1, p. 497. 
149 Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire (London: War Office, 1922;  Uckfield: Naval & Military 
Press, 1999),  p. 324.  
150 AWM 252/206 ‘Casualties by divisions’, untitled document in the Australian War Memorial, cited by R. 
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medical services in returning a third of those wounded and over half the sick to duty within 
theatre.151           
 
Whenever possible, men were returned to their own units.152  On 31 July the IGC confirmed 
that less seriously wounded cases were, as far as possible, to be retained in France for treatment 
and to rejoin their own units as early as possible when fit.153  The policy was certainly applied 
as far as Bert Oakes and George Culpitt were concerned.  Bert Oakes had finally arrived with 
7th KSLI on 21 July but on 22/23 was buried by a shell bursting over the trench.  He survived 
but was badly shaken and was back at the Base recuperating by 28 July where he remained 
during early August.  He was fit enough to return to his Battalion by mid-August and wrote 
home on 21 August that he had been in action the previous week ‘but am glad to say I came 
through safely although had many narrow escapes’.154  George Culpitt of 10th RWF had been 
in action with 3rd Division but in late July was evacuated with influenza.  After nearly three 
weeks in hospital he was declared fit enough to go to the recently established No 5 Convalescent 
Camp at Cayeux where he spent a further three weeks before being returned to the IBD at 
Rouen, where those who had been wounded or sick did only light training ‘and did not train 
with the new recruits from England’.  After about a week he and eleven others were warned for 
the line, six each for 10th and 9th RWF.  By now it was about 24 September and 10th RWF was 
near Bethune, where Culpitt was happy to rejoin ‘A’ Company.155  Admittedly these are just 
two men out of thousands, but there is no reason to suppose that they were especially unusual 
at that time. 
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Not all the men who arrived in France or who recovered from slight wounds or sickness could 
be sent to the front line.  Men were medically examined again on arrival at the IBDs and 
classified as: ‘A’ – fit for General Service; ‘TB’ - Temporary Base until fit for general service; 
‘PB’ – Permanent Base but fit enough for service on the LofC and in Army Corps; or ‘PU’ – 
Permanently Unfit: never likely to become fit for active service but could be employed in the 
same way as PB men.  With the Manning problems back home, there was constant pressure 
from both the War Office and GHQ for fit men in the Base Areas to be ‘combed out’ and sent 
forward to fight, their places being taken by PB men; in July the IGC was employing 16,000 
PB replacements at the Bases, Casualty Clearing Stations and the various hospitals.156  These 
men were also employed by Armies at Ammunition Railheads and also to relieve men of 
fighting units on such duties as ‘sanitary fatigues, Officers and Mess Servants, cooks, charge 
of Divisional recreation rooms etc’.157   
 
It was all a bit piecemeal, however, and a definite organization was required to administer the 
PB men, both on the LofC and with Armies.  On 7 September the CinC requested authority 
from the War Office for the creation of organizations to administer the PB men at each of the 
Bases, Le Havre, Rouen, Étaples and Calais.  At this point the proposed organizations were 
simply intended to organize and administer the constant flow of large numbers of PB men rather 
than to form them into battalions of a particular size.158  Such organizations would be less viable 
with the Armies as the PB men were scattered over very wide areas so it was proposed to have 
7 NCOs per 100 PB men and one officer at Army Headquarters, responsible for their 
                                                 
156 TNA: WO 95/3969 IGC War Diary - 22 July 1916. 
157 TNA: WO 95/3969 IGC War Diary entry 25 July 1916. 
158 TNA: WO 95/3970 IGC War Diary – 21 September 1916. 
 
 
147 
 
administration, periodical re-classification and the replacement of casualties.159  By early 
November, however, it had been realized that a more formal organization was needed and 
battalions of 4,000 and upwards were now formed to administer PB men at Le Havre, Rouen 
and Étaples with a battalion of up to 2,000 at Calais.  On 11 November No 3 Employment Base 
Depot noted the formation of the PB battalion with 4,300 men.  Two weeks later the camp 
strength was 1,472 and the 4,906 men of the PB battalion were providing labour for POW 
camps, Schools of Instruction, Bases and Army Headquarters.160 
 
New units were also brought out for work behind the Front line; in August the 2nd Garrison 
battalions of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and the Kings Own 
Yorkshire Light Infantry arrived for employment on traffic control work.161  Further dedicated 
labour units, both skilled and unskilled, arrived in the form of Army Service Corps (ASC) 
Labour Companies and Infantry Labour battalions.  By the end of August six more Labour 
battalions would arrive and the War Office considered that the deficiency of 9,000 unskilled 
labourers in France would then be practically made good.162  However, yet more were required 
and on 5 October the 14th (Labour) Devonshire and the 21st (Labour) Cheshire arrived at Havre.  
Altogether, thirty-three Infantry Labour battalions were formed in 1916 of which thirty went to 
France for employment mainly on road maintenance.  
 
Other sources of labour included large numbers of German prisoners of war who were formed 
into companies and set to work, primarily repairing roads, guarded by PB men.163  There were 
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also labour units drawn from various parts of the Empire and units made up of non-combatants, 
who had been accepted by the Tribunals as conscientious objectors.  The main aim behind the 
provision of skilled and unskilled labour was the reduction of demands on the fighting troops 
whilst out of the line.   
 
Planning for the following year had already begun and the question of future reinforcements 
was raised by Haig in a report to Robertson dated 21 November, which the latter attached as an 
Appendix to a note to Lloyd George.164  The Infantry strength of the 55 divisions on the Western 
Front was 576,079 against an establishment of 689,680, although 22,881 reinforcements at the 
Base reduced the deficit to 90,500.  Looking ahead to 1 March 1917 it was estimated that some 
302,500 infantrymen would be needed to provide a surplus of 10% with units, cover estimated 
winter wastage of 113,000 and enable adequate drafts to be available at the Base on 1 March 
1917.  Haig continued to regard ‘the prospects of success on this front next year as most 
favourable’ but emphasized that the first essential was ‘an adequate supply of men, sufficiently 
trained, and on the spot, to fill vacancies in the ranks immediately they occur’. 
 
Developments at Home July – December 1916 
The provision of manpower remained at the forefront of attention at home.  There were two 
aspects: the immediate drafting organization to send out reinforcements and the longer term 
provision of manpower for the future. 
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Creation of the Training Reserve 
Reinforcement by regiment with the consequent streamlining of Base Depots in France during 
July enabled re-organization of the home draft-finding units.  In early August it was announced 
that a new Infantry corps, to be known as the Training Reserve (TR), would be created on 1 
September.165  Full details were issued in ACI 1528.  The Regimental reserves (SR, ER where 
they existed, and TF Reserve battalions) were to be brought up to strength immediately with 
men from their Second and Local Reserve battalions.  Thereafter they would be kept at full 
strength by the allocation of Infantry general service recruits raised in their regimental area.  
Once a regiment’s reserve battalions were full, surplus recruits would be allocated in the first 
instance to regiments of the same Command which had been unable to obtain sufficient recruits 
from their respective areas.  Once all the Command’s regimental reserves were full, its surplus 
recruits would be posted to TR battalions affiliated to the Districts of the Command.  When a 
draft was required for a battalion, available trained men would be taken from its regimental 
reserves.  The ACI was very clear that only when insufficient men were available would they 
be drawn from an affiliated TR battalion.   
 
The TR battalions were formed from the Second Reserve and Local Reserve battalions which 
lost their regimental designations and were numbered consecutively as TR battalions.  From 1 
September men remaining in them after the regimental reserves had been filled received new 
regimental numbers, prefixed by ‘TR/’, the number of the District in which the Record Office 
of the unit was situated and then the actual number eg TR/4/12345.  The existing Reserve 
Infantry Brigades were reduced to twenty-four, each containing between four and six TR 
battalions, and with an overall establishment of 208,500.  To arrive at this establishment 33 of 
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the 145 Second and Local Reserve battalions were disbanded.  In the Marches area, four RWF 
battalions were combined into two TR battalions but otherwise the changes for No 4 District 
units were simply of nomenclature with the brigading and locations remaining the same.  The 
9th (Reserve) KSLI, for example, now became the 48th TR battalion but remained within 11th 
Reserve Brigade at Prees Heath.166  The No 3 District TR battalions were more scattered with 
five at Altcar in Lancashire, six at Prees Heath and two apiece at Cannock Chase, Wareham in 
Dorset and Seaford in East Sussex.  In total, 26 TR battalions were affiliated to Western 
Command, 9 for No 4 District and 17 for No 3 District.   
 
The 194 TF Reserve battalions in their 14 Groups also became, through amalgamations, 87 
battalions in 14 Reserve Brigades.167  For the Marches this meant the absorption of the 5th, 6th 
and 7th TF (Reserve) battalions of both the Cheshire and the RWF by their 4th (Reserve) 
battalions; 1st (Reserve) Monmouthshire absorbed its 2nd and 3rd Reserve Battalions.  All the 
No 4 District TF (Reserve) battalions remained in the Welsh Reserve Brigade TF at Oswestry.   
 
It is clear from careful reading of the whole ACI that the intention was to preserve regimental 
and territorial connections and that TR men were only be drafted to battalions which could not 
be supplied with men from their regimental reserves.  Some Regiments seem to have had little 
difficulty with the new TR battalions: the KSLI noted that ‘when the personnel [of 49th TR 
Battalion] became mixed with officers and men of other regiments, the spirit and traditions of 
the KSLI were always preserved’.168  For others, however, misperceptions lingered to be 
repeated in works written after the war.  In writing of 1st Cheshire’s reinforcements in late 
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July/August 1916, the Regimental historian appears to have confused the MSA provisions for 
compulsory transfer with the as yet uncreated TR noting that ‘In future, Battalions were to 
receive men from a pool formed by recruits and reinforcements from units whose recruiting 
areas were contiguous.  It was felt that this would destroy ‘esprit de corps’ …’.169  He was not 
alone in his post-war misperceptions: the oft-quoted comment by Captain Dunn of 2nd RWF 
that some ‘hairy-eared theorist’ had told the new War Lord ‘that the way to win was to destroy 
the Regiment ……. and nationalize the Army’, although dated 28 July 1916, was clearly 
accorded greater credibility in retrospect.170  At the time referred to by both these comments, 
the TR had not yet been created.   
 
Creation of the Manpower Distribution Board 
The main conflicting demands for manpower in the longer term were those of the War Office 
and the Ministry of Munitions and there was some concern when on 8 July, following the death 
of Lord Kitchener in June, Lloyd George moved from Munitions to become Secretary of State 
for War.  Within a couple of weeks, however, and much to Macready’s relief, he had been 
persuaded that many men employed on munitions could be spared for the Army without 
jeopardizing the output of material.171  On 28 July the Army Council, including Lloyd George, 
decided that the War Office should press for the creation of a strong central committee to 
organize the distribution of manpower, and that a sound working agreement should be reached 
with the Ministry of Munitions over the release of skilled men from the military for civil 
work.172  Macready had first proposed a strong central committee for the distribution of 
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manpower in May 1916 but nothing had come of it.173  He now re-submitted the proposal for a 
small Board, with a Chairman and two civilian Members, ‘able to determine the relative 
importance of competing demands and [possessing] powers of final and absolute decision as to 
the allocation of men available’, in a Memorandum to the Cabinet on 2 August.174  The War 
Committee discussed the matter favourably on 5 August, creating a small committee to draft 
Terms of Reference for what would become the Manpower Distribution Board (MPDB).175  
Specifically, the Board was to:   
determine all questions arising between Government Departments relating to the 
allocation or economic utilization of manpower for the purpose of the successful 
prosecution of the war and  … to direct the Government Departments concerned to 
create the machinery necessary to co-ordinate their activities in regard to the distribution 
or utilization of men and women.   
 
It was also to decide on the feasibility of any future large-scale demand for manpower by any 
Department.  Although agreement to its creation had been given, it would be 12 September 
before its composition was finally agreed and work could begin; by now it had grown to five 
members.  The Army Council considered it was all taking too long and Robertson continued to 
stress the need for urgency.  Recruiting was the ‘reverse of satisfactory’ with a large number of 
men rejected as unfit and many employers releasing older men rather than the younger ones 
needed.  Some 400,000 men would be required by 15 March 1917 to keep the present number 
of divisions up to strength and provide for RA and RFC expansion.176   
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On 26 September, Macready and Brigadier-General Auckland Geddes, Director of Recruiting, 
informed the MPDB that British forces in France were short of 80,000 men and it was estimated 
that no more than 105,000 would be sent to France over the next three months.  Macready 
blamed the shortage on the lack of co-ordination between departments, the demands of the 
Ministry of Munitions and the actions of the Tribunals.177   Over the next few days evidence 
was taken from Government Departments and the MPDB’s first report was submitted to the 
War Committee on 3 October.178  There would be two subsequent reports, on 12 October and 9 
November respectively, but ultimately Macready felt that ‘nothing effective developed from its 
activities’.179  The situation between the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions was 
eventually resolved through a series of bi-lateral meetings between Montagu, the Minister for 
Munitions, and Lord Derby and agreement that, through a process of de-badging, some 50,000 
semi-skilled and unskilled munition workers, aged under 30, could be made available for 
general military service by the end of January 1917.180  Their places in munitions factories 
would be filled by substituting women and men unfit for general service.  Most importantly, 
there was to be ‘close co-operation’ between the two Ministries.181    
 
However, this addressed only part of the problem.  On 24 November the Army Council 
discussed the need to scrutinize men employed at home: as at 1 November there were nearly 
400,000 men employed within Home Forces and Macready was tasked to reduce this number 
by 100,000 by the end of current year.  It was also proposed to send a senior officer ‘familiar 
with the man-power situation and the difficulties which have to be overcome in providing 
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reinforcements for the fighting troops’ to France to examine the number of fit men employed 
on the LofC and at the Bases with a view to their replacement by others.  Finally, it was agreed 
that Macready was to prepare ‘a complete survey of the recruiting prospects for the next 12 
months’ for submission by the Army Council to the War Committee.182 
 
Macready’s survey took the form of a strongly worded Memorandum on the Supply of Men for 
the Army which warned that:  
unless steps are taken at once by His Majesty’s Government to introduce some better 
system of utilizing the manhood of the nation untrammelled by conditions that in 
practice now nullify to a great extent the objects of the Military Service Acts, it will be 
impossible after April next to keep the armies up to strength.183  
 
It was estimated that, with the monthly intake running some 20,000 below requirements, the 
total number of recruits obtained in 1916 would be 95,000 short of the number agreed the 
previous February.  The Army’s anticipated requirement for 1917 was 940,000 men and a 
further 250,000 to 350,000 would be required by Munitions.  To raise these numbers it was 
suggested that all men up to 55 ‘should be utilized for such national service as HM Government 
deem to be essential to the effective prosecution of the war’.  The Army Council submitted the 
memorandum to Lloyd George for presentation to the War Committee but he, presumably for 
reasons of his own, now decided that it should be sent by the Military Members only so that the 
‘Parliamentary members of the Army Council (held) themselves free to press its adoption on 
the Cabinet’.184  
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Matters were reaching a head. The MPDB may not have made universally accepted or indeed 
effective proposals but a passage in its Third Report initiated a step towards national service.  
On 30 November the War Cabinet agreed unanimously that the military situation overall was 
such that the time had come ‘for the adoption of compulsory national service’ for all men up to 
the age of 60.185  It was hoped that once the necessary details had been worked out the necessary 
legislation could be enacted before Christmas but this did not happen, not least because the 
Government fell with the resignation of Asquith on 5 December.  The new Prime Minister was 
Lloyd George, with Lord Derby replacing him at the War Office.  It is not within the scope of 
this thesis to examine how much the manpower problem might have contributed to the political 
crisis.  The Government’s fall, however, would delay consideration of compulsory national 
service until 1917.   
 
Analysis of Battalions’ Composition  
The total number of deaths during 1916 for Marches battalions on the Western Front, both 
Regular and TF, was 5,763, an increase of 2,439 over the previous year, reflecting the greater 
intensity and length of the Somme battle.186  It is not possible to calculate the total number of 
casualties but taking the deaths at roughly 20 percent, the total casualties could have been in 
the region of 28,000.  Some of these would have been minor, and their recipients soon treated 
and returned to duty, but other casualties would have taken longer to recover and some might 
never again have been fit enough.  Whatever the outcome it seems fair to say that the Marches 
Regiments on the Western Front had probably required well over 20,000 replacements during 
1916, the equivalent of over 20 new Infantry battalions.  A view of quite where these 
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replacements had been obtained may be gained from detailed analysis of deaths in selected 
battalions for the period 1 July – 30 November 1916.187   
 
Details of the enlistment locations for the English battalions are shown in Table 3.1 below.  
Enlistment Location 1st Cheshire 9th Cheshire  1st KSLI 6th KSLI 
Regimental Area 146 71% 100 66%  66 57% 89 82% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - England 3  7   9  2  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 3  3   20  7  
Total enlisted in No 4 District 152 73% 110 72%  95 83% 98 90% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 19  8   5  8  
 Liverpool/Manchester 16  19   4  0  
Total Enlisted in Western Command 187 90% 137 90%  104 90% 106 97% 
Northern Command 13  8   2  2  
Southern Command 1  2   2  1  
 Birmingham 1  1   2    
Eastern 2  1   2    
London District 1  3   2    
Scotland/Ireland 2     1    
Overseas          
Total Other Commands 20 10% 15 10%  11 10% 3 3% 
Total Deaths 207  152   115  109  
Table 3.1. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected English Regular battalions who were killed/died 
between 1 July – 30 November 1916. 
 
 
For 1st Cheshire enlistments in the regimental recruiting area remained roughly the same at 71 
per cent but those for 9th (Service) Cheshire had dropped from 100 per cent in 1915 to 66 per 
cent.  The figures for those recruited in No 4 District, however, remain around 72 percent and 
in both cases the numbers enlisted in Western Command were 90 per cent, due to the proximity 
in No 3 District of the conurbations of Liverpool and Manchester and the rest of Lancashire.   
Similarly, the composition of the KSLI remained recognisably similar to earlier years.  
Enlistments in the Regimental area had dropped for both 1st and 6th KSLI but those in Western 
Command as a whole stood at 90 and 97 per cent respectively.  Some 17 per cent of 1st KSLI 
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had been recruited in Wales reflecting its proximity to mid-Wales and fewer men were recruited 
from No 3 District.   
 
Poor recruiting in Wales made reinforcements for the two Welsh regiments more problematical 
although greater efforts were being made to post Welsh recruits to Welsh regiments. 
Enlistment Location 2ndRWF 9th RWF  1st SWB 10th SWB 
Regimental Area 44 23% 28 22%  54 45% 46 94% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - England 18  12   6  1  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 43  41   21  2  
Total enlisted in No 4 District 105 54% 81 64%  81 67% 49 100% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 16  3   4    
 Liverpool/Manchester 9  6   2    
Total Enlisted in Western Command 130 67% 90 71%  87 72% 49 100% 
Northern Command 9  17   10    
Southern Command 12  3   2    
 Birmingham 26  11       
Eastern 2  1   4    
London District 15  4   17    
Scotland/Ireland 1     1    
Overseas          
Total Other Commands 65 33% 36 29%  34 38%   
Total Deaths 195  126   121  49  
Table 3.2. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected Welsh Regular battalions who were killed/died 
between 1 July – 30 November 1916. 
 
By late July 1916 2nd RWF had become recognisably more Welsh with 46 per cent having 
enlisted in Wales as opposed to 32 per cent in 1915.  In 1915, 45 per cent of those who died 
had enlisted in Southern Command, mainly from the Birmingham area, but this had decreased 
to 19 percent in 1916.  Western Command enlistments had risen to 67 and 71 per cent for 2nd 
RWF and 9th RWF respectively.  Conversely, some 62 per cent of 1st SWB had enlisted in 
Wales, a slight drop on the 1915 figures, and 72 per cent in Western Command.  The 10th SWB 
had arrived in France in December 1915 and its 1916 deaths were those of original Kitchener 
recruits, all except one of whom had enlisted in Wales.  
  
The figures for those born in Cheshire (see Table 3.3 below) were more varied but again 
comparison of those born in Western Command show that the percentages remain high at 78 
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per cent for 1st Cheshire and 81 per cent for 9th Cheshire.  The Cheshire Regular battalions thus 
remained recognisably the same as they had always been.  Births in the regimental area and 
Western Command for 1st and 6th KSLI also remained similar across 1915 and 1916.   
Birth location 1st Cheshire 9th Cheshire  1st KSLI 6th KSLI 
Regimental Area 92 44% 79 52%  57 50% 74 68% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – England 5  5   8  2  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 9  5   11  4  
Total born in No 4 District 106 51% 89 59%  76 66% 80 73% 
Born in No 3 District 25  16   7  7  
 Liverpool/Manchester 30  18   3  1  
Total Born in Western Command 161 78% 123 81%  86 75% 88 81% 
Northern Command 19  11   6  6  
Southern Command 2  4   5  3  
 Birmingham 2  1   1  2  
Eastern 3  5   2  5  
London District 6  2   2    
Scotland/Ireland 6  2   1  3  
Overseas          
Total Other Commands 40  25   17  19  
Location of Birth Unknown 6  4   12  2  
Total Deaths 207  152   115  109  
Table 3.3. Birth locations of soldiers of selected English Regular battalions who were killed/died between 1 
July – 30 November 1916. 
 
It is thus fair to say that both the English county regiments in the Marches remained remarkably 
homogeneous in late 1916.   
 
The picture changes again for those born in Wales, however, since in 1916 fewer than half the 
soldiers from either 2nd or 9th RWF battalion had actually been born there, although the 
surnames of most were Welsh (see Table 3.4).  Roughly half of 1st and 10th SWB had been born 
in Wales, many of the rest having been born just across the border in Gloucestershire or else in 
London.  The composition of the Welsh battalions thus reflects regional recruiting problems 
but also the growing emphasis on posting Welsh recruits to Welsh regiments. Roughly one third 
had enlisted in England for service in Welsh battalions but scrutiny of the Medal Index Cards 
(MIC) does not as yet indicate previous operational service in English battalions for these men.   
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Birth location 2ndRWF 9th RWF  1st SWB 10th SWB 
Regimental Area 53 27% 26 21%  31 26% 24 49% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – England 17  9   7  3  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 26  33   22  4  
Total born in No 4 District 96 49% 68 54%  60 50% 31 63% 
Born in No 3 District 15  7   9  0  
 Liverpool/Manchester 7  4   1  0  
Total Born in Western Command 118 61% 79 63%  70 58% 31 63% 
Northern Command 18  22   10  2  
Southern Command 19  10   12  12  
 Birmingham 14  6   1    
Eastern 3  6   4  1  
London District 11  1   18  1  
Scotland/Ireland 6     3  1  
Overseas      1    
Total Other Commands 71  45   49  17  
Location of Birth Unknown 6  2   2  1  
Total Deaths 195  126   121  49  
Table 3.4. Birth locations of soldiers of selected Welsh Regular battalions who were killed/died between 1 
July – 30 November 1916. 
 
 
The Marches were a fertile recruiting ground for the TF and Table 3.5. consequently, with the 
exception of 1/4th RWF, shows a continuing high percentage of enlistments from within the 
regimental areas.  Although less than half of 1/4th RWF had enlisted in the Regimental area, 
roughly two-thirds had at least enlisted in Wales.   This probably reflects traditional custom in 
crossing county and regimental boundaries.  For example, the Stockport-based 1/6th Cheshire 
had always contained men from Glossop in Derbyshire, nineteen of whom show up as the 17 
per cent enlisted in Northern Command.  Overall, in 1916 TF enlistments from within No 4 
District remained almost universally high. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
TF Enlistment Locations 1 /5th  
Cheshire 
1 /6th  
Cheshire 
1 /4th 
RWF 
1 /1st 
Monmouths 
1 /2nd 
Monmouths 
Regimental Area 104 93% 90 78% 20 49% 34 92% 64 91% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - 
England 
5  4  2  1    
Elsewhere in No 4 District - 
Wales 
  1  7  1  5  
Total enlisted in No 4 District 109  95 83% 29 71% 36 97% 69 99% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 1        1  
 Liverpool/Manchester   1        
Total Enlisted in Western 
Command 
110 98% 96 83% 29 71% 36 97% 70 100% 
Northern Command 2  19 (17%) 5      
Southern Command           
 Birmingham           
Eastern     7  1    
London District           
Scotland/Ireland           
Overseas           
Total Other Commands 2 2% 19 17% 12 29% 1 3%   
Total Deaths   115  41  37  70  
Table 3.5. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected TF battalions who were killed/died between 1 July – 
30 November 1916. 
 
The birth locations for TF soldiers are more scattered, as shown in Table 3.6. 
Birth locations 1 /5th  
Cheshire 
1 /6th  
Cheshire 
1 /4th 
RWF 
1 /1st 
Monmouths 
1 /2nd 
Monmouths 
Regimental Area 75 67% 48 42% 12 29% 23 62% 28 40% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – 
England 
5  4  2  2  2  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - 
Wales 
2    6  2  11  
Total born in No 4 District 82 73% 52 45% 20 49% 27 73% 41 59% 
Born in No 3 District 7  9        
 Liverpool/Manchester 6  8    1    
Total Born in Western 
Command 
95 85% 69 60% 20 49% 28 76% 41 59% 
Northern Command 5  16 (14%) 7    4  
Southern Command 5  1    2  6  
 Birmingham     1      
Eastern 1    3  1    
London District 1    1  1  2  
Scotland/Ireland   1    1  1  
Overseas 2      1  1  
Total Other Commands 14  18  12  6  14  
Location of Birth Unknown 3  28  9  3  15  
Total Deaths 112  115  41  37  70  
Table 3.6. Birth locations of soldiers of selected TF battalions who were killed/died between 1 July – 30 
November 1916. 
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The large number of unknown places of birth for some of the battalions make it difficult to draw 
any firm conclusions.  Of those whose birth locations are known, however, fewer had actually 
been born within the Regimental areas and Western Command.                
 
Conclusions 
Much had changed during 1916 as the demand for men became ever greater.  The first tentative 
moves in January towards compulsory service for single men under the age of 41 had by 
December appeared to become the realization that national service was required to ensure that 
best use could be made of the nation’s population.  How much this quantum leap would change 
the Army’s composition in the future remained to be seen. 
 
The legislation that brought about compulsion had also had a major effect on the TF, allowing 
TF soldiers for the first time to be transferred without their consent between units and corps, 
and into Regular units.  This legislation had enabled TF replacements, many of them former 
HS and Derby men, to be used to fill gaps caused by Somme casualties. The side-effect, 
however, was deep-seated resentment against the way in which their terms of service had been 
changed which would continue to fester for years.   
 
The need for men had also prompted re-consideration of how existing Army manpower should 
be used.  The Medical Services had played a significant part in this by introducing more accurate 
classifications enabling better use of less-fit men in order to release fit men to fight.  
Improvements had also been made in the treatment of casualties, enabling more men to be 
returned to duty in theatre.  
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The Army’s procedures for casualty reporting and demanding replacements had continued to 
prove effective under the severe testing of the Somme but a need to streamline the reinforcement 
organization had been identified before the battle started.  Replacements were now drawn from 
regiments rather than battalions and the Base Depots had been re-organized to implement this.  
At Home further streamlining of the Reserve organization had occurred in September.  
Regimental reserves continued to be maintained as the first port of call for replacements but 
once the regimental reserves were full surplus recruits could fill up other neighbouring 
regiments; only when all the Command’s regimental reserves were full would surplus recruits 
be sent to the new TR battalions for use where needed.  Despite perceptions in the Army at 
large, however, emphasis remained on preserving regimental affiliations.  
 
Analysis of selected battalions from the Marches regiments during the period 1 July to 30 
November shows their composition remaining remarkably similar to that of earlier years.  The 
English county regiments continued virtually the same whilst the Welsh battalions had become 
more Welsh.  The numbers enlisted in the parent Command remained high overall: over 67 per 
cent of those who died had enlisted in Western Command and nine of the fourteen battalions 
analysed showed 90 percent or higher.   
 
By the end of 1916, manpower remained problematical but steps had been started towards its 
better use across the nation.  The Army was attempting to make better use of the men that it had 
but as yet there is no evidence that the localized regimental system was being eroded, either by 
design or circumstances.
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Chapter 4 
The ‘Man Question’ and its Effects 
 
This chapter starts in late 1916, when the seeds of much that would happen in 1917 were sown, 
and then considers developments both at home and on the Western Front.  It briefly outlines 
political attempts to address the manpower problem and then considers developments in the 
recruiting and training organization and changes intended to make better use of existing 
structures and Army manpower.  Inevitably, some initiatives would cause tension between the 
Government and the Military and between the War Office and GHQ France.  For coherence, 
some of the latter, such as the implementation of the Lawson Report and the employment of 
women, have been handled as discrete topics rather than attempting to split them between home 
and France.  The focus then shifts to the Western Front where it is more appropriate to consider 
developments chronologically.  Much has been written on the Arras, Messines, 3rd Ypres and 
Cambrai offensives so examination has been limited to general manpower aspects, although 
some analysis of training is included together with the effects on battalions from the Marches.  
All the 1917 offensives would prove costly, requiring large numbers of replacements and the 
effect of these on the composition of selected Marches battalions in the second half of 1917 has 
been analysed in comparison with the same period of preceding years.   
 
Political Aspects at Home 
The provision of manpower for the Army would become increasingly difficult during 1917 as 
the Government sought to balance the needs of the nation with those of the Army.  In late 1916 
the new War Cabinet had agreed to compulsory national service for all men up to the age of 60 
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but further progress was delayed by the fall of the Government on 5 December.1  Lloyd George 
became Prime Minister, with Lord Derby succeeding him at the War Office, but the former’s 
previous interest in the ‘Man Question’ now appeared to have waned.2  Furthermore, it was 
soon apparent that resistance from the Labour movement towards anything implying industrial 
compulsion, and the Cabinet’s unwillingness to jeopardise the newly created Coalition 
Government would colour the manpower situation for the next few months. 
 
It had provisionally been agreed in late 1916 that a Director-General of National Service 
(DGNS) would be appointed to take charge of both military and civilian compulsory National 
Service.3  By 19 December, however, it was apparent that enrolment into an ‘industrial army’ 
was to remain on voluntary with no set time limit for its end.  Only if the voluntary effort failed 
would the Government ask Parliament to release them from any previously given pledges 
concerning industrial compulsion.4  It was clear that compulsion was a long way off.5    
 
Neville Chamberlain was appointed as DGNS but he could make little progress during the next 
few months since he lacked a clear definition of his powers and responsibilities.  It would not 
be until late March that a Ministry of National Service Act was passed ‘for the purpose of 
making the best use of all persons, whether men or women, able to work in any industry, 
occupation or service’.  No greater powers were conferred on Chamberlain, however, and those 
he had were circumscribed by the inclusion of specific pledges to allay fears of industrial 
                                                 
1 TNA: CAB 37/160/7 War Committee Meeting 21 November 1916 and CAB 37/160/33 War Committee Meeting 
30 November 1916.  
2 K. Grieves, The Politics of Manpower (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 91, citing Robertson’s 
letter to Monro dated 12 January 1917.  
3 TNA: CAB 37/161/26 War Cabinet Meeting No 7 of 14 December 1916. 
4 TNA: CAB 37/161/42 War Cabinet Meeting No 11 of 19 December 1916. 
5 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1916/dec/19/prime-ministers-statement. 
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compulsion: there would be ‘no compulsory employment or transfer of any person in or to any 
industry, occupation, or service’.6  Although Chamberlain produced regular reports, progress 
became increasingly frustrating for all concerned, as ‘committees without end sat and 
investigated the needs of various trades and requirements of Government departments (and) 
recommendations were made only to be put aside or watered down owing to pressure from 
various interests’.7   
 
A Bill amending the 1916 MSAs was finally introduced but it was limited to a single clause 
enabling the medical re-examination of men who had been discharged from the Navy or Army 
due to disablement or ill-health, men who had previously been rejected for service either after 
volunteering or having been called up under the MSAs, or who had been exempted from 
overseas service.  On 5 April, the Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act 1917 was 
passed.8  It was to prove a highly unpopular Act and would subsequently cause questions to be 
raised in the Commons over its operation.9 
     
By 22 June and Chamberlain’s Tenth Report it was apparent that National Service was not 
working.  Insufficient men had come forward as volunteers for National Service, there were 
delays in employing them and despite the country-wide creation of an elaborate organization to 
provide substitutes for men called up for service, few such vacancies had been created and 
Chamberlain’s substitutes were unwanted.10  Furthermore the Army was still not obtaining the 
                                                 
6 Public General Acts Passed in the Seventh and Eighth Years of the Reign of King George V (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1918), pp. 6 & 7: Ministry of National Service Act, 1917.   
7 General Sir N. Macready, Annals of an Active Life Vol. 1London: Hutchinson, n.d.), pp. 263-4. 
8 Public General Acts Passed in the Seventh and Eighth Years of the Reign of King George V pp 13 – 15: 
Military Service (Review of Exceptions) Act 1917. 
9 TNA: CAB 23/3/17 169th Meeting of 26 June 1917. 
10 TNA: CAB 23/3/33 Minutes of 185th Meeting of the War Cabinet on 13 July 1917. 
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men it required.  In an effort to end the deadlock, the Army’s Director of Recruiting, Brigadier-
General Auckland Geddes, now produced a memorandum proposing the transformation of the 
whole recruiting administrative machine from an age to an occupational basis as soon as 
possible and to end all Government protection of lads between 18 and 19.11  Effectively he was 
proposing the transfer of the Army’s recruiting organization to civilian control.  This was not 
such a maverick suggestion from within the War Office as it might be supposed – in March 
1916 Macready had unsuccessfully proposed to Kitchener the formation of one central authority 
to be responsible for the distribution of the nation’s man-power.12 
 
It did not take long for the War Cabinet to agree to the transfer of Army recruiting to a civilian 
organization, which it was subsequently determined would be the Ministry of National 
Service.13  That the DGNS would no longer be Chamberlain was by now patently apparent and 
he finally left office on 10 August.  On 11 August Auckland Geddes was offered the post but 
before accepting he made sure of a clearly defined role from the outset with a seat in Parliament 
and the status of a Cabinet Minister.  These increased powers would allay the War Office’s 
previous concerns and give the new DGNS a better chance of balancing the demands of the 
fighting services with those of the civilian world.    
 
There would be differences between the War Office and Geddes in the future but there was now 
confidence that the latter understood the needs of the military and that whatever he might decide 
in the future ‘would be in the best interests of the nation, whether those interests were civil or 
                                                 
11 TNA: CAB 24/20/83 Memorandum by Brigadier General Auckland Geddes on the Theory and Practice of 
Recruiting dated 23 July 1917.  
12 Macready, Annals of an Active Life Vol. 1, p. 238. 
13 TNA: CAB 23/3/49 201st Meeting of 1 August and CAB 23/5/58 210th Meeting of 19 August 1917. 
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military’.14  Geddes’ knowledge of manpower issues and his increased powers would enable 
him to assess the relevant merits of the conflicting demands for manpower and address 
problems that up to now had been systemic rather than deliberate.  By now, however, the 
position of the Army was serious as by August the total deficit was 347,560 physically fit men 
and 39,143 men of lower physical categories.15   
 
Allocation of Recruits  
The political resistance to universal compulsion meant that it remained possible to volunteer 
before being called up and many continued to do so.  In February William Tonkyn, a 23-year 
old civil servant, who as such could have remained exempt, requested permission from his 
Government Department to enlist.16  The young Ivor Hanson had attested four days before his 
18th birthday in November 1916.  He could then have waited to be called up on reaching 18 
years 8 months but instead enlisted in early January 1917.  On the suggestion that he had already 
been called up, he rather curtly informed the hapless enquirer: ‘That’s not true, for I shall not 
be of military age until about nine months’ time, but I am enlisting as a volunteer’.17  There are 
numerous other examples of both men and boys who continued to volunteer rather than wait to 
be called up.   
 
Army recruits were categorized by Recruiting Medical Boards and then allocated to Arms and 
Services according to monthly instructions.18  As many ‘A’ men as possible were to be sent to 
                                                 
14 Macready, Annals of an Active Life Vol. 1, p. 267. 
15 Statistics of the British Military Effort, p. 369 and Macready, Annals of an Active Life Vol. 1, p. 263. 
16 IWM: Con Shelf Letters of W.D. Tonkyn’ 
17 J.I. Hanson & A. Wakefield, Plough and Scatter (Yeovil: Haynes, 2009), pp. 48, 56 – 57 & 67. In mid-January 
1917, he joined the RFA and was posted to Bettisfield Park Camp in Shropshire. 
18 TNA: WO 293/5 ACI 2418 of 24 December 1916; WO 293/6 ACI 158 of 26 January 1917, ACI 358 of 1 March 
1917; ACI 536 of 28 March 1917; ACI 688 of 26 April 1917; all entitled ‘Posting recruits who are called up from 
Class B, Army Reserve, or who come forward for service before being called up, on or after 1 [month] 1917’. ACI 
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the Infantry Regimental Reserves (Reserve, Extra Reserve and TF Reserve Battalions) and the 
Training Reserve.  Those not destined for the Infantry were allocated elsewhere according to 
monthly requirements: in March, 11,000 ‘A’ men were to go to the Artillery and 100 to the 
Mounted Military Police (MMP).  Allocations were distributed by Commands: Western 
Command were to provide 2,440 of the 11,100 Artillerymen.  Men in lower fitness categories, 
B(i), B(ii), C(i) and C(ii) were allotted to other arms as appropriate to their fitness levels.   
 
The monthly Recruit Posting ACIs emphasized that recruits should be posted to units in which 
they wished to serve, provided they were suitable for them.  Allocations to each corps or unit 
were to include men who had originally volunteered to serve in a particular one; should there 
be no vacancies then he should be posted to other units, Regular or Territorial, raised in the 
same county or district.19  William Tonkyn naturally asked to join the Civil Service Rifles.  Two 
weeks later he learned that he had been accepted and that he would be released from 
Government service so long as he passed the medical examination.  Pronounced fit, he was 
posted to the Civil Service Rifles on 1 March and arrived at Hazeley Down Camp a week later 
to join 3/15th London Regt (Civil Service Rifles).20    
 
The emphasis on meeting recruits’ preferences continued throughout the year.  At the end of 
May the message was clear:  
The fullest consideration must be given to recruits’ preference for … their own national 
or even local corps. Advantage must be taken of everything that tends in any way to 
foster esprit de corps and these national and local sentiments are a valuable asset which 
                                                 
865 of 27 May onwards: ‘Arrangements for posting men to the Army who present themselves for service during 
the month of (June) 1917’.  See Appendix 4 re medical categories. 
19 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 158 of 26 January 1917. 
20 IWM: Con Shelf Diary of W. D. Tonkyn. 535391 Pte W D Tonkyn 12B Pl C Coy, 3/15 th London Regt (Civil 
Service Rifles), Hazeley Down Camp, Winchester. 
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must be kept in view … In the case of Infantry of the Line, recruits who have any such 
preference should be posted, wherever possible, to their own local regiments.21 
 
In September it was noted that volunteers were to be posted their chosen corps irrespective of 
the numbers allotted, providing they were physically and technically suited.  Any man over 18 
years 8 months wishing, with good reason, to be posted to a particular Infantry Regiment should 
have his request granted by the posting officer:   
the fullest consideration must be given to the men’s preference for what they regard as 
their own national or even local corps provided that they are suitable as regards 
Medical Categories etc.  Advantage must be taken of everything that leads in any way 
to [their] esprit de corps and these national and local sentiments are a valuable asset 
which must be kept in view.   
 
Lads under 18 years 8 months, who expressed a preference for a particular regiment, were not 
to be posted ‘indiscriminately to a TRB in the Command in which (they) presented (themselves) 
for service’ but should be posted to a TR Brigade affiliated to the same District as their chosen 
Regiment and their documents endorsed showing this choice. 22  It seems that, despite the 
pressures on recruiting, the value of esprit de corps accruing from keeping soldiers with others 
from the same locality continued to be recognized throughout 1917.23  The operative phrase, 
however, was ‘wherever possible’. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 865 of 27 May 1917. 
22 TNA: WO 293/7 ACI 1329 of 29 August Arrangements for posting men to the Army who present themselves 
for service during the month of September 1917. 
23 This would appear to contradict Captain Dunn’s reported conversation with Major Roger Poore concerning an 
‘inspector’s comment: ‘I suppose this is another piece of your esprit de corps.  Well, there’s to be no more of it’. 
NB: Poore was not attached to 2nd RWF until early 1917 so would have been with 2nd Wiltshire Yeomanry at the 
time of the alleged comment.  J.C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew 1914-1919(London: Abacus edn., 1987), p. 
246.   
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Infantry Recruit Training 
Adult recruit training followed a fourteen weeks syllabus designed to produce men able to 
march and shoot to a standard where they could take their place in a rifle section.24  No one was 
supposed to be sent overseas unless he was ‘up to the standard required for the particular draft 
concerned, both as regards training and physical fitness’.25  For various reasons, however, not 
all men did complete their training before being drafted.  In early 1917 3rd TRB consisted of six 
companies: three for recruits, two for returned BEF men and one containing unfit men and 
permanent staff.26  The Battalion noted bitterly that in December 1916 over half their Category 
‘A’ NCOs had been required for overseas reinforcements, thus reducing the number of 
instructors by about 40.  Furthermore, after February no officer, WO or NCO fit for General 
Service should be retained in a TRB for more than six months, which meant that potentially 
two thirds of the instructional staff of NCOs could be sent overseas at any moment.  There were 
also difficulties in conducting training.  The scale of SMLE rifles and bayonets for TR battalions 
was set at just 25% of the establishment which meant that, however carefully training was 
organized, units found it impossible to ensure that each man used the same rifle continuously 
throughout his musketry course, with consequent problems for zeroing the weapon and 
successful completion of the marksmanship tests.27  As a result of the training problems, all 415 
drafts sent to France by 3rd TRB in the first six months of 1917 were shown as partially trained.28  
Such men were categorized as ‘A(ii)’ (recruits who should be fit for ‘A(i)’ as soon as trained) 
and the nominal roll for such a draft was to be headed ‘SPECIAL’.  If it was the full musketry 
course that had not been completed, a note was also to be placed against each man’s name: 
                                                 
24 TNA: WO 293/5 ACI 1968 of September 1916. 
25 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 431 and 432 of 11 March 1917 and 533 of 28 March 1917.  
26 TNA: WO 95/5460 3rd TR Bn War Diary. NB ‘Employed men’ were the Permanent Staff of the unit. 
27 TNA: WO 293/6 ACIs 313, 986 and 987 of 1917. 
28 TNA: WO 95/5460 3rd TR Battalion War Diary. 
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‘Fired only parts … GMC’.29  It was expected that training would be completed on arrival at 
the Base(s) overseas. 
 
New instructions for the organization and roles of men within a platoon, culled from lessons 
learned on the Somme, had been issued in February, and aspects of these were introduced into 
recruit training as soon as possible.30  Initially, it is unlikely that many of the recruit training 
instructors had the necessary experience for this training.  It would not be until August that 
Infantry recruit training syllabi would be specifically amended to ensure that not only would 
every man be ‘sufficiently trained to take his place in his platoon overseas, but also that the 
training of Infantry drafts (met) the requirements of SS143 Instructions for the Training of 
Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917’.31   
 
In January, the War Cabinet had agreed to lower the age at which men were warned for call up 
from 18 years 7 months to 18 years.32  At that time, young recruits were posted with others of 
all ages to reserve units although the youths were trained in separate squads until turning 18 
years and 8 months, when they would be posted to the draft-producing companies of their unit.33  
Robertson and Macready were unhappy with this approach, and from February onwards 
changes to the training of young soldiers were gradually introduced, starting with the 
announcement that all future ‘A(iv)’ recruits under 18 years 8 months were to be posted to 
selected TR battalions for their training.34  There was of necessity a transition period: on 26 
                                                 
29 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 431 and 432 of 11 March 1917 and 533 of 28 March 1917.  
30 General Staff instructions: SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917 and SS 
144 The Normal Formation for the Attack, both issued in February 1917; TNA WO 293/6 ACI 322 of 22 
February 1917. 
31 TNA: WO 293/7 ACI 1230 of 6 August 1917 Training of Infantry Recruits. 
32 TNA: CAB 23/1/39 Appendix II to Minutes of 39th War Cabinet Meeting of 19 January 1917. 
33 TNA: WO 293/5 ACI 2418 dated 24 December 1916 and WO 293/6 ACI 158 of 26 January 1917. 
34 Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1921), p. 
304 and TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 358 of 1 March 1917, ACI 536 of 28 March 1917 and ACI 688 of 26 April 1917. 
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February 4th TRB became an ‘A(iv)’ battalion to train recruits aged under 19, whilst 2nd TRB 
followed on 6 April and 5th on 1 May.35  For young recruits already in the system, the changes 
could have long-term effects.  Clyde Hulme, from Burslem in Staffordshire, volunteered on 22 
January 1917, a month before his 18th birthday.  Mobilized on 2 April 1917, he reported to the 
local Depot.  His age meant that he was destined for a YS battalion and he should have been 
posted to one serving his local district, No 6.  The process of re-designation of TRBs, however, 
threw up anomalies and although Clyde was posted fairly locally, to Rugeley, it was to 8th TRB, 
serving No 5 District.  Both these Districts belonged to Northern Command but this initial 
posting placed Clyde, now TR/5/31291 Pte Hulme, with recruits from elsewhere in the 
Command and his future postings would be to units of No 5 District.36    
 
Further rationalization of young soldiers training came during May.37  Under the ‘General 
Scheme’ all youths enlisting under 18 years and 8 months, except those allocated elsewhere 
under the monthly recruit disposal ACI, were to be posted to selected TR battalions.  On 
completion of four months’ training they would be transferred to Infantry battalions to continue 
training until they turned 19; non-Infantrymen would continue their TR training or be 
transferred to other arms.  The June posting ACI confirmed the new approach but the whole 
area was now so complicated that a chart was necessary.38  An abbreviated version is given 
below. 
 
 
                                                 
35 TNA: WO 95/5459 1st TR Brigade War Diary. 
36 www.ancestry.com Service Record for 64802 Pte Clyde Hulme DLI. 
37 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 803 of 17 May 1917 ‘Posting and Training of Men under 19 Years of Age’. 
38 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 865 of 27 May 1917 ‘Arrangements for posting men to the Army who present 
themselves for service during the month of June 1917’. 
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Category <18y8m > 18y 8m & < 25y 25y & < 30y 30y and over 
A TR Regimental Reserves, TR, Foot Guards, monthly allotments to other Arms 
B (i) TR RH, RFA and RGA according to allotments in 
monthly posting ACI; surplus to TR 
Arms other than Infantry, 
according to allotments; TR 
B (ii) TR TR Arms other than Infantry: as 
allotted; Labour Units, 
Employment Companies 
Arms other than Infantry: as 
allotted; Labour Units, 
Employment Companies; ASC 
MT learners 
B (iii) TR TR Clerks – or to Reserve ‘B’ Clerks – or to Reserve ‘B’ 
C (i) TR RFC, RFA and RGA 
according to 
allotments; and TR 
RFC, RFA and RGA as 
allotted; and TR 
Arms other than Infantry: as 
allotted; RFC, TR, ASC MT 
Learners 
C (ii) TR TR Arms other than Infantry: as 
allotted; Labour Units, 
Employment Companies 
Arms other than Infantry: as 
allotted; Labour Units, 
Employment Companies 
C (iii) TR TR Clerks – or to Reserve ‘B’ Clerks – or to Reserve ‘B’ 
 
Specific instructions as to the allocation of Infantry recruits by age and medical categories 
followed:39 
Units Age of Recruits   
Young Soldiers Battalions 18 years 1 month A (iv) B (i) C (i) 
Junior Training Reserve Battalions Under 18 years 8 Months A (iv) B (i) C (i) (not required for the 
YS bns) B(ii), B(iii), C(ii), or C(iii) 
Regimental Reserves (Reserve, 
Extra Reserve, TF Res Bns) 
Over 18 years 8 mths A (ii) 
Senior Trg Res Bns Over 18 years 8 mths B (i), B(ii), B(iii), C (i), C(ii), and C(iii) 
NB. After six weeks training men in the lowest medical categories considered unlikely ever to be 
upgraded to Categories A, B(i) or C(i)  would be transferred to other arms or the Labour Corps. 
 
The previous instructions had placed the youngest recruits in Young Soldiers (YS) battalions 
for the first four months of their training but were then vague about what happened afterwards.  
This was remedied a few days later by the creation of Graduated Battalions, which were to be 
affiliated in pairs to each YS battalion.40 The youngest recruits, those aged 18 years 1 month, 
in Categories ‘A(iv)’, ‘B(i)’ and ‘C(i)’ would complete four months’ training in a YS battalion 
before being posted to a Graduated battalion. Companies in both YS and Graduated battalions 
                                                 
39 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 873 of 31 May 1917: Disposal of Recruits Allotted to Infantry in Monthly ACI for 
Posting of Recruits. 
40 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 925 of 12 June 1917: Training of Junior Training Reserve Battalions, Young Soldiers 
Battalions and Graduated Battalions. 
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were organized specifically by age: for example the 3rd Company of a YS battalion would 
contain lads aged 18 years 2 to 3 months.  On reaching 18 years 5 months they would move as 
a formed company, 250 strong, to an affiliated Graduated battalion which they would also move 
through by age.41  The YS training followed the ACI 322 syllabus up to the eighth fortnight, 
with the proviso that they were to have fired the GMC on the SMLE rifle during this period.  
On joining the Graduate battalions, those selected as bombers, Lewis gunners and signallers 
would begin specialized training.  Before leaving the Graduated battalions, all recruits would 
be put through a refresher course on the SMLE rifle, including live firing.  Allowing two weeks 
for inoculations and a further two weeks for leave the combination of YS and Graduated 
battalions would take recruits up to the age of 19 when they could be drafted overseas.  
 
The slightly older youths posted to Junior TRBs would receive six months training.  It was 
recognised that these recruits were still developing so any below ‘B(i)’ and ‘C(i)’ would initially 
undergo six weeks fitness training.  After that, those unlikely ever to become ‘A’, ‘B(i)’ or 
‘C(i)’ would be transferred to other units whilst any who might be upgraded would start their 
six months’ recruit training as soon as considered fit.  The training syllabus was organised in 
fortnightly blocks; after the eighth fortnight, some of the hours allotted to ‘field work’, ‘field 
engineering’ and ‘bombing’ would train the recruit to take his place in a platoon organized in 
accordance with SS143.42  On completion of six months’ training, the recruit would be 
transferred as required. 
 
                                                 
41 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 986 of 21 June 1917. 
42 General Staff, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action 1917 ( London: HMSO, 1917). 
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For the TR Brigades, there would now be a period of flux as their TRBs were converted to the 
new organization: 28 Graduated battalions would be linked in pairs to 14 designated YS 
battalions whilst the remaining 60 TR battalions would consist of Junior and Senior TRBs.   
 
Posting and Drafting 
Demands for replacements continued to be made by DAG 3rd Echelon to the War Office, which 
then issued orders to the appropriate Commands for the preparation and despatch of the 
necessary drafts.  Men selected for drafts were to be ‘A(i)’, unless destined for garrison or 
labour units or designated ‘special’ drafts requiring completion of their training on arrival 
overseas.  Men who had previously been returned sick or wounded would be available for 
drafting as soon as they were ‘A(i)’ again.43 
 
The increased flexibility over postings and the frequency of transfer had led to administrative 
difficulties in keeping track of soldiers.  This was particularly the case for the TF in which each 
TF battalion issued its own series of regimental numbers which meant the allocation of new 
numbers each time a TF soldier was posted between units even of the same Regiment.  The 
increasing frequency with which men were being transferred to different units on arrival at the 
Bases had meant increased clerical labour and consequent risk of errors.  In order to make it 
easier to keep track of TF Infantry soldiers it was decided that new TF Regimental numbers 
were to be allocated by March 1917.  Each Infantry Regiment was allocated a block of six figure 
numbers starting at 200001, broken down into blocks for each TF battalion.44  Each soldier was 
                                                 
43 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 432 of 11 March 1917 Despatch of Cavalry, Yeomanry and Infantry Drafts to units 
serving with the Expeditionary Force. 
44 TNA: WO 293/5 ACI 2414 of 23 December 1916: Infantry of the TF – Re-Numbering of Personnel and 
Alterations in Administrative Arrangements. For example, 4th Cheshire was allocated 200001 – 240000, 5th 
Cheshire 240001 to 265000 and 6th Cheshire 265001 – 290000. 
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allocated a new number from his battalion’s block which he would retain as long as he 
continued to serve in the same regiment, irrespective of whether he was posted to a TF or 
Regular battalion.  Only on posting to a new regiment would he receive a new number.45  
Conversely, in future a regular soldier would retain his regular number even when posted to a 
TF unit of his regiment.  It was also confirmed in the same ACI that after 1 March the only men 
who could become TF infantry soldiers would be those directly enlisting into a TF unit or TF 
soldiers from other arms transferred to TF Infantry.  However, a further category who could 
receive TF numbers were men posted to TF units as their first unit, having been called up from 
Army Reserve Class B.   
 
Releasing Fit Men to Fight 
The Army Council, under increasing Governmental pressure, needed to be sure that the men 
sent overseas were being used to best advantage, and in late 1916 had sent a senior officer 
‘familiar with the man-power situation and the difficulties which have to be overcome in 
providing reinforcements for the fighting troops’ to France to take a radical look at the 
situation.46  The officer selected, Lt Gen H.M. Lawson, spent most of December visiting various 
locations in the Base areas and scrutinizing the manpower figures.  On 3 December there had 
been 10,084 officers and 241,589 men on the LofC, of whom over half (7596 officers and 
126,069 men) could be classed as effective.47   
 
                                                 
45 On being transferred to a different Regiment, a TF Infantry soldier would be posted initially to a TF unit of that 
Regiment and allocated an appropriate number which he would then keep on being posted to a Regular battalion 
of that Regiment.  
46 TNA: WO 33/881 Minutes of 194th Meeting of Army Council on 20 November 1916. 
47 TNA: WO 95/43 DAG War Diary 14 December 1916 and WO 95/26 GHQ AG War Diary 30 December 1916.  
TNA WO 106/362 Report by Lt Gen H.M. Lawson on the Number and Physical Categories of Men Employed out 
of the Fighting Area, dated 16 January 1917. 
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Lawson concluded that it would be possible to reduce or reorganize the many units which had 
gradually collected at the Base and on the LofC and to comb out manpower for the Front.  He 
had also found the physical conditions in the rear areas much less severe than at the Front and 
concluded that only ‘B’ men (those fit for garrison service, labour and sedentary work abroad) 
need be employed there.  There should be medical re-examinations at regular intervals and any 
‘A’ men combed out for duty at the Front.  Overall, he considered that better organization and 
supervision could reduce the numbers in the rear areas, estimating that some 26,000 ‘A’ men 
could be combed out and sent to the Front plus a further 12,100 if their places were taken by 
women.  A constant watch would be necessary, however, to ensure ‘co-ordination and co-
operation with the consequent prevention of overlapping and waste of manpower’.48   
 
It took two weeks for Lawson’s report to be received in France, the delay probably being the 
first of a series of irritants for GHQ.49  A holding response was received a month later, noting 
that some parts of the report could be actioned at once whilst others would require more detailed 
investigation ‘as to the most economical method of replacement of fit men by men of a lower 
category and women’.50  As a first step GHQ had considered how best to allocate non-‘A’ men.  
With the Armies, it would be possible to release ‘A’ men to fight by employing Permanent Base 
(PB) men in newly created Labour Companies and with POW companies in the rear parts of 
the Army areas.  PB men not required by the Armies could be employed on the LofC as could 
Permanently Unfit (PU) men not required at the Base.  Those PU men unable to be employed 
at their trades in France should be sent home.  Garrison battalions, currently split up between 
the Army Railheads and the LofC, should be withdrawn and any ‘A’ men made available as 
                                                 
48 TNA: WO 106/362 Report by Lt Gen H M Lawson on the Number and Physical Categories of Men Employed 
out of the Fighting Area, dated 16 January 1917. 
49 TNA: WO 32/5093 WO letter No 121/France/287 (AG1) dated 27 Jan 17 and TNA WO 95/26 AG GHQ War 
Diary entry for 1 February 1917. 
50 TNA: WO 32/5093 AG –C94 dated 25 February 1917. 
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reinforcements, their places being taken by PB men.  Also possibilities for employment on the 
LofC and at the Base were ‘coloured labour’ (sic) and women.   
 
By 11 March, tension between the War Office and GHQ is visible in Haig’s personal covering 
letter to a thirty one page report from GHQ: 
There is every wish and intention on my part to comb out fit men, and the Army 
Council may rest assured that the importance of this matter is fully appreciated, and 
that elimination will be carried out to the limit compatible with safety.51 
 
A thorough investigation had now been carried out and such of Lawson’s recommendations as 
were considered ‘advantageous and feasible’ were being implemented.  It was necessary to 
make the changes gradually, however, and there was also a limit  
 
to the extent to which replacement by unfit men, women and coloured labour can be 
carried out with safety, and this limit can only be decided in this Country.  Conditions 
in England and France differ, and the failure of any service in this Country through 
inefficient personnel may directly affect the troops, and even endanger operations. 
 
Pressure to release men in lower medical categories for service in France was also being applied 
at home, both in the HD organization and through greater substitution of women for men.52  A 
conference to discuss how to obtain as many ‘A’ men as possible for the Infantry took place at 
the end of March.53  The Agenda was lengthy, covering topics including economizing in 
personnel at home and abroad; the employment of women ‘in every possible sphere’; the release 
of lower category men at home for work on LofC abroad; and reduction in the categories of 
men accepted for the Technical Corps.  Every possible avenue was being explored.  In April a 
further pool of men for overseas service became available at the stroke of a pen: conditions on 
the Western Front were really very similar to those at home and the definition of Category C 
                                                 
51 TNA: WO 32/5093 GHQ letter dated 11 March 1917. 
52 TNA: WO 32/5093 Lawson letter dated 14 March 1917 covering Memo on ‘Urgent Need of Setting Free for 
Service in France of trained men of B & C Categories in the Home Establishments’. 
53 TNA: WO 162/34 Calling notice for conference on Manpower to be held on 29 March 1917. 
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was now amended to read ‘Fit for service at home or in North Western Europe’.54  This enabled 
‘C’ men to be posted to the Base for employment in garrison or labour units or on sedentary 
work thus releasing fitter men for the Front.   
 
Work on Lawson’s proposals continued in France, where it had been decided to revise the 
classifications: ‘A’: men fit in all respects for fighting and who would be kept exclusively for 
fighting units; ‘TU’: temporarily unfit men likely to be reclassified A at the periodical 
inspections; and ‘PU’: permanently unfit men who for some reason would never be upgraded 
to ‘A’.55  The ‘TU’ men were waiting to go to fighting units as soon as they were passed fit and 
who could in the meantime be used on work being carried out by ‘A’ men, thus releasing the 
latter for service at the Front.  The ‘PU’ men would replace ‘A’ or ‘B’ men on the LofC but any 
not fit for work in France would be returned to England in order to release others for France.  It 
was noted, however, in an irresistible dig at the War Office that large numbers of ‘A’ men 
continued to arrive in units intended for duty on LofC and the process of combing them out was 
often delayed since it was entirely dependent on supply from home of ‘an adequate’ number of 
‘B’ men, ‘coloured personnel’ and women.   
 
Progress reports and instructions on the implementation of Lawson’s proposals continued to 
pass between GHQ and London.  In early July, the War Office stated that AG GHQ should be 
authorized to investigate the numbers, category, nature of the employment of all personnel 
employed in the BEF and should issue all instructions as regards allotment and distribution of 
such personnel.56  In return, GHQ noted that the replacement of fit men by those of lower 
                                                 
54 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 679 of 26 April 1917. 
55 TNA: WO 32/5093 GHQ letter dated 8 April 1917. 
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categories was continuing with the men so released being sent for training before being posted 
to the Infantry.  The arrival of 1859 ‘Cape Boys’ had enabled the replacement of a similar 
number in ASC horse transport companies on the LofC and about 1,000 women had already 
arrived.57  In August the Army Council demanded monthly statistics from GHQ on the progress 
made on the various measures adopted.58  The staff in GHQ obviously felt that London was 
labouring the point unnecessarily; the clerical effort entailed was considerable and by December 
GHQ declined to send any more such reports.59    
 
Creation of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) 
Even before Lawson reported that the employment of women in France could release over 
12,000 men for the Front, consideration was being given to their greater use by the Army.  By 
1917 women were already serving overseas in various capacities, mainly medical, and many 
more had taken on new roles at home.  Voluntary organizations had grown up, including the 
Women’s Legion.  This was a private organization which hired out cooks from its cookery 
section to the War Department; by the end of 1916 detachments totaling 2,000 cooks and 
kitchen staffs were working in 200 camps in England, where the standard of catering had been 
improved, with less wastage.60  The only people not delighted were the men who would now 
be posted overseas.  The Women’s Legion had also formed a mechanical transport section and 
the QMG’s Department was only too happy to hire ‘ready made chauffeurs … uniformed and 
clothed and paid at a certain rate’.  They were a great success although inevitably there were 
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pockets of resistance: it was noted that some Home Commands were not happy with ladies 
driving staff cars at night.61   
 
The suggestion of employing women clerks in France had been mooted in August 1916 but 
discounted, ostensibly due to lack of suitable accommodation.62  By December the increasing 
seriousness of the manpower situation caused the question to be raised again, and on 4 
December Macready gained Haig’s acceptance to the introduction of women for duty in the 
rear areas.63  The way was further paved by Lawson, who explained wherever he went how 
successful the substitution of women for men in many roles had been in England.  That is not 
to say that he was totally enlightened as his views were inevitably coloured by the prejudices 
of the time: 'It does not look well, nor is it fair on the men themselves, to have quantities of men 
in khaki doing work which all over England is being done by the other sex’.  To the obvious 
objection being raised, he simply noted that results at home had shown ‘that the sex difficulty 
has not been anything like what some have predicted’.64   
 
On 5 January Macready called the first of a series of conferences to discuss the future 
employment of women by the Army.65  It was already clear that it was a question of when and 
not if women should be employed with the Army but what Macready wanted to establish was 
how that ‘woman power’ could be organized simply, and with central control, in order to avoid 
the proliferation of small groups.  Initially the proposed employments were clerical, 
housekeeping and driving and several requests for these services had already been received, 
                                                 
61 TNA: WO 162/31 Conference on the Organization of Women Employed by the Army – 5 January 1917. 
62 TNA: WO 95/3970 IGC War Diary - 15 August 191. 
63 Dame Helen Gwynne-Vaughan, Service with the Army (London: Hutchinson, 1941), p. 12 and Bidwell, 
Women’s Royal Army Corps, p. 10. 
64 TNA: WO 106/362 Lawson Report, 16 January 1917. 
65 TNA: WO 162/31 Conference on the Organization of Women Employed by the Army.  
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including female clerks for Rouen and elsewhere.  Although catering staff and drivers for 
employment at home had previously been obtained from the Women’s Legion, it was 
anticipated that in future women should be recruited through DGNS and ‘belong more or less 
to the Army’.  That raised the question of potentially differing terms of service and the thorny 
question of rates of pay.    
 
Further conferences were held, chaired by Macready, and attended by members of his staff plus 
the heads of the Women’s Legion Sections: Cookery and Housekeeping; Motor Drivers; and 
Clerks.66  Discussions covered terms of service, discipline and the proposed enrolment form, 
concerning which the Head of the Cookery and Housekeeping Section stated that ‘as far as she 
could speak for her women, they were willing to sign anything, and that what they wanted was 
to be soldiers, that they wanted to take the place of a man in every sense’.  The need for central 
organization effectively meant a new corps for which an interim title was decided upon: 
Women’s Army Service Department.     
 
Lawson’s first report in mid-January identified 12,100 posts in France that could potentially be 
filled by women.  This gave further impetus to what was already moving forward very 
positively and on 6 February Macready outlined full details of the proposed scheme.67  By now 
a new AG branch, AG11, had been formed and the corps’ first head appointed: Mrs Mona 
Chalmers-Watson, the sister of Sir Auckland Geddes, Director of Recruiting, and Sir Eric 
Geddes, then DG Transportation in France.   
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The GHQ response to Lawson’s report opened the way for women to be employed in France.68  
It confirmed that 2,430 women clerks could be accepted for work in different locations, such 
as Étaples, Rouen and Montreuil.  It was understood that they would come out under their own 
officers and be employed in parties of not less than one officer to twenty women.  ‘As an 
experiment’ a domestic section consisting of eleven cooks, six waitresses, two scullery maids 
and a clerk was requested for each of Calais, Étaples, Rouen, Le Havre and Boulogne, and it 
was also noted that women drivers could be used.  Armed with GHQ’s agreement, Mrs Watson 
visited France at the end of February, together with the newly-designated Chief Controller 
overseas, Mrs Gwynne-Vaughan, in order to see where women could be employed and 
accommodated.69   
 
On their return to London, feverish planning ensued to establish what was now confirmed as 
the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and to start recruiting women.  Aspects requiring 
attention were the corps organization, areas of employment, rates of pay and the design of a 
khaki uniform and badges of rank.  One area examined in detail was the legal status of women 
posted to a theatre of war to replace combatant soldiers since, unlike medical personnel, they 
would not be protected by the 1906 Geneva Convention.  Rather unflatteringly it was agreed 
that women serving overseas could be defined as ‘camp followers’ and as such be covered by 
the Army Act whilst those serving at home would be covered by civil law.  It was thought 
necessary, however, for there to be a written contract so female recruits were required to sign 
enrolment forms confirming their agreement to serve for twelve months or the duration of the 
war, whichever was the greater, to fulfil the rules, regulations and instructions laid down from 
time to time for the Corps, to work wherever the Army Council required, to obey all orders, to 
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perform any work, and finally to be discharged at a week’s notice (later extended to a month) 
if their services were no longer required, or without notice for breach of conditions.70          
 
In mid-March Mrs Gwynne-Vaughan took up her post in France with the immediate task of 
organizing accommodation suitable for use by women. She toured locations in the rear areas, 
including Abbeville, Rouen, Le Havre, Dieppe and Étaples, meeting Commandants, inspecting 
accommodation and discussing possible employment with the employing officers.  She was 
disconcerted to find that however helpful the officers she met were during the official side of 
the visits, she would later be told that wherever it was ‘was the one place where women ought 
not to come’.  Indeed she discovered almost universal objection to the employment of women, 
largely because the military distrusted the complications working with women might bring and 
disliked ‘the intrusion into their offices and workshops of an alien element’.71  It would take 
time for the new Corps to be accepted but the manpower situation meant there could be no 
turning back.    
 
On 28 March details of the proposed employment of women at the Base and on the LofC were 
announced.72  There would be six categories: clerical, typist and shorthand typist; cooks, 
waitresses and domestic staff; motor transport services; storehouse women, checkers and 
unskilled labour; telephone and postal services; and a miscellaneous category covering any 
employments not falling into any of the above.  The publication of the ACI was not a moment 
too soon because women were about to start arriving in France. 
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The first detachment of fourteen cooks and waitresses for the Officers Mess in Abbeville arrived 
on 31 March.  They were followed almost immediately by a draft for the Officers’ Club in 
Boulogne and a further twenty-two clerks arrived on 7 April for the Forestry Directorate at Le 
Touquet.  By mid-April the first of the big camps for females was nearly finished: a collection 
of hutments just outside Abbeville to accommodate clerks and others at the Advanced 
Mechanical Transport Depot (AMTD) where spares for all kinds of vehicles were stored and 
distributed.73  In mid-May a detachment of women clerks would arrive for the DAG’s office in 
Rouen.74  Pay clerks were also arriving for the Command Pay Office at Wimereux, where there 
would soon be several hundred women and a request was received in mid-May for twenty-four 
domestic staff for the Fourth Army School.75  Also in May, the first draft of postal workers 
arrived for employment in the Army Post Offices in the rear area and at Le Havre, Boulogne 
and Calais.  These women had answered a notice in the Post Office Circular for female Sorters, 
Sorting Clerks and Sub-Office Assistants with at least four months service with the GPO to 
enrol in the WAAC for service in France with the Army Postal Service.  They were under the 
impression that their duties would be similar to those back home, so were somewhat shocked 
to find they were working on the counters in the Army equivalent of an ordinary post office.76    
 
Accommodation, thought originally to be a major obstacle, in fact proved perfectly manageable.  
It varied according to locality: where available, hotels and villas could be used, as at Wimereux, 
but elsewhere large wooden huts accommodating twenty or thirty women or Nissen huts 
holding eight women were used.  It would soon become necessary to create female Base Depots 
                                                 
73 Gwynne-Vaughan, Service With the Army, p. 31.  In later years the Mautort MT Camp would be remembered 
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74 TNA: WO 95/43 DAG War Diary 14 May 1917. 
75 Gwynne-Vaughan, Service With the Army, p 34. 
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in France.  Eventually there would be two depots, one at Étaples and a second one outside Le 
Havre.  The big camp at Étaples, housing over 500 women, would eventually have between 70 
– 80 Nissen huts as well as dining huts, recreation huts and washing facilities. 
 
Developments had moved very quickly and several hundred women had already been sent 
overseas before the publication in July of a comprehensive ACI codifying numerous aspects to 
do with the new organization.77  The Corps’ purpose was ‘to effect substitution of women for 
soldiers in certain employments throughout units, formations and offices administered by the 
Army Council … at Home, and at the Bases and on the Lines of Communication Overseas’.  
Such substitution was to be based on clear, if unflattering, guidelines: four women clerks or 
four technical women for the RFC and ASC Motor Transport would be considered respectively 
as equivalent to three soldier clerks or three technical soldiers.  A certain number of women 
would be required for clerical and domestic duties, and a scale was laid down for the 
employment of the latter in military messes and cookhouses.  It was also specifically stipulated 
that no woman would be employed unless her employment relieved a soldier for other purposes.  
There followed detailed instructions on administration, hierarchy, pay and allowances, uniform, 
discipline and accommodation.   
 
The main effort initially was the provision of women for overseas but it was noted that the 
Military Cookery and the Motor Transport sections of the Women’s Legion could be gradually 
absorbed into the WAAC.  Existing contracts would be honoured but any Women’s Legion 
member who wished and passed the medical standard could enrol in the WAAC.  At home the 
substitution of servicewomen for soldiers was initially very slow: only 815 in September but 
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then rising to 15,696 in December.  The number of women in France grew steadily: by 
September there would be 2,280 and 4,105 in December.78  Although this equated to a few 
battalions’ worth of men, it was still well short of Lawson’s anticipated 12,000.  The problem 
was that women were not coming forward in anything like the numbers anticipated, mainly 
because of the many other job opportunities that had opened up for them in the absence of men 
serving abroad.  The munitions industries, for example, were booming and an unskilled worker 
could earn far more there than doing domestic work with the Army.  As a result, WAAC 
domestic trades were to prove surprisingly difficult to fill.  Clerks proved easier to recruit as 
the work offered encouraged them to make use of their skills, gain different types of clerical 
experience and retain their job status.  The most likely recruits were young unmarried women 
with no domestic commitments at home; married women could volunteer but were not eligible 
for overseas service if they had husbands serving in France.  It was a big step, however, for a 
young woman to enrol and it was probably not surprising that recruiting was slow.   
 
Formation of Labour Corps 
The Labour Corps was also formed in early 1917 in order to make better use of men employed 
as labour.79  Existing ASC Labour Companies and Infantry Labour battalions were absorbed 
into the new Corps and men of lesser fitness categories were transferred to it.80  The men of the 
new Corps were generally older or of lower medical categories than infantrymen at the Front, 
although every Labour Corps soldier was medically re-examined each month to see if they were 
fit enough to be upgraded.  They were organized in Employment companies, of which there 
were two types: Labour companies (450 men under 5 officers) and Area companies (2 officers 
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and 270 men).  Men of Divisional Employment Companies could be employed as Brigade 
clerks, loaders for divisional trains, on salvage duties and in the divisional canteens in each case 
to replace men who were fit for active duty.81  In July, GHQ could report that some 7,000 unfit 
men from England had been formed into Divisional Employment Companies, and that Area 
Employment Companies for Army and Corps HQs were also now arriving.82   
 
The Western Front  
It had been agreed at Chantilly during the preceding November that current operations would 
continue over the winter.  Co-ordinated offensives would start again in the spring with attacks 
by the French between the Oise and the Somme, and by the British between Bapaume and 
Arras.  Haig felt he could, if necessary, launch attacks by 1 February but would have preferred 
to wait until May when the BEF would be in a better position.  The preferred date had to be a 
joint decision with the French, however, so it was agreed that they should be ready by the first 
fortnight of February but that if the enemy remained contained then they might delay the 
offensives until a more favourable date.83   
 
The winter was a period of consolidation and rebuilding after the battles of 1916.  
Reinforcements were arriving; between 21 November and 31 December 171,802 were 
despatched to France with a further 35,738 under orders to move.84  It had been decided that all 
Infantry battalions should be brought up to 100 men above establishment and that the training 
                                                 
81 TNA: WO 95/1519 5th Division A&Q Branch War Diary entry for 23 May 1917. 
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146,700 Infantry (114,408 British plus 32,292 Colonial) with 35,680 British and 58 Colonial under orders.  
 
 
189 
 
of untrained men should be completed at the Front.85  There was also increased awareness of 
the need to take care of the battle-hardened men they already had: a Fourth Army Routine Order 
on Wastage Returns exhorted:  
The replacement of trained men is a very costly business, and it is difficult to place any 
limit to the value to our country of the trained man who has been through the experience 
of the Somme Battle.  His loss from bad man mastership is, therefore, a reflection on 
his Officer of the most serious nature.  Every effort should be made by all officers to 
keep the men in good health, good spirits, and training.   Care and forethought are 
necessary in arranging duties and work, so that the men may be spared the unnecessary 
fatigue entailed by waiting, falling in too soon etc etc.86 
 
The intention was good but many soldiers would have been surprised by the last sentence. 
 
The BEF now contained 56 Infantry divisions, divided between five Armies, but these would 
increase with the arrival of more TF divisions during February and March.  The 42nd (East 
Lancashire) Division arrived from Egypt in February plus a further five second line TF divisions 
from England.  As was by now usual, they would gradually be introduced into the line: in mid-
February 64 officers and 178 men from the 66th Division were attached to the 5th Division for 
familiarization purposes.87 
 
The events of the first few months of 1917 were described by the Official History as:  winter 
fighting on the Somme battlefield, the pursuit of the enemy as he withdrew to the Hindenburg 
Line during February and March, the capture of outposts in front of that line and the battles of 
Arras.  The ‘short-range enterprises’ of the winter fighting were ‘almost all successful and 
frequently at small cost’, but even so the BEF’s overall casualty figures for January were 
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12,535.88  More alarming were the sick wastage figures, 41,543 in January, 41,302 in February 
and 54,950 in March, undoubtedly due to the atrocious weather conditions of the winter of 
1916/17.89  Reinforcements continued to arrive but in declining numbers: 82,165 in January 
and 62,672 in February (both exclusive of RE, RA and RFC), but it is difficult to draw 
comparisons since in March the way in which the reinforcement figures were shown was 
changed to show only those sent to the divisions: 58,860 Cavalry and Infantry had been 
despatched.90 
 
During the winter, ‘troops of all arms showed an intelligence and adaptability … which was the 
fruit of hard-won experience and training’.91  Once the Germans withdrew to the Hindenburg 
Line, however, it became a different kind of warfare with rising casualty figures: 21,023 and 
22,361 respectively for February and March.  The Official History would subsequently note   
Our inexperienced young soldiers seemed quite at sea when they got into the open, 
and enterprising young leaders were non-existent through lack of training in open 
warfare. 
 
and that 
many men come out quite untrained - sometimes only nine weeks after enlistment …  It 
will be realized that the art of movement so as to gain every inch of advantageous ground 
can only be learnt by careful training …92 
 
 
Arrangements for completing the training of untrained drafts seem to have varied according to 
the formation concerned.  In 2nd Division, 1st KRRC complained that a draft of 128 untrained 
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men was received on 19 March and that ‘close order drill, and the handling of arms, at both of 
which the untrained Draft are particularly slow’ required great attention.93  In the Fifth Division, 
however, as early as January it had been decided that untrained drafts would be sent to Brigade 
Training Centres on arrival; on 3 March 1st Cheshire noted the arrival of 40 reinforcements that 
had come from the XVth Brigade Training Depot but there is no mention of the need for any 
further training.94  There would continue to be general comments about men being untrained – 
but occasionally these were recognized as perceptions as much as reality: a May 1917 poem 
apparently put out by GHQ described the ‘Lads who have scarcely been out a year … are to Alf 
but as untrained boys’; Alf being the old soldier who had been out since 1914.95   
 
New drafts needed time to be absorbed by units and the larger the draft the longer this might 
take.  However, as the Cheshires had found in 1916 ‘given the opportunity to get the Battalion 
together in a rest area, these men soon became one with the unit’.96  Training helped weld a unit 
together and the publication in early 1917 of two General Staff pamphlets based on lessons 
learned in 1916, SS 135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action and SS 
143, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action meant that there was plenty 
to be done before the anticipated spring battles.  In SS 135 there was growing emphasis on the 
need for both careful preparation before any action and the co-ordination of different types of 
weapon into a coherent whole whilst in SS 143, the platoon was treated as a self-contained unit 
with four fighting sections.  All men were riflemen and bayonet fighters but each section had 
its own specialty: a section of picked shots and bayonet fighters, and scouts; the bombing team; 
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the rifle bombers; and the Lewis gun team.97  For trench-to-trench attacks the concept was now 
that platoons would attack in two waves: the first wave would be the assault team of the riflemen 
and bombers, and the second wave the fire team with rifle grenades and the Lewis gun.      
 
The collective training necessary to absorb the new organization and tactics was started at once.  
The 13th Cheshire spent the afternoon of 16 February re-organizing its companies, platoons and 
sections ‘under the scheme set out in GHQ letter No OB 1919 dated 7 February’.98  The 1st 
Cheshire’s War Diary shows training being carried out whenever the battalion was out of the 
line.  From 23 January onwards training is shown daily for nine days, including time in early 
February on the Divisional Range at Le Quesnoy where 40 men from each company fired 100 
yards grouping, 200 yards application and 200 yards rapid fire.  After a spell in the trenches, 
training continued through late March and into April.  On 27 March the battalion practised an 
attack in wave formation, from 9-10.45 am with specialist training after that and on 4 April the 
battalion spent the day on a ‘Brigade manoeuvre’.99   Similarly, the 7th KSLI in 3rd Division 
was heavily involved in training from January onwards.  Their training through February is 
described as ‘progressive’ and, after a spell working on the fortification of the caves under 
Arras, they moved back with the Brigade on 21 March to Liencourt for training in open warfare; 
practice attacks were held daily until 30 March, when the battalion returned to Arras to take 
over a section of the trenches opposite Tilloy.100  The examples of these two battalions, one 
                                                 
97 SS 135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action issued by the General Staff December 
1916 and SS 143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action 1917, issued by the General Staff 
February 1917. 
98 TNA: WO 95/2246/3 13th Cheshire War Diary for February 1917. 
99 TNA: WO 95/1571 1st Cheshire War Diary 1917. 
100 Major W. de B. Wood, History of the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (London: The Medici Society, 1925; 
Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 2003), pp. 234-36. The main excitement on 3 April was a raid in order to capture 
a prisoner for identification purposes; the ground was thick with snow and there was a nearly full moon but the 
men, dressed in sheets and ladies’ nightdresses purchased in Arras, entered the enemy trenches and returned with 
a prisoner, having not suffered any casualties themselves. 
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from First and the other from Third Army, indicate the type of detailed training and preparation 
now incorporated into the build-up for the forthcoming Battles of Arras.  
 
The anticipated spring offensive would start in April and GHQ had been moving Corps and 
Divisions between Armies in order to create the attacking force required in First and Third 
Armies.  It was another period of organizational change: letters on the ‘Distribution of Corps 
and Divisions to Armies’ were sent on 26 January and 7 February, with a forecast being issued 
on 21 February of the ‘Movements to be carried out between Armies before the commencement 
of operations’.  In order to ensure that the attacking divisions would be up to strength AG’s 
staffs were notified of those, such as 24th and 34th Divisions, requiring immediate priority for 
reinforcements.101      
 
The effectiveness of the casualty reporting procedures had been reviewed, and, in late March, 
Fowke confirmed the continuation of the previous year’s system of reporting approximate 
Cavalry and Infantry casualty numbers by telegram during heavy fighting.  There were to be a 
couple of minor adjustments: divisions in which any battalions had suffered 50 or more 
casualties were to wire the numbers by battalions not later than 6 pm daily to AG GHQ and the 
DAG, 3rd Echelon.  Should further casualties in excess of 50 occur during the night another 
wire would be sent the next morning as soon as the total numbers for the Battalion could be 
estimated.  Casualties would be reported by phases, the duration of which would vary according 
to the fighting and the number of casualties suffered; effectively a running total was kept as 
each wire was to begin with: ‘Total estimated casualties from … (date of commencement of 
phase inserted)’.  A further change was that battalions would now be represented by letters of 
                                                 
101 TNA: WO 95/11 GHQ GS War Diaries for January and February 1917.  
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the alphabet and the words ‘officers’ and ‘other ranks’ were not to be used.  An example was 
given: ‘Total estimated casualties from 10th March, B 5 and 315 …’ which indicated that since 
10 March the 2/4th North Lancashire had lost 5 officers and 315 other ranks.  As before accurate 
casualty reports were still to follow the estimated reports.102  The rapid transmission of 
approximate numbers indicated as quickly as possible the numbers of reinforcements that would 
be needed, whilst the introduction of codes saved on signal traffic and to an extent would also 
hide the identities of the battalions concerned.   
 
The Armies were also making their own various arrangements for reinforcements during the 
offensive.  Only Third Army, however, is specifically mentioned as having gained approval 
from GHQ for the formation of a reinforcement camp in each Corps where the personnel not 
taking part in an attack would assemble, and where reinforcements would join. These would 
not replace casualties from day to day but would be kept there to reconstitute units at a definite 
point.103 
 
The Battle of Arras was in fact a series of battles during April and May, starting on 9 April with 
the attack on Vimy Ridge and the first battle of the Scarpe and culminating in the Battle of 
Bullecourt in May.104  Twenty-six Infantry divisions took part altogether, including four 
Canadian, and nine Marches battalions were in action.  Of these, 7th KSLI, took part in all three 
Battles of the Scarpe, whilst 1st Cheshire was in support to the Canadians for the attack on Vimy 
and during the Second Battle of the Scarpe.  These battalions have been selected for analysis.   
 
                                                 
102 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary for 28 March 1917 and Appendix I for that month. 
103 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary for 11 March 1917. 
104 9-14 April First Battle of the Scarpe and Battle of Vimy Ridge; 23-24 April Second Battle of the Scarpe; 28–
29 April Battle of Arleux; 3-4 May Third Battle of the Scarpe with capture of Fresnoy; 3-17 May Battle of 
Bullecourt, fought after a first unsuccessful attack on 11 April. 
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On Easter Monday, the three Brigades of 3rd Division took part in the First Battle of the Scarpe 
with the German first, second and third lines as their objectives.  The 7th KSLI, in 8th Brigade, 
took part in the final assault to capture the enemy’s third line and secure the high ground 
immediately south of Fenchy Chapel, known as Chapel Hill.  At 08.50 the Brigade advanced 
towards the third line but on reaching Tilloy in the second line it was found the village had not 
been cleared. The KSLI left-front company decided to move around the village’s northern flank 
and capture the Bois des Boeufs.  Having fought off a German party sent to assist the garrison 
in the wood, they proceeded to clear it and then continued towards the third line.  At about 
2.30pm they were stopped by intense rifle and machine gun fire from the flanks and had also 
found very strong uncut wire in front of the position.  A further bombardment to cut the wire 
was ordered at 5.30, to be followed by a further infantry attack at 7pm.  Both were unsuccessful.  
The KSLI dug themselves in overnight about 600 yards from the enemy in readiness for a 
subsequent bombardment and attack the following morning which proved successful.  During 
their attack they had advanced over 5,000 yards and captured 156 prisoners.  Their own 
casualties amounted to 167: one officer killed and eight wounded, and 22 other ranks killed, 
131 wounded and 5 missing.105  They would hold their newly captured sector of the enemy line 
until being relieved on the night of 13/14 April.  Between 23-27 April, the battalion returned to 
the trenches during the Second Battle of the Scarpe; during this period they suffered a further 
29 casualties: 8 killed, 20 wounded and 1 missing.106     
 
                                                 
105 Wood,  History of the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, pp. 237-8; TNA: WO 95/1384 3rd Division A & Q 
War Diary note dated 16 April shows KSLI OR casualties 9-13 Apr as 22 killed, 129 wounded and 16 missing; 
SDGW shows 34 deaths for the same period, of which 30 were KIA.  This highlights the difficulty of obtaining 
accurate figures.   
106 TNA: WO 95/1384 3rd Division A & Q War Diary note dated 30 April 1917 showing casualties 23-27 April. 
 
 
196 
 
A return from Third Army giving the strengths of its divisions as at 6pm on 1 May shows the 
3rd Division as having 399 officers and 11034 men, plus a further 33 officers and 401 men in 
the Corps Depots.  Although it had suffered estimated casualties of 139 officers and 3027 men 
the Division was still considered fit for fighting.107  Some 39 officers and 2142 men had been 
sent to units as reinforcements during April.108  Not only was this 885 fewer than the number 
of casualties incurred but some battalions were receiving nothing like the replacements they 
needed: 17 men reached 7th KSLI during April, with a further 16 at the Corps Depot, against a 
total casualty toll of 187.  
 
The 7th KSLI was in action again in early May, advancing at 04.45 on 2 May in support of an 
attack on the Bois des Vert.  The attack was checked by machine-gun fire and the battalion dug 
themselves in about 8am.  No further advance was possible so they were employed in 
consolidating the ground gained until relieved on 7 May.  During this time they had suffered 5 
officer and 98 soldier casualties.  They were again in the trenches between 10 – 15 May and 
suffered a further 2 officer and 40 soldier casualties.   
 
The 3rd Division War Diary shows that between 9 April and 16 May 7th KSLI suffered 383 
soldier casualties, of whom 46 had been killed, 307 wounded and 30 missing.  SDGW shows 
107 deaths for the same period which includes many of the missing plus those who would die 
of wounds.  The 7th KSLI was a Service battalion which had arrived in France and joined 3rd 
Division in October 1915.  It had fought on the Somme and by now might have been expected 
                                                 
107 TNA: WO 158/20 State of Divisions in Third Army as at 1 May 1917.  NB Other Divisions were less fit: eg 
31st and 33rd would be fit for fighting in about seven days but the 34th was tired and needed three or four weeks 
rest; the 29th Division was ‘weak and has had hard fighting but spirit very good’; whilst the 12th Division was fit 
for fighting and the 18th Division had yet to be used and was ‘Fresh and fit for fighting’. 
108 TNA: WO 95/1384 3rd Division A & Q War Diary for April 1917. 
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to be showing a serious change in its composition.  Analysis shows, however, that two thirds 
of those who died had enlisted in its recruiting area, with a further 18 per cent having enlisted 
in No 4 District, mainly the neighbouring areas of Cheshire and North Wales.  Altogether 96 
per cent had enlisted in Western Command, many of those enlisting in No 3 District having 
come from southern Lancashire.  Of the men who died, with the exception of 5 each from the 
Shropshire Yeomanry and the Cheshire Regiment, plus 1 from the Somerset Light Infantry, all 
(96) were originally KSLI soldiers, although not all had started out in 7th KSLI.  Just under one 
third had arrived in France in 1915; at the other end of the scale eight appear to have been 
mobilized in the second half of 1916, although whether they were ‘Derby men’ or conscripts is 
unknown due to the dearth of Service Records, and would have arrived with the battalion in 
early 1917.109  The fact that 90 per cent were original KSLI soldiers from various battalions 
would indicate that men previously wounded were being returned to their parent Regiment.  
The 7th KSLI was continuing to show remarkable homogeneity in its composition. 
 
The 1st Cheshire, in 15th Brigade of 5th Division, would play a less active part in the battles of 
April/May.  With the exception of 13th Brigade which was in action on 9 April, the 5th Division 
had been in reserve for the Canadians and it would not be until 13 April that it moved up to 
relieve the 4th Canadian Division.  At dusk 1st Cheshire deployed in former German trenches 
but as contact with the enemy had been lost it was decided to push forward to a line of outposts 
towards La Culotte.  This had just been done when a peremptory order from 15th Brigade 
instructed the Battalion to withdraw to the line they had left.  By the time this had been done, 
fresh orders were received that the battalion was to act as advance guard to the Brigade.  As the 
Cheshire Regimental History notes: ‘Practically none of the officers had any experience of this 
                                                 
109 SDGW and www.ancestry.com ; there are very few KSLI Service Records available.   
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form of manoeuvre and only after very strenuous work by the Battalion staff was the unit ready 
to advance at the appointed time.’  On nearing La Culotte they came across a formidable 
entrenched position, protected by three deep belts of barbed wire and fully manned.  The houses, 
mine buildings and factory had also been strengthened, fortified and occupied by machine gun 
posts.  No further advance was possible.  To make matters worse, a party from a neighbouring 
battalion, on approaching from the rear, mistook the Cheshire Battalion HQ for the enemy and 
opened fire, killing A/RSM Eldridge who had arrived from England less than 3 weeks earlier.         
 
Taking the same dates as for 7th KSLI, 40 soldiers of 1st Cheshire lost their lives between 9 
April and 14 May.  Half were TF soldiers who had joined the battalion in August and September 
1916, having been transferred under the authority of AO 204 and ACI 1499 of 1916, and five 
men were from a draft of over 100 from 2/1st Denbigh Yeomanry which was sent to France and 
transferred to 1st Cheshire in early October 1916.  Virtually all the previously TF soldiers had 
joined in 1914 and 1915 and their transfer to a Regular battalion had been made possible by the 
second MSA.  Of the rest of those killed, eleven were pre-war soldiers recalled in 1914, a couple 
were ‘Derby’ men and just one, Alexander Tydd, was a conscript.  The most unfortunate were 
eight men who had joined the battalion in February 1917, one of whom, Sydney Goodier, was 
killed a month before his nineteenth birthday.  Some 70 per cent had enlisted in Cheshire with 
a further 10 per cent from North Wales and Shropshire; altogether 88 per cent had enlisted in 
Western Command.  Despite the losses of the Somme, the great majority of 1st Cheshire 
continued to have a connection with its traditional recruiting areas.    
 
It is difficult to be sure how well-trained the reinforcements were that arrived at units during 
this period.  For the GHQ Manning staffs it was often a balance between the need for 
 
 
199 
 
reinforcements to reach units as quickly as possible against time spent at the Base to familiarise 
them with conditions in France. It also depended on the availability of trained reinforcements 
to meet the specific requirement.  On 11 April, it was decided that:  
11 April 1917: Owing to the necessity of rapidly bringing up to establishment Divisions 
which have been temporarily withdrawn from the line for training and refitting …in 
certain cases it might be necessary to send reinforcements up to Divisions from the Base 
before completing their 9 days Base Training.110   
 
 
What is not absolutely clear, however, is how this dovetailed in with the arrangements preferred 
by the different formations: 5th Division had their Brigade Training Battalions; Third Army had 
its Corps reinforcement camps and the XIII Corps of First Army had the following 
arrangements in place by early May:  
 
Railhead for reinforcements is at Pernes.  From there drafts are brought under Corps 
arrangements to Ecoivres, where they are met by Divisional Guides and conducted to 
transport lines of units.  Privates who have not previously served in this country, on 
arrival at Pernes, are sent to a Corps Training Depot at Floringhem for purpose of 
completing their training.111 
 
In many cases, reinforcements continued to be men returning after having been wounded who 
would need little or no training.  In mid-May 5th Division commented that ‘Since April 9th 1,147 
ORs have joined as reinforcements.  These are composed chiefly of men returning from 
hospital.’112 
 
The Official History gives the total losses for Third, First and Fifth Armies for April and May 
as 158,660, of whom 29,505 had been killed.113  The War Office suggested in mid-May that a 
                                                 
110 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary April 1917. 
111 TNA: WO 95/1519 5th Division A&Q Branch War Diary of 6 May 1917. 
112 TNA: WO 95/1519 5th Division A&Q War Diary for 14 May 1917. 
113 BOH 1917 Vol 1, p. 558. 
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Cavalry Division be dismounted and formed into four Infantry battalions but GHQ requested 
delay, as the Cavalry Corps was in the process of taking over a considerable portion of the front 
line and any alteration would seriously affect current plans.114  The number of Cavalry and 
Infantry reinforcements dispatched to divisions during April and May was 150,733 but most of 
these had been directed to the divisions preparing for the next offensive, plans for which were 
already nearing fruition.115  On 7 May, Haig had informed the Army Commanders that he hoped 
to capture the Messines Ridge in a month’s time. 
 
Second Army was to attack the Messines ridge with twelve divisions which had not fought in 
the Arras area.  The whole battle would be prefaced by the explosion at zero hour of nineteen 
mines underneath the German lines.  Prior to the battle, training areas had been laid out to the 
rear of each corps sector on ground resembling that to be crossed during the assault and marked 
with tapes and coloured flags showing the various farms, woods, strongpoints and objectives.  
The assaulting brigades carried out several rehearsals with the men wearing full kit and 
practising every detail.116  The attack on the Messines Ridge went in as planned on 7 June and 
was a ‘stunning success’ due to the careful planning and preparation.117 By 14 June the battle 
was over with all objectives having been gained.   
 
There had been comparatively few casualties during the assault but many more were caused by 
subsequent heavy and accurate German shelling of the newly-gained lines.  Altogether 24,562 
casualties were incurred by the Second Army between 1 – 12 June.  Had the Messines casualties 
                                                 
114 TNA: WO 95/16 AG GHQ War Diary entries for 12 and 14 May 1917. 
115 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary end of month returns for April and May 1917 and BO H 1917 Vol. 1, 
p. 508. 
116 BOH 1917 Vol. 2, p. 34. 
117 J.M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), p. 72. 
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been the total for the month of June, life would have been a lot easier for the Manning staffs 
both at home and in France but the total soldier casualties for that month were 64,962 which 
with sick wastage of 38,925 made a total of 103,925 all arms.  The Cavalry and Infantry 
reinforcements despatched to Divisions numbered only 83,134.  It was now agreed that six 
Corps Cavalry regiments could be disbanded and the men posted to the Infantry.118 
 
Planning for the next offensive had started and in mid-July Casualty Reporting procedures were 
further refined: in future when an Infantry battalion had lost 50 or more men missing in any 
single day a footnote was to be added to the Daily Casualty list stating the probable number 
that had been taken prisoner.  At the end of each week a separate return was to be submitted 
showing the total missing by Divisions, plus the numbers included in the totals thought to have 
been taken prisoner alive.119  
 
The 3rd Battle of Ypres would start on 31 July.  Again, training of the assaulting battalions had 
been fitted in around the need to provide working parties for the preparation of the front. The 
main attack would be launched by Fifth Army and during the preceding weeks models showing 
the lie of the ground to be crossed had been constructed in Corps training areas.  Lectures and 
practical demonstrations had been given on how to deal with various possible situations and 
each Infantry Brigade had thoroughly rehearsed its task over ground on which was shown the 
outlines of the trenches and strongpoints to be attacked, particular attention being paid to attacks 
on pillboxes with parties of bombers, supported by Lewis gun fire and rifle grenades.  The 
numbers for the initial objective had been calculated on one man for every three yards of front 
plus half or a whole platoon for the capture of each group of farm buildings in the intermediate 
                                                 
118 TNA: WO 95/16 AG GHQ War Diary entries for 26 and 28 June 1917. 
119 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry dated 14 July 1917. 
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area.  The Official History notes that battalions taking part in the offensive had been brought 
up to strength, averaging 35 officers and 925 ORs, but only some 16 officers and about 660 
ORs would go into action with the rest remaining behind in order to provide a nucleus of 
reinforcements.120  In reality, the strengths of many of the battalions were lower: 13th, 14th, 15th 
and 16th RWF in 38th Division would go into battle with 551, 294, 420 and 456 ORs 
respectively.121   
 
At 3.50 on 31 July, the Second and Fifth Armies attacked.  The Second Army managed to 
extend its line in many places but further progress was dependent on the Fifth Army’s progress 
along the high ground of the main Ypres Ridge towards Gheluvelt.  Unfortunately, Fifth Army 
after a good start met with mixed fortunes.  On the left and in the centre two German lines had 
been over-run and the line advanced about 3,000 yards with the capture of the Pilckem Ridge.  
On the right, II Corps had been less successful in assaulting the Gheluvelt Plateau, although it 
had captured the German front line and had advanced about 1,000 yards beyond.  The estimated 
casualties reported to AG GHQ by the 14 divisions actively engaged on 31 July were 592 
officers and 17,022 ORs and for the 1-3 August amounted to 481 officers plus 12,925 men.122  
These numbers were fewer than those of 1 July 1916, but the nine leading divisions of Fifth 
Army had already lost 30 – 60 per cent of their fighting strength.123 
 
Sixteen Marches battalions were involved, although not all would take part in the initial attack.  
At about 10.00 am 6th Cheshire, in 118th Brigade of 39th Division, moved forward to connect 
                                                 
120 BOH 1917 Vol. 2, p. 147 and fn 2. 
121 Ward, Regimental Records of the Royal Welch Fusiliers Vol III 1914-1918, p.328. 
122 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary for 31 July and 1, 2, 3 August 1917. 
123 BOH 1917 Vol. 2, pp. 178 and 179.  The Official History divisional losses, which include field artillery and 
machine gun companies, show 39th Division with the highest loss of men: 3,871.   
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the left of the main attack with the defensive front along the Steenbeek. They advanced steadily 
through pouring rain, passed through St Julien and captured the final objective, the German 
Third Line west of Aviatik Farm, some 1,100 yards north-east of St Julien.  Unfortunately, the 
troops on the right had been held up short of St Julien and the Cheshire’s right flank became 
exposed.  The Germans spotted this and attacked, causing many casualties.  Fierce fighting 
ensued and a heavy German barrage then compounded the situation.  Eventually the Cheshires 
were able to withdraw and the whole line fell back to the east bank of the Steenbeek – where 
yet more casualties were caused by the British guns shelling them during the evening.124  During 
the day 6th Cheshire had lost approximately 500 men, killed, wounded or missing.  They were 
relieved in the evening of 1 August, by which time their strength was 3 officers and 57 ORs but 
returned to garrison the captured trenches the next day with 3 officers and 121, having been 
rejoined by returning stragglers.  By the time they were relieved on 5 August, the total casualties 
would be 3 officers and 193 men killed or missing with a further 12 officers and 269 men 
wounded.125    
 
The Cheshires moved back to rest and re-organize, and were re-joined by the men who had 
been left out of the action.  For the Battalion clerks, one of whom was Walter Williamson, it 
was a period of feverish activity.  Williamson’s diary gives a clear account of the work 
necessary to identify casualties after a battalion had been in action.  In this instance, the 
difficulty of obtaining accurate information had been compounded by a shell having taken out 
the Orderly Room dugout, with the loss of the companies’ records, so it was very difficult to 
sort out details of the casualties. 
The Record Office at the base had furnished us already with a fresh roll of the 
Battalion. Working from this we first found out who were still present with the 
                                                 
124 BOH 1917 Vol. 2, p. 168 and Crookenden, Cheshire Regiment in the Great War, p. 113. 
125 TNA: WO 95/2590 – 6th Cheshire War Diary 31 July – 5 August 1917. 
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Battalion.  Evidence was then taken from officers and men, of particulars of men 
known to have been killed.  The list still remaining was then gone into again with 
lists received from Officers in charge of burial parties.  Lists were also coming in 
daily from casualty Clearing Stations. Still a long roll remained of men still 
unaccounted for. For the time being these had to be reported as ‘Missing’, until 
such times as evidence came through that they were officially notified as Prisoners 
of War.  Of those that still remained unaccounted for, and reported as missing, after 
a statutory period, the casualty lists would contain their names as No …. Reported 
Missing July 31st 1917 now presumed Killed in Action.126 
 
 
A total of 114 6th Cheshire men are shown in SDGW as having been killed on 31 July.  
Unfortunately, very few of their Service Records have survived but examination of available 
information indicates a battalion still predominantly made up of Cheshire soldiers.  Over 90 of 
those killed had enlisted in Cheshire, many in the battalion’s home town of Stockport, with a 
further 13 from neighbouring counties.  Over a third (45) had been with the battalion since 
1915, 18 of whom had arrived in France with it in November 1914.  The loss of so many 
‘originals’ must have hit the battalion hard.  Of those arriving after 1915, 19 were shown as 
already belonging to 6th Cheshire on arrival at the IBD and appear to have been drafted from 
the Reserve battalion as replacements during the latter part of 1916.  Some 16 of the rest had 
had previous service in other Cheshire battalions, both Regular and TF but it is likely that many 
of the late 1916 arrivals shown on arrival at the IBD as unallocated Cheshire soldiers were 
Derbyites like Walter Williamson who had attested in late 1915, was called up in June 1916 
and, with the number 44170, had joined 3rd Cheshire.  In December 1916 he had been posted to 
France and allocated to 6th Cheshire at the IBD with the number 15362 before joining the 
battalion as part of a draft of 283 which joined the battalion on 12 December.127  Of the men  
who died on 1 July, only 8 had regimental numbers in the 15xxx range which were higher, and 
thus later, than Williamson’s; they may not have been part of the same draft but it is safe to 
                                                 
126 Doreen Priddey, ed., A Tommy at Ypres – Walter’s War, The Diary and Letters of Walter Williamson (Stroud: 
Amberley, 2011), p. 155. 
127 Ibid and TNA: WO 95/95/2590 – 6th Cheshire War Diary entry for 12 December 1916. 
 
 
205 
 
assume that they had arrived with the battalion before 1 March 1917 when the new 6-figure 
numbers were allocated.  However, it remains impossible to identify how many might have 
been conscripts rather than volunteers.  Geographically, of the total who died only 18 had not 
originally enlisted in the Cheshires and 12 of these had already been transferred to the Regiment 
prior to arriving in France.  In late July 1917, therefore, the 1/6th Cheshire remained 
predominantly a Cheshire battalion, which had been able to replace previous losses from within 
Regimental resources.128    
 
The manpower situation was becoming increasingly serious for the BEF as a whole.  
Correspondence passed rapidly between London and GHQ as the two AG Branches sought to 
obtain men.  In early August the War Office warned GHQ that the estimated minimum number 
of Infantry reinforcements to become available for France during the months of August, 
September and October would be 123,000 British and 34,250 Overseas Contingents.129  
Although it was noted as a minimum, it was unlikely that there would be many more to replace 
the anticipated further losses of the offensive.  A General Staff Memorandum on 11 August 
showed the infantry to be 85,000 men deficient, an average of 1,650 men short in each division.  
On 17 August the situation was made even clearer in a letter from Robertson to GHQ warning 
that probably less than 8,000 men would arrive as drafts during September.130  As a special 
measure it was decided temporarily to deplete certain arms (unspecified) of the Service at home 
in order to provide drafts for Infantry units in France. This would free up an additional 20,000 
Infantry Reinforcements for August, September and October.131   
 
                                                 
128 SDGW deaths for 6th Cheshire on 31 July 1917 plus Medal Rolls and Service Records on www.ancestry.com   
129 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry 7 August 1917. 
130 BOH 1917 Vol. 2, p.234 and fn. 2. 
131 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry 22 August: War Office letter 121/Drafts/7509 (AG1). 
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The increasing need to transfer men between cap-badges had thrown up certain anomalies, and 
by August it had become necessary for the War Office to issue amended instructions on the 
procedures for posting and transferring all soldiers.132  The extent of the problem may be seen 
by it being thought necessary to confirm that, irrespective of whether he had a Regular or TF 
Regimental number, a man serving on a Regular attestation or record of service paper was a 
Regular soldier whilst a man serving on a TF attestation was a TF soldier.  A recruit called up 
under the MSAs or who enlisted voluntarily was now to be allotted a Regular number 
irrespective of whether his first posting was to a Regular or a TF unit, unless he was posted to 
units of corps without any regular unit, such as the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC).  For 
ease of reference a chart was contained in the Instruction (abbreviated for the purpose of this 
thesis) to make the transfer procedures absolutely clear: 
A. Description of Corps in 
which a Regular soldier is  
required to serve 
Transfer Posting Re-numbering 
Any Corps (except HAC etc) He will be transferred to 
the Corps in which he is 
required to serve. 
He will then be posted 
to a Regular or TF unit 
of the new Corps as 
required. 
The Officer i/c Regular Records 
of the new Corps will allot the 
soldier a Regular number 
B. Description of corps in 
which a TF Soldier is 
required to serve on transfer 
Transfer Posting Re-numbering 
A corps containing one or more 
TF units 
He will be transferred to 
the Corps in which he is 
required to serve 
He will then be posted 
to a regular or TF unit 
of the new corps as 
required. 
The Officer i/c TF Records of 
the new Corps will allot the 
soldier a TF number from the 
series assigned to the TF unit or 
units of the new corps. 
 
A Corps including both 
Regular and TF soldiers but not 
containing a TF unit. 
He will be transferred to 
the corps in which he is 
required to serve 
He will then be posted 
to a unit of the new 
corps as required 
The Officer ic Records of the 
new corps will allot the soldier 
a regular number. 
A corps not containing a TF 
unit and not including TF 
soldiers 
He will be enlisted on a regular attestation, posted 
to a unit of the corps in which he is required to 
serve and discharged automatically from his former 
corps under para 144 of TF Regulations. 
The Officer ic Records of the 
new corps will allot the soldier 
a regular number. 
 
 
It was also now decided to make a subtle change concerning the provision of Infantry drafts by 
placing the onus on Reserve units to telegraph the War Office as soon as they anticipated that 
                                                 
132 TNA: WO 293/7 ACI 1245 of 11 August 1917. Procedure on Transfer and Posting of Regular and Territorial 
Force Soldiers.  Amended Instructions. 
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they would have drafts completely ready for despatch.  The telegram was to show the numbers 
available, their state of training and when they would be ready for despatch.  The War Office 
would then inform the Reserve unit for which theatre and regiment (or unit) the draft should be 
prepared, or whether it was to be allocated on arrival overseas.  Lists of drafts available would 
be sent daily from the War Office to the Commands concerned for calling forward as 
required.133   It was a simple change but designed to speed up the despatch of appropriate drafts. 
 
Haig held a Manpower Conference on 21 August at which he warned the Army Commanders 
that British divisions in France would probably be 100,000 men below establishment by the 
end of October, and emphasized the necessity for ‘A’ men to be released for the Infantry 
whenever possible.134  The same day he directed that immediate steps should be taken to 
examine all Directorates and departments and to send to the Base Depots ‘all personnel, trained 
and untrained whose services can be dispensed with temporarily’.  Daily reports were to be 
forwarded of the numbers despatched to Base Depots and a roll of the men sent to HQ 3rd 
Echelon stating to which Base Depot they had been sent.135   
 
AG Branch GHQ continued to seek more men from other sources already in theatre.  In early 
August the disbandment of all except four of the ten Entrenching Battalions was proposed and 
instructions were subsequently given for the disbandment of all Entrenching Battalions except 
Number 7, which received Guards and reinforcements from Rouen and Le Havre and Number 
10, which received reinforcements from Étaples and Calais.136  Later in the month the Infantry 
                                                 
133 TNA: WO 293/7 ACI 1301 of 21 August 1917 Despatch of Infantry Drafts to Units serving with the 
Expeditionary Forces.  
134 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry 21 August 1917. 
135 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry 21 August 1917 – CinC letter C/408/1 to QMG, DGMS, EinC, 
DGT, GOC LofC Area.  
136 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entries dated 3, 6, 11, 25 and 27 August 1917.  
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attached to the RE Tunneling Companies were also withdrawn for use as ordinary 
reinforcements.137  Attention had also returned to the Cavalry.  On 4 August it was decided that 
twelve Corps Cavalry Regiments were to be dismounted and the men thus released withdrawn 
to the Base for training as Infantry.  It was also decided that since only 2000 reinforcements 
were to be maintained in country for the various branches of the MGC, only 100 were necessary 
for the Cavalry Brigade MGC thus releasing a further 400 for Infantry reinforcements.  Any 
possible source of manpower was being considered.    
 
 
The level of training of reinforcements remained problematical.  It remained possible for drafts 
to arrive in France requiring completion of their training but time at the Base for these men was 
now reduced to five days.138  There was a need to get them to units at the front as soon as 
possible but training capacity was also now needed to turn fit men ‘combed out’ at the Base 
and on the LofC into Infantry, which seems to have taken about six weeks.  In early September 
the War Office offered to despatch 10,000 ‘B1’ men to be substituted for a similar number of 
‘A1’ men so long as the latter could be made available as reinforcements before 1 October.  
GHQ had obviously responded that the ‘A1’ men thus released would not be available as 
reinforcements until 1 November since the War Office offer was withdrawn on the grounds that 
the men could be better used for substitution at home.139  Time was also needed to train the 
Cavalry as Infantry.  They had been dismounted in August but it would be October before the 
16th Warwickshires would receive a draft ‘for the most part fellows of good physique; mostly 
cavalrymen from the base drafted into the infantry’.140 
 
                                                 
137 TNA: WO 95/26 AG War Diary entry for 21 August 1917. 
138 TNA: WO 95/26 AG War Diary entry dated 22 August 1917. 
139 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entries 1 and 11 September 1917.  
140 J. Cooksey & D. Griffiths, Harry’s War (London: Ebury Press, 2013), p. 264, Wednesday 17 October 1917. 
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The Official History shows the number of casualties for the period 31 July – 28 August as 3,424 
officers and 64,586 ORs but for the BEF as a whole the August figures were 5,096 officers and 
103,998 ORs.  The total Cavalry and Infantry reinforcements dispatched to divisions had been 
4,111 officers and 90,844 men.  It was a massive shortfall, although the bulk of the 
reinforcements would have gone to those divisions engaged in the offensive.  Some 22 British 
divisions had been in action on the Fifth Army front, 14 of which had been withdrawn for 
replenishment but despite the nucleus of officers and men held back from the battle, would not 
be fit for action again for some weeks.141  A further indication of the seriousness of the 
manpower situation is visible in the dwindling recruiting figures.  Drafts arriving in France 
during August would have had to have started their training in April.  That month the number 
of ‘A’ men required had been 267,494 but only 55,857 were actually recruited, of whom 18,660 
were lads who could not be posted abroad until they turned 19.142  
 
Some battalions were more fortunate than others.  The 6th Cheshire received several drafts 
during September, most of whom were returned casualties from their own and other Cheshire 
battalions.  The question of the absorption of these drafts was always a consideration but Walter 
Williamson felt that:  
   
The CO had a thoughtful way of dealing with these.  He would call all men out who 
had been with the battalion previously, and put them in the companies that they 
wished for, so that they could get amongst their old friends again. The remainder 
were then divided amongst the four companies to bring them as near as possible to 
equal strength. 
 
                                                 
141 BOH 1917 Vol. 2, p. 209 and TNA 95/26 AG War Diary figures for August 1917.  
142 Statistics of the Military Effort, p. 369. 
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The 6th Cheshire War Diary notes that between 9–17 September 33 men rejoined and 216 
reinforcements arrived.143   
 
Planning was continuing for the next stage of the offensive.  The lead had now passed to Second 
Army and Plumer produced a plan based on a series of steps, each with a strictly limited 
objective, culminating in gaining the Gheluvelt plateau.  On 20 September, Second and Fifth 
Armies attacked with 11 divisions at the start of the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge.  It was a 
complete success.  There were of course casualties: those for the Infantry on the first day were 
estimated at 450 officers and 13,028 ORs.144  In 19th Division, 9th RWF was in reserve but was 
hurried up to hold the line at Hessian Wood, arriving in time to ward off a German counter-
attack but coming under heavy shell-fire.  Over 20-21st September they suffered 109 casualties: 
3 officers wounded, 21 ORs killed (including 7 died of wounds), 73 wounded and 12 missing.145  
Analysis of the 21 men killed shows that one third had not originally enlisted in the RWF, 
although only two had enlisted outside Western Command.  The other two-thirds had all served 
previously in 9th RWF or other RWF battalions but the effect of the ‘combing out’ activities of 
earlier in the summer is clearly visible: four men had come from being attached to Tunneling 
Companies, two had been in 4th (Garrison) RWF and two had been in the 19th Division Cyclist 
Company.  However, the fact that two thirds of those killed had previous RWF service would 
appear to indicate that even during ‘combing out’ some attention was paid to regimental 
affiliations. 
 
                                                 
143 Priddey, A Tommy at Ypres, p. 171 and TNA: WO 95/2590 – 6th Cheshire War Diary. 
144 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry for 20 September 1917. 
145 TNA: WO 95/2092-1 9th RWF War Diary 20 – 21 September 1917. 
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The second ‘step’, the Battle of Polygon Wood, began on 26 September.  The main attack, by 
I ANZAC Corps, was intended to gain the whole of Polygon Wood and the southern part of the 
village of Zonnebeke.  The X Corps was to cover the right and attack with two divisions either 
side of the Menin Road whilst on the left the Fifth Army was to reach a line between Zonnebeke 
Station and Kansas Crossroads.  Four Marches battalions would be involved, 2nd and 10th RWF, 
6th Cheshire and 7th KSLI, although none would take part in the first assault.  The 10th RWF 
and 7th KSLI of 3rd Division had arrived in the Salient about a week earlier whilst 2nd RWF in 
33rd Division had been moved south from the coast arriving in the line on 23 September.  The 
newly arrived divisions had trained as much as they could: the 10th RWF had spent 10 days 
training before they left their previous location, the 3rd Division’s Brigades having practised 
assembling at night on taped positions and by day attacking strong-points with rifle and rifle 
grenade.146  What they brought to the attack, however, were fresh troops in units that were up 
to strength: 7th KSLI’s strength was 44 officers and 957 ORs.147      
 
At 05.50 am on 26 September the Second and Fifth Armies attacked with seven divisions.  The 
estimated Infantry casualties reported during the first day were 161 officers and 4,969 men but 
by the end of the period 26 September – 3 October the ‘all arms’ casualty figures were: 681 
officer and 14,694 OR.148  For the four Marches battalions the casualties totaled 1046 ORs, 
although it is difficult to draw exact comparisons as the War Diary figures for each battalion 
cover different periods.149  All the battalions had lost a large proportion of their fighting 
                                                 
146 Ward, Regimental Records of the Royal Welch Fusiliers Vol III, p. 348. 
147 Wood, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, p. 243. 
148 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry for 26 September 1917 and BOH 1917 Vol. 2, p. 293. 
149 TNA: WO 95/2423-1 War Diary of 2nd RWF for 26/27 September 1917; WO 95/1436-2 War Diary of 10th 
RWF for 26/29 September; WO 95/2590-3 War Diary of 6th Cheshire casualty figures for 20 – 27 September; 
Wood, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, p. 244. 
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strength; although 2nd RWF’s total casualties look the least they were said to be one-third of the 
trench strength with which they had gone into action.150     
 
Battalion Brigade/Division In Action Killed Wounded Missing Total Cas 
2nd RWF 19th Bde, 33rd Div 26–27 Sep 31 121 37 189 
10th RWF 76th Bde, 3rd Div 26-29 Sep 39 202 38 279 
7th KSLI 8th Bde, 3rd Div 26-30 Sep 36 237 27 300 
1/6th Cheshire 118th Bde, 39th Div 20-27 Sep 60 167 51 278 
   166 727 153 1046 
 
The BEF’s OR losses for the whole of September were 101,253 (total casualties all arms 59,201 
and sick wastage of 42,052).  The number of Cavalry and Infantry reinforcements sent to the 
Divisions, 116,982, was the highest of the whole year, presumably due to the ‘combing out’ 
measures taken in August.151  As ever, however, the availability of specific reinforcements was 
patchy.  The Welsh battalions seem to have had the greatest difficulty in getting speedy 
reinforcements.  It would be 5 November before 2nd RWF received 168 ORs from the Base, 
whilst 10th RWF received ‘penny packets’ of 8 ORS during October and a further 179 by 22 
November.152  On 3 October 7th KSLI showed a strength of 670 ORs but drafts amounting to 
only 53 were received during that month and a further 14 during November.153  In contrast, 1/6th 
Cheshire received its first draft on 29 September and by the end of October 62 men had rejoined 
and 410 reinforcements had arrived.154  It is difficult to draw specific conclusions since it is 
apparent that the War Diary writers did not all have the same priorities: both 2nd and 10th RWF 
War Diaries are meticulous in mentioning every single officer but ORs appear rather as an 
afterthought, whilst 6th Cheshire separates out those ORs rejoining the battalion and those newly 
                                                 
150 Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew, pp. 404-5. 
151 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary figures for September 1917. 
152 TNA: WO 95/2423-1 War Diary of 2nd RWF for 26 September – 5 November 1917; WO 95/1436-2 War 
Diary of 10th RWF for 26 September – 22 November 1917. 
153 Wood, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, pp. 243-4. 
154 TNA: WO 95/2590-3 6th Cheshire War Diary for September – October 1917. 
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arriving from the Base.  It was not just a problem of numbers, though, as however many 
reinforcements arrived they could not necessarily replace the loss of experience: of those who 
had been killed, both 2nd RWF and 7th KSLI had lost Company Sergeant-Majors, 6th Cheshire 
had lost five Sergeants, whilst 2nd and 10th RWF had each lost four and between the four 
battalions some 21 Junior NCOs had been lost.  Although men would be promoted into their 
vacancies, it takes time to grow into a more senior rank and the different responsibilities 
devolving upon it. 
 
The 3rd and 33rd Divisions had taken part in only one attack, Polygon Wood, but would play no 
further part in 3rd Ypres.155  The 33rd Division, to 2nd RWF’s disgust, was moved south to an 
‘inactive’ Corps, near Messines.156  The 3rd Division moved to 3rd Army, and arrived in the St 
Omer area.  It would be involved in a subsidiary attack near Bullecourt in November but as far 
as 7th KSLI was concerned it was a quiet period; the battalion’s total casualties for November 
were 2 officers and 9 ORs wounded and 3 ORs killed.157  The 39th Division had taken part in 
three battles, Pilckem Ridge, Menin Road and Polygon Wood, but remained in the area, 
presumably because sufficient TF reinforcements were available to bring it rapidly back to 
strength.  It did not take part in any further attacks although 6th Cheshire would have an 
uncomfortable time during the Battle of Poelcappelle supplying working parties at Hell Fire 
Corner from 5 am to 5 pm for five days for the ANZAC Corps.158  
 
The success of the ‘steps’ so far encouraged GHQ to attempt a third: to capture the eastern edge 
of the Gheluvelt Plateau and the village of Broodseinde with twelve divisions on a frontage of 
                                                 
155 TNA: WO 158-20 Items 737 and 738 Divisions taking part in attacks 31 July – 12 October 1917, Ypres. 
156 Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew, pp. 406-8. 
157 Wood, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, pp. 244-5. 
158 Crookenden, Cheshire Regiment in the Great War, p. 123. 
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14,000 yards.  Three Marches battalions would take part: 1st Cheshire in 5th Division, 1st RWF 
in 7th Division and 1/2nd Monmouthshire in 29th Division.  The attack started on 4 October and 
the main objectives were rapidly gained, although there were more difficulties on the flanks.  
The total Second Army losses for 4–8 October were 12,498, of which 10,862 were Infantry, 
whilst between 4–6 October the four assaulting divisions of the Fifth Army lost 4,283 and the 
assaulting divisions of X and IX Corps lost  8,114.159  It was a further successful step, with the 
line having been advanced about 1,000 yards closer to the Passchendaele Ridge and almost all 
the Gheluvelt Plateau had now been gained, but the casualties continued to mount: a total of 
24,895 for this operation.   
 
The battles of Poelcappelle, and then First Passchendaele, followed in quick succession but 
there would be little Marches’ involvement until Second Passchendaele which started on 26 
October and lasted officially until 10 November.  By now it had been raining continuously since 
4 October and conditions had become atrocious.  The Canadian Corps put in the main attack 
but on the right X Corps made a third attempt to capture the Gheluvelt and Polderhoek spurs.  
Later in the battle the 1st Division, including 1st SWB, would play their first part in 3rd Ypres, 
having spent the previous months some miles west of Dunkirk preparing to land on the Belgian 
coast once the anticipated gains of the Ypres battle had been exploited. There their training had 
been limited to embarkation and disembarkation, and scaling replicas of the high walls of the 
German coastal defences.  They were brought south in late October and at 5 am on 10 November 
1st SWB was to attack north-eastwards beyond Goudberg.  They came up against fierce 
opposition and by early afternoon were forced to fall back from the line they had reached.  They 
                                                 
159 BOH 1917 Vol. 2, pp. 311 and 315. 
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had suffered heavy losses with 372 OR casualties, well over two thirds of those who had gone 
into action.160    
 
On 20 November Haig finally decided to close down the Ypres campaign.  By then he had been 
required to despatch five British Divisions to help the Italians, including the 5th and 7th Divisions 
so 1st Cheshire and 1st RWF were now away from the Western Front.  It would be April before 
they would return.  The total all ranks casualties for 3rd Ypres, 31 July–10 November, were 
238,313 of which the Infantry casualties amounted to 170,534.  Some 33,713 ORs had been 
killed plus a further 29,036 were missing, many of whom would never be found.161  The overall 
figures for the BEF in France were much higher: between 1 August and 31 October the total 
losses were 404,629 (276,674 casualties and 127,955 sick wastage).  From their peak in 
September the number of Infantry and Cavalry reinforcements sent to divisions had dropped in 
October to 4,899 officers and 78,233 men.162   
 
The offensives of 1917 continued, however, with the Battle of Cambrai, 20th November–7th 
December, which would still further deplete the BEF’s manpower.  Several Marches battalions 
took part in the various stages of the battle but for the purpose of this thesis it is not proposed 
to go into any detail as it would be largely repetitious.   
 
 
 
                                                 
160 C.T. Atkinson, History of the South Wales Borderers (London: Medici, 1931; Uckfield: Naval & Military 
Press, n.d.), pp. 345-9. 
161 BOH 1917 Vol. 2, p.360 and fn 2; p.361; p. 364-5. 
162 TNA: WO 95/26 Figures from AG GHQ War Diary for August – December 1917.  NB the War Diary does 
not contain the overall figures for November 1917. 
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Analysis of Selected Battalions 
The selected Battalions, with the exception of 1/4th KSLI, had been in action throughout 
1917.163  It would be expected by now that analysis of the men who had died would begin to 
show a lesser ability to reinforce from within the traditional sources for the particular 
Regiments.  As Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show, this is true to an extent but not as much in every case 
as might have been anticipated. 
 
Enlistment Location 1st Cheshire 9th Cheshire 1st KSLI 6th KSLI 
Regimental Area 70 59% 62 67% 43 53% 104 73% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - England 1    10  10  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 14  1  11  7  
Total enlisted in No 4 District 85 72% 63 68% 64 79% 121 85% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 9  11  5  8  
 Liverpool/Manchester 8  4  2  6  
Total Enlisted in Western Command 102 86% 78 85% 71 88% 135 94% 
Northern Command 9  7  4  3  
Southern Command 3  4  2  1  
 Birmingham 0  1  1    
Eastern 1  2    4  
London District 2    3    
Scotland/Ireland 1        
Overseas 0        
Total Other Commands 16  14  10  8  
Total Deaths 118  92  81  143  
Table 4.1. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected English Regular battalions who were killed/died 
between 1 July – 30 November 1917. 
 
The Cheshire’s ability to reinforce its Regular battalions with men enlisted within its 
Regimental area of Cheshire has dropped for 1st Cheshire from 71 per cent in 1916 to 59 per 
cent but has remained steady for 9th Cheshire at 67 per cent.  The KSLI enlistments in their 
Regimental area have also dropped from the 1916 figures: 1st KSLI is down by 18 per cent to 
53% whilst 6th KSLI has fallen 9 per cent to 73%.  Turning the figures round, however, in the 
second half of 1917 about two-thirds of 1st and 9th Cheshire had enlisted within the Regimental 
                                                 
163 1/4th KSLI had been in Far East since February 1915; landed at Le Havre 29 July 1917 and joined 190 th 
Brigade, 63rd Division on 18 August 1917.  
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area whilst the KSLI varied between just over half for 1st KSLI and almost three-quarters for 
6th KSLI.  The ability of the two English county regiments to make up their numbers from 
within No 4 District remains visible with, at the lowest, 9th Cheshire showing 68 percent and, 
at the highest, 6th KSLI at 85 per cent enlistments in that area.  Looking at the figures for 
enlistments in Western Command as whole, the enlistment figures have fallen since 1916 but 
still stand at 85 per cent for both Cheshire battalions and 88 and 94 per cent for 1st and 6th KSLI 
respectively having been enlisted within their Home Command.   It is apparent that even by the 
second half of 1917, the Cheshire and the KSLI Regular battalions are still able to draw to a 
large extent on men from their traditional recruiting areas. 
 
Enlistment Location 2ndRWF 9th RWF 1st SWB 10th SWB 
Regimental Area 39 28% 11 14% 45 31% 39 45% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - England 20  4  8  6  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 26  15  33 23% 7  
Total enlisted in No 4 District 85 61% 30 38% 86 60% 52 60% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 16  16 20% 3  2  
 Liverpool/Manchester 13  14 18% 9  4  
Total Enlisted in Western Command 114 81% 60 76% 98 67% 58 67% 
Northern Command 6  5  10  1  
Southern Command 3  2  2  5  
 Birmingham 2    3  1  
Eastern 5  7  11 8% 16 18% 
London District 8  5  18 13% 6 7% 
Scotland/Ireland 2    1    
Overseas         
Total Other Commands 26  19  45  29  
Total Deaths 140  79  143  87  
Table 4.2. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected Welsh Regular battalions who were killed/died 
between 1 July – 30 November 1917. 
 
Turning to the RWF and the SWB, the picture is more varied.  Only 28 and 14 per cent 
respectively were enlisted into the 2nd and 9th RWF in their Regimental area.  Traditionally, 
however, their recruits had come from throughout Wales and neighbouring English counties so 
the figures for No 4 District rise to 61 per cent for 2nd RWF but reach only 38 per cent for 9th 
RWF.  The influence of Lancashire and particularly Liverpool and Manchester can be seen, 
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however, contained within the figures of 81 per cent and 76 per cent enlistments in Western 
Command.  The Birmingham influence on 2nd RWF has virtually disappeared now with only 
two men out of 140 having enlisted in that city.  The SWB show greater numbers than the RWF 
as having enlisted in the Regimental area, with an increase of 5 per cent over 1916 for 1st SWB 
although there is a serious drop of 45 per cent for 10th SWB.  For both SWB battalions 60 per 
cent had enlisted in No 4 area, rising to 67 per cent for both from Western Command.    
Again, a growing spread of birth locations across all sample battalions is visible in Tables 4.3. 
and 4.4.  
 
Birth location 1st Cheshire 9th Cheshire 1st KSLI 6th KSLI 
Regimental Area 47 40% 43 47% 39 48% 80 56% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – England 4    10  10  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 5  2  2  6  
Total born in No 4 District 56 47% 45 49% 51 63% 96 67% 
Born in No 3 District 17  15  6  8  
 Liverpool/Manchester 8  3  0  5  
Total Born in Western Command 81 67% 63 68% 57 70% 109 76% 
Northern Command 15  11  4  11  
Southern Command 2  6  4  5  
 Birmingham 0  1  1  1  
Eastern 2  1  3  6  
London District 4  1  3  1  
Scotland/Ireland 1  1  2    
Overseas 0        
Total Other Commands 24  21  17  24  
Location of Birth Unknown 13  8  7  10  
Total Deaths 118  92  81  143  
Table 4.3. Birth locations of soldiers of selected English Regular battalions who were killed/died between 1 
July – 30 November 1917. 
 
For the English battalions, the numbers of those born within the respective Regimental areas 
has fallen slightly.  Those born in Cheshire has dropped but only by four and five per cent 
respectively for the 1st and 9th battalions.  For 1st KSLI, the number of those born in Shropshire, 
Herefordshire or Radnorshire has fallen by just 2 per cent, although the drop for 6th KSLI is 12 
per cent.  For all four battalions, however, the numbers of those born within Western Command 
remains above two thirds of the whole. 
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For the Welsh battalions, less than a quarter of those who had died during the period were born 
in the Regimental areas of their respective battalions.  Even when the numbers of those born in 
Wales are added, the percentages for all battalions are still well below 50 per cent.  Overall, 
they are lower, but not markedly so, than the 1916 figures.  Conversely, the figures for those 
born in Western Command are slightly higher for 2nd RWF and within 1 per cent for 9th RWF 
and 1st SWB.  Only 10th SWB shows a fall of 10 per cent having been born within Western 
Command; in part, however, this may be qualified by the men born across the Welsh border in 
Gloucestershire and Somerset, and thus shown against Southern Command, who had moved to 
the South Wales coalfields for work. 
 
Birth location 2ndRWF 9th RWF 1st SWB 10th SWB 
Regimental Area 30 21% 12 15% 26 18% 21 24% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – England 21  4  11  10  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 24  10  32 22% 10  
Total born in No 4 District 75 54% 26 33% 69 48% 41 47% 
Born in No 3 District 17  13 16% 6  3  
 Liverpool/Manchester 6  10 13% 7  2  
Total Born in Western Command 98 70% 49 62% 82 57% 46 53% 
Northern Command 12  9  11  2  
Southern Command 7  3  9  17  
 Birmingham     3  1  
Eastern 6  3  8  13  
London District 6  5  18  4  
Scotland/Ireland 2  3  3    
Overseas   1      
Total Other Commands 33  24  52  37  
Location of Birth Unknown 9  6  9  4  
Total Deaths 140  79  143  87  
Table 4.4. Birth locations of soldiers of selected Welsh Regular battalions who were killed/died between 1 
July – 30 November 1917. 
 
The figures for enlistments in the TF battalions (see Table 4.5 below) reflect even greater 
continuing homogeneity, although for 1/5th Cheshire, 1/4th RWF and 1/4th KSLI, the totals are 
small and consequently skew their percentages.  It is clear from the figures for 1/6th Cheshire 
and 1/2nd Monmouthshire that they were continuing to be able to replace largely from within 
 
 
220 
 
their own Regimental areas.  When enlistments in No 4 Area are considered 80 per cent of 1/6th 
Cheshire and 86 per cent of 1/2nd Monmouthshire had enlisted there, rising to 89 per cent and 
99 per cent respectively for Western Command.  It seems likely that these higher figures reflect 
both the number of original TF HS soldiers that had become available for posting overseas as 
a result of the 1916 MSAs and also the number of Derby men who had enlisted in the TF.   
     
Enlistment Location 1/5th 
Cheshire 
1 /6th 
Cheshire 
1 /4th 
KSLI164 
1 /4th RWF 1/2nd 
Monmouths 
Regimental Area 7 88% 188 77% 36 97% 9 50% 59 66% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - 
England 
  6  1  1  8  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - 
Wales 
      4  11  
Total enlisted in No 4 District 7 88% 194 80% 37 100% 14 78% 78 86% 
Enlisted in No 3 District   15    2  6  
 Liverpool/Manchester 1  9      4  
Total Enlisted in Western 
Command 
8 100% 218 89% 37 100% 16 89% 88 99% 
Northern Command   15    1    
Southern Command   1      1  
 Birmingham   1        
Eastern   3    1    
London District   4        
Scotland/Ireland   2        
Overseas           
Total Other Commands   26    2  1  
Total Deaths 8  244  37  18  89  
Table 4.5. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected TF battalions who were killed/died between 1 July – 
30 November 1917. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
164 1/4th KSLI had been in Far East since February 1915; landed at Le Havre 29 July 1917 and joined 190 th 
Brigade, 63rd Division on 18 August 1917.  
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Birth location 1/5th 
Cheshire 
1 /6th 
Cheshire 
1 /4th 
KSLI 
1 /4th 
RWF 
1 /2nd 
Monmouths 
Regimental Area 6 75% 121 50% 28 76% 4 22% 31 35% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – 
England 
  9      11  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales   2  3  1  14  
Total born in No 4 District 6  132 54% 31 84% 5 28% 56 63% 
Born in No 3 District 1  22    1  4  
 Liverpool/Manchester   10    1  3  
Total Born in Western 
Command 
7 88% 164 67% 31 84% 7 39% 63 71% 
Northern Command 1  22    1  1  
Southern Command   2  2    6  
 Birmingham           
Eastern   9    1  2  
London District   3  3    1  
Scotland/Ireland   4        
Overseas   1        
Total Other Commands 1  41  5  2  10  
Location of Birth Unknown   39  1  9  16  
Total Deaths 8  244  37  18  89  
Table 4.6. Birth locations of soldiers of selected TF battalions who were killed/died between 1 July – 30 
November 1917. 
 
The TF birth locations (Table 4.6. above) appear to show an ever-widening gap between those 
of the English and the Welsh, particularly 1/4th RWF, battalions.  As with enlistments, however, 
the small number of deaths skew the percentages.  
 
Overall, the figures in the Tables show that for the Regular battalions of the English and Welsh 
Marches the majority of those who had died had enlisted in Western Command.  For the TF, 
the figures are even higher, presumably since many of their numbers had not become available 
for use as reinforcements until late 1916.  Overall, it appears that the pre-war plans for the 
provision of reinforcements from local and Command areas were still proving effective to a 
greater extent, at least for the Marches Regiments, than might have been anticipated by this 
stage in the war.   
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Developments at Home later in 1917 
Under normal circumstances the lead time from enlistment to arrival at a frontline unit for an 
adult recruit was some four months, so it seems appropriate here to return to events concerning 
training and recruiting during the second half of 1917.      
 
Changes to Young Soldiers Training 
In the continuing search for re-deployable manpower it was soon realized that Graduated 
battalions could be used for Home Defence.  With five companies each they could send a 
company abroad every two months and still have four companies containing youths at various 
stages of training.165  From July onwards Graduated battalions would gradually replace Second 
Line and HS Garrison battalions in the 71st, 72nd and 73rd home-service Divisions.166  The 
battalions replaced were thus freed up to provide replacements or substitutes for other men 
released for service overseas. 
 
Although serving their purpose, the TR in general remained unpopular in an Army used to 
Regimental links for the Infantry.167  For adult Infantry recruits who spent only fourteen weeks 
in training it was a lesser problem but for the youths who would spend almost a year in the 
system some change was deemed necessary.  In late October a further nine YS and eighteen 
                                                 
165 Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal, p. 305. 
166 In mid-July, 4th TRB left 1st TR Brigade for Ipswich becoming 258th (Graduated) Battalion in 215th Brigade, 
72nd Division.  In mid-August all but one of 1st TR Brigade’s battalions were re-designated: 2nd and 5th became YS 
battalions and 3rd and a new 4th became Graduated battalions.  The subsequent departure of 3rd TRB to Surrey and 
4th TRB to Stockton on Tees as the 276th and 273rd (Graduated) Infantry Battalions respectively and the arrival of 
12th and 13th YS battalions meant that by October the 1st TR Brigade would become solely a YS Brigade.  
167H.E.L. Mellersh, Schoolboy into War (London: William Kimber, 1978), p. 125. Harold Mellersh found his 
posting to 5th TRB during September 1917: ‘entirely impersonal.  The men did not know each other nor have 
anything in common. … In belonging to the 5th TRB one belonged to nothing. … And the conscripts did not want 
to be there any more than I did …’.  It is not clear how much this view was due to Mellersh’s own antipathy to 
‘another home-service job’ or to misplaced hindsight: at that time 5th TRB was a YS battalion taking recruits aged 
18 years 1 month.167  He may simply have been echoing the prevailing view of the TRBs. 
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Graduated were added to the existing fourteen YS and twenty-eight Graduated battalions and 
allotted to twenty-three Infantry Regiments.  The Graduated battalions became the 51st and 52nd 
battalions of each regiment with the YS as the 53rd battalions.  Scant regard was paid to the 
provenance of the original Reserve battalions, although usually the new battalions had 
originated in the same recruiting District; nine, however, changed recruiting districts but 
remained within the same command.  The new 51st Cheshire had started life as 13th SWB, both 
in District 4, but the 225th Graduated Battalion, formerly 50th TRB and previously 14th (Reserve) 
Cheshire, would become 51st Manchester thus moving from District 4 to District 3 albeit 
remaining within Western Command.   
 
 
Changes to the Recruiting Organization 
The major changes in late 1917 were to the recruiting organization.  It had been agreed in 
August that responsibility for recruiting was to pass to the MNS but this would take some time 
to effect.  The Solicitor General had initially advised that the transfer of any of the Army 
Council’s statutory powers for recruiting would require legislative action but, in the interests of 
speed, the Council decided that in the meantime an ACI of limited duration should authorise 
the DGNS to act on its behalf in connection with recruiting.168  Although it seems to have 
remained unclear whether legislation would be needed, the War Cabinet agreed on 8 October 
that one of the functions of the DGNS should be ‘to obtain for the Army, Navy and Air Service 
such men as could be withdrawn from civilian life without detriment to the maintenance of 
essential public services’.169  The Army Council now agreed the transfer of its statutory powers 
                                                 
168 TNA: WO 163/22 Minutes of Army Council Meeting of 27 September 1917 and WO 293/7 ACI 1483 of 28 
September 1917: Ministry of National Service and Recruiting. ACI to remain in effect until 31 October 1917. 
169 TNA: CAB 24/4/10 Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting No 246 of 8 October 1917 and Appendix I. 
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for recruiting to the MNS and concluded a formal agreement with the MNS as to future 
responsibilities.170  The need for legislative action had been circumvented. 
 
On 1 November the MNS assumed responsibility for ‘recruiting, enlistment, the call up of men 
of the Reserve Forces individually and otherwise in relation to the provision of men for the 
Army’.171  At midnight on 31 October the Army’s recruiting organization had been subsumed 
into a new regionally based one, with the former Regimental Area Commanders becoming 
‘Assistant Directors of Recruiting’ responsible to the appropriate Regional Director of 
Recruiting for the ‘efficient working and organization of their Areas’.  There were to be ten 
Regions, which differed slightly from the Home Commands.  The Regimental Areas of the 
Cheshire and the South Lancashire Regiments were now in North Western Region for 
recruiting, the Shropshire and Herefordshire area became part of the West Midlands whilst 
Wales now formed a region on its own.  The number of recruits required monthly for Military 
Service would be allotted proportionately among the regions.172 
 
The effect of these changes, however, was not as fundamental for the Army as might appear, 
since the Military authorities retained the right of final approval and posting of recruits.  The 
MNS Recruiting Areas were the old Regimental Areas and once a recruit had been enlisted he 
was sent to the appropriate Infantry Depot for the Area, now known as the ‘Reception Depot’, 
for posting in accordance with the continuing monthly ACIs.  It remained possible for men to 
volunteer, either before being sent a calling up notice or through what was called ‘Direct’ 
enlistment, when an individual was not liable, usually through age, under the MSAs.  Such 
                                                 
170 TNA: WO 163/22 Minutes of Army Council Meetings No 232 of 11 October and No 233 of 22 October. 
171 TNA: NATS 1/859 Press release of 1 November 1917. 
172 IWM: Ministry of National Service Instructions Issued During November and December 1917, Numbers 1-47 
(inclusive) of 1917 (London: HMSO, 1919). 
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enlistments might be conditional on the man being posted to the corps of his choice, so long as 
he was not below the physical or technical standard required.  If he could not meet the standards 
required, and declined to be posted to any other corps, he could return to civilian life.  In the 
case of the Infantry, irrespective of whether he was a volunteer or not, full consideration was to 
be given to the individual’s preference provided he was of the right medical category: ‘if a man 
over 18 years and physically suited desires to be posted to a particular infantry regiment with 
good reason, his request should be granted by the Posting Officer, and no other authority is 
necessary’.173     
           
Later in November a Recruit Distribution Battalion was created for each Command.  The main 
function of these units was to post or ‘otherwise dispose of’ all ‘B(2)’ and ‘B(3)’ recruits 
received.  Any men thought likely be upgraded to ‘A’ or ‘B1’ after a three month course of 
physical training were to be retained until the end of this period and then posted according to 
the result of the course.174  
 
In order to aid administration under the new regime, the medical categories had been simplified 
by the abolition of the distinction between ‘B’ and ‘C’ with effect from 1 November.175  Those 
in categories lower than ‘A’ who were likely to be sent overseas would in future be selected on 
the basis of a special medical examination at the time they were required to proceed abroad.  
There seem to have been a few disparities in the results of the medical boards, however, as in 
                                                 
173 TNA: WO 293/7 ACI 1621 of 29 October: Arrangements for posting to the Army men who present themselves 
for service during the month of November 1917 and ACI 1731 of 28 November 1917: Arrangements for Posting 
to the Army men accepted for service during the month of December 1917. 
174 TNA: WO 293/7 ACI 1702 of 20 November 1917: Organization of Recruit Distribution Battalions, Training 
Reserve, for the reception and disposal of Category ‘B(2)’ and ‘B(3)’ Recruits. 
175 TNA: WO 293/7 ACI 1606 of 25 October 1917: Alteration of Classification of Men by Categories.  Details of 
the categories are at Appendix 4. 
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December it was dictated that the Medical Officer inspecting every draft was to ‘enter in his 
own handwriting against each man’s name on the nominal roll of the draft, his remarks as to 
the man’s fitness for service, and [was to] sign the roll’.176    
 
Conclusions 
Throughout 1917 manpower had been the predominant question.  There seems little evidence 
that men were being deliberately withheld since early in the year it appears to have been more 
of a systemic problem with the Government simply unable rather than unwilling to force the 
Departments of State to release manpower.  Although a step towards universal compulsion 
appeared to have been taken at the end of 1916, it was recoiled from and even the introduction 
of National Service was based firmly on the voluntary principle.  It would not be until later in 
the year with the arrival of Geddes, with his understanding of national manpower issues, as 
DGNS that any real co-ordination of the nation’s manpower would become possible.      
 
Within the Army, the shortage of recruits had forced greater attention to be focussed on both 
the allocation of men to appropriate parts of the Army with the monthly posting ACIs and the 
‘combing out’, at home and overseas, of men who were fit to fight.  Lawson’s evidence that 
there were ‘A’ men not being used to best advantage in France had prompted positive action 
and the fruits of the efforts of GHQ may be seen in the replacements being provided during 3rd 
Ypres.  The revisiting of the medical categories throughout the year had also enabled better use 
of manpower, particularly in the newly created Labour Corps.  The arrival of women to serve 
with the Army, although not in as many numbers as hoped for, had also played a part in freeing 
up fit men to fight. 
                                                 
176 TNA: WO 293/7 ACI 1829 of 16 December 1917: Regulations for ensuring fitness of men sent to join 
Expeditionary Forces, and fixing responsibility for same. 
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Infantry recruit training had been streamlined for the youngest recruits with the introduction of 
new units.  Since late 1914, comments had been made on how poorly trained new drafts were 
and there seems little evidence that the 1917 drafts were really any less well-prepared than 
before.   
 
The procedures for reporting casualties and obtaining replacements remained the ones that had 
been tried and tested on the Somme and earlier.  Although difficulties in obtaining replacements 
were undoubtedly being encountered by some Regiments, analysis of the deaths suffered by 
selected Marches battalions shows that the majority of men had been enlisted in the traditional 
recruiting areas of the battalions concerned.  Despite gloomy predictions to the contrary it still 
remained possible for a man to choose to serve in his local regiment and there continued to be 
mention of the value of esprit de corps. 
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Chapter 5  
1918: Just Enough 
 
After a brief review of the end of 1917, this chapter has been divided into three sections: January 
– April, May – July and the ‘Advance to Victory’.  In the first two sections, events at home and 
on the Western Front are considered in tandem with mention of the German offensives and the 
involvement of some of the Marches battalions in them.  The third section intentionally 
concentrates on the composition of units in the remaining months of the war.  Mention of the 
manpower crises of 1917-18 is unavoidable but political aspects have been kept as far as 
possible to a minimum in order to remain within the scope of this thesis. 
 
Situation at the end of 1917 
At the end of 1917 Haig required sufficient fully trained men to return the BEF to full strength 
as soon as possible, whilst in the longer term new recruits would be needed for drafting later in 
1918 and potentially into 1919.  The passing of responsibility for recruiting from the military 
to the MNS in November did not of itself enable the raising of greater numbers of men.  Some 
36,543 had been recruited in October, 23,372 of whom would be old enough and sufficiently 
trained to be drafted in about February, but by December the overall figure had fallen to 24,923.1  
The availability of men in the country as a whole was rapidly dwindling.   
 
                                                 
1 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War (SME) (London: War 
Office, 1922; Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 1999) pp. 364, 370. 
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In early November, the AG’s Branch in London informed Haig of a likely deficit of 259,000 
against his anticipated requirement of 857,000 Infantry for the following year.2  It was expected 
that at least 140,000 men would be sent to France by 1 April 1918, which would be augmented 
by an estimated 15,000 per month returning to duty from hospitals in France, making a total of 
215,000 by that date.  Every effort would be made to increase these figures by cutting out non-
essential men at Home, but the letter ended on a slightly confrontational note: ‘a process which 
must be continued with vigour throughout the Force under your Command’.3  Haig’s response 
inevitably reminded the Army Council of ‘the very serious situation which is likely to arise in 
regard to manpower’ in the British units in France.  By 31 March the BEF’s Infantry would be 
approximately 40 per cent below establishment, which would not only paralyze the BEF’s 
offensive power but also reduce the amount of line that could be held.  Unless more men could 
be made available it would be necessary to break up 15 divisions in order to bring all infantry 
battalions up to establishment in just 31 divisions.  Urgent decisions were needed so that plans 
for holding the line and the distribution of troops over the winter could be made.4     
 
The Army Council was only too aware of the situation and was conducting its own battles with 
the Government.  On 15 November, Geddes had produced a Memorandum reviewing the state 
of the nation’s manpower and seeking decisions from the War Cabinet on the priorities to be 
given to the various demands.5  Amongst these was a demand for 600,000 Category ‘A’ recruits 
for the Army between December 1917 and June 1918, plus 320,000 men of lower categories.  
At the same time the Navy would require 90,000 but industries such as munitions, ship-building 
                                                 
2 BOH 1918 Vol. I, Appendix 3 War Office letter from AG2 (signed Corcoran) to Haig dated 3 Nov 17. (Extract 
at Appendix 6). 
3 Ibid. 
4 BOH 1918 Vol. I, Appendix 4 Letter from Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to the War Office dated 24 November 
1917. 
5 TNA: CAB 24/4/24 G.174 Problem of the Maintenance of the Armed Forces dated 15 November 1917. 
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and agriculture also required men.  Having considered all available facts and statistics, Geddes 
had concluded that it would be impossible to meet in full the demands of the Navy and Army 
under the existing legislation.  It was for Cabinet to decide but Geddes proposed that priority 
for manpower should be given to the Navy, with only a proportion, 200,000, of the Army’s 
demand being met.  He had concluded that 150,000 Category ‘A’ men could be recruited from 
men of military age still in civil life but after meeting the Navy’s demand for 90,000 only 60,000 
would be available for the Army, leaving a deficit of 140,000 on the already reduced proportion 
that had been suggested.  Legislation would be necessary if any more men were to be obtained.  
To that end Geddes made the following proposals: 
 Lowering the age at which youths might be sent overseas.  Legislation was not strictly 
necessary for this, as the MSA 2 (1916) had simply stated that ‘steps shall be taken to 
prevent as far as possible the sending of men abroad before they attain the age of 19’, 
but was probably advisable. 
 Lowering the Military Age to 17. 
 Raising the Military Age to 45, with further power to raise it to 50 by Order in Council. 
 Abolishing the period of grace automatically given when exemptions expired or were 
withdrawn. 
 Limiting the power of tribunals. 
 Cancelling Occupational exemptions. 
 Extending Compulsory Service to Ireland.   
 
Geddes’ detailed analysis of the need for additional labour for both civil industries and military 
service placed action firmly in the War Cabinet’s domain; his Memorandum informed their 
future discussions.   
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The War Cabinet’s immediate reaction to Geddes’ paper on 3 December was that the proposed 
legislation was impossible.  Further discussions highlighted the gravity of the manpower 
situation, however, and on 6 December it was proposed that a Cabinet Committee be created to 
produce a scheme that the Government could present to Parliament.6  It was subsequently 
decided that Lloyd George would himself chair the Manpower Committee, which would 
contain four other Cabinet members.7  The gravity of the situation was succinctly defined by its 
Secretary, Maurice Hankey:   
The economic crisis instead of being a danger to be guarded against, is actually 
present; and, second: that the seriousness of the military man-power crisis is not 
merely that we shall not smash the enemy if the men are not forthcoming, but that the 
enemy may smash us.   The problem that confronts the Committee, therefore, is to 
avert a military catastrophe without plunging us into an economic catastrophe equally 
fatal to the cause of the Allies.8 
 
The Manpower Committee (MPC) would take evidence from the various Government 
departments.  A measure of Geddes’ importance, however, is that he attended all the MPC’s 
main meetings in his capacity as DGNS.  Despite his previous military role as Director of 
Recruiting, he was now seen as an expert advisor on manpower as a whole and played a key 
part in providing information and analysis.  In addition to the recommended legislative changes, 
Geddes also now proposed the revision of the Schedule of Protected Employments.  This would 
require negotiations with the Trades Unions but the urgency of the situation was such that on 
20 December Lloyd George alerted Parliament to the impending revisions. 
 
                                                 
6 TNA: CAB 23/4 War Cabinet Meetings WC 289 of 3 December 1917 and 293 of 6 December 1917. 
7 The other members were Lord Curzon, Leader of the House of Lords and member of the War Policy Committee; 
George Barnes, Minister of Pensions; Sir Edward Carson, Minister Without Portfolio; and General Smuts, Cabinet 
Member and Member of the War Policy Committee. 
8 TNA: CAB 27/14 Manpower Committee (MPC) 2 Note by Secretary 8 December 1917.  
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There remained the question of immediate reinforcements for France from those already in the 
Army.  In December 1917 some 60,534 reinforcements, both Cavalry and Infantry, were 
despatched to divisions but the overall all Arms losses in the BEF for that month had been 
102,109 (47,581 casualties and 54,528 sick).9  As far as GHQ was concerned, the men they 
needed were in England and should be released immediately.  There were indeed trained 
soldiers at Home but it proved hard to identify many that could be released under normal 
circumstances.  Geddes had identified 490,000 men in categories A1, A2 and A4 who would at 
some point be available for drafting plus a further 90,000 men who were for various reasons 
unavailable.10  A minute submitted by Lord Derby to the War Cabinet on 24 November 1917 
explained that the figure of over 500,000 ‘A’ men at Home included men in units preparing for 
overseas, draft-finding units, Home Service men and those in depots and administrative units.11  
They represented only about a third of the whole, however, as a note by Robertson analyzing 
the numbers retained for Home Defence indicated that there were in fact 1,420,000 men on the 
strength of the Army at home, of whom only 410,000 were Home Defence troops held against 
an establishment previously authorized by the War Cabinet.12  The balance was made up by 
men employed by different War Office departments: some 80,000 belonged to the RFC; close 
to 50,000 were in the Medical Corps; some 90,000 belonged to the Army Service Corps (ASC); 
others to the Army Ordnance Corps (AOC) and the Army Pay Corps (APC); and there were 
nearly 200,000 employed by the Labour Corps.  Some 46,000 soldiers were also employed 
under the Ministry of Munitions, in agriculture, and on dock and transport work.  Finally, there 
                                                 
9 TNA: WO 95.26 AG GHQ War Diary figures for December 1917. 
10 TNA: CAB 24/4/24 G. 174 Problem of the Maintenance of the Armed Forces dated 15 November 1917.  The 
numbers were broken down as follows: A1: 192,000 who should be immediately available; A2: 124,000 recruits 
now in training who should be available within three or four months; and A4: 174,000 youths in training who 
would be available at some point before 30 September 1918.  Included within the 490,000, however, were some 
113,000 men engaged variously in munitions, skilled trades, dock and transport battalions and Home Service Units.   
11 TNA: CAB/24/33 Note on Recruiting for the Army submitted to the War Cabinet by the Secretary of State for 
War on 24 November 1917.  
12 TNA: CAB/24/38 Troops Required for Home Defence dated 3 January 1918. 
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could be between 3-400,000 sick and wounded at home.  After deducting these figures from the 
whole, less than a third were potential drafts for overseas service once they were sufficiently 
trained and old enough to go to the front.13   
 
Lack of manpower was not the only reason that the BEF’s plans for the Western Front in 1918 
were on hold: in early November the British, French and Italian Prime Ministers had agreed to 
form a Supreme War Council, to be composed of the Prime Minister and a Member of the 
Government of each of the countries whose Armies were fighting on the Western Front.  Its 
overall aim was the creation of:  
a central body charged with the duty of continuously surveying the field of operations 
as a whole and, by the light of information derived from all fronts and from all 
Governments and Staffs, of co-ordinating the plans prepared by the different General 
Staffs, and, if necessary, of making proposals of their own for the better conduct of the 
War.14  
 
The Council would be based at Versailles where its members would be assisted by ‘Permanent 
Military Representatives’ acting as technical military advisers without executive functions. At 
the second meeting in early December the Military Representatives were instructed to examine 
the military situation and make recommendations on future plans of operations.  This was way 
too late and meant that there could be no decisions on future military policy for the foreseeable 
future.  Consequently, on 7 December Haig advised his Army Commanders that it would be 
necessary to adopt a defensive posture for the next few months.  The withdrawal of Russia from 
the war meant that Germany could move some 30 more divisions to the Western Front if she 
wished.15  The implication was that Germany could and probably would mount an offensive in 
the spring. 
                                                 
13 Sir W. Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1921), pp. 342-3. 
14 HC Deb 14 November 1917 vol 99 cc389-91 Statement by the Prime Minister. 
15 G. Sheffield & J. Bourne, Douglas Haig, War Diaries and Letters (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005), p. 
358. 
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Over the preceding two years the BEF had concentrated on offensives.  If the anticipated 
German offensive was to be withstood, then ‘training in defence, as well as the material 
preparations which defence involved’ were urgently required.16  Detailed instructions on 
defensive measures were issued by GHQ on 14 December.17  Preparations were initiated 
immediately and progressed as quickly as labour, weather and other conditions allowed.  They 
were conducted, however, against what must have been a frustrating set of unknowns for GHQ: 
the future availability of manpower for the Army, the role and decisions of the Supreme War 
Council, the organization of divisions in France and the continuing French requests for the 
British to take over more of the line.   
 
January – April 1918 
The MPC’s draft report was circulated at the beginning of January.  It was discussed by the 
War Cabinet on 9 January, when the accuracy of some figures was queried, and then again on 
22 January when a subsidiary question was raised relating to labour for the shipyards.18  In fact 
the report was never fully signed off but became effectively a working document with decisions 
being taken on its initial findings and further negotiations being conducted with the Trades 
Unions.19        
 
The draft’s underlying conclusions were that the staying power of the Allies must be 
safeguarded until such time as American forces had arrived in sufficient numbers to restore the 
                                                 
16 BOH 1918 Vol. 1, p. 39.  
17 BOH 1918 Vol. 1, Appendix 6. 
18 TNA: CAB 23/5/11 Minutes of 319th Meeting of War Cabinet on 9 January 1918 and CAB 23/5/30 338th War 
Cabinet Meeting of 22 January 1918. 
19 TNA: CAB 24/4/36 Final Revise of Draft Report of the Cabinet Committee om Manpower (Paper G.185) dated 
2 April 1918. 
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balance of numbers on the Western Front in the Allies favour and that the maintenance of that 
staying power involved not only that of the armies but of the Allied nations as a whole.  
Accordingly, the MPC had ‘carefully considered and balanced the requirements of the fighting 
forces and of the nation and of the Allies’ in recommending priorities for the distribution of the 
nation’s manpower:  
1. The fighting personnel requirements of the Royal Navy and the Air Services. 
2. Shipbuilding, and then the construction of aeroplanes and tanks.  
3. Food production, timber felling and the provision of food storage accommodation.20 
To the dismay of the Army Council, the priority to be given to manpower for the Army was not 
specifically stated.  Instead there was a rather optimistic exhortation that ‘every effort should 
be made to avoid wastage of manpower by the adoption of suitable strategy and tactics, and by 
the development of fortifications’ plus recommendations concerning the redistribution of 
existing Army manpower, including reduction in the number of battalions per division and a 
review the force allocated to Home Defence.   Macready was told by ‘a very despondent 
Auckland Geddes’ that, even if the Cabinet’s proposals were carried out without being 
weakened by the Trades Unions or Parliament, he did not expect to be able to give the Army 
‘more than 150,000 A men and 100,000 lower category men’ up to 31 December 1918.21  
 
The MPC had considered Geddes’ proposed legislation with mixed results.  It was agreed that 
legislation should be introduced as soon as possible to remove the period of grace automatically 
added to exemptions, and also enabling the DGNS to cancel occupational exemptions, which 
was required to complement the proposed revision of the Schedule of Protected Occupations. 
                                                 
20 Ibid pp. 27-8. 
21 General Sir N. Macready, Annals of an Active Life (London: Hutchinson, n.d.), pp. 283-4.  
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The MPC had not agreed, however, with Geddes’ proposed extensions to the age limits for 
military service, nor with extending compulsory military service to Ireland.     
 
On 14 January a two-clause Military Service Bill was introduced in the Commons.22  Its 
intention was to create ‘an easily understood system of clear cuts by age, by occupation’.  There 
was some opposition from the Labour Party but the Government decided to press ahead in view 
of the urgency of the manpower situation and the new Act received Royal Assent on 6 February.  
A revised Schedule of Protected Occupations, which the new Military Service (No 1) Act 1918 
was designed to complement, had already been issued on 1 February.23  Recruiting increased 
slightly due to the revised Schedule, with, for example, the number of munition workers 
released rising from 3,700 in the third week of March to 9,000 in the second week of April.24  
Consequently, no immediate use was made of the power to withdraw exemptions.  Adult men 
recruited from February onwards would, however, not be trained and ready for drafting until 
mid-June at the earliest. 
 
Reduction in Size of Divisions 
Of more immediate impact on the BEF was the long-anticipated re-organization of divisions. It 
had been under consideration since early 1917 when the Cabinet had asked the War Office to 
consider the possibility of reducing the number of battalions in a division.25  The Army Council 
had responded that no such reorganization should be made until it had become clearly 
impossible ‘to obtain the number of men required to maintain divisions at their present 
                                                 
22 Hansard HC Debate 14 January 1918 vol 101 cc 58-134. 
23 TNA: MH 47/142/3 M.M. 130 (Revised) Schedule of Protected Occupations for men employed on Admiralty, 
War Office or Munitions Work or in Railway Workshops. 
24 History of the Ministry of Munitions VI Part 2 (London: HMSO, 1922), pp. 49-50 cited in K. Grieves, The 
Politics of Manpower, 1914-18 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 192. 
25 TNA: CAB 23/1/55 Minutes of 55th Meeting of War Cabinet on 5 February 1917. 
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establishment’.26  That moment had now arrived and the MPC firmly recommended reduction 
of the number of battalions in British divisions on the Western front from twelve to nine.  
 
GHQ had for some months anticipated that a future lack of reinforcements would make it 
necessary to organize down to the numbers of men available.  In both August and November 
the GS Staff had analysed alternative organizational permutations, concentrating in the end on 
two options: breaking up divisions or reducing the number of battalions per division.27  The 
first option would create least dislocation, both organizationally and tactically, reduce the 
number of trained commanders and staffs to be found and could also ‘afford an opportunity of 
breaking up certain divisions who do not, perhaps, quite pull their weight.’  There would, 
however, be strong political resistance to this option in view of the likely reaction of the French 
since a reduced number of divisions would affect the length of the British front line. The 
alternative option of reducing the number of battalions would mean far more widespread 
dislocation, the revision of current and familiar tactical doctrine, the reorganization of all 
supporting arms within divisions and would also not help address the shortage of trained staff 
officers.  Against these aspects was the knowledge that both France and Germany had reduced 
the number of battalions in their divisions and it was recognized that concentrations were easier 
with larger numbers of small formations than with smaller number of large ones.  It was also 
admitted that whilst there were  
sentimental objections to reducing the number of battalions and any such decrease 
would be unpopular, at any rate to start with.  Experience shows, however, that the 
feeling soon disappears and all amalgamations carried out heretofore have been a 
success.28  
                                                 
26 TNA: CAB 24/19/97 and WO 163/22 Army Council Memorandum of 10 February 1917 cited in Precis No 855 
prepared for Army Council 204th Meeting of 6 March 1917.  
27 TNA: WO 158/20 GHQ Item 139: Notes dated 11 August 1917 and G.S Note Reduction of number of divisions 
or Reduction of number of battalions in each division dated 28 November 1917. 
28 Ibid. 
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Logically, it would have been preferable to break up divisions but the decision was in the end 
to be political.  In their draft report the MPC followed the French and German examples and 
recommended reducing the number of battalions.  
 
The Army Council appears to have decided to forestall a direct order from Cabinet and on 5 
January warned GHQ that divisions in France were to be re-organized.  The order was 
subsequently confirmed by War Office letter on 10 January.29  Divisions were to be reduced in 
strength from twelve to nine battalions, plus a pioneer battalion, and a list of 145 battalions was 
sent to GHQ from which those to be reduced were to be chosen.  Care was to be taken ‘to break 
up battalions with the shortest service to their credit, and to preserve as far as possible Regular 
battalions, first line Territorial battalions, and the earlier units of the New Army’.30 
 
It took an enormous amount of hurried planning but GHQ’s plans were notified to the War 
Office by 18 January.  Rather than leave some divisions untouched it was decided to reduce all 
British divisions in France, starting on 29 January and completing by 15 February.31  On 23 
January GHQ issued Corps with details of the organizational changes required.  These were 
then amplified by AG GHQ with instructions concerning disposal of personnel of battalions 
selected for disbandment or amalgamation: they were to be posted to other battalions of their 
own Regiment or withdrawn to a general pool of reinforcements for subsequent posting.  As far 
as possible parties posted to new units were to be composed of men who had served in the same 
                                                 
29 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War diary entry of 5 January 1918.  Confirmation was subsequently received in 
War Office letter 121/Drafts/8579 dated 10 January 1918.  
30 Macready, Annals of an Active Life, p. 283. 
31 BOH 1918 Vol. 1, pp. 54 -5. 
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sub-units.32  Once all postings had been carried out as instructed any surplus personnel were to 
be withdrawn to Corps Reinforcement Camps or to newly reformed Entrenching battalions.33 
 
The 19th Division was notified that all four battalions of 56th Brigade (7th King’s Own, 7th East 
Lancashire, 7th South Lancashire and 7th North Lancashire) were to be disbanded on 4 February.  
The Brigade would then be reconstituted by the movement within the Division of 9th Cheshire 
and 8th North Staffordshire, from 58th and 57th Brigades respectively, and with the arrival of 
1/4th KSLI from 63rd Division.  Instructions for all postings of men of disbanded battalions were 
sent from the DAG 3rd Echelon’s office: for example, ten officers and 202 men from 7th East 
Lancashires were to be sent to 1st East Lancashires whilst the 9th RWF, remaining in 58th 
Brigade, received five officers and 147 men from 10th RWF, disbanded in the 3rd Division.34  
Drafts from 10th RWF, together with those from 19th RWF, were also sent to other battalions of 
the RWF and the remainder amalgamated to form the 8th Entrenching Battalion.35  The 38th 
(Welsh) Division was ordered to disband four locally raised battalions, distributing the officers 
and men amongst other battalions of the Division, but received 2nd RWF from the 33rd 
Division.36  The impact on battalions of the Marches Regiments may be seen at Appendix 7, 
which confirms that wherever possible men had been posted to battalions of their parent 
Regiments.        
 
                                                 
32 TNA: WO 95/2056 19th Division GS War Diary and WO 95/2058 19th Division A&Q War Diary, both for 
January 1918.  The A & Q War Diary contains copies of relevant letters from GHQ, Third Army and Third 
Echelon.   
33 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry for 12 February 1918. 
34 TNA: WO 95/2058 19th Division A&Q War Diary entry dated 20 February 1918.   
35  Major C. H. Dudley Ward, Regimental Records of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers Vol III 1914-1918 (London: Forster 
Groom, 1921), p. 378. 
36 Lt Col J. E. Munby, A History of the 38th (Welsh) Division (London: Rees, 1920; Uckfield: Naval & Military 
Press, 2003), pp. 31-2.  The battalions disbanded were: 15th (London Welsh) RWF, 113th Bde; 10th (1st Rhondda) 
Welsh, 114th Bde; 11th (2nd Gwent) SWB and 16th (Cardiff City) Welsh, both of 115th Inf Bde. 
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The MPC draft report had suggested that it might be possible to bring the reduced British 
divisions back up to strength by incorporating newly-arrived American battalions but by the 
end of January it had become clear that there would be no American agreement to this.  In any 
case, their numbers in France were increasing only gradually.  On 1 December 130,000 men 
were in France but this gave a false picture: on 9 January the War Cabinet was informed that 
the actual American fighting force numbered just 58,000 rifles and machine guns, the 
equivalent of four American divisions.37   
 
Haig’s timetable for re-organizing the British divisions proved wildly optimistic, as 
reorganization was not completed until 4 March.  By then 115 British battalions in France had 
been disbanded, 38 had been amalgamated to form 19 units and seven had been converted to 
Pioneers.38  It had been a period of both heartache and great organizational flux and, although 
battalions were again at or near full strength, ‘it would have been less detrimental to efficiency 
if the change could have been spread over a long period’.39 
 
Some divisions escaped.  The British divisions in Italy retained their 12-battalion structure, as 
did the Dominion divisions in France, although some re-organization of the latter was necessary 
to ensure a continued supply of drafts.  The 4th New Zealand Brigade in England had already 
received instructions that it was to be disbanded in order to provide reinforcements for the rest 
of the New Zealand Brigades. This was completed by 15 February.40  Similarly the 5th Canadian 
Division was broken up in order to provide 100 men over establishment for each Canadian 
                                                 
37 BOH1918 Vol. I, p. 35 and TNA: CAB 23/5 War Cabinet Meeting No 319 of 9 January 1918. 
38 BOH 1918 Vol. I, p. 55. 
39 Macready, Annals of an Active Life, p. 283. 
40 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entries for 15 December 1917 and 15 February 1918 and BOH 1918 
Vol I, p. 55. 
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battalion in France.  The five Australian Divisions had sufficient drafts, for the time being, to 
maintain twelve battalions in each. 
 
Re-organization of Base Depots 
Re-organization of the draft-receiving units had started in late 1917 with reduction in the 
numbers and role of the Base Depots.  The previously large numbers of reinforcements retained 
at the Base for nine days for assessment of their level of training had made for huge camps and 
in September there had been a serious disturbance at the largest of these, Étaples.  There is some 
evidence that this disturbance prompted Haig to decide to move the training of newly arrived 
Infantry reinforcements away from the Base to Corps Reinforcement Camps, but whether it was 
his decision alone is unsubstantiated.41  In December 1917, however, the number of IBDS was 
reduced to twelve, now numbered by letter A to M.  On 15 December twenty IBDs at Étaples 
were replaced by just five (E, F, G, H, J), plus a Medical Board Depot through which all hospital 
discharges were to pass.42  As the time spent at the Base was now much shorter, fewer IBDs 
were needed, but there is some evidence of continued Regimental links: reinforcements for the 
Cheshires passed through ‘C’ IBD at Rouen whilst those for Southern Command Regiments 
seem to have passed through ‘D’ IBD.43  Completion of the reorganization was dependent on 
the creation of all Corps Reinforcement Camps, which was not finished until 4 February.44  
 
The changes were formalized in the January 1918 revised edition of SS 152 Instructions for the 
Training of the British Armies in France.  In future, any further training required by Infantry 
                                                 
41 TNA: WO 256/22 Haig’s diary entry for 23? September 1917 cited in C. Messenger, Call to Arms (London: 
Cassell Military Paperbacks, 2006), p. 404. 
42 TNA: WO 95/4027 Etaples Base War Diary entry dated 15 December 1917. 
43 TNA: WO 95/4186 ‘D’ IBD War Diary. 
44 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry for 4 February 1918. 
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reinforcements would occur at Corps Reinforcement Camps or with their units.  The roles of 
the Camps were two-fold: as holding locations for trained Infantry reinforcements awaiting 
despatch to their units, and where personnel not taken into action by their units should be sent, 
and also as training camps for ‘combed-out’ men transferred to the Infantry and inefficient 
Infantrymen returned from their units.  The Reinforcement Camps were organized in Divisional 
Wings for the Corps concerned, although these were sometimes referred to as Divisional Depot 
Battalions.  The VIIth Corps Reinforcement Training Camp, for example, contained ‘Wings’ 
for 16th (Irish), 39th, 21st and 9th Divisions.  Once sufficiently trained, men could be sent 
immediately to their units so long as these were not in action and would have seven clear days 
in which to absorb the draft.45   
 
Preparation and Planning 
It had long been anticipated that the Germans would mount a large offensive early in 1918.  The 
collapse of Russia in 1917 had enabled the movement of large numbers of German divisions 
from the Eastern to the Western Front, whilst for the German High Command the build-up of 
American troops meant that any offensive must be undertaken sooner rather than later.   
 
In January the BEF had taken over part of the line from the French and now stretched from 
north to south: Fourth Army from north of Ypres to north of Armentières; First Army from 
north of Armentières to Gavrelle, six miles north-east of Arras; Third Army from Gavrelle to 
Gouzeaucourt; and Fifth Army from Gouzeaucourt to the Barisis-St Gobain railway.46  
                                                 
45 General Staff, SS 152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France (London: HMSO, January 
1918) and TNA: WO 95/521 Fifth Army GS Box containing VII Corps Reinforcement Training Camp diary for 
21 – 29 March 1918. 
46 BOH 1918 Vol. 1, p.115.  Fourth Army reverted to being called Second Army when it was taken over again by 
Plumer on his return from Italy.  
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Arrangements had been agreed in principle for co-operation between the French and British 
Armies.  By March these had been firmed up:  relief was to be asked for only in the event of 
the British being engaged in a battle on another part of their front, whilst intervention might be 
requested in the event of a serious and sustained German offensive against any part of the 
British front making it difficult for the British to find sufficient reserves to continue the fight.47 
 
It was a period of tension. In his despatches, Haig later wrote: 
Towards the middle of February 1918, it became evident that the enemy was preparing 
for a big offensive on the Western Front … By the end of February 1918 these 
preparations had become very marked opposite the front held by the Third and Fifth 
British Armies … As the 21st March approached it became certain that an attack on this 
sector was imminent.48    
 
 
21 March – 5 April: The First Battles of the Somme 1918 
The German attack opened at 4.40 am on 21 March with a terrific bombardment on the whole 
of the Fifth Army’s front, on three-quarters of that of the Third and stretching as far north as 
Armentières.  It was the first act of an offensive that would last until into April and consisted 
of six distinct phases.49  The subsequent Infantry attack followed some five hours later in thick 
mist.  Casualties rapidly mounted and it became impossible for reliable casualty returns to be 
produced until later and then they would cover a period of several days.50  The first estimated 
casualties shown in the AG GHQ War Diary cover the period up to 23 March: 1861 officers 
and 53,691 ORs.  Emergency steps to find reinforcements had been taken in theatre: all leave 
                                                 
47 BOH 1918 Vol. I, pp. 48, 101-2. 
48 E. Wyrall, The Nineteenth Division 1914-1918 (London: Edward Arnold, 1932; Uckfield: Naval & Military 
Press, 1999), p. 132. 
49 Battles of: St Quentin, 21 - 23 March; First Battle of Bapaume, 24 - 25 March; Rosières, 26 - 27 March; First 
Battle of Arras, 28 March; the Avre, 4 April; and the Ancre, 5 April 1918.  NB There was a subsequent action at 
Villers Bretonneux in late April.  
50 BOH 1918 Vol. I, p. 216. 
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had been stopped as had the sending home of officers on courses; the 3rd Echelon had been 
instructed on the policy concerning reinforcement of divisions and transfer of personnel; and 
the DGMS had been ordered to ‘comb out drastically’ the convalescent depots in order to obtain 
5,000 ‘A’ men at once and 500 more in a few days.  Finally a cipher telegram had been sent to 
the War Office explaining the situation and asking what reinforcements could be provided as 
an emergency measure.  The War Office had responded that 2,000 Infantry drafts would be sent 
daily and the number would be increased.51 
 
The need to find additional reinforcements for the BEF dominated War Cabinet’s discussions 
on 23 March.52  The CIGS, now General Sir Henry Wilson, informed the Cabinet that the 
Executive War Board in Versailles had decided that two French divisions and one British should 
be brought back from Italy.  Whether British divisions should be brought from Palestine and 
Mesopotamia was also discussed but no decisions reached; moving divisions from Salonica 
was actively ruled out since, although up to strength numerically, they were weakened by 
malaria.  Discussions then turned to resources available at home.  Major General Hutchinson, 
Director of Organization in the War Office, had identified a total of 231,000 from which drafts 
could be produced.  Not all these men were in fact available, however, since the impact of the 
calling up of 16,000 trained soldiers working on munitions plus 45,000 from agriculture 
required further study.  The remaining 170,000 men could be sent, including 88,000 currently 
on leave from the BEF, 5,000 men on commissioning courses and 50,000 boys aged over 18½ 
but under 19 who had completed their training.  The release of this last group would require a 
Cabinet decision since it had previously been pledged that boys under 19 should not be sent 
abroad except in national emergency.  It was reluctantly decided that that time had come and 
                                                 
51 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry for 23 March 1918. 
52 TNA: CAB 23/5 Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 371 of 23 March 1918. 
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that trained 18½ year olds should be sent.  The measures available, however, were short-term.  
The War Cabinet at last decided that Geddes should produce further proposals to increase the 
number of men available for military service, noting that the present military situation could 
enable previously insurmountable political difficulties to be overcome. 
 
In France, immediate and longer term arrangements continued to be made.  It was recognized 
that this might not be the only German onslaught and on 24th March instructions were given 
that divisions in First and Second Armies were to be kept up to strength.53  Men returning from 
leave and hospital, belonging to these Armies and VI and XVII Corps of Third Army were to 
proceed there but the remainder, with the exception of staff officers, were to be detained at Base 
Camps until further orders.  When a division was definitely pulled out of the line 3rd Echelon 
was to be informed and battalions brought up to 800 ORs as soon as possible, with the 6th and 
34th Divisions being placed on the priority list for reinforcements.  A War Office telegram 
advised that once men returning from leave had been sent, 10,000 reinforcements (all arms) 
would be sent daily.54 
 
On 25th March, the War Office notified GHQ that available shipping capacity limited drafts to 
12,000 a day but asked whether more could be ‘digested in France’ if that number could be 
increased.  In response, GHQ requested as many as possible be sent, at least for the next ten 
days.  Drafts were currently unable to reach units on the battle front but the War Office would 
be notified if congestion at the Bases made a pause necessary.  It appears to have taken time for 
the number of reinforcements to build up as on 27 March 3,969 arrived at Boulogne with a 
                                                 
53 Fourth Army had been retitled Second Army on the return of Plumer from Italy on 17 March and the departure 
of Rawlinson for Versailles.  
54 TNA: GHQ AG War Diary entry for 24 March 1918.  NB. The instruction that Infantry drafts, casuals or returned 
leave men should be sent to VI or XVII Corps was countermanded on 26 March. 
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further 6,280 due the following day.  On 29 March a further 4,720 arrived there and 2,098 via 
Calais.  On 30 March 7,886 were due to embark for France. Fortunately sufficient 
accommodation was available at different Bases for the retention of returning leave men and 
drafts as by now operational considerations were beginning to affect their onward movement.  
On 30 March it was noted that drafts arriving at Boulogne and Calais were not to be sent to 
Bases at Rouen or Le Havre but were to be retained at Étaples and Calais and sent from there 
when required.  On 31 March it was noted that railway traffic from the south and south-west of 
Amiens was to be kept to a minimum but that every effort was to be made to get through 
reinforcements from Rouen and Le Havre.55 
 
In the short term there may have been a disconnect between what was promised and the numbers 
actually arriving in France, but on 25 March Lord Derby informed the War Cabinet  that 
106,000 men, of whom 95,400 were Infantry, were available for immediate transfer.  Together 
with the 88,000 on leave at Home and a further 18,000 trained men who would be available as 
drafts by 20 April, a total of 212,000 men was available for France.  What was needed was 
more shipping so that 20,000 – 25,000 might be sent daily.  Having confirmed the immediate 
availability of reinforcements, the War Cabinet now turned its attention to further sources of 
manpower.  Some actions could be taken immediately and the Cabinet agreed to reduce the size 
of  Medical Boards, thus speeding up the rate of examinations and enabling Travelling Medical 
boards to deal with 90,000 examinations a week, and also to reduce the ‘calling up notice’ from 
14 to 7 days.  Macready also informed them that a new eye-test was to be introduced that should 
gain more ‘A’ men for the Army.  The perennial topic of the withdrawal of men from the 
                                                 
55 TNA: GHQ AG War Diary entries for 25, 27, 29, 30 and 31 March 1918. NB The figures for arriving 
reinforcements seem to be minus those for returning leave men.  The Official History 1918 Vol II p. 11 shows 
39,384, including leave men, being sent over between 24 – 28 March. 
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munitions industry, coal mines and dockyards was also discussed together with the stopping of 
recruiting for the Navy and even the recall of wounded men who had been discharged.  The 
main topics under consideration, however, were Geddes’ earlier proposals to raise the upper 
age limit for recruiting to 55 and to extend conscription to Ireland.  This time the War Cabinet 
decided to take advantage of the situation in France to obtain from Parliament the necessary 
powers and Geddes was now tasked to produce a short bill for its consideration.56 
 
The arrival rate of reinforcements rapidly increased and during the first week of April 73,618 
men landed in France.57  The 1st TR Brigade noted that its battalions had been ‘practically 
denuded’; on 6 April a draft of 123 boys, aged between 18½ and 18¾, with four months training 
was despatched, without the normal pre-draft leave.58  Against this, however, casualty numbers 
had continued to rise: the estimated running total reported to GHQ by 31 March was 4,477 
officers and 119,985 ORs.  By 5 April this had risen to 8,344 officers and 169,145, but as the 
Official History points out these are gross, uncorrected figures.  When figures for the 
approximate number of missing, who later returned are applied, it seems the total casualties 
were about 160,000, of whom about 22,000 were probably killed, 96,000 wounded or gassed 
and 42,000 unwounded taken prisoner.59   The Germans had also lost heavily but by the end of 
5th April had advanced some 40 miles and had come within reach of the vital railway junctions 
at Amiens. 
 
                                                 
56 TNA: CAB 23/5 Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting No 372 of 25 March 1918. 
57 BOH 1918 Vol. 2, p. 11. 
58 TNA: WO 95/5459 1st Training Reserve Brigade Diary entries 31 March and 6 April 1918. 
59 TNA: WO 95/26 for 51 March and OH p. 489-490. 
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Battalions from the Marches had played their part in resisting the onslaught, although only three 
were in Fifth Army which bore the full brunt of the German onslaught.60  On 21 March the 39th 
Division was in Reserve to the north of Péronne but was released at noon and placed at the 
disposal of VII Corps.  Its 118th Brigade, containing 1/6th Cheshire, 1st Cambridgeshire and 4/5th 
Black Watch, was ordered forward at 5pm to construct a switch line from Tincourt Wood to 
Saulcourt.  The next day the 118th and 117th Brigades occupied the new trench, and as other 
units retired through them, they became ‘the front line as far as active resistance was concerned’ 
until 7pm when they received orders to retire.61  The following morning they retired again, and 
occupied a trench on Mont St Quentin, to the north of Péronne, facing south-east.  The enemy 
attacked at about 4pm and 6th Cheshire was withdrawn only just in time to avoid being entirely 
captured: ‘there was no chance of getting any of the wounded away and a certain number of 
men must have fallen into [the enemy’s] hands’.62  By nightfall 118th Brigade had crossed the 
Somme and was in position opposite Cléry.  The following two days seem to have been 
relatively quiet but on 27 March the enemy attacked in force, and 118th Brigade was forced to 
retire, having suffered a number of casualties from machine gun fire.  Further retirements 
followed with units and men becoming scattered; late on 27th 6th Cheshire found only 3 officers 
and 35 men.  The following day composite battalions were formed of all units; the 118th Brigade 
Composite Battalion taking the place of the individual battalions.63  Further withdrawal 
followed to the area of Aubercourt before a very depleted 39th Division was relieved on 31 
March and withdrawn to south-east of Amiens.  By now its total all ranks strength was 4538.  
It had suffered 3941 casualties, although it had received 801 reinforcements.64  
                                                 
60 Fifth Army: 6th KSLI in 20th Division, 15th Cheshire in 35th Division and 1/6th Cheshire in 39th Division.   
61 E. Riddell & M.V. Clayton, The Cambridgeshires 1914 to 1919 (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1934; Uckfield: 
Naval & Military Press, 2004), p. 156 and TNA: WO 95/2590/3 War Diary of 1/6th Cheshire March 1918. 
62 TNA: WO 95/2590/3 1/6th Cheshire War Diary entry for 23 March 1918. 
63 TNA: WO 95/2590/3 1/6th Cheshire War Diary entry for 28 March 1918. 
64 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary figures for March 1918. 
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The 6th Cheshire War Diary shows a total of 332 soldier casualties for the period 21 – 30 March: 
20 dead, 139 wounded and 162 missing whilst the SDGW total deaths for the battalion up to 31 
March is 51.65  The discrepancy may be explained by the confusion of the retreat plus in many 
cases dates of death were assumed.  Analysis of available details for the SDGW individuals 
gives a cross-section of the battalion in early 1918.  It still consisted predominantly of Cheshire 
Regiment men, some 76 per cent having arrived in France as Cheshire soldiers, both Regular 
and TF, but despite its being a TF battalion, the available Service Records show that only 18 
were original TF soldiers.  Even at this late stage of the war over half of those who died (30) 
had attested in 1914 and 1915, although 8 of these were Derby men mobilized after mid-1916.  
Twelve were attested after mid-1916, five of whom were volunteers and seven conscripted.  
Experience of service in France varied with 22 having arrived before the end of 3rd Ypres.  Some 
18 men had joined the battalion 1918 (6 having been part of the draft of 100 men from 16th 
Cheshire).                
 
Other Marches battalions in Third Army were encountering much the same experiences as those 
of Fifth Army.66  The 19th Division contained 9th Cheshire, 9th RWF and 5th SWB.  By 6.30 pm 
on 23 March, the remnants of 9th RWF already numbered about 9 officers with 60 ORs.67  As 
the offensive wore on, units became totally disorganized.  At nightfall on 25 March, 56th 
Brigade was ordered to withdraw and concentrate on Hébuterne, which was carried out with 
difficulty as it was not known where units had halted for the night. ‘As many men as possible 
                                                 
65 TNA: WO 95/2590/3 Appendix 1 to 1/6th Cheshire War Diary for March 1918 and SDGW deaths for 1/6th 
Cheshire 21 – 31 March 1918. 
66 Third Army: 7th KSLI in 3rd Division, 1st KSLI in 6th Division, 9th Cheshire, 9th RWF, 1/4th KSLI and 5th SWB 
in 19th Division, 10th Cheshire, 11th Cheshire and 6th SWB in 25th Division and 1/4th RWF in 47th Division. 
67 Wyrall, The Nineteenth Division, pp. 153-5. 
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were collected and two weak battalions were formed: practically the whole of the 9th Cheshire 
Regiment was unaccounted for.’  The 58th Brigade was in the same state.  At 4pm it was thirty 
strong with four officers; 9th RWF were eight strong with one officer.  Between 21 – 26 March, 
56th and 58th Brigades had lost 970 and 1434 all ranks casualties respectively.68  Losses in 9th 
Cheshire and 9th RWF had been 369 and 460 respectively.69  Late on 26 March 19th Division 
was relieved by 4th Australian Brigade and a few days later it was moved north to the Messines 
sector.70   
 
On 1 April, amongst Haig’s 58 divisions were nine ‘used’ divisions containing 800 infantry 
each (with drafts posted, arrived or en route), seven ‘used’ divisions in the course of being made 
up, three exhausted divisions which could not be refilled at present, and fifteen exhausted 
divisions, still in or near the line.  Fresh divisions were sent south to reinforce the Third and 
Fifth Armies whilst some of the most battered divisions were now sent north to Second Army, 
to be placed in a ‘quiet’ area.71   
 
Reinforcements were gradually arriving.  Between 3-8 April, 9th Cheshire received 477 ORs 
and by 10 April, when the battalion moved to Nieppe, numbered 12 officers plus 752 men: 63 
per cent having arrived during the previous week.  The 9th RWF had received some 400 men, 
but it was noted that very few had any battle experience.72  Some reinforcements were returning 
wounded: Major Clayton of 1st Cambridgeshire rejoined the 39th Division with ‘a large draft, 
                                                 
68 Ibid, pp. 166-7 and 173. 
69 A. Crookenden, The Cheshire Regiment in the Great War (Chester: Evans, nd; Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 
2005), p. 131 and C.H. Dudley Ward, Royal Welsh Fusiliers Vol III 1914-1918 (London: Forster Groom, 1921; 
Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 2005), p. 406. 
70 BOH 1918 Vol. 1, p. 524 and TNA: WO 95/2079/1 9th Cheshire War Diary for 29 March 1918.  
71 BOH 1918 Vol 2, pp. 113, 13. 
72 TNA: WO 95/2079 9th Cheshire War Diary April 1918 and Dudley Ward, Records of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 
p. 410. 
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many still in bandages, picked up on the railway line at Calais’.73  Reinforcements were also 
rapidly arriving for the 25th Division, now in the Ploegsteert sector, and its battalions were 
practically up to strength.  Its Divisional History notes that many reinforcements were aged 19 
and ‘most excellent’ material but that the absence of older men suitable for promotion to NCO 
rank was, in some units, a serious disadvantage.  Like the other divisions, the 25th now needed 
several weeks of hard training to enable officers to get to know their men; to absorb 
reinforcements and to become a useful fighting force again.  With this in mind it had been 
placed with other divisions in the same state ‘in what was supposed would be a quiet sector for 
at least an appreciable time’.74     
 
The Military Service Act (No 2), 1918  
The basic problem remained, however: more manpower would be needed.  As requested by the 
War Cabinet on 25 March, Geddes had produced proposals for a further MSA.  They were far-
reaching, perhaps in anticipation of their being toned down: the age limit for military service 
should be lowered to 17 and raised to 55; compulsion should be extended to Ireland; and the 
tribunal system should be abolished and replaced by Military Service Advisory Committees to 
consider priorities for conscription.75  After discussions during several Cabinet meetings it was 
agreed that a lower age of 17 would be impracticable and that the furthest they could go towards 
introducing conscription in Ireland would be to place a provision in the Bill giving the 
Government the power to extend it at a future date by Order in Council.76  The Bill did not have 
an easy ride but was passed by Parliament on 18 April.  In its final form the Act raised the upper 
                                                 
73 Riddell & Clayton, The Cambridgeshires 1914 to 1919, p. 156. 
74 M. Kincaid-Smith, The 25th Division in France and Flanders, (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 2001), pp. 
193-4.  
75 TNA: CAB 24/46/37 NSR 32 dated 26 March 1918. 
76 TNA: CAB 23/5/68 Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 376 of 28 March, 377 of 29 March, 383 of 5 April and 
384 of 6 April 1918.  
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age limit for conscription to 50, which could be extended to 55 by Order in Council if necessary 
in the future, it made possible the extension of conscription to Ireland by Order in Council, 
enabled closer regulation of Appeals Tribunals and granted power by proclamation to withdraw 
certificates of exemption in case of national emergency.77   
 
The powers in MSA (No 1) of 1918, enabling the withdrawal of exemption certificates granted 
on occupational grounds, had so far remained unused but under the new Act this could be done 
by Proclamation.  The first ones were now issued on 20 April withdrawing exemption from 
men under 23 who were fit for general service.  Recruiting for the Army began to increase from 
30,197 in March, to 78,298 in April, 84,019 in May and peaking in June at 88,950.78  It could 
not continue at that rate without serious damage to the nation’s economy.  In the Army 
Council’s eyes, the new legislation was too little too late since the earliest the April recruits 
would be available after the minimum of training would be September.  Moreover, just under a 
third of the recruits were under 19 and therefore unavailable until even later.   
 
9 – 29 April: Battle of the Lys 
The next German offensive, Operation Georgette, was aimed at strategic targets just behind the 
British lines in Flanders: Hazebrouck with its rail network linking the British lines to the 
Channel ports and the high ground around Mont Kemmel over-looking Ypres.  The plan was 
to attack south of the River Lys, heading towards Hazebrouck, with a second attack on the 
following day between the Lys and Ypres. If successful the British occupation of the Ypres 
Salient would become untenable.   
 
                                                 
77 Public General Acts, 8&9 Geo 5 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1918), pp. 5-12. 
78 Statistics of the Military Effort, pp. 371-2. 
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The area to be attacked was roughly bisected by the River Lys with the British First Army 
holding the southern part of the line and Plumer’s Second Army north of the river.  It had been 
a relatively quiet area since 1915 and five of the six divisions facing the attack had been sent 
there to recuperate after the March offensive.  Second Army’s IX Corps occupied the line from 
just north of Armentières, including the Messines Ridge, to a mile north of Ypres.  From right 
to left its divisions were the 25th, 19th and 9th, all of which were still refitting.  The last thing 
they needed after their losses on the Somme the previous month was another German offensive.   
 
The Germans attacked on 9 April and there was to be fierce fighting over the next three weeks 
with a succession of battles.79  The British line was relentlessly pushed back until the German 
advance was halted within sight of Ypres.  They had failed to take Hazebrouck and nor had 
they ousted the British from Ypres.  In repelling them the British lost 82,040 casualties.   
 
The Marches battalions of 19th and 25th Divisions that had been involved in the March offensive 
had again been mauled.  Amongst the Reserves hurried into line had also been 2nd SWB of 29th 
Division and 1st Cheshire of the 5th Division, newly returned from Italy.  The experiences of 
March were repeated with battalions moved between brigades and companies becoming 
separated.  As early as 10 April, 9th Cheshire had in the space of a few hours been transferred 
from 19th to 34th and then to 25th Division, being joined in the latter division by 4th KSLI.80  
Further north near Wytschaete, the 9th RWF, with 58th Brigade, had been placed under 
command of 9th Division on its left.  By the evening HQ 9th RWF had to send out patrols to 
                                                 
79 Battles of the Lys: Estaires 9 – 11 April (XI and XV Corps, First Army), Messines 10/11 April (IX Corps, 
Second Army), Hazebrouck 12 – 15 April (First Army), Bailleul 13 – 15 April (IX Corps), Kemmel 17 – 19 and 
25/26 April and Scherpenberg 29 April 1918.  
80 Wyrall, The Nineteenth Division 1914 – 1918, p. 177; Crookenden, The Cheshire Regiment in the Great War, 
p. 136. 
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discover where its companies were.  Two were found but the front and support line companies, 
A and D, had lost heavily and there were only vague rumours of small parties holding out.81   
By 12 April IX Corps’ line, extending from Nieppe, across the forward slopes of the Neuve 
Eglise rise, to the slopes of the Wulverghem spur and almost to Wytschaete, was held by a 
mixture of brigades and units of five different divisions.82  Even the Pioneer battalions of 19th 
and 25th Divisions, 5th and 6th SWB, had been pressed into use to defend the line.  What was 
effectively crisis management continued as the line continued to fall back.  Finally, overnight 
on 18 April 19th Division was relieved by the 28th French Division, more slowly than usual 
owing to ‘difficulties of interpretation’.83  ‘Very tired and much reduced in numbers,’ the troops 
rested during 19 – 20 April and then moved to the Proven area for a further rest and refit.  On 
20 April, 53 officers and 2626 ORs arrived from the 19th Divisional Wing of the IX Corps 
Reinforcement Camp for distribution to units; 9th Cheshire received 156 reinforcements over 
the next couple of days.84   
 
The 19th Division’s total casualties between 9 – 30 April were 4,565.85  Those for 25th Division 
were 7,584; between 9 April – 4 May its three Marches battalions lost: 
ORs Killed Wounded Missing Total 
10th Cheshire 32 295 336 663 
11th Cheshire 32 305 532 869 
6th SWB 32 293 82 407 
     
Although replacements had been found in a hurry after the March offensives, their quality had 
been variable: 
                                                 
81 Dudley Ward, Royal Welsh Fusiliers Vol III 1914-1918, p. 412. 
82 BOH 1918 Vol. 2, p. 272. 
83 TNA: WO 95/2079-1 9th Cheshire War Diary entry 18/19 April 1918. 
84 TNA: WO 95/2058 19th Division A&Q War Diary entry 20 April and WO 95/2079 9th Cheshire War Diary 
entries22 and 24 April. 
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It had been abundantly proved during the recent battle that the units with their abnormal 
proportion of boys under 20 years of age and older men over 35 were not up to the 
previous standard.  The scarcity of men of the best fighting ages between 21 and 28 was 
most noticeable in every unit.  The older men, largely men combed out from 
administrative employment and past the best fighting age, proved the fallacy of the 
theory that it is possible to make a fighting soldier of the man of 35 equal to the 
continental soldier of the same age who has performed military service in his youth.86 
 
Analysis of the 80 men of 9th Cheshire killed between 10 - 29 April, shows that some 33, or 41 
per cent, had arrived between late March and 8 April and that just over 50 per cent had joined 
the battalion during 1918.87  It might have been expected by this stage that most would be 
conscripts but of those joining between late March and early April, some 21 were volunteers 
and 12 were conscripted.88 Looking at the 80 men overall: 57 per cent (46, including 7 ‘Derby-
men’) were volunteers, 20 were Conscripts and 4 unknown.  Over a quarter had seen previous 
Cheshire Regiment service in various battalions and at least eight had come to France with the 
original battalion in 1915.  The age profile may be charted: 
Age Numbers Comments 
18 4 Arrived early April; posted from TRBs to 9th Cheshire 
19 32 All joined 9th Cheshire in 1918 
20 2  
21 – 28 22 Optimum fighting ages 
29 2  
30s 10  
40s 2  
 
 
Despite the views of the 25th Division’s historian, replacements in their 20s were not necessarily 
the best specimens.  Several who joined 9th Cheshire were returning from UK having been 
                                                 
86 Kincaid-Smith, The 25th Division in France and Flanders, pp. 243, 251-2. 
87 SDGW records for soldiers of 9th Cheshire 10-29 April 1918.   Analysis of the Service Records of these men is 
possible because unusually 75 per cent has survived. NB: Some 54 soldiers are shown as having died between 10-
18 April but a longer period has been analysed to give greater evidence of the composition of the battalion.  The 
battalion remained close to the line and was subjected to heavy shelling on 26th, 27th and 29th April.  Drafts were 
received: 22 April: 148 and 24 April: 8. 
88 The Record of Service/Enrolment Forms have been used to analyse the types of engagement.  Army Form B 
2513 was used to attest conscripts. 
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evacuated for treatment for wounds and ailments such as trench feet and diarrhoea; at least three 
had been ‘combed out’ from their recuperation at the Western Command Depot in late March.  
Others, for example former members of the ASC and AVC, were the products of ‘combing out’ 
in 1917 and had needed re-training as Infantrymen.  The ‘boys’ had actually received longer 
training than the adults: all had received six months and many of the 19 year olds nearer a year.  
Regardless of ages and previous training, the major difficulty for the battalion had been the lack 
of time to absorb the newcomers.  Finally, looking at the available enlistment details, some 23 
had enlisted in Cheshire and a further 21 in Wales.  Together with 20 from Area 3, this makes 
a total of 64 or 80 per cent of those killed had enlisted in Western Command Area.  Even 
considering those who joined in late March/early April, 30 out of 33 had enlisted in Western 
Command.  It would seem therefore that, despite the rush to send out reinforcements after the 
March Offensive, emphasis was still being placed on sending reinforcements from the 
battalion’s parent Command.   
 
Cadreization of Divisions and New Arrivals 
The 39th Division, having lost 4,588 casualties between 21 March and 5 April, had moved back 
to Le Tréport for refitting and training.  On 10 April orders were received to organize a strong 
Composite Brigade of four battalions and move hurriedly to Hill 60, near Ypres.  No 4 Battalion, 
containing men of 1/1st Cambridgeshire, 4/5th Black Watch and 1/6th Cheshire, was allotted 
defences in and around Voormezeele.  With 39th Division’s spare transport at Watten, Major 
Clayton of the Cambridgeshires was endeavouring: 
to teach musketry and fire tactics to transport-drivers and cooks. This was a hair-raising 
job; ‘England’s last hope’, as the force was irreverently called, had unorthodox views 
regarding the safety of firearms, and it was just as well they did not go into action!89 
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The manning situation continued to worsen and on 20 April GHQ decided to reduce the 14th, 
16th, 30th, 34th, 39th, 40th, and 66th Divisions to cadres.  This usually meant reducing infantry 
battalions to 10 officers and 45 ORs, with the surplus being sent to the Base Depots for re-
posting.  In this instance, battalion training staffs from 16th, 30th, 39th and 66th Divisions were 
to be used to train Americans when they arrived, but the depleted battalions were left in place 
and continued to receive reinforcements.90  The 1/6th Cheshire sent 3 officers and 14 men ‘to 
join the 77th Division American Army as specialist instructors’ but the battalion continued to 
exist, receiving 2 officers and 85 men from the Base and 40 men from hospital.  It was now 
effectively in three parts, with further men still with the 39th Division’s Composite units.91    
 
Reinforcements began arriving from other theatres, with ‘divisions and brigades turning up of 
whose existence the troops in France had never before heard’.92  The 52nd and 74th Divisions 
began to arrive from Egypt and more shipping was made available for the transportation of the 
American Armies.  Slowly numbers began to improve and at the end of April, AG GHQ 
reported on an improvement in Infantry and Cavalry strengths: 
     Officers Men 
Strength beginning of April              21652   482817 
Battle casualties                         4112   108286 
Reinforcements              6490   179668 
Strength at end of month       23550   53833493    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry for 20 April 1918 and BOH 1918 Vol. 3, p. 5. 
91 C. Smith, War History of the 6th Battalion, The Cheshire Regiment (TF) (Chester: 6th Cheshire, 1932), p. 3.  
92 Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal, p. 337.  
93 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entries 22, 28 and 6 May 1918.  
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May – July 1918 
On 6 May AG GHQ reported that the total casualties between 21 March and 30 April had been 
9,704 officers and 230,089 men.94  Inevitably, the quest was now on to apportion blame and 
both the Government and the military authorities were under attack. 
 
The Maurice Debate 
In introducing the proposed MSA 2 to Parliament on 9 April, Lloyd George had made two 
inaccurate statements, namely that the Army in France had been stronger on 1 January 1918 
than on 1 January 1917, and that there were only three ‘white’ (ie British) divisions in Palestine 
and Egypt.  The figures were queried in some newspapers and on 18 April a question was raised 
in Parliament as to whether the numbers given Lloyd George for January 1918 included labour 
units and non-combatants.  It is clear from the response given that not only was there a 
misunderstanding over the composition of the figures but also that the War Office had provided 
incorrect figures for France and Flanders, which included 86,000 based in Italy.95  A subsequent 
Parliamentary statement by Bonar Law on 23 April also suggested that the extension of the 
British line in January 1918 had been an arrangement made solely by the British and French 
military authorities.  If correct, the implications of these statements were that on 21 March the 
British had had more fighting troops than the Germans on the Western Front and had not been 
weakened by any action of the Government. 
 
Matters came to a head on 7 May with the publication in The Times and other newspapers of 
letters by Major-General Frederick Maurice, the former War Office Director of Military 
Operations.  It was a brave move, which put him in breach of military discipline and cost him 
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his career.  He charged that the Government had deliberately misled the House of Commons 
over the decision to extend the front, the strength of the Army in France on 1 January 1918 and 
the number of British Infantry divisions in Egypt and Palestine and wanted some sort of public 
inquiry into his allegations.   
 
In fact Maurice’s allegations were correct as the statements made to Parliament had been 
inaccurate: the extension of the line had been decided by the Supreme War Council, at the time 
of Lloyd George’s speech there were six British divisions in Egypt and labour and non-
combatant figures had incorrectly been included in the figures for the Army in France.  The 
latter error might have been a genuine mistake, albeit never admitted by Lloyd George, 
particularly as the War Office continued to provide conflicting and inaccurate figures.96  
Maurice was not to get a public inquiry, however.  Instead the issue was raised in Parliament 
and turned by the Government into what was effectively a vote of confidence in the country’s 
war leadership.  Lloyd George made a powerful speech, if based on somewhat doubtful 
material, refuting all Maurice’s charges.97 The Government did not fall but further mistrust had 
been sown between it and the military authorities. 
 
Reinforcements for France 
In early May the War Office warned GHQ that the maximum number of British Infantry 
reinforcements that could be expected from England by the end of August was 93,000.98  In 
addition, battalions and divisions were being brought back from the Middle East but there was 
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a long lead time between notification of their departure and their actual arrival.  The 74th 
Division left Egypt in April and completed disembarkation on 11 May.  Word also came that 
some 23 Infantry battalions were being released from Egypt but would not arrive in France until 
June.99  Other sources were tapped: seven former TF battalions, including 23rd Cheshire, arrived 
from UK at the end of May to become Garrison Guard battalions.  They were not the fittest of 
men but medical categories were beginning to be blurred.100   
 
Changes to the Reception of Reinforcements 
It was decided in late May to abolish Corps Reinforcement Camps, perhaps because too many 
of them had been caught up in the fighting of March and April and had proved unable to send 
reinforcements forward.  Instead, two Reinforcement Training Camps were to be established 
near the Bases, for ‘combed out’ men and those requiring training, and Reception Camps were 
to be established for each Army, Corps and Division.  By mid-June the new organization was 
in place.  Army Reception Camps had been formed: Second Army’s at Watten, First and Fifth 
Army sharing a camp at Auvin, Third Army’s at Doullens and Fourth Army’s at Longpré.  
Corps Reception Camps had been formed for all Corps except the IXth and Division Reception 
Camps for all divisions except those previously cadreized.  No 1 Reinforcement Training Camp 
had been completed at Audresselles and orders issued for No 2 Camp to be prepared at Ste 
Marguerite.101  The purpose behind the changes would appear to have been the requirement to 
have reinforcements as close behind divisions as possible. 
 
 
                                                 
99 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entries for 9 and 11 May and 30 June 1918. 
100 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry for 30 May 1918.  The seven arrivals were: 25th Liverpool; 15th 
Essex; 2/6th DLI; 11th Somerset LI; 11th R Scots Fusiliers; 36th Northumberland Fusiliers; and 23rd Cheshire. 
101 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entries for 25 May, 15 and 21 June 1918. 
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Re-organization and Rebuilding  
The divisions that had been reduced to cadre continued to limp along.  In early May the plan 
was for 30th and 34th Divisions to be reconstituted as first-line divisions, with battalions arriving 
from Egypt and Palestine and for 40th and 59th Divisions to be refilled with ‘B’ men as garrison 
divisions.  The 14th and 16th Divisions were to be sent to England in mid-June to be reconstituted 
with Infantry battalions of ‘B1’ personnel and then return to France. 102  
 
The 39th Division remained as a cadre for training American troops but its battalions were 
beginning to be dispersed.  Both 1/6th Cheshire and 1/1st Cambridgeshire were sent to join 
divisions with largely the same Home Command affiliations.  On 25 May 1/6th Cheshire moved 
south to the 25th Division, where it joined 10th and 11th Cheshire.  In mid-May 1st 
Cambridgeshire had joined 12th (Eastern) Division, absorbing 11 officers and 408 men from 7th 
Suffolk thus making it effectively an amalgamation of three battalions since the 7th Suffolk had 
already absorbed the 8th Suffolk in February.  It had also received drafts and was now up to 
strength again with experienced NCOs and men, mainly ‘slightly wounded men returned to 
duty after the Spring battles’.103  Training was now the Cambridgeshires’ main activity in order 
to weld the battalion into ‘an effective fighting weapon and give it the essential qualities of self-
confidence and esprit de corps’.104   
 
There was a pause in German attacks during the first three weeks of May but the line still had 
to be held.  All along it were Divisions in various states of rebuilding but there were still some 
that had seen very little action so far.  During early May 38th (Welsh) Division held the line in 
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the now quiet area of the Somme.  They were withdrawn for a fortnight’s rest on 20 May when 
‘considerable drafts’ were received and the time was spent largely on musketry training, 
culminating in a rifle meeting held on the day before the Division went back into the line.  
During June all three battalions of 318th American Infantry Regiment were attached to the 
Division for instruction but life for the Welsh remained relatively quiet.105 
 
Other divisions were not to be so lucky.  It had been agreed with the French in April that four, 
possibly five, ‘tired’ divisions should be sent to a quiet French sector, the Chemin des Dames, 
to recuperate and refit whilst releasing French divisions for a General Reserve.  Four divisions, 
8th, 21st, 25th and 50th would be sent with IX Corps to French Sixth Army on the Aisne front, 
west of Reims, and the 19th Division would join VIII Corps with the French Fourth Army near 
Chalons sur Marne.106  HQ IX Corps had arrived on 26 April and its divisions had followed 
over the next couple of weeks.  The 19th Division arrived later, on 18-19 May; on arrival 9th 
Cheshire found their new location at La Chaussée very comfortable with ‘exceedingly good’ 
billets.  The surrounding countryside ‘was very fine and the canal offered good facilities for 
bathing, which was much enjoyed by all during the hot weather that followed’.107  It was a 
peaceful existence for the battalions of these divisions, which between the 19th and 25th 
Divisions included eight from the Marches Regiments.   
 
27 May – 6 June: Battle of the Aisne 
On 26 May warning was received of a German plan to attack the Chemin des Dames either the 
next day or the day after, and the IX Corps divisions were moved into the front line by the 
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French Sixth Army Commander, General Duchêne.  On 27 May the German opening heavy 
bombardment on front and support lines, headquarters and other vulnerable points, was 
‘generally agreed to have been the heaviest, most terrible and most destructive of the war’.108  
The assault that followed it up was swift and brutal.  By the end of the day the Germans had 
crossed the Rivers Aisne and Vesle, had driven a salient 25 miles wide at the base and nearly 
12 miles deep into the Allied line.109  The British divisions in the line had been virtually 
destroyed for a third time:  
in their exhausted, untrained and unwelded state, both out-numbered, ungunned and 
practically unprovided with aeroplanes [they] were totally unable to withstand the shock 
of the German assaults and successfully defend the sector of the line assigned to them 
along the Aisne.110 
 
 
Over the next four days the Allies gradually fell back before the onslaught and it became a 
similar tale as the previous German offensives with changes of command within divisions and 
composite units being formed.  On 29 May the much-depleted divisions of IX Corps were joined 
by 19th Division from VIII Corps and the following day about 500 all ranks in small parties 
from 8th, 25th and 50th Divisions were temporarily absorbed by the 19th Division battalions.  
During further heavy fighting during the day practically the whole of 9th RWF and 9th Welsh 
became surrounded, and were killed or captured, and the following morning the remnants were 
organized into a composite company and placed under command of 9th Cheshire.111  On 1 June 
the remains of 74th Brigade of 25th Division was withdrawn to reorganize; it would now be 
composed of two composite battalions of 25th Division and two of 8th Division.112  The fighting 
finally began to die down and 25th Division noted no further enemy attacks between 2 – 5 June 
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264 
 
apart from heavy shellfire.  There was a further flurry of activity on 6 June when the enemy 
launched a big attack against the Montagne de Bligny.  The 58th Composite battalion, formed 
of remnants of 2nd Wiltshire, 9th RWF and 9th Welsh, left their trenches and fought off the enemy 
with bayonets.  A further attack was made mid-morning against which a 9th Cheshire counter-
attack failed but 1/4th KSLI was brought up from reserve and staged a further counter-attack, 
going forward ‘with great dash, the remnants of 9th Cheshire being carried forward (for the 
second time) by the magnificent dash and spirit of their comrades’.  The enemy was taken by 
surprise and by 12.15 the Montagne de Bligny was again in British hands.  It was not without 
cost, however.  The 19th Division OR casualty figures for 1 – 8 June show totals of 25 killed, 
298 wounded and 378 missing with a note that the majority had occurred on 6 June.113   Overall, 
the IX Corps casualties between 27 May and 19 June were 1,298 officers and 27,405 ORs.114   
 
Further Reorganization and Re-building  
The process of rebuilding continued.  Sir Henry Wilson, who had replaced Robertson as CIGS 
in February 1918, had promised a further 70,000 shortly but admitted that almost all would be 
‘B’ men, obtained by reducing the number of Home Service Divisions in France to four.  GHQ’s 
plan for rebuilding both the cadreized divisions and those that had been mauled on the Aisne 
was outlined by Haig in a letter to Foch on 10 June, which clearly shows the shortage of 
completely fit men.115  In outline, the 8th, 21st and 19th Divisions were to be withdrawn and 
refilled with ‘A’ men; battalions from Palestine and Salonika would be used to reconstitute the 
30th, 34th and either the 25th or 50th Divisions; ‘B’ men already in France would reconstitute the 
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40th and 59th Divisions whilst the cadres of 14th and 16th Divisions, together with that of either 
the 25th or 50th, would be sent to England to be refilled with ‘B’ men before returning to France.  
The 39th and 66th Divisions would remain as training cadres for the five American Divisions in 
the British zone.   
 
The 25th Division had learned on 9 June that it was to be broken up and its battalions used as 
reinforcements for other units.  Wherever possible the policy of retaining Regular, TF and the 
earlier Service battalions continued.  On 8 July 1/6th Cheshire moved to 30th Division where it 
was joined by the 25th Division’s Pioneer battalion, 6th SWB.  Both 10th and 11th Cheshire had 
lost heavily on the Aisne and were now effectively disbanded.  Men from the 10th were absorbed 
by 9th Cheshire of 19th Division, whilst 11th Cheshire, which had lost over half its number in 
casualties on the Aisne, sent 16 officers and 492 men to be absorbed by 1/6th Cheshire.  The 
latter battalion was highly relieved as it had feared that it might be the other way round!116  The 
25th Divisional cadre left for England where it was refilled with nine battalions from British 
divisions from the Italian front.     
 
After a period of uncertainty as to its future, in mid-June 40th Division learned that it was to 
become a ‘semi-mobile’ division of ‘garrison’ battalions.117  Some of these had been formed 
from ‘B1’ men collected from various labour companies which were now given regimental 
titles: 8th Garrison Battalion, for example, became 13th (Garrison) East Lancashire.  Others were 
‘Garrison Guard’ battalions formed from TF Home Service battalions that had arrived in France 
during May, one of which was 23rd Cheshire.  The Brigade Commander of 119th Brigade, Frank 
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Crozier, was dismayed to see the quality of the men arriving for his Brigade and instructed the 
Regimental Medical Officers of his new battalions to comb out any ‘old fellows whom they 
consider beyond hope of physical redemption’.  The process was repeated with fresh drafts and 
eventually Crozier had three battalions and a trench mortar battery.118  Intensive training was 
needed to get the men fit, together with musketry training as many of the men had done no 
military training for a very long time and some had never fired a rifle.  Almost equally as 
important was the need to develop self-confidence and esprit de corps.   The title ‘Garrison’ 
was quietly dropped from the battalions during July. 
 
The remains of the 19th Division were relieved on 19 June by the 8th Italian Division and 
withdrawn for rest and refit.  It still contained many men from other divisions who had been 
temporarily attached to it and these were now sorted and returned.  The 3rd Worcestershire was 
transferred from 25th Division and reinforcements arrived from the 19th Divisional Wing.  On 
30 June the Division began moving back to the British zone where it was to be held in GHQ 
Reserve.119  It would spend July resting and training the new drafts before moving back into the 
line at Locon and Hinges in early August.  It would be in and out of the line from then on but 
would not take part in a major operation until the Battle of the Selle in mid-October.120  
 
Sickness 
There must have been times when the hard-pressed staff of ‘A’ Branch in GHQ felt the odds 
had been stacked against them.  On 30 June it was discovered that men of the various battalions 
that had arrived from Salonika and Palestine had malaria and would need medical treatment 
                                                 
118 F. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land  (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930), p. 215.  
119 TNA: WO 95/2038 19th Division A & Q War Diary for June 1918 and TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary 
entry for 30 June 1918. 
120 Wyrall, The Nineteenth Division 1914-1918, pp. 210-11. 
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and two months isolation before being posted to divisions.  The battalions, including 4th and 7th 
Cheshire and 1st Herefordshire, would be used to reconstitute the 30th and 34th Divisions when 
fit but in the meantime were to be sent to a separate camp in Serqueux where they would be 
administered by the now cadreized 50th Division.  Perhaps more in hope than expectation, GHQ 
suggested to the War Office that 9,000 reinforcements from England should be earmarked for 
malarial battalions but there is no indication of their response.121   
 
During May and June there had been outbreaks of a mild but highly infectious type of influenza 
amongst units of First Army.  Patients usually returned to duty after a week or ten days but the 
numbers affected were such that 3,000 beds made available at Étaples for these cases on 21 
June were filled within three days.  It was yet another factor to be taken into account in the use 
of divisions: on 20 June an attack by 29th Division against La Becque had to be postponed.122  
 
Manpower Outlook for the Rest of the Year 
In mid-July Geddes submitted a paper to the War Cabinet seeking decisions on recruiting 
priorities for the rest of the year.  Over 450,000 men had been raised for the Armed Forces since 
1 January 1918 but the Admiralty was now owed 37,500 to meet its original demand, the Army 
Council had requested 551,000 recruits for July-August with more demands anticipated later in 
the year and the Air Ministry wanted 196,000 men for the period 1 July – 31 May 1919.  These 
demands could not be met in full since in Geddes’ view the total recruitment for 1918 could not 
                                                 
121 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entries for 30 June and 16 July 1918. 
122 Major-General Sir W.G. Macpherson, Medical Services General History Vol III (Uckfield: Naval & Military 
Press, 2009), pp. 258-9. 
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much exceed 700,000 men ‘without shattering industry and severely crippling our whole war 
effort.123   
 
Manpower was discussed by the War Cabinet on 19 July.124  As ever, the Prime Minister having 
taken advice from anyone not in the British military, an aside was made as to whether  the Army 
was making the best use of its manpower in France but the main issue was manpower in the 
nation as a whole.  The strain on industry was proving too great and output was being affected.  
Geddes commented that the physical standard of the men left was very low and that, apart from 
boys coming of age, only older men were available who were ‘difficult to get and not worth 
much’.  The Cabinet failed to adopt any formal resolution.  Instead it would be left to Geddes’ 
discretion as to how to allocate the man-power at his disposal.   
 
August – November 1918 
Recruits obtained from August onwards would be unavailable for drafting until 1919.  This 
final section therefore ignores further political aspects and concentrates on the Western Front 
during the last months of the war.  The virtual destruction of large parts of the Armies in France 
and their subsequent rebuilding with drafts from various sources has been examined in the 
earlier sections.  The effect of this on the composition of battalions from the Marches will now 
be considered rather than dwelling in detail on the battles of the Hundred Days. 
 
Drafts for the rest of 1918 would have to be made up from what was available.  Requirements 
for men of below Category ‘A’ would be met from the Home Army whilst ‘A’ men continued 
                                                 
123 TNA: CAB 24/58 War Cabinet Paper GT 5127 Memorandum by the Minister of National Service on the 
Manpower Situation Second Half of 1918 dated 16 July 1918. 
124 TNA: CAB 23/7 Minutes of the War Cabinet Meeting WC 449 of 19 July 1918.  
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to be those ‘combed out’ or youngsters coming into the age bracket.  The tap of under-19 year 
olds was turned off in August, however, with a War Cabinet decision that the national 
emergency had now passed and no more were to be sent on active service overseas.125  There 
had been mixed views on the usefulness of 18 year olds in units.  Most ‘were most excellent 
material’, having received longer training at home than adult recruits, but a proportion were 
insufficiently developed and had to be held back at the Base.       
 
Owing to age and physique some of these immature boys were quite incapable of 
carrying the weight and doing the work required of an infantry soldier in the line: their 
presence in the ranks rendered them a danger to their units.  To use them at the time 
was only a waste of those who might later on, with proper training and physical 
development, have become valuable reinforcements for the Army.126 
 
Only 50,000 ‘boys’ had been available to be sent in the initial surge at the end of March but 
more had followed and in August the perception in Third Army was that at least 50 per cent of 
the infantry in its thirteen divisions were ‘boys’.127  The implication is that these were 18 year 
olds but they could equally have been newly-called up 19 year olds.   
   
August – September 1918 
No Marches units took part in the Battle of Amiens in early August but many would be involved 
soon after, both on the Somme and in Flanders.  Those divisions, such as 19th Division, who 
had been hardest hit during successive German offensives remained for now in the north but 
many others were further south.  The largest concentration of Marches battalions was now in 
                                                 
125 TNA: CAB 23/7 Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting WC 455 of 7 August 1918 and WO 95/26 AG GHQ War 
Diary entry for 16 August 1918. 
126 Kincaid-Smith, The 25th Division in France and Flanders, pp. 193-4   and TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War 
Diary for September 1918: During September two ‘YS’ battalions were formed for ‘immatures’, designated No 1 
and No 2 YS Battalions.  
127 BOH 1918 Vol 4, p. 181. 
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the 38th (Welsh) Division which had been largely uninvolved in the offensives of earlier in the 
year.  It had been on the Somme since April and would now play a full part in the advance from 
the Ancre to beyond the Sambre.   
 
The 2nd RWF had joined 38th (Welsh) Division in the February re-organizations.  There seems 
to have been a certain amount of ambivalence about the move which meant leaving 19th 
Brigade, described by Dunn as the ‘step-child’ in every Division to which it had been attached 
or belonged, and joining a division which had ‘been in GHQ’s bad books since the Mametz 
muddle’.128  By August the battalion was fully part of the Division and was in action over the 
period 21 August – 3 September, during the Battles of Albert and then Bapaume.  Examination 
of the composition of 2nd RWF is difficult as very few Service Records are available for the 87 
men who died over this period but rough analysis of their Service numbers provides at least an 
outline picture.129  Leaving aside the eleven men with TF Service numbers, some 55 per cent 
of the rest had pre-1917 RWF numbers.  A further 26 per cent had arrived during 1917, some 
of the later ones probably as a draft of 169 which arrived with 2nd RWF on 5 November 1917 
and a further 18 per cent had arrived during 1918.130  The bulk of those killed had thus been 
RWF for some time.  Over a third, 39 per cent, had enlisted in Wales, although only 16 per cent 
in the Regimental area, but around eighty-five per cent continued to have been enlisted in 
Western Command.  This shows a very high percentage still being drawn from the parent 
Command in 1918.131     
 
                                                 
128 J.C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew (London: King, 1937; Jane’s 1987), p. 440. 
129 I am grateful to ‘hywyn’ of the Great War Forum for advice on RWF Service Numbers. 
130 TNA: WO 95/2423 2nd RWF War Diary for 5 November 1917.  
131 Riddell & Clayton, The Cambridgeshires 1914 – 1919, p. 194.   In August the 1/1st Cambridgeshire which had 
moved from the 39th Division to 12th Division, received a ‘large draft of men, mainly Cambridgeshires and Suffolks 
– a good useful lot, but many had spent too long under Base Depot conditions, and were not looking as hard and 
bronzed as the remainder of the Battalion’. 
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Comparison of the ages of the 2nd RWF fatalities with those of two other Third Army battalions 
in action in the same area, 1st Cheshire and 7th KSLI, enables examination of the effects of their 
involvement in the earlier German offensives, including the proportion of ‘boys’ they 
contained.132  1st Cheshire had returned from Italy with Fifth Division in April, and had taken 
part in the Battle of the Lys.  Since then it had remained in the area of the Forêt de Nieppe 
where further attacks were constantly expected but none materialised.  In mid-August it had 
moved south, arriving in Bayencourt on 19 August ready for its attack in the area of Bucquoy; 
by 3 September it had reached Beugny.  In March, 7th KSLI of 3rd Division had been driven 
back in the Arras area during the Spring offensive after which it had then been moved north 
only to be caught up in the Battle of the Lys.  On 19 August it arrived at Monchy ready to attack 
near Courcelles; by 3 September it was near Lagnicourt.    
 
Casualties were heavy in all three battalions, with a total of 290 being killed between them.  
Battalion 2nd RWF 
(38th  Div) 
%  1st Cheshire 
(5th Div) 
% 7th  KSLI 
(3rd Div) 
% 
Total deaths 21 Aug – 3 Sep 18 87  110  93  
Known ages 74  100  84  
18  2  8  17  
19 11  22  17  
20 8  8  5  
Total aged 18 – 20 21 28% 38 38% 39 46% 
Total aged 21 – 29 – best fighting age in 
terms of physical strength and maturity  
36 49% 47 47% 31 37% 
30s and 40s 17 23% 15 15% 14 17% 
Average age of those known  26  24  23  
 
The effects of their earlier losses during 1918 with the consequent influx of replacements are 
clearly visible in the average ages of those killed.  Not surprisingly, 7th KSLI shows the highest 
number of 18 and 19 year olds: 40 per cent (34) of the known ages.  In 1st Cheshire the figure 
                                                 
132 The data has been extracted primarily from CWGC and then by using Census records and BMD on 
www.ancestry.com for the ‘unknowns’. Where there has been any doubt, or the name is too common to search, 
the age has been left as unknown.  The percentages are against the known ages.  
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was 30 per cent but only 17.5 per cent in 2nd RWF.133  The proportion of ‘boys’ in all three 
battalions is thus less than 50 per cent, even when twenty-year olds are included.  The 
perception of the extreme youth of Third Army battalions may therefore not be universally 
accurate.  It is dependent on how heavily particular battalions had been used during the 
preceding months.  
 
How the ‘boys’ performed in action is rarely noted in battalion War Diaries but some references 
appear in Battalion Histories.  The 1/1st Cambridgeshire, now in 12th Division, had received 
drafts amounting to 350 in late August.  About 50 were experienced men but the rest were boys, 
called up in the spring and with an average length of service of about 15 weeks.  Although they 
had fired their musketry course, they knew nothing about Lewis guns and, having come straight 
from the Base, had never been under fire.  In early September, when the battalion was in action 
around Nurlu, the CO was impressed by the newly-arrived youngsters’ performance, noting 
that ‘as long as they had leaders they kept steadily on’.  It was only when the officers and 
platoon sergeants became casualties that ‘they quickly lost cohesion and were scattered in 
depth, to become victims of their inexperience in how to make use of ground and cover’.  Once 
out of the line again, the battalion had time for a week’s intensive training and ‘the youngsters 
daily grew more like hardened veterans.134 
 
Between 8 August and 26 September the British Armies advanced an average of 25 miles on a 
front of 40 miles, with casualties of about 180,000.135  The continuing forward momentum 
meant that reinforcements had to be moved forward in the wake of the fighting divisions.   On 
                                                 
133 Captain Dunn believed that all but twenty of the drafts received by 2nd RWF in early November 1917 were 
eighteen year olds.  Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew, p. 414. 
134 Riddell & Clayton, The Cambridgeshires 1914 – 1919, pp. 216, 228-9, 231. 
135 BOH 1918 Vol. 3, p. 509. 
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3 September 38th Division established a Reinforcement Staging Camp at Contalmaison.  Three 
days later it moved to Beaulencourt where the arrival the following day of the Division’s 
Reception Camp relieved it of its function.136  Fifth Division laid down clear instructions that 
reinforcements, together with men returning from leave and ‘casuals’ (usually those returning 
individually from hospitals or courses), were to be sent up automatically each day whenever 
Brigades were in Support or Reserve, and could also be sent up on demand by Brigades actually 
in the Line.  ‘Dumped’ personnel, the nucleus left behind when battalions went into action, 
would rejoin their Brigades, if demanded, when Brigades were withdrawn into Divisional 
Reserve.137  
 
Replacements were arriving but numbers in Divisions were steadily decreasing.  On 4 
September the total strength of Fifth Division was 392 officers plus 9228 ORs, including 70 
plus 1077 ‘dumped’ personnel.  By 30 September it was 373 officers plus 8497 ORs, including 
87 plus 1040 ‘dumped’ personnel.138  
 
Reinforcements were still arriving in France from other parts of the world but not always of the 
quality or quantity required.  Malarial cases continued to arrive from Salonika with a further 
12,000 due during October.  In order to administer all Infantry reinforcements suffering from 
malaria 197th Infantry Brigade was withdrawn from 66th Division.  Its place in that division was 
taken by the South African Brigade, now re-organized into three battalions due to lack of 
                                                 
136 TNA: WO 95/2541 38th Division A & Q War Diary for September 1918. 
137 TNA: WO 95/1520 -3 5th Division Standing Administrative Instructions for Battle dated 23 September 1918.  
138 TNA: WO 95/1520 -3 5th Division War Diary figures for 4 and 30 September 1918. 
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reinforcements.  Even the Australians were running short of men and their Divisions were also 
now forced through lack of reinforcements to reduce to ten battalions per division.139   
 
October – November 1918       
The great advance continued.  In the north, the battle of Ypres took place 28 September – 2 
October, followed by Courtrai in mid-October, but the main thrust continued to be further south 
and eastwards, in Artois and Picardy.  
 
In perhaps its ‘stiffest fighting of the whole advance’, the 38th Division was in action on 8 
October at Cambrai, when its task was to advance over five thousand yards through Villers 
Outreaux.140  During the attack, some 89 men of 115th Brigade died, for whom the ages of 76 
are known.  Analysis shows an average age of 24 for each battalion, a decrease of two years for 
2nd RWF since a month earlier.  The majority of men killed in each battalion, however, remained 
in the age group 21-29. 
   
Battalions in 115th Brigade 2nd RWF %  17th RWF % 10th SWB % 
Total deaths 8 – 9 Oct 18 16  38  35  
Known ages 11  34  31  
Total aged 18 – 20 4 36% 10 29% 9 29% 
Total aged 21 – 29 – best fighting age in 
terms of physical strength and maturity  
6 55% 20 59% 17 55% 
30s and 40s 1  4  5  
Average age of those known  24  24  24  
 
                                                 
139 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary for September 1918.   Much to their disgust, the Fifth Division, which 
had escaped reorganization whilst in Italy, would also lose battalions in early October.  TNA: WO 95/1520/3 Fifth 
Division War Diary entry for 1 October 1918. 
140 TNA: WO 95//2541 38th Division A & Q War Diary for 1918.  The Estimated casualties are carefully noted for 
each day throughout the advance and the arrival of all officer reinforcements by name but the diary makes 
absolutely no mention of OR reinforcements. It does, however, note occurrences such as the departure on 27 
September of the OC 38th Division MT Company on 7 days Special leave to England in order to purchase for the 
Division a new Cinema engine and soda-water plant!  
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Enlistment locations have also been analysed and these battalions continue to show remarkable 
homogeneity.  Although figures for their recruiting area were low, both the RWF battalions 
show over 50 per cent as having enlisted in Wales; conversely some 57 per cent had enlisted in 
10th SWB in its home recruiting area.  For each battalion fewer than 25 per cent had enlisted 
outside Western Command.   
 
The Battle of the Selle took place over the period 17 – 25 October.  Amongst the divisions 
involved were the 1st, 6th and 19th.  The 1st Division, which included 1st SWB, had been fighting 
steadily forwards since the attack on the Drocourt-Queant Line in early September.  The 6th 
Division, including 1st KSLI, had spent the summer in Flanders, in the Kemmel-Dickebusch 
sector, before moving south in mid-August to take part in the attacks on the Hindeburg Line.  
The 19th Division, which included 9th RWF, had been mauled and rebuilt on three occasions 
earlier in the year and was now taking part in its first action since the Aisne.  The total number 
of deaths across the three battalions was 85, the ages of  80 being known.   
Battalion 1st SWB  %  1st KSLI % 9th RWF % 
Total deaths 17 – 25 October 1918 24  31  30  
Known ages 21  30  29  
18    2  2  
19 4  5  6  
20 4  4  5  
Total aged 18 – 20 8 38% 11 37% 13 45% 
Total aged 21 – 29 – best fighting age in 
terms of physical strength and maturity  
9 43% 13 43% 10 34% 
30s and 40s 4 19% 6 20% 6 21% 
Average age of those known  24  24  24  
 
The average age of those who died in all three battalions was again 24 but all three battalions 
are showing a greater number of youngsters amongst the dead, with 9th RWF showing 45 per 
cent.  Presumably this battalion which had had to be refilled three times earlier in the year had 
received a higher proportion of the available ‘A’ men, who by now were almost all youngsters.  
The average ages of each battalion would have been lower had they not contained a proportion 
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of men over thirty but these were not necessarily men who had been conscripted late; 39 year-
old Pte David Hughes of 9th RWF had first arrived in France in November 1914 with 1/4th RWF.    
 
The 19th Division was relieved overnight on 23/24 October, having lost 111 killed, 603 
wounded and 25 missing during the recent battle.  It now had a few days rest during which a 
large number of reinforcements arrived, mostly young soldiers without any previous experience 
of the war.    
  
Time was short in which to prepare them for the next battle, but training in open warfare 
began at once and it was surprising to see how quickly they grasped the principles; they 
were taught be instructors who were by now seasoned warriors.141 
 
Having come late to the ‘Advance’, 19th division was now to be in action up to the end: 
Valenciennes, the Sambre on 4 November and the Grande Honnelle 5 – 7 November.  
Reinforcements continued to arrive but now in ‘penny-packets’ rather than large drafts.  
Between 20 – 30 October, 9th Cheshire, in reserve for the Selle, had received 19 ORs.  The 
casualties, however, were now appreciably fewer, although whether this is due to the different 
style of warfare or the reduced size of battalions is difficult to say.  The table below, however, 
shows that the composition of the three Marches battalions in 19th Division in their last action 
of the war remains predominantly drawn from Western Command. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
141 Wyrall, The Nineteenth Division 1914-1918, p. 222. 
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3 – 9 Nov 18 9th Cheshire 9th RWF 1/4th KSLI 
Total Killed in Action 13 13 24 
Enlisted Regimental Area 7 4 7 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – England   2 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 2 5 1 
Total enlisted in No 4 District 9 9 10 
Enlisted in No 3 District  3 7 
 Plus Liverpool/Manchester 1 1 3 
Total Enlisted in Western Command 10 13 20 
Northern Command 2  1 
Southern Command 1  1 
 Plus Birmingham    
Eastern   1 
London District    
Scotland/Ireland    
Overseas   1 
Total Other Commands 3 0 4 
 
 
Reinforcements continued to arrive and between 10 – 27 November 9th Cheshire received 42 
replacements.142  The reinforcement tap had thus not been entirely turned off but the men 
available were appreciably fewer.  They had been just enough. 
 
Conclusions for 1918 
The manpower crisis of early 1918 had been coming since 1914 but the German Spring 
Offensive threw the shortages into stark relief and forced long overdue actions to be taken.  
Many of those rushed out initially were not new men but those already in the Army and 
employed at Home by different War Office Departments.  The General Staff had long been 
urging a reduction in their numbers and this was now forced upon them.143  Other measures 
were taken and Macready subsequently doubted whether  
the Government would have cared for the fierce light of publicity to have been thrown 
on the methods which had to be employed, or indeed, in thousands of cases, on the class 
                                                 
142 TNA: WO 95/2079 9th Cheshire War Diary entries for October and November 1918. 
143 Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal, p. 342-3. 
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of men who had to be sent, men who were in reality not fit in any capacity for the theatre 
of war.144 
 
The Army Council continued to blame the Government for the shortage of manpower, never 
fully recognizing the impact of its continuing demands for men upon the nation’s industries, 
including those heavily involved in the war effort.  The Government’s need was to balance the 
conflicting demands within the prevailing political climate. The dilemma was, perhaps, felt 
most acutely in the coal mining industry.  Miners were essential to the war economy but they 
also made excellent soldiers.  Throughout 1918 the Government, and especially Lloyd George, 
flip-flopped over conscripting miners and releasing them back to the Home Front.145    In 
August, for example, GHQ received a demand for 500 ‘B’ miners to be returned home.146  There 
seems little or no evidence, however, that the Government actively withheld men from the 
Army.  It was more a case of delayed action, misleading statements and growing distrust on 
both sides.       
 
The Cabinet did take the decision to allow under-19 year olds to be sent during the immediate 
emergency.  Many of those sent proved to be excellent material but although they had received 
longer initial training they lacked time to gain experience of the Western Front before being 
thrust into action.  Many were killed and there was a feeling of future capital being expended, 
together with an undoubted paternalism amongst senior officers at the sight of younger men in 
action.  The perception that the youngsters made up half the Infantry in the later months of the 
war does not appear to be founded in reality. 
                                                 
144 Macready, Annals of an Active Life Vol. 1, p. 287. 
145 See David Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London: Allen Lane, 2011), p. 
386.  For the problems of coal mining during the war, see Barry Supple, The History of the British Coal Industry 
Volume 4: 1913-46 The Political Economy of Decline, (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2004), pp. 43-116. 
146 TNA: WO 95/26 AG GHQ War Diary entry for 30 August 1918. 
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It has long been thought that by 1918 battalions were made up of men drawn from all over the 
country.  The evidence of the Marches battalions surveyed does not support this, showing that 
well over two-thirds continued to have enlisted originally in Western Command.  The surpluses 
obtained by the re-organization of divisions early in 1918 were largely distributed to other 
battalions of the same Regiment and the Reserve battalions and TRBs of the parent Command 
continued to supply newly trained men.  Men of 1914 would have talked about the same football 
teams as those of 1918. 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the provision and management of OR replacements 
for British Infantry battalions on the Western Front.  It is difficult to obtain an accurate view 
of the size of the problem since the statistics compiled after the war show figures reported up 
to March 1920.  Furthermore, the figures for the wounded relate to the number of wounds and 
not the number of individuals wounded.  Enough can be gleaned, however, to indicate the 
magnitude of the problem confronting the Army’s manning staffs in meeting the need for 
replacements for just one theatre of the war:1 
 
Infantry Casualties on the Western Front  
 Killed Wounded Missing Total 
Regular Army 307,975 908,692 155,450 1,132,117 
TF 91,558 287,649 46,968 426,175 
Totals 399,533 1,196,341 202,418 1,798,292 
 
Reinforcement Process 
The over-arching requirement was to provide sufficient reinforcements for units in the field as 
quickly as possible.  Plans and procedures for this had been laid down pre-war, based on the 
requirements of previous conflicts but the demands of industrial warfare inevitably forced 
changes in the process.  These might not have been as dramatic as developments in weaponry 
and tactics but nonetheless showed a steady evolution to meet changing demands.   
 
At the start of the war a single Special Reserve unit serving the Line battalions of each Infantry 
Regiment (with occasionally an Extra Reserve unit for large regiments) prepared drafts when 
notified of requirements by the War Office.  Once ready the draft would be despatched to the 
                                                 
1 Statistics of the British Military Effort of the British Empire (SME) (London: War Office, 1922; Uckfield: Naval 
& Military Press, 1999), pp. 249, 240 fn 1. 
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theatre concerned, to the Divisional IBD for the appropriate battalion.  After several days spent 
training at the Base the men would be sent forward to join their units, arriving in many cases 
almost a month, if not more, after they had been demanded.  By the end of the war, the 
emphasis in the reinforcement system had changed from demand to supply.  Regimental 
Reserve units, both Regular and TF, together with TR units affiliated to the Regiment’s parent 
Home Command prepared drafts, informing the War Office as soon as they were ready.  The 
Command concerned was then informed of their availability and called drafts forward as 
required.  On arrival in theatre these drafts were moved rapidly forward to Divisional 
Reception Camps, close behind the fighting units, from where they could be fed into units as 
soon as they had time to absorb them.  A speedier, more streamlined process had evolved. 
 
Behind this evolution lay a willingness to change systems and organizations in the light of 
experience and in the interests of greater efficiency.  Initial confusion arising out of the pre-
war plans between the roles of the IGC and the DAG 3rd Echelon was resolved before 
Christmas 1914, with the latter assuming sole responsibility for the calling forward of drafts 
from home.  The process of casualty reporting to GHQ and the 3rd Echelon was speeded up by 
late 1915 with the introduction of daily submission of estimated numbers.  This remained 
unchanged for the rest of the war, with the sole refinement in early 1917 of the introduction, 
in the interests of accuracy and the avoidance of double counting, of running totals per unit 
for the phase of battle concerned.  In France, the processing of drafts developed with the IBDs 
being re-organized twice to reflect changing circumstances.  Firstly, in May/June 1916 it was 
decided in the interests of greater flexibility to reinforce by regiment rather than battalion.  
This necessitated the re-organization of Divisional IBDs into larger ones serving groups of 
Regiments from the same Home Command.  Subsequently, their size and role would be 
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reduced in late 1917, effectively turning them into transit camps, simply receiving and posting 
men to units and then sending them rapidly forwards towards reinforcement units further 
towards the front. The cause of this later reorganization is said to have been the disturbance at 
Étaples in September 1917 but it coincided with the move to situate reinforcements closer to 
corps and subsequently divisions. 
 
Provision of Manpower 
The fundamental requirement for the reinforcement process was obviously the availability of 
sufficient manpower.  Initially the influx of volunteers provided ample resources but the 
recruiting downturn in late 1915 led to the introduction of compulsion in 1916.  The problem 
for the nation as a whole was that the indiscriminate recruiting of earlier years had caused 
manpower shortages in various industrial sectors.  It was now intended to regulate the 
occupations from which men were called up but the necessary mechanisms were not in place 
and throughout 1917 the Government proved unable rather than unwilling to force the 
Departments of State to release manpower.  The introduction of the concept of National 
Service early in that year proved ineffective, despite the creation of the Ministry of National 
Service and it would not be until later in the year that the appointment of a DGNS with 
Ministerial authority would enable any real co-ordination of the nation’s manpower to become 
possible.  By then, however, the situation had become critical.      
 
The manpower crisis of early 1918 had thus been coming since 1914 but the German Spring 
Offensive threw the shortages into stark relief.  Since the end of 3rd Ypres the Army Council 
and GHQ had been demanding more men to replace the losses suffered during that offensive.  
The War Cabinet’s problem was the distribution of manpower for the country as a whole; the 
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large numbers demanded by the War Office ran the risk of destroying the nation’s industries, 
including those required for the war effort.  The Army Council appeared unable or indeed 
unwilling to recognize this, failing even to agree amongst its members in response to the 
question:    
assuming a choice had to be made between a considerable reduction of men in the 
Army and a proportionate reduction in munitions and supplies, including those of our 
Allies, which would the War Office prefer?  The Adjutant General of the day had 
always answered that they must have the men, whilst the Master General of Ordnance 
and the Quarter Master General had said that they must have the supplies.2 
 
 
The Government and the Military hierarchy increasingly distrusted each other since neither 
accepted, nor even understood, the other’s position.      
 
Despite the views of the Official History, and Lloyd George’s many comments on the subject, 
there is little evidence in Cabinet papers that the Government actively withheld men.3  Other 
fronts had been opened up, all requiring manpower, and on the Government’s insistence 
divisions had been sent to Italy in late 1917.  The Government’s real role was in the taking-up 
of men from civilian life.  This had to be governed by the industrial requirements of the nation 
as a whole, and also by the increasingly difficult political climate of the time, with the growing 
Labour and Trades Union lobby.  The two 1918 MSAs were passed, simply because of the 
national emergency caused by the German offensives.   
 
The calling up of men from civilian life was always a long-term measure.  By the time notice 
had been given and men called up and trained, some four months would elapse before the 
                                                 
2 TNA: CAB 23/7 Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting 449 of 19 July 1918. 
3 BOH 1918 Vol. 1, p. 52 fn 1: ‘It is obvious that the British Armies in France could have been brought up to full 
establishment before 21st March without unduly weakening the forces elsewhere had the Government so willed.’ 
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earliest time at which they could be drafted.  The men rushed to France to confront the German 
offensives were men already trained and retained at home.  The sole decisions made at that 
time by the Cabinet related to the sending of under-age boys who had completed their training 
and the release of men from units earmarked for Home Defence, the latter bringing a complaint 
from Sir John French, the C-in-C Home Forces.4  The rest of the manpower rushed to France 
came from men employed by different departments of the War Office. 
 
The Need for Greater Flexibility 
There was early recognition of the need for greater flexibility in the use of manpower.  One 
facet of this was the need to be able to transfer men to different units and arms within the 
Army, which would require legislation to alter terms of service.  This was passed for Regular 
soldiers in 1915 but the TF remained obdurate and consequently its usefulness both overseas 
and at home was reduced.  It would not be until the 1916 MSAs that it would become possible 
to transfer TF soldiers without their consent between units and corps, and into Regular units.  
The side-effect, however, was deep-seated resentment against the way in which TF terms of 
service had been changed.  The flexibility thus gained, however, shows a willingness to 
sacrifice unit and cap badge loyalty to meet the needs of expediency.      
 
The Medical Services also played a significant part in increasing both flexibility and the 
availability of manpower.  Medical classifications were refined which enabled greater use of 
less-fit men in appropriate employment in order to release fit men to fight.  Improvements 
were also been made in the treatment of casualties, enabling more men to be returned to duty 
in theatre.  The medical authorities subsequently calculated that some 64 per cent of the 
                                                 
4 TNA: CAB 24/46 GT 4030 Troops Available for Home Defence dated 25 March 1918. 
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wounded returned to duty in the front line and a further 18 per cent returned to employment 
on LofC or garrison duties, or in sedentary occupations.5   
 
The growing shortage of recruits had also necessitated greater attention being paid to how and 
where men were employed.  The monthly posting ACIs allocated men by fitness category and 
aptitude to appropriate parts of the Army.  Men already serving and who were fit enough to 
fight were ‘combed out’ so that they could be sent to the front.  New Corps were also created, 
specifically to release fitter men to fight: the Labour Corps and the WAAC.  Although fewer 
women had joined the latter Corps for service overseas than hoped, they had also played their 
part and their conduct during the March 1918 offensive won them recognition in the form of 
their name being changed to Queen Mary’s Army Auxiliary Corps (QMAAC). 
 
Training 
Adult recruits were posted on enlistment to draft-finding units for their training.  New Reserve 
units had been created in 1915 to cater for New Army battalions and also for the TF but the 
anticipated increase in manpower with the introduction of conscription led to the creation of 
the TR.  This did not replace the Regimental Reserve battalions but augmented them by taking 
surplus manpower within a Home Command after the former were filled.  Despite perceptions 
in the Army at large, however, emphasis remained on preserving regimental affiliations.  It 
still remained possible for a man to choose to serve in his local regiment and there continued 
to be mention of the value of esprit de corps. 
 
                                                 
5 BOH 1918 Vol. 5, p. 597. 
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Infantry training for the youngest recruits had evolved during 1917 with the introduction of 
new units.  Later in the year these would become specifically YS battalions from which the 
lads would move to Graduated battalions, becoming part of the Home Army. Under normal 
circumstances, the youngsters would receive up to a year’s training whilst adult Infantry 
recruits received a minimum of 14 weeks, long enough to train the man to at least the minimum 
standard required to take his place in a rifle section.  What could not be imparted was the 
experience gained by being in action.  Even in late 1914, the Army’s perennial complaint had 
been heard that the new drafts were not as good/well trained as those that had gone before.  
There seems little evidence that drafts later in the war were in fact any less well-prepared than 
before.  What was lacking was time to acclimatize them to the front – and also the experienced 
officers and NCOs to lead them.   
 
Soldiers’ Ages 
It has been assumed that the drafting of 18 year olds earlier in the year and the conscription of 
youths immediately they turned 19 meant that 50 per cent of Infantry units during the Hundred 
Days were made up of ‘boys’.  Analysis has shown, however, that the average age was 24, 
towards the middle of the optimum fighting ages of 21 - 28.6 
 
Composition of Battalions 
Before the war both the recruiting and the reinforcement organizations were based on 
territorial affiliations: the Regiment’s recruiting area, the Military District in which that was 
located and the parent Home Command to which it belonged.  It has long been assumed that 
by the end of the war these territorial affiliations had been seriously eroded and even that there 
                                                 
6 Rough analysis using CWGC data of 1st Cheshire soldiers who died between 8 August and 11 November 1914 
provides 73 known ages, and an average age of 26/27. 
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had been a definite intention to ‘destroy the Regiment ….. and nationalize the Army’.7  
Selected battalions of Regiments of the English/Welsh Marches have been analysed over a 
comparable period of time for each year of the war in order to test this assumption.  Those for 
1918 are below.8   
Enlistment Location 1st Cheshire 9th Cheshire 1st KSLI 6th KSLI 
Regimental Area 95 39% 35 50% 55 35% 14 39% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - England 8    14  3  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 17  6  28  6  
Total enlisted in No 4 District 120 50% 41 59% 97 61% 23 64% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 30  7  21  5  
 Liverpool/Manchester 25  5  12  2  
Total Enlisted in Western Command 175 73% 53 76% 130 82% 30 83% 
Northern Command 31  7  2  1  
Southern Command 8  3  17  3  
 Birmingham 3    2  1  
Eastern 11  2  5  1  
London District 7  4  1    
Scotland/Ireland 6  1      
Overseas     2    
Total Other Commands 66  17  29  6  
Total Deaths 241  70  159  36  
Table 5.1. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected English Regular battalions who were killed/died 
between 1 July – 30 November 1918.   
 
Enlistment Location 2ndRWF 9th RWF 1st SWB 10th SWB 
Regimental Area 49 25% 19 19% 22 22% 63 36% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - England 14  6  9  10  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 55  32  23  39  
Total enlisted in No 4 District 118 60% 57 58% 54 54% 112 64% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 28  15  15  23  
 Liverpool/Manchester 19  8  10  5  
Total Enlisted in Western Command 165 84% 80 81% 79 79% 140 80% 
Northern Command 10  4  4  5  
Southern Command 3  1  2  6  
 Birmingham 5  1    3  
Eastern 2  3  5  11  
London District 10  9  10  9  
Scotland/Ireland   1    1  
Overseas 1        
Total Other Commands 31  19  21  35  
Total Deaths 196  99  100  175  
Table 5.2. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected Welsh Regular battalions who were killed/died 
between 1 July – 30 November 1918. 
 
                                                 
7 J. C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew (London: King, 1938; Abacus, 1997), pp. 245-6. 
8 For ease of comparison and to include soldiers who died immediately post the Armistice the date period has 
been kept the same as that of previous years. 
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Inevitably, the dwindling availability of manpower had had some effect and by 1918 the 
numbers originally enlisting in the respective Regimental areas had decreased for the Regular 
battalions of the Cheshire Regiment, KSLI and SWB, although those for the RWF remained 
the same as in 1914: around 25 per cent.  The percentages for those enlisted in No 4 District 
had also decreased by 1918 but nonetheless remained above 50 per cent for all the Regular 
battalions, and had actually risen for the RWF as it had become more Welsh.  The pattern 
continued for those enlisted in Western Command where, despite a fall from 1914 levels, 73 
per cent and above had been enlisted in that Command.   
 
The 1918 birth locations (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4) do not show such a great difference from 
those of 1914. 
Birth location 1st Cheshire 9th Cheshire 1st KSLI 6th KSLI 
Regimental Area 69 29% 26 37% 49 41% 8 22% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – England 6    14  3  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 14  5  21  4  
Total born in No 4 District 89 37% 31 44% 84 53% 15 42% 
Born in No 3 District 38  11  24  4  
 Liverpool/Manchester 20  8  5  4  
Total Born in Western Command 147 61% 50 71% 113 71% 23 64% 
Northern Command 35  7  9  3  
Southern Command 7  3  20  4  
 Birmingham 2    3  1  
Eastern 10  3  6  2  
London District 10  2      
Scotland/Ireland 7  1      
Overseas   1  2    
Total Other Commands 71  17  38  10  
Location of Birth Unknown 23  3  8  3  
Total Deaths 241  70  159  36  
Table 5.3. Birth locations of soldiers of selected English Regular battalions who were killed/died between 
1 July – 30 November 1918. 
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Birth location 2ndRWF 9th RWF 1st SWB 10th SWB 
Regimental Area 37 19% 17 17% 11 11% 38 22% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – England 11  8  6  10  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales 39  21  19  40  
Total born in No 4 District 87 44% 46 46% 36 36% 88 50% 
Born in No 3 District 32  11  17  23  
 Liverpool/Manchester 14  5  8  3  
Total Born in Western Command 133 68% 62 63% 61 61% 114 65% 
Northern Command 15  3  9  7  
Southern Command 11  6  6  17  
 Birmingham 4    1    
Eastern 3  5  4  12  
London District 7  8  9  11  
Scotland/Ireland 1  2  2  3  
Overseas 2      2  
Total Other Commands 43  24  31  52  
Location of Birth Unknown 20  11  8  9  
Total Deaths 196  99  100  175  
Table 5.4. Birth locations of soldiers of selected Welsh Regular battalions who were killed/died between 1 
July – 30 November 1918. 
 
The greatest fall had been for 1st Cheshire, from 55 per cent in 1914 having been born in 
Cheshire to 29 per cent in 1918.  In 1st KSLI and 1st SWB, the drop had been just 8 per cent 
whilst for 2nd RWF the number of those born within its recruiting area had risen by 8 per cent.   
Whilst the figures for the Cheshire soldiers born within Western Command had fallen from 
1914 levels, for the other battalions, both English and Welsh, the numbers of those born within 
Western Command remained above 60 per cent.    
 
The existence of Lancashire, with the conurbations of Liverpool and Manchester, in the other 
District of Western Command had undoubtedly helped retain the homogeneity of the 
battalions surveyed, as it always had done.  Overall, around three-quarters of those killed in 
the Regular battalions of the Marches had continued to come from the traditional recruiting 
areas of Western Command.        
 
The smaller numbers of TF deaths in 1918, except for those for 1/6th Cheshire and 1/4th KSLI, 
slightly skew the percentages.  However, although the localized recruiting for TF battalions 
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had inevitably been eroded, Table 5.5 shows that over 77 per cent continued to be drawn from 
Western Command.    
Enlistment Locations 1 /5th 
Cheshire 
1 /6th 
Cheshire 
1/4th 
KSLI 
1 /4th 
RWF 
1 /2nd 
Monmouths 
Regimental Area 13 81% 30 53% 20 24% 14 42% 10 59% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District - 
England 
    14  5  2  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - 
Wales 
  1  5  4  1  
Total enlisted in No 4 District 13 81% 31 54% 39 46% 23 70% 13 76% 
Enlisted in No 3 District 2  7  16  2    
 Liverpool/Manchester   6  10  2  2  
Total Enlisted in Western 
Command 
15 94% 44 77% 65 77% 27 82% 15 88% 
Northern Command   4  3  4    
Southern Command   4  8      
 Birmingham       1    
Eastern 1  4  3  1  1  
London District   1  4    1  
Scotland/Ireland           
Overseas     1      
Total Other Commands 1  13  19  6  2  
Total Deaths 16  57  84  33  17  
Table 5.5. Enlistment locations of soldiers of selected TF battalions who were killed/died between 1 July – 
30 November 1918. 
 
Birth Locations 1 /5th 
Cheshire 
1 /6th 
Cheshire 
1/4th 
KSLI 
1 /4th 
RWF 
1 /2nd 
Monmouths 
Regimental Area 11 67% 19 33% 17 20% 9 27% 4 24% 
Elsewhere in No 4 District – 
England 
    8  4  1  
Elsewhere in No 4 District - Wales   3  5  1  1  
Total born in No 4 District 11 67% 22 39% 30 36% 14 42% 6 35% 
Born in No 3 District 2  10  17  3  1  
 Liverpool/Manchester   3  9  1  1  
Total Born in Western Command 13 81% 35 61% 56 67% 18 55% 8 47% 
Northern Command   6  5  6    
Southern Command   4  7  1  2  
 Birmingham   1  1      
Eastern 2  4  6    1  
London District   1  3    1  
Scotland/Ireland     1    1  
Overseas     2  1    
Total Other Commands 2  16  25  8  5  
Location of Birth Unknown 1  6  3  7  4  
Total Deaths 16  57  84  33  17  
Table 5.6. Birth locations of soldiers of selected TF battalions who were killed/died between 1 July – 30 
November 1918. 
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Details of the birth locations are less conclusive, but the smaller numbers of deaths for 1/5th 
Cheshire, 1/4th RWF and 1/2nd Monmouthshire affect the percentages. 
   
Overall, analysis of selected battalions of Regiments from the English/Welsh Marches 
indicates that their composition remained largely the same as it always had been.  A soldier of 
1914 would have found the same regional accents amongst those he served with in 1918, even 
though the individual battalions had been rebuilt several times.  
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Appendix 1 - Home Commands1 
 
 
Commands Districts Counties 
Scottish – 
 HQ 
Edinburgh 
1 – HQ Perth Aberdeenshire, Argyll, Banffshire, Bute, 
Caithness, Clackmannan, 
Dumbartonshire,  Elgin, Fifeshire, 
Forfarshire, Invernesshire, Kincardine, 
Kinross, Nairn, Orkney, Perthshire, 
Renfrewshire Ross and Cromarty, 
Shetland, Stirlingshire, and Sutherland.  
2 – HQ Hamilton Ayrshire, Berwickshire, Berwick-on-
Tweed (Regulars and Special Reserve 
only), Dumfries, Edinburgh, Haddington, 
Kircudbright,  Lanarkshire, Linlithgow, 
Peebles, Roxburgh, Selkirk and 
Wigtownshire. 
Western –  
 HQ Chester 
3 – HQ Preston Cumberland, Isle of Man, Lancashire 
(except 40th Regimental District) and 
Westmorland. 
4 – HQ Chester Cheshire, Herefordshire, Shropshire, that 
portion of Lancashire in the 40th 
Regimental District and Wales: 
Anglesey, Brecknockshire, 
Cardiganshire, Carmarthenshire, 
Carnarvonshire, Denbighshire, Flintshire, 
Glamorganshire, Merionethshire, 
Montgomeryshire, Monmouthshire, 
Pembrokeshire and Radnorshire.  
Northern –  
 HQ York 
5 – HQ York Durham, Northumberland, Yorkshire, 
Berwick on Tweed, (except Regulars and 
Special Reserve) 
6 – HQ Lichfield Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, 
Nottinghamshire, Rutland and 
Staffordshire. 
Southern –  
 HQ: Salisbury 
7 – HQ Warwick Warwickshire, Gloucestershire, 
Worcestershire, Oxfordshire, 
Buckinghamshire, Berkshire (except 
Windsor for Regular troops and that 
portion of the County included in the 
Aldershot Command) 
8 – HQ Exeter Devon, Somerset, Cornwall, Dorset, 
Wiltshire, Hampshire (except that 
portion included in the Aldershot 
Command)  
                                                 
1 Army List (London: HMSO, August 1914) 
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Commands Districts Counties 
Eastern –  
 HQ: 
Horseguards, 
London 
9 – HQ Warley, Essex Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, 
Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Norfolk, 
Northamptonshire, Suffolk 
10 – HQ Hounslow Kent, Middlesex, Sussex, Surrey (except 
portion included in Aldershot Command) 
and Woolwich (exclusive of Territorial 
Troops therein). 
Ireland –  
 Dublin 
11 – HQ Dublin Londonderry, Antrim, Donegal, Tyrone, 
Down, Fermanagh, Armagh, Monaghan, 
Louth, Cavan, Dublin, Kildare, Wicklow 
and Carlow 
12 - HQ Cork Sligo, Leitrim, Mayo, Roscommon, 
Longford, Meath, Westmeath, Galway, 
King’s County, Queen’s County, Clare, 
Tipperary, Kilkenny, Wexfored, 
Limerick, Waterford, Kerry and Cork. 
Aldershot –  
 HQ: 
Aldershot 
 Parts of Berkshire, Surrey and 
Hampshire 
 London District – 
HQ: Horseguards, 
London 
The County of London, the Guards 
Depot at Caterham, Purfleet, Rainham 
Rifle Range, and (for Regular troops) 
Windsor. 
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Appendix 2 – Military Recruiting Areas for Marches 
Infantry Regiments and Changes under Ministry of 
National Service 
 
Military Recruiting Areas2 
 
Western Command: Cheshire, Lancashire, Shropshire, Herefordshire, Monmouthshire, 
Cumberland, Westmorland, the Isle of Man and the whole of Wales.   
HQ in Watergate Street, Chester 
 
Subdivided into two Military Districts, each containing Regimental Areas numbered 
according to the former Regimental Number: 
 
No 3 Military District – covering Cumberland, Westmorland, Isle of Man and Lancashire 
(except 40th Regimental District). HQ in Preston.  Infantry Regiments recruited in No 3 
Military District: 
 The King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regt) 
o Regimental Area No 4: Part of Lancashire (including Barrow in Furness, 
Lancaster, Morecambe and Ulverston) 
 
 The King’s (Liverpool) Regiment 
o Regimental Area No 8: Part of Lancashire (including Bootle, Liverpool 
and Southport) and IoM. 
 
 The Lancashire Fusiliers 
o Regimental Area No 20: Part of Lancashire (including Bury, Middleton, 
Radcliffe, Rochdale and Salford). 
 
 The East Lancashire Regiment 
o Regimental Area No 30: Part of Lancashire (including Accrington, 
Blackburn, Burnley, Clitheroe and Darwen) 
 
 The Border Regiment 
o Regimental Area No 34: Cumberland and Westmorland 
 
 The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment 
o Regimental Area No 47: Part of Lancashire (including Bolton, Chorley and 
Preston) 
 
 The Manchester Regiment 
o Regimental Area No 63: Part of Lancashire (including Ashton-under-Lyne, 
Manchester and Oldham) 
                                                 
2 Kelly’s Directory of Cheshire 1914, p 229; Kelly’s Directory of Shropshire 1913, p 222; Army List - February 
1915, Army List – January 1917 
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No 4 Military District – covering counties of Cheshire, Flint, Denbigh, Anglesey, 
Carnarvon, Merioneth, Montgomery, Radnor, Cardigan, Brecknock, Monmouth, Pembroke, 
Carmarthen, Glamorgan, Hereford, Shropshire and that portion of Lancashire in the 40th 
Regimental District). HQ in Shrewsbury 
 
Infantry Regiments recruited in No 4 Military District: 
 
 The Cheshire Regt     Depot: Chester 
o Regimental Area No 22: covered County of Cheshire  
 
 The Royal Welsh Fusiliers (RWF)   Depot: Wrexham 
o Regimental Area No 23: covered Denbighshire, Flintshire, 
Carnarvonshire, Anglesey, Merioneth and Montgomeryshire ie North and 
Mid Wales 
 
 The South Wales Borderers  (SWB)  Depot: Brecon 
o Regimental Area No 24: covered Brecknockshire, and Monmouthshire,  
 
 The South Lancashire Regiment   Depot: Warrington 
o Regimental Area No 40 – part of Lancashire including St Helens and 
Warrington   
 
 The Welsh Regiment     Depot: Cardiff 
o Regimental Area No 41: covered Cardiganshire, Carmarthenshire, 
Pembrokeshire, Glamorganshire ie South and West Wales. 
 
 The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI) Depot: Shrewsbury   
o Regimental Area No 53: covered Counties of Shropshire, Herefordshire 
and Radnorshire (NB Herefordshire and Radnorshire came under Area 53 
for Regular Recruiting but not for TF. 
 
TF-only Regiments in No 4 Military District 
 
 Herefordshire Regt 
 Monmouthshire Regiment 
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Recruiting Areas Under Ministry of National Service wef 1 
November 19173 
 
Instruction No 2 of 1917 dated 15 November 1917: Constitution and Organisation of 
Regions, Regional Headquarters and Recruiting Areas, and Transfer of Recruiting to Civil 
Control under the Minister of National Service formalised the new Recruiting organisation 
in place from 1 November 1917.  . 
 Regional HQs were established to take over administration of respective regions wef 
‘midnight 31 October 1917’ (see below) 
 Organization of Regional HQs: 
o Director of Recruiting: ‘the principal representative of the Ministry of 
National Service in the Region so far as concerns all matters relating to the 
raising of men for the Armed Forces’. 
o Deputy Director of Recruiting – assisted by Heads of Sections: 
 Official to deal with exec work of Recruiting machinery 
 Official to act as Legal Adviser 
o Commissioner of Medical Services – assisted where necessary by Deputy 
Commissioner 
o Deputy Controller of Registration – plus Assistant Controller where 
necessary. 
 Deputy Controller of Statistics. From 1 Nov 17 the Area Commanders of the Military 
Recruiting Areas became Assistant Directors of Recruiting, directly responsible to 
the Director of Recruiting for their Region for the efficient working and organisation 
of their Areas. 
 Posting Arrangements – wef 1 Nov 17. 
o Recruits would be posted by the Military Authorities 
o The Recruiting Authorities had no further responsibility or duties for posting 
‘except where a man who cannot for any reason be compulsorily posted 
volunteers to serve in a Corps of his choice.  In these cases it will be the duty 
of the Recruiting Authorities to enlist the man (but not to finally approve him) 
and despatch him to the Reception Depot.  A slip will be attached to his 
documents to the effect that he has volunteered for service on condition that 
he is posted to a certain corps. If the man is not accepted for the Corps 
selected and declines to join any other corps, he will be allowed to return to 
civilian life, and in this case the posting officer will make an entry to the 
following effect on the third page of the man’s attestation paper ‘not finally 
approved for corps selected,’ and return the documents to Area headquarters 
for necessary action by the Assistant Controller of Registration.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Ministry of National Service Ministry of National Service Instructions Issued During November and December 
1917, Nos 1-47 (inclusive) of 1917 (London: HMSO, 1919) 
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Appendix I to National Service Instruction 2 of 1917 
 
Region     Location of Regional HQ 
London    War Office (temp) then Newington 
Causeway 
East Anglia    Paddington (82 Westbourne Terrace) 
South Eastern    Paddington (84 Westbourne Terrace) 
South Western   Bristol  
Yorkshire and East Midlands  Nottingham 
West Midlands   Queen’s College, Birmingham 
North Western     Liverpool University 
Northern    Newcastle on Tyne 
Scotland    Edinburgh 
Wales      Cardiff 
 
The new Regions as applied to the Marches Regiments 
    
Region Regimental 
Area 
Recruiting Areas HQ 
North Western    
 8th Liverpool Seaforth 
 8th Isle of Man Seaforth 
 22nd Cheshire Chester 
 47th N Lancashire (Preston) Preston 
 47th Lancashire (Bolton) Preston 
 20th Lancashire (Bury) Bury 
 4th Lancashire (Lancaster) Lancaster 
 40th South Lancashire 
(Warrington) 
Warrington 
 30th East Lancashire (Blackburn) Preston 
 63rd Lancashire (Ashton–u–Lyne) Ashton-u-Lyne 
    
West Midlands 53rd Shropshire Shrewsbury 
 53rd Herefordshire Shrewsbury 
    
Wales 23rd Carnarvonshire Wrexham 
 41st Glamorganshire Cardiff 
 41st Carmarthenshire Cardiff 
 24th Brecknockshire Brecon 
 24th Monmouthshire Brecon 
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Appendix 3: Marches Reserve Battalions (Regular Army) 
 
 
Battalion 1915 1916 1917 
3rd (SR) 
Cheshire 
Birkenhead (Mersey 
Defences) 
Birkenhead (Mersey 
Defences) 
Birkenhead (Mersey 
Defences);  
December to Newcastle on 
Tyne 
3rd (SR) 
RWF 
Wrexham until May; 
then Liverpool 
Litherland, Liverpool  Litherland, Liverpool; 
November to Ireland 
3rd (SR) 
SWB 
Pembroke Dock; 4 coys 
in Edinburgh; June to 
Liverpool  
Hightown, Liverpool Hightown, Liverpool 
3rd (SR) 
KSLI 
Edinburgh; March to 
Pembroke Dock 
Pembroke Dock Pembroke Dock 
December to Ireland 
    
14th 
(Reserve) 
Cheshire 
April: became a Second 
Reserve Bn in 11th 
Reserve Bde; Kinmel 
Park and then Prees 
Heath, Shropshire 
September: became 
59th TRB in 11th 
Reserve Bde at Prees 
Heath 
May: became 225th (Grad) 
Bn in 203rd Bde, 68th Div at 
Halesworth, Suffolk;  
October: retitled 51st (Grad) 
Bn Manchester Regt at 
Yarmouth. 
12th 
(Reserve) 
RWF 
April: became a Second 
Reserve Bn in 14th 
Reserve Bde; Kinmel 
Park, N Wales 
September: became 
62nd TRB in 14th 
Reserve Bde at 
Kinmel Park 
May: became 62nd (YS) Bn 
in 14th Reserve Bde; at 
Kinmel Park; 
October: retitled 53rd (YS) 
Bn Cheshire Regt  
9th 
(Reserve) 
SWB 
April: became a Second 
Reserve Bn in 13th 
Reserve Bde; at Kinmel 
Park 
September: became 
57th TRB in 13th 
Reserve Bde at 
Kinmel Park 
May: became 282nd (Grad) 
Bn in 201st Bde, 67th Div at 
Canterbury 
October: retitled 52nd 
(Grad) Bn SWB   
 
9th 
(Reserve) 
KSLI 
April: became a Second 
Reserve Bn in 11th 
Reserve Bde; Kinmel 
Park and then Prees 
Heath, Shropshire  
September: became 
48th TRB in 11th 
Reserve Bde at Prees 
Heath, Shropshire 
Remained 48th TRB in 11th 
Reserve Bde; at Prees 
Heath, Shropshire 
    
13th 
(Reserve) 
SWB 
August: formed as local 
reserve bn from Depot 
Coys of 10th (1st 
Gwent) & 11th (2nd 
Gwent) SWB; at 
Kinmel Park 
September: became 
59th TRB in 13th 
Reserve Bde; at 
Kinmel Park 
May: became 213th (Grad) 
Bn in 194th Bde 65th Div; at 
the Curragh, Ireland 
October: retitled 51st (Grad) 
Bn Cheshire Regt, 
remaining at the Curragh, 
Ireland  
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Battalion 1915 1916 1917 
17th 
(Reserve) 
Cheshire 
August: formed as local 
reserve bn from Depot 
Coys of 15th (1st 
Birkenhead) & 16th (2nd 
Birkenhead) Cheshire 
in 17th Reserve Bde; at 
Prees Heath, 
Shropshire 
September: became 
74th TRB in 17th 
Reserve Bde; at Prees 
Heath, Shropshire 
May: became 74th (YS) 
TRB in 17th Reserve Bde; 
at Prees Heath, Shropshire 
October: retitled 53rd (YS) 
Bn Manchester Regt; at 
Prees Heath but soon to 
14th Reserve Bde at Kinmel 
Park 
18th 
(Reserve)  
RWF 
August: became local 
reserve bn in 14th 
Reserve Brigade; at 
Kinmel Park 
September: combined 
with 20th (Reserve) 
bn to form 63rd TRB 
in 14th Reserve Bde at 
Kinmel Park 
May: became 226th (Grad) 
Bn in 203rd Bde 68th Div at 
Halesworth, Suffolk 
October: retitled 51st (Grad) 
Bn Welsh Regt 
21st & 
22nd 
(Reserve) 
RWF 
 April: in 14th Reserve 
Bde at Kinmel Park 
September: combined 
to form 64th TRB in 
14th Reserve Bde at 
Kinmel Park 
May: became 64th (YS) Bn 
in 14th Reserve Bde 
Oct: became 53rd (YS) Bn 
Welsh Regt  
14th 
(Reserve) 
SWB 
September: formed as 
local reserve bn from 
depot coy of 12th (3rd 
Gwent) SWB; at 
Conway 
January: to 14 
Reserve Bde at 
Kinmel Park 
September: became 
65th TRB in 14th 
Reserve Bde; at 
Kinmel Park 
Remained 65th TRB in 14th 
Reserve Bde; at Kinmel 
Park 
 
Source: Brigadier E.A. James, British Regiments 1914 – 18 (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 
1998) 
 
 
  
 
 
300 
 
Appendix 4: Medical Categories from 1916 onwards 
 
Early 1916 
The following categories were recognized4: 
General Service 
Field Service at home 
Garrison service abroad 
Garrison service at home 
Labour 
Sedentary work (clerks, storemen, batmen, cooks, orderlies, sanitary duty men) 
 
May 1916 
The categories were revised:   
A: General Service 
B1: Abroad: Garrison service 
B2: Abroad: Labour 
B3: Abroad: Sedentary work 
C1: At Home: Garrison service 
C2 At Home: Labour 
C3 At Home: Sedentary Work5 
 
June 1916 
Further revision of categories and additional guidelines added, primarily for use by Medical 
Boards assessing the fitness of soldiers recovering from wounds6: 
 
A:  able to march, see to shoot, hear well and stand ‘active service conditions’.  
A1: Men fit for overseas service in all respects: training, physically and 
mentally fit. 
A2: Recruits who will be fit for A1 as soon as trained. 
A3: Returned EF men who will be fit for A1 as soon as hardened. 
A4: Men under 19 years who should be A1 or A2 when 19. 
B: free from serious organic diseases, able to stand service on the lines of 
communication in   France or in Garrisons in the Tropics. 
B1: Abroad: Garrison service: able to march 5 miles, see to shoot with 
glasses and hear well. 
B2: Abroad: Labour: able to walk 5 miles to and from work, see and hear 
sufficiently for ordinary purposes. 
B3: Abroad: Sedentary work: only suitable for sedentary work. 
C: free from serious organic disease, able to stand service conditions in garrisons at 
home. 
C1: At Home: Garrison service 
C2 At Home: Labour 
C3 At Home: Sedentary Work 
                                                 
4 BOH 1916, Vol. 1, pp. 152-3. 
5 TNA: WO 293/4 Army Council Instruction (ACI) 1023 of May 1916. 
6 TNA: WO 293/4 ACI 1241 of June 1916. 
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D:  Men unfit for service in A, B or C but likely to be fit in six months 
 E:  Those not likely to be fit for service in A, B or C 
  
April 1917 
Category C was amended as it had been realised that there was very little difference between 
UK and North West Europe:   
  
C: Fit for service at home or in North Western Europe, but not fit for General Service 
  C1: In garrison or labour units. 
  C2: In labour units or in Command, Garrison or regimental employments 
C3: Sedentary work: clerks, storemen, batmen, cooks, orderlies, sanitary 
duties etc. 7 
 
October 1917 
All previous ACIs were cancelled and the distinction between Categories B and C was 
abolished in order to simplify administration.8  With effect from 1 November 1917 all soldiers 
in Category C were to be placed in the corresponding sub-division of Category B.  From that 
date all soldiers serving at home, whether recruits on enlistment or on being called up from 
Class B Army Reserve, serving soldiers or men who had been sent home sick or wounded 
from an Expeditionary Force or from a garrison abroad, were to be classified in the categories 
shown in the table below.  
 
Selection of those in categories lower than ‘A’ who were fit for service in NW Europe only 
and those fit to serve anywhere was in future to be made by special medical examination when 
they were actually required to proceed abroad. 
 
 
Categories Standards Guidance 
A Fit for general 
service. 
(i)  Men actually fit for general 
service in any theatre of war in all 
respects, both as regards training, 
physical and mental qualifications. 
 
(ii)  Recruits who should be fit for 
A (i) as soon as trained. 
 
(iii) Men who have previously 
served with an Expeditionary 
Force, who should be fit for A (i) 
as soon as ‘hardened’. 
 
(iv) Men under 19 years of age 
who should be fit for A(i) or A(ii) 
as soon as they are 19 years of age. 
 
Able to march, see to shoot, 
hear well and stand active 
service conditions. 
                                                 
7 TNA: WO 293/6 ACI 679 of April 1917. 
8 TNA: WO 293/7 ACI 1606 of October 1917: Alteration of Classification of Men by Categories. 
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B Not fit for general 
service, but fit for 
service at home 
(and abroad in the 
case of men passed 
fit for service 
overseas) 
(i) In field units (at home only) and 
in Garrison units, or on duties of an 
analogous nature. 
 
(ii) In Labour units, or on garrison 
or regimental outdoor employment 
 
(iii) On sedentary work as clerks, 
storemen, batmen, cooks, 
orderlies, on sanitary duties etc or, 
if skilled tradesmen, at their trades. 
 
Free from serious organic 
disease; and in addition if 
classified under: 
-B(i) Able to march at least 5 
miles, see to shoot with glasses 
and hear well. 
-B(ii) Able to walk to and from 
work a distance not exceeding 5 
miles, see and hear sufficiently 
for ordinary purposes. 
-B (iii) Only suitable for 
sedentary work or on such 
duties as storemen, batmen, 
cooks, orderlies, sanitary duties 
etc.  Also, if a skilled 
tradesman, fit to work at their 
trades. 
D Temporarily unfit 
for service in 
categories A or B, 
but likely to become 
fit within six 
months, and 
meanwhile either: 
(i) In Command Depots 
(ii) In Regimental Depots 
(iii) In any unit under or awaiting 
medical or dental treatment (who 
on completion of treatment will 
rejoin their own original category). 
 
E Unfit for service 
in categories A or B 
and not likely to 
become fit within 
six months. 
Awaiting discharge, re-
classification or invaliding home 
from abroad. 
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Appendix 5 – Military Service Acts 1916 – 1918 
 
Act Date 
Passed 
Appointed 
Date 
Provisions 
1916    
An Act to make 
provision with respect to 
Military Service in 
connexion (sic) with the 
present War. 
Military Service Act, 
19169 
27 
January 
1916 
 
2 March 
1916 
 Conscripts all male British 
subjects both  resident in 
Great Britain and aged 18 – 
40 on 15 August 1915 and 
who were unmarried or 
childless widowers on 2 
November 1915 
 Provisions for certificates of 
exemption 
 Schedule 1: Exceptions 
 Schedule 2: Constitution of 
Tribunals 
 
An Act to make further 
provision with respect to 
Military Service during 
the present War. 
Military Service Act 
(No 2) 191610 
25 May 
1916 
 
24 June 
1916 
 Conscripts every male British 
subject resident in Great 
Britain since 14 August 1915 
aged 18 – 40 from the 
‘appointed date’. 
 Prolongs expiring terms of 
service for the duration of the 
war.   
 Modifies exceptions 
contained in the previous Act. 
 Provisions relating to 
certificates of exemption 
 Authorises transfers of 
officers and men of the TF 
without their consent to 
another Corps and/or their 
posting to regular units of 
their own or the Corps to 
which they are transferred. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
9 Public General Acts, 5&6 Geo 5 (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1916), Chapter 104. 
10 Public General Acts, 6&7 Geo 5 (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1916), Chapter 15. 
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1917 
An Act to enable the 
exception from Military 
Service of Men excepted 
on the ground of previous 
rejection, or the previous 
relinquishment of, or 
discharge from, Naval or 
Military Service, or 
unsuitability for Foreign 
Service, to be reviewed. 
Military Service 
(Review of Exceptions) 
Act, 191711 
5 April 
1917 
  Enabled the call up for 
examination of certain 
categories of men excepted 
under the 1916 MSAs: TF 
soldiers not suited for foreign 
service; men previously 
discharged from Services on 
grounds of disablement or ill-
health; men previously 
rejected on any grounds.  
 Did not apply to agricultural 
workers employed on work 
certified to be of national 
importance or to men 
disabled as a result of wounds 
received during the present 
war. 
An Act to enable His 
Majesty in Council to 
carry into effect 
conventions which may 
be made with Allied and 
other States as to the 
mutual liability of His 
Majesty’s subjects and 
subjects of the Allied and 
other States to military 
service. 
Military Service 
(Conventions with 
Allied States) Act, 
191712 
10 July 
1917 
30 days after 
the Order in 
Council 
applying the 
Act  
 Allows for conscription of 
British subjects living abroad 
and of Allied citizens in 
Britain. 
 Convention signed with 
Russia (July) and with 
France (October). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
11 Public General Acts, 7&8 Geo 5 (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1918), Chapter 12. 
12 Public General Acts, 7&8 Geo 5 (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1918), Chapter 26. 
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1918 
An Act to repeal 
subsection (3) of section 
three of the Military 
Service Act 1916 and to 
provide for the 
cancellation of 
certificates of exemption 
from military service 
granted on occupational 
grounds. 
Military Service Act, 
191813 
6 
February 
1918 
6 February 
1918  
 On the expiration of 
certificates of exemption, 
only two weeks now allowed 
before the man is deemed to 
have been enlisted.   
 Enables Director General of 
National Service to withdraw 
certificates of exemption 
granted on occupational 
grounds at any time by order. 
Applies to any certificates of 
exemption granted on 
occupational grounds by 
tribunals or Government 
Departments.  Effective from 
fourteen days after the order, 
providing neither House of 
Parliament has objected 
within that period.  
 
An Act to make further 
provision with respect to 
Military Service during 
the present war. 
Military Service (No 2) 
Act, 191814 
18 April 
1918 
18 April 
1918 
 Extension of conscription to 
men aged 41 to 50 
 Allows for extension of the 
age limit to 55 by Order in 
Council 
 Allows for extension of 
conscription to Ireland by 
Order in Council.   
 Enables provisions as to 
applications for certificates of 
exemption and as to calling 
up. 
 Power by proclamation to 
withdraw certificates of 
exemption in case of national 
emergency.   
 Penalty for avoidance or 
assisting the avoidance of 
service: up to six months 
imprisonment, with or 
without hard labour. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Public General Acts, 7&8 Geo 5 (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1918), Chapter 66. 
14 Public General Acts, 8&9 Geo 5 (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode , 1918), Chapter 5. 
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Appendix 6 - Abstract from Directed letter from AG2 to 
Haig dated 3 November 1917.15 
(Included to show how manpower numbers were calculated.) 
   
The letter informs Haig of ‘the following facts in regard to Manpower for the next twelve 
months so far as concerns units other than those belonging to the Overseas Dominions’. 
During the coming year:  
 It was estimated that 110,000 men would be needed for new units: expansion of RFC 
48,000; artillery approx. 40,000; remainder MGC, Tanks and Military Railways. 
 DGNS calculated that possibly 20,000 A men will be drawn from the Army for civil 
work; a further 80,000 be set aside to meet the wastage in arms other than infantry  
 Therefore 210,000 men would be deducted from the numbers that can be made 
available for the Infantry. 
 
Assuming that wastage for the year commencing 1 November 1917 would be the same as the 
previous year, drafting prospects for the Infantry between 1 November 1917 – 31 October 
1918 appeared to be: 
 
Ai, Aii and Aiv men in hand who will become available    163,000 
Returned EF men becoming fit       250,000 
           413,000 
New recruits DGNS hopes to provide       275,000
  
Total           688,000 
 
Less the figures noted earlier        210,000 
 
Numbers available for Inf drafts up to 31 Oct 18 all theatres   478,000
     
Wastage in France up to October 1918 likely to be     782,000 
Plus current deficit against establishment        75,000 
Total           857,000 
 
Therefore deficit         379,000 
(Does not include estimated numbers required to make good Infantry wastage in other 
theatres (60,000)) 
 
Towards the deficit it was thought likely that 180,000 would become available from sick and 
wounded men becoming fit in France – reducing the total deficit to 259,000 
 
It was also estimated that 140,000 men would be sent from Home to France by 1 April 1918 
to which could be added an estimated 15,000 per month returning from hospitals in France 
making an anticipated total deficit up to 1 April of 215,000. 
  
                                                 
15 BOH 1918 Vol. 1, Appendix 3: War Office letter from AG2 (signed Corcoran) to Haig dated 3 November 
1917. 
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Appendix 7 – Re-organizations/Movements and Arrivals of Marches 
Battalions on the Western Front during 191816 
 
Regiment/ 
Battalions 
1 January 
191817 
Occurrences During 1918 11 November 
1918 
  February 1918 Rest of 1918  
Cheshire     
1st  Italy: 
15th Bde/5th 
Div 
 April: returned 
to France  
15th Bde/5th 
Div; France  
1/4th (TF) Egypt:53rd 
Div 
 From Egypt: 1 
July to 102nd 
Bde/34th Div  
102nd Bde/34th 
Div; Belgium 
1/5th (TF) 56th Div; 
Pioneer  
  56th Div; 
Belgium,  
1/6th (TF) 118th Bde/39th 
Div   
6 Feb: absorbed 5 
officers + 100 
men from 16th 
Cheshire;  
28 May to 75th 
Bde/25th Div; 17 
June absorbed 
16 officers & 
492 men from 
11th Cheshire; 8 
Jul to 21st 
Bde/30th Div 
21st Bde/30th 
Div; Belgium  
1/7th (TF)  Egypt:53rd 
Div 
 From Egypt; 1 
July to 102nd 
Bde/34th Div  
102nd Bde/34th 
Div; Belgium 
9th (Service) 58th Bde/19th 
Div 
Feb: moved to 
reconstituted 56th 
Bde 
June absorbed 
personnel from 
10th Cheshire 
56th Bde/19th 
Div; France 
10th (Service)  7th Bde/25th 
Div 
Feb: absorbed 
personnel from 
13th Cheshire;  
21 Jun reduced 
to cadre; 
personnel to 9th 
Cheshire;  
 
11th (Service)  7th Bde/25th 
Div 
Feb: absorbed 
personnel from 
13th Cheshire;  
17 Jun reduced 
to cadre; 
personnel to 
1/6th Cheshire; 3 
Aug disbanded 
in France 
 
13th (Service)  74th Bde/25th 
Div 
16 Feb: – 
disbanded in 
France; personnel 
to 10th & 11th 
Cheshire 
 
  
                                                 
16 Brigadier E.A. James. British Regiments 1914-18 (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 1998). 
17 Battalions in France or Flanders unless otherwise stated.  
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Regiment/ 
Battalions 
1 January 
1918 
Occurrences During 1918 11 November 
1918 
15th (Service)  105th Bde/35th 
Div  
6 Feb: absorbed 
15 officers + 310 
men of 16th 
Cheshire 
 
 
 105th Bde/35th 
Div; Belgium  
16th (Service)  105th Bde/35th 
Div 
6 Feb: disbanded; 
5 officers + 100 
men to 1/6th 
Cheshire; 15 
officers + 310 
men to 15th 
Cheshire;  rest to 
II Corps 
Reinforcement 
Camp – later to 
12th Entrenching 
Battalion   
  
23rd (TF) At Home: 
224th 
Bde/Garrison 
Guard 
Battalion 
 May to France: 
178th Bde/59th 
Div; June joined 
121st Bde/40th 
Div 
121st Bde/40th 
Div; 
France 
     
RWF     
1st Italy: 
22nd Bde/7th 
Div 
  22nd Bde/7th 
Div; Italy 
2nd  19th Bde/33rd 
Div 
6 Feb: to 115th 
Bde/38th (Welsh) 
Div 
 115th Bde/38th 
(Welsh) Div; 
France 
1/4th (TF) 47th Div; 
Pioneer 
  47th Div; 
Pioneer; 
Belgium 
9th (Service) 58th Bde/19th 
Div 
Feb: absorbed 5 
officers + 147 
men from 10th 
RWF 
 58th Bde/19th 
Div; France 
10th (Service) 76th Bde/3rd 
Div 
8 Feb: disbanded; 
5 officers + 147 
men to 9th RWF; 
others to 8th 
Entrenching 
Battalion 
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Regiment/ 
Battalions 
1 January 
1918 
Occurrences During 1918 11 November 
1918 
13th (Service) 
(1st North 
Wales) 
113th Bde/38th 
(Welsh) Div 
  113th Bde/38th 
(Welsh) Div; 
France 
14th (Service)  113th Bde/38th 
(Welsh) Div 
 
 
  113th Bde/38th 
(Welsh) Div;  
15th (Service) 
(1st London 
Welsh) 
113th Bde/38th 
(Welsh) Div 
Feb: disbanded; 
men used to 
reinforce other 
battalions in 38th 
Division 
  
16th (Service) 113th Bde/38th 
(Welsh) Div 
  113th Bde/38th 
(Welsh) Div; 
France 
17th (Service) 
(2nd North 
Wales) 
113th Bde/38th 
(Welsh) Div 
  113th Bde/38th 
(Welsh) Div; 
France 
19th (Service)  110th Bde/40th 
Div 
6 Feb: disbanded; 
men  to 8th 
Entrenching 
Battalion 
  
24th 
(Denbighshire 
Yeomanry) (TF)  
Egypt:  
231st Bde/74th 
Div 
 May: to France; 
21 June joined 
94th Bde/31st 
Div 
94th Bde/31st 
Div; 
France 
25th 
(Montgomery & 
Welsh Horse 
Yeomanry) (TF) 
Egypt: 
231st Bde/74th 
Div 
 May: to France;  231st Bde/74th 
Div; Belgium 
26th (Service) 4th Garrison 
Guard 
Battalion 
 May: to 176th 
Bde/59th Div; 
July became 26th 
RWF 
 
176th Bde/59th 
Div; Belgium 
     
SWB     
1st 3rd Bde/1st 
Div 
Feb: received 100 
men from 12th 
SWB 
 3rd Bde/1st 
Div; France 
2nd 87th Bde/29th 
Div 
Feb: received 100 
men from 12th 
SWB 
 87th Bde/29th 
Div; Belgium 
5th (Service) 19th Div; 
Pioneer 
Feb: received 50 
men from 12th 
SWB 
 19th Div; 
Pioneer; 
France 
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Regiment/ 
Battalions 
1 January 
1918 
Occurrences During 1918 11 November 
1918 
6th (Service) 25th Div; 
Pioneer 
 2 July: to 30th 
Div as Pioneers 
30th Div; 
Pioneer; 
Belgium 
10th (Service) 
(1st Gwent) 
115th Bde/38th 
Div 
  115th Bde/38th 
Div; 
France 
11th (Service) 
(2nd Gwent) 
115th Bde/38th 
Div 
Feb: disbanded; 
men reinforced  
battalions in 38th 
Div 
  
12th (Service) 
(3rd Gwent) 
119th Bde/40th 
Div 
10 Feb: 
disbanded; 50 
men to 5th SWB; 
100 men each to 
1st & 2nd SWB; 
remainder to 9th 
Entrenching Bn 
together with 
remnants of 11th 
King’s Own and 
19th Welch 
  
     
KSLI     
1st 16th Bde/6th 
Div 
Feb: received men 
from 5th KSLI 
 16th Bde/6th 
Div;  
France 
1/4th (TF) 190th 
Bde/63rd Div 
4 Feb: to 56th 
Bde/19th Div; 
received men from 
5th KSLI 
 56th Bde/19th 
Div; France 
5th (Service) 42nd Bde/14th 
Div 
4 Feb: disbanded; 
personnel to 1st, 
1/4th, 6th and 7th 
KSLI 
  
6th (Service) 60th Bde/20th 
Div 
Feb: received men 
from 5th KSLI 
 60th Bde/20th 
Div; 
France 
7th (Service) 8th Bde/3rd 
Div 
Feb: received men 
from 5th KSLI 
 8th Bde//3rd 
Div;  
France 
10th (Shropshire 
& Cheshire 
Yeomanry) 
Egypt: 
231st Bde/74th 
Div 
 May: to France;  231st Bde/74th 
Div; Belgium 
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Regiment/ 
Battalions 
1 January 
1918 
Occurrences During 1918 11 November 
1918 
Monmouthshire     
1/1st (TF) 46th Div: 
Pioneer 
  46th Div: 
Pioneer; 
France 
1/2nd (TF) 29th Div: 
Pioneer 
  29th Div: 
Pioneer; 
Belgium 
Herefordshire     
1/1st (TF) Egypt: 53rd 
Div 
 From Egypt; 30 
June to 102nd 
Bde/34th Div 
102nd Bde/34th 
Div; Belgium 
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